Opinion
NO. 01-17-00531-CR
06-12-2018
ROBERTO SANDOVAL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 299th District Court Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. D-1-DC-15-207036
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Self-defense is a justification defense. A defendant's conduct is justified by necessity, necessitating the self-defense. Therefore, a defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction only when the defendant admits the alleged acts of the offense. In a prosecution for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a member of the defendant's household, defendant Roberto Sandoval testified that the complaining witness attacked Sandoval with a knife and that the two engaged in a struggle during the attack. However, Sandoval testified repeatedly and uniformly that he never held, or injured the complaining witness with, the knife. Sandoval also elicited no testimony suggesting that he injured the complaining witness with the knife. Because Sandoval did not admit the charged conduct, he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. We affirm.
Background
Roberto Sandoval lived in one of four bedrooms in a single-family home in Austin. D. Chapman and her boyfriend lived in one of the other four rooms. One afternoon, Sandoval, Chapman, Chapman's boyfriend, and Chapman's friend were in the home's fenced backyard cooking and drinking alcohol. At one point, Chapman's boyfriend escorted Chapman's friend inside to show her where the bathroom was, leaving only Chapman and Sandoval in the backyard.
Sandoval filed this appeal in the Court of Appeals of Texas for the Third Court of Appeals District, but the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this court. Misc. Docket No. 17-9066 (Tex. June 20, 2017); see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013) (authorizing such transfer); id. § 73.002(a) (granting jurisdiction of transferred case to court to which case is transferred). We therefore "must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if [this] court's decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court." TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. We are unaware of any conflict between the Third Court of Appeals' precedent and that of this court on any relevant issue. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 500 S.W.3d 106, 112 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
Chapman's and Sandoval's testimony disagreed about what happened next. According to Chapman, Sandoval propositioned her for sex. She responded like she had to all his previous propositioning—"No." Sandoval then went to the kitchen, which was just inside the back door; grabbed a knife; and returned to the backyard. Sandoval attacked Chapman with the knife, slicing her several times before her boyfriend could respond to her screams for help. When the boyfriend returned, Sandoval dropped the knife, fled the backyard, and was apprehended a block and a half away. Blood pooled beneath Chapman in the backyard. The police officer that apprehended Sandoval photographed the large reddish-brown stains on Sandoval's shirt and jeans. Chapman's wounds were near-fatal, but she survived.
Sandoval testified that it was actually Chapman who grabbed the knife from the kitchen and attacked him. He told the jury that he struggled with Chapman to fend off her attack and eventually wrestled her to the ground. Crucially, he told the jury numerous times, on both direct and cross-examination, that he never held the knife, that he never cut Chapman during their struggle, and that he did not see any blood at all before he left the backyard.
At the charge conference, Sandoval's counsel objected to the proposed charge because it lacked a self-defense instruction and requested that the court add such an instruction. The trial court refused.
The jury believed Chapman. Sandoval was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a member of his household, two enhancement allegations were found to be true, and Sandoval was assessed punishment at twenty-five years' imprisonment.
Refusal to Instruct the Jury on Self-Defense
In his sole issue, Sandoval contends that the trial court erred by refusing his request for a self-defense instruction. He contends that his testimony about his struggle with Chapman entitled him to the instruction.
I. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense for an abuse of discretion. Steele v. State, 490 S.W.3d 117, 130 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Castro v. State, No. 03-10-00266-CR, 2011 WL 3796104, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Claimed error in the jury charge is reviewed under a two-step procedure. Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh'g)). First, we determine whether there is error in the charge. Barrios, 283 S.W.3d at 350. If there is error, then we proceed to a harm analysis. See id.; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.
When instructing the jury on defensive issues, the general rule is that a defendant is "entitled to an instruction on any defensive issue raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is weak or strong, unimpeached or contradicted, and regardless of the trial court's opinion about the credibility of the defense." VanBrackle v. State, 179 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). "In deciding whether a defensive theory is raised, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the defense." Id. at 713; accord Steele, 490 S.W.3d at 130.
A particular application of the general rule governs defenses like self-defense. See VanBrackle, 179 S.W.3d at 715. A defendant is not entitled to a self-defense instruction if the defendant claims, through either the defendant's testimony or others', that the defendant "did not perform the assaultive acts alleged, or that he did not have the requisite culpable mental state, or both." Id. "If a defendant . . . categorically denies that he even touched the victim of an alleged assault, he has engaged in no conduct which needs justifying. He has essentially denied that the alleged criminal act ever took place." Id. The defendant must admit to every element of the offense. See Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); In re E.O.E., 508 S.W.3d 613, 621 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).
So when all of the defensive evidence is "to the effect that the defendant did not commit the alleged acts," a self-defense instruction is not warranted "because there [i]s no evidence that he acted in self-defense." VanBrackle, 179 S.W.3d at 715 (emphasis in original); accord Barrett v. State, No. 12-16-00289-CR, 2018 WL 525330, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 24, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op).
II. A self-defense instruction was not warranted because Sandoval denied injuring Chapman with the knife or even holding the knife.
Sandoval testified that he did not cause Chapman's injuries with the knife because he never held the knife. Specifically, he testified that he "never had the knife," that he "never held" the knife, and that Chapman "had it the whole time." He continued: "I didn't have no knife," "I didn't get the knife," "I didn't touch the knife," and "I didn't have the knife." Throughout his testimony, Sandoval described the knife as only in Chapman's hands or on the ground until he left the backyard. He testified that he never took the knife away from Chapman after she began attacking him. He elicited no other testimony suggesting that he ever held the knife or injured Chapman with it. Therefore, the defensive evidence is "to the effect that the defendant did not commit the alleged acts," precluding a self-defense instruction. See VanBrackle, 179 S.W.3d at 715; see also Barrett, 2018 WL 525330, at *3. In other words, since Sandoval did not admit all the elements of the charged offense, the jury charge's lack of a self-defense instruction was not error. See Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 659; In re E.O.E., 508 S.W.3d at 621.
Sandoval responds that his testimony "that he struggled with" Chapman and "that he struggled and used force against" Chapman entitled him to a self-defense instruction. However, notwithstanding his testimony about a struggle, Sandoval still maintained that he did not commit the act of injuring Chapman with the knife. He testified that he "didn't cut her" during their struggle and that he "didn't cut that woman." And he proposed that, if Chapman had been cut during their struggle, he would have seen the extensive blood at the scene but that he did not see any blood. Sandoval testified that, as far as he knew, when he left the backyard Chapman was uninjured. Sandoval continually denied injuring Chapman with the knife, so his testimony about their struggle did not entitle him to a self-defense instruction. See Barrett, 2018 WL 525330, at *3; VanBrackle, 179 S.W.3d at 715.
Finally, Sandoval relies on Boget v. State, 74 S.W.3d 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), for the proposition that the key inquiry in evaluating whether the law of self-defense applies in a case is whether the defendant directed his force against another. He contends that this proposition renders his "struggle" testimony sufficient to have warranted a self-defense instruction.
Sandoval's characterization of Boget confuses what is necessary to support a self-defense instruction with what is sufficient. The Court of Criminal Appeals in Boget resolved whether self-defense may justify the defendant's use of force when the defendant is not charged with an offense involving use of force against a person. 74 S.W.3d at 24, 31. Boget was charged with criminal mischief for damaging Palacios's truck's windows. Id. at 24-25. Boget elicited testimony that Palacios was trying to run him over with her truck when he broke the windows. Id. at 25-26. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Boget was entitled to a self-defense instruction, overruling prior authority that limited self-defense to prosecutions involving assaultive offenses. Id. at 31. The decision clarified that the conduct alleged, rather than the offense charged, establishes what is necessary to support a self-defense instruction, not what evidence is sufficient to justify such an instruction because the evidence admits all the elements of the offense.
We hold that Sandoval's repeated testimony that he never held the knife and that he never injured Chapman with it, notwithstanding his testimony about their "struggle," precluded a self-defense instruction. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by refusing the instruction. We overrule Sandoval's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Russell Lloyd
Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Lloyd. Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).