Finally, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, as a court is required to do on a motion for summary judgment (Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 73 N.Y.2d 183, 194; Crosland v. New York City Tr. Auth., 68 N.Y.2d 165, 168, n 2), the homeowner's involvement went beyond the mere expression of dissatisfaction and demands for timely completion of the work. The direction to reuse old planking rather than install new plywood was a material contributing factor in plaintiff's injury, and the degree of interference thus implicates both "direction as to the manner of the performance of the work by the injured work[er]" and direction as to use of materials supplied by her, even without direction as to the manner of performance (Galbraith v. Pike Son, 18 A.D.2d 39, 43, citingMendes v. Caristo Constr. Corp., 5 A.D.2d 268, 270, affd 6 N.Y.2d 729;cf., Sanna v. Potter, 179 A.D.2d 982, 983, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 758 [no evidence any materials supplied by defendants contributed to accident]). Under the circumstances of this case, defects in the materials that the homeowner supplied and her insistence upon the use of the materials in the performance of the project raise questions of fact as to her direction and control of the work within the contemplation of Labor Law § 240(1).

New York law, applicable in this diversity suit, sustains the availability of the single-family owner exception except where supervision of the manner or method of performance of work was undertaken. Duda v. John W. Rouse Construction, 32 N.Y.2d 405, 345 N.Y.S.2d 524, 298 N.E.2d 667 (1973); Kelly v. Bruno and Son, Inc., 190 A.D.2d 777, 593 N.Y.S.2d 555 (2d Dept. 1993); Sanna v. Potter, 179 A.D.2d 982, 579 N.Y.S.2d 472 (3d Dept. 1992). Surprise imposition of strict liability, which would discourage homeowners from making home improvements because of fear of lawsuits if they made requests or criticisms to contractors or handled purchasing of materials and obtained building approvals, is disfavored. Spinillo v. Strober, 192 A.D.2d 515, 595 N.Y.S.2d 825 (2d Dept. 1993). There is no indication that Mr. Freedman acted as a construction contractor, rather than attorney for and assistant to his wife, the title holder.

Decided September 17, 1992 Appeal from (3d Dept: 179 A.D.2d 982) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED OR DENIED

In his affidavit, plaintiff averred that he and defendant had discussions about work orders, logistics, materials and the architectural drawings, that defendant checked in with him on a daily basis, that defendant told him where to park during work hours and to lock a gate at the conclusion of the workday, that defendant changed the stairs and windows to be used for the house and changed the placement of a fireplace and that defendant moved rocks and applied tape to plywood at the construction site. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, however, this evidence does not indicate that defendant directed or controlled the manner of plaintiff's work (seeSnyder v. Gnall, 57 A.D.3d 1289, 1291, 870 N.Y.S.2d 562 [2008] ; Sanna v. Potter, 179 A.D.2d 982, 983, 579 N.Y.S.2d 472 [1992], lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 758, 589 N.Y.S.2d 308, 602 N.E.2d 1124 [1992] ; Sotire v. Buchanan, 150 A.D.2d 971, 972, 541 N.Y.S.2d 873 [1989] ). Critically, there was no evidence indicating that defendant directed plaintiff on how to install the floor joists or to climb onto them as part of the installation process (seeKammerer v. Baskewicz, 257 A.D.2d 811, 812, 684 N.Y.S.2d 30 [1999] ; Douglas v. Beckstein, 210 A.D.2d 680, 682, 619 N.Y.S.2d 396 [1994] ; Valentia v. Giusto, 182 A.D.2d 987, 989, 581 N.Y.S.2d 939 [1992] ).

At most, the evidence presented by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment demonstrated that the defendants, particularly Judith Rodriguez, monitored the progress of the work, approved the aesthetics of the work, such as grout texture and color, and oversaw the work's general quality, such as the straightness and angles of stone and masonry. A homeowner's involvement in these areas reflects typical homeowner interest in the ongoing progress of the work and does not constitute the kind of direction or control necessary to overcome the homeowner's exemption from liability ( see Affri v Bosch, 45 AD3d 615, 616; Arama v Fruchter, 39 AD3d 678, 679; Edgar v Montechiari, 271 AD2d 396, 397; McGuiness v Contemporary Interiors, 205 AD2d 739, 740; Spinillo v Strober Long Is. Bldg. Material Ctrs., 192 AD2d 515, 516; Sanna v Potter, 179 AD2d 982, 983). Even assuming that the defendants did loan the short ladder to the plaintiff, it was not equivalent to directing or controlling the work and could not serve as a predicate for liability outside of the homeowners' exemption ( see Stone v Altarac, 305 AD2d 849, 850; Miller v Trudeau, 270 AD2d 683).

The defendants established, as a matter of law, that they did not exercise any direction or control over the manner or method of the work being performed ( see Duarte v East Hills Constr. Corp., 274 AD2d 493, 494). The evidence showed that the defendants' instruction to the plaintiff related to the aesthetic appearance of the home, which does not constitute the kind of control necessary to overcome the statutory exemption from liability ( see Sanna v Potter, 179 AD2d 982), nor does the inspection of the work as it progresses constitute the requisite direction or control necessary for the imposition of liability ( see Spinillo v Strober Long Is. Bldg. Material Ctrs., 192 AD2d 515, 516). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants were exempt from liability.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was liable under Labor Law §§ 200 and 240 (1). The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding his allegation that the defendant exercised supervision and control over the work, and, therefore, there is no basis for liability under Labor Law § 200 (see, Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290; McGuinness v. Contemporary Interiors, 205 A.D.2d 739; Patterson v. Pasa, 203 A.D.2d 866; Sanna v. Potter, 179 A.D.2d 982). Further, as the owner of a single family dwelling who neither directed nor controlled the work on the property, the defendant was exempted from strict liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) (see, Lombardi v. Stout, supra; Porrata v. Pomareda, 236 A.D.2d 379; McGuinness v. Contemporary Interiors, supra).

We agree with the determination of the Supreme Court that the defendant did not direct or control the manner in which the plaintiff worked on the defendant's one-family home. Therefore, the defendant is exempt from liability pursuant to Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 ( see, Kostyj v Babiarz, 212 AD2d 1010; Douglas v Beckstein, 210 AD2d 680; Patterson v Pasa, 203 AD2d 866; Stephens v Tucker, 184 AD2d 828). Inasmuch as there was no evidence that the ladder supplied by defendant was defective, the court also properly dismissed the plaintiffs causes of action based on common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 ( see, Douglas v Beckstein, supra; Reyes v Silfies, 168 AD2d 979; see also, Sanna v Potter, 179 AD2d 982). We have considered the plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.

A jury verdict must be based on more than mere speculation or guesswork. Where there are several possible causes of an injury, for one of which the defendant is not responsible, and it is just as probable that the injury was the result of one cause as the other, the plaintiff cannot recover without proving the injury was sustained wholly or in part by a cause for which the defendant was responsible ( see, Bernstein v City of New York, 69 NY2d 1020, 1021-1022). Accordingly, absent some competent evidence, such as expert testimony establishing causation, the slipping of the ladder, in and of itself, was insufficient to show that the defendants were negligent in furnishing an unsafe or inadequate ladder ( see, Dougherty v Milliken, 163 NY 527, 532; Sanna v Potter, 179 AD2d 982, 983). Moreover, the court properly found that the arrangement between Howerter and Dugan did not constitute a compensable hiring under Labor Law § 200. Although without Howerter's efforts the defendants would have had to pay someone to remove the trees, the Labor Law provisions relied on by the plaintiffs are inapplicable to persons such as friends and neighbors who voluntarily render casual assistance to a homeowner in performing a home repair or construction job ( see, Mordkofsky v V.C.V. Dev. Corp., 76 NY2d 573, 577; Whelen v Warwick Val. Civic Social Club, 47 NY2d 970, 971; Alver v Duarte, 80 AD2d 182, 183; Yearke v Zarcone, 57 AD2d 457, 461).

In addition, Krawczyk apparently made several other decisions about the work, requesting that moisture resistant sheetrock be used in the bathrooms and that the kitchen be completed before the remainder of the job. Alone, input of this latter type is insufficient to impose liability because it is akin to the scheduling and quality decisions ordinarily made by homeowners, which does not equate to the sort of direction and control contemplated by these provisions of the Labor Law ( see, Kostyj v Babiarz, 212 A.D.2d 1010, 1011; Sanna v Potter, 179 A.D.2d 982, 983, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 758); nevertheless, as part of an overall pattern of interaction between Krawczyk and the various workers engaged to build this house, it cannot be entirely discounted ( see, Chura v Baruzzi, 192 A.D.2d 918, 918-919; Ennis v Hayes, 152 A.D.2d 914, 915). Hence, summary judgment should not have been granted to either party, at least on the issue of Thomas Krawczyk's liability. Plaintiffs have, however, acknowledged that Denise Krawczyk did not direct or control the work, and there is no record evidence to the contrary; accordingly, the complaint as against her should have been dismissed. As for the other issues raised by defendants as alternative grounds for denying plaintiffs' motion, they too involve disputed factual issues which cannot be resolved at this juncture.