Opinion
15-73018
05-23-2022
MALKEET SINGH SANHOTRA, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A205-169-773
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Malkeet Singh Sanhotra, a native and citizen of India, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's ("IJ") decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency's factual findings. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that the harm Sanhotra experienced in India, even considered cumulatively, did not rise to the level of persecution. See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Persecution . . . is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We reject as unsupported by the record Sanhotra's contentions that the agency failed to adequately explain its reasoning or otherwise erred in its analysis.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency's determination that Sanhotra failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution in India. See id. at 1018 (possibility of future persecution "too speculative").
Thus, Sanhotra's asylum claim fails. Because Sanhotra failed to establish eligibility for asylum, in this case, he did not establish eligibility for withholding of removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency's denial of CAT relief because Sanhotra failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to India. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not address Sanhotra's remaining contentions because the BIA did not reach these issues in denying relief, see Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) ("In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), and Sanhotra does not argue that the BIA erred by deciding his case without reaching those issues, see Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party's opening brief are waived). To the extent Sanhotra now contends changed country conditions make him eligible for asylum-related relief, he may raise this claim in a motion to reopen filed with the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
Sanhotra's motion to supplement the record on appeal (Docket Entry No. 9) is denied. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (the court's review is limited to the administrative record).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).