See State v. Mann , 2002-NMSC-001, ¶ 17, 131 N.M. 459, 39 P.3d 124 ("[The appellate courts] will not overturn a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial unless the trial court abused its discretion."); Hanberry v. Fitzgerald , 1963-NMSC-100, ¶ 2, 72 N.M. 383, 384 P.2d 256 (applying an abuse of discretion standard for the review of an appellant's "claim that the verdict [was] excessive, requiring a remittitur or a new trial"); Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. (Jose Sandoval ), 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791 ("The applicable standard in reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial or remittitur is [an] abuse of discretion."). "[The] trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is contrary to logic and reason."
"The district court has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for new trial, and such an order will not be reversed absent clear and manifest abuse of that discretion." Saenz v. Ranack Constructors, Inc. , 2018-NMSC-032, ¶ 19, 420 P.3d 576 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations , Inc. , 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791 ("[T]he denial of a motion for a new trial or remittitur is [reviewed for an] abuse of discretion."). An abuse of discretion occurs when the lower court's decision is contrary to law, logic, or reason.
Under New Mexico law, "[a] party seeking to recover damages has the burden of proving the existence of injuries and resulting damage with reasonable certainty." Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 146 N.M. 853, 860, 215 P.3d 791, 798 (Ct. App. 2009). The "reasonable certainty" standard thus means that
The amount of damages ultimately awarded "'necessarily rests with the good sense and deliberate judgment of the tribunal assigned by law to ascertain what is just compensation[;] . . . each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.'" Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA-095, ¶18, 146 N.M. 853, 858, 215 P.3d 791, 796 (quoting Sandoval v. Chrysler Corp., 1998-NMCA-085, ¶13, 125 N.M. 292, 296, 960 P.2d 834, 838). Surveying typical damages awards in similar cases is generally not useful to the determination of an appropriate damages award. Id. (observing that "[w]e are skeptical about the usefulness of comparing awards for pain and suffering in other cases.")(citations omitted).
It was not until the posttrial JMOL motion that Defendants argued that the evidence failed to satisfy a particular definition of "profit." See Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. , 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791 ("Generally, a motion for a new trial cannot be used to preserve issues not otherwise raised during the proceedings."). Because Defendants did not raise this legal argument before the case was submitted to the jury, we do not consider it further.
The trial judge may only substitute the judge's damages determination for the jury's if "it appears that the amount awarded is so grossly out of proportion to the injury received as to shock the conscience." Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc ., 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 20, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {71} New Mexico's "analytical framework for reviewing the grant of a remittitur[,]" Nava , 2004-NMSC-039, ¶ 16, 136 N.M. 647, 103 P.3d 571, respects the primacy of juries in determining damages.
to respond to the claim of error and to show why the court should rule against that claim, and (3) to create a record sufficient to allow this Court to make an informed decision regarding the contested issue. Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. , 2009–NMCA–095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791. {14} Here, Defendants never sought nominal damages in their answer and counterclaim; instead, Defendants' counterclaim sought "the value of the damage" caused by Plaintiffs' alleged trespass only.
“The applicable standard in reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial or remittitur is abuse of discretion.” Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009–NMCA–095, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.”
120 N.M. 191, 196–97, 900 P.2d 351, 356–57 (Ct.App.1995). Eyeglass World also relies on Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009–NMCA–095, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791, that requires, for application of the rule permitting reversal for improper closing argument, the rule “only be applied as a last resort and is not to be applied unless we are satisfied that the argument presented to the jury was so flagrant and glaring in fault and wrongdoing as to leave the bounds of ethical conduct, such as going outside the record.” Id. ¶ 57 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Neither the district court nor the Board had an opportunity to consider or rule upon the argument Henry raises on cross-appeal. See Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. , 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791 ("The primary purposes for the preservation rule are: (1) to specifically alert the district court to a claim of error so that any mistake can be corrected at that time, (2) to allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to respond to the claim of error and to show why the court should rule against that claim, and (3) to create a record sufficient to allow this Court to make an informed decision regarding the contested issue.").