Opinion
F042752.
7-15-2003
Sandra F., in pro. per., for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Phillip S. Cronin, County Counsel, and W. Richard Bailey, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
THE COURT
Before Dibiaso, Acting P.J., Buckley, J. and Wiseman, J.
Petitioner, in pro. per., seeks extraordinary writ review (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 39.1B) of respondent courts order that a section 366.26 hearing be held on July 25, 2003, as to her daughter R. We will deny the petition.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Petitioner has an extensive history of drug abuse and drug-related offenses. In March 1999, her then two-year-old daughter, R., was removed from her custody after R. was found with severe head lice and without proper care or nutrition. The social services department (department) filed a dependency petition on R.s behalf pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) and placed R. with her maternal great-aunt. The juvenile court subsequently assumed dependency jurisdiction and ordered a plan of reunification.
In December 1999, the court terminated reunification services for petitioner and set the matter for permanency planning. In September 2000, the court ordered a permanent plan of guardianship for R. with her maternal great-aunt. At that time, petitioner was incarcerated and not expected to be released for several years. The court further ordered reasonable visitation at the great-aunts discretion.
Guardianship proved to be an appropriate placement for R. and petitioner maintained contact with her by writing and calling her on the telephone. In March 2003, the department advised the court R.s great-aunt wanted to adopt her and recommended the court set the matter for permanency planning. On March 21, 2003, the court set a section 366.26 hearing to determine the most appropriate plan for R.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues there was no attempt to facilitate reunification, citing the fact she received only one visit with R. since her incarceration in June 1999. Petitioner is correct. Any efforts by the court to facilitate reunification ceased in 1999 when the court terminated reunification services. Once services are terminated, the focus shifts from reunification of the family to permanency planning for the child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309, 851 P.2d 826.)
Moreover, petitioner waived her right to challenge the courts order terminating reunification services by failing to timely appeal from the termination order. (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.) She also waived appellate review of the courts visitation order by failing to directly appeal from the order. Further, to the extent petitioner seeks to reinstate reunification services or modify the visitation order, she must do so through the juvenile court by way of a section 388 petition.
Section 388 allows the parent of a child adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court to petition the court to change, modify or set aside any order upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.
Finally, to the extent petitioner challenges the courts order setting the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court acted within its discretion by doing so. Section 366.3, subdivision (c) provides in relevant part"If, following the establishment of a legal guardianship, the county welfare department becomes aware of changed circumstances that indicate adoption may be an appropriate plan for the child, the department shall so notify the court. The court may vacate its previous order dismissing dependency jurisdiction over the child and order that a hearing be held pursuant to Section 366.26...."
After four years of caring for R., the great-aunt offered her permanency through adoption. In light of the changed circumstances and the legislative preference for adoption, the court properly set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.