Opinion
24A-CR-232
12-06-2024
Richard A. Sandlin, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court The Honorable Sarah K. Mullican, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 84D03-2209-MR-3277
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Crone, Senior Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] A jury found Richard A. Sandlin guilty of murder. On appeal, Sandlin argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense and in excluding a witness's testimony. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] The facts most favorable to Sandlin's conviction are as follows. In late August 2022, Sandlin's girlfriend, Martha Custer, told Sandlin that Donald (Don-Don) Riley had grabbed her hand and placed it on his penis. Sandlin became "upset and mad" and told Custer to file a police report. Tr. Vol. 3 at 184. Custer filed a report on August 29 and told Sandlin that she had done so, but he did not believe her. On August 31, the report was assigned to Vigo County Prosecutor's Office Investigator Brad Rumsey, who was unable to speak with Custer before he had to leave town on business.
[¶3] Around September 1, Sandlin asked his neighbor, James Brown, "[H]ave you seen that n****r? I'm ready to kill him." Tr. Vol. 2 at 139. Around 8:00 p.m. on September 3, Sandlin rode his motorcycle to the home of his friend, Charles Beauchman. Beauchman was taking a shower when Sandlin arrived, and Sandlin talked to him from outside the bathroom. Sandlin was "upset" and told Beauchman that he was going to "go beat Don-Don up." Id. at 196.
Beauchman told Sandlin, "[T]hat's stupid, don't do that," and, "[S]he ain't worth it." Id. at 197. Sandlin "had some possessions at [Beauchman's] house" and asked Beauchman to "[m]ake sure [Sandlin's] daughter got them" "if anything happened[.]" Id. When Beauchman got out of the shower, Sandlin was gone.
[¶4] Sandlin rode to the home of another friend, Brandon Orman, who was socializing with his brother Donald Orman, Brad Hayes, and Riley. The Ormans and Hayes were sitting in the living room when they heard Sandlin's motorcycle outside. Riley was in the kitchen talking to the others and getting ready to leave through the back door. When Riley opened the door, Sandlin entered the kitchen with a revolver pointed at Riley's throat. Riley retreated, put up his hands, and said, "[W]e don't need all that[.]" Id. 73. Within seconds, Sandlin shot Riley in the face, and Riley fell to the floor. The Ormans and Hayes ran out the front door, and Sandlin went out the back door. The Ormans called 911, and the police arrived within thirty seconds of receiving the dispatch. Officers found Riley dead on the kitchen floor. They also searched the back yard and alley for a weapon but did not find one.
[¶5] Between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, Sandlin arrived at Beauchman's home. Sandlin "seemed upset and nervous" and said that "he needed to talk to" Beauchman. Id. at 198, 199. Sandlin said "that he had gotten Don-Don" and that "he had to leave, because the police would be coming." Id. at 202.
[¶6] That night, Custer went to James Brown's home and talked with his wife, Lucinda Miller. Miller told Custer that she had heard that Riley had been shot. Custer called Sandlin on speakerphone. Miller heard Sandlin tell Custer, "One (1) less n****r you have to worry about on the streets." Id. at 124.
[¶7] Sandlin picked up Custer on his motorcycle and went to the home of another friend, where they stayed for several days. The friend heard that the police were looking for Sandlin and asked him to leave. On September 7, Sandlin was apprehended and taken to the Terre Haute Police Department.
[¶8] Sandlin was Mirandized and questioned by two detectives. During the interview, which was recorded, Sandlin said that he was unarmed when he went to Brandon Orman's home and that he did not know that Riley would be there. Sandlin claimed that Riley "pulled a gun on [him] as soon as [he] walked in the door." Tr. Vol. 3 at 167. According to Sandlin, he hit Riley's "hand and spun it around" and took the revolver away from him. Id. at 177. Sandlin said that he put the revolver "back in [Riley's] face .... and it went off. Okay, so [Riley] had to have the hammer already pulled back." Id. at 226. Sandlin claimed that he "didn't plan on taking [Riley's] life" and that he dropped the revolver on the ground "right outside" the back porch. Id. at 228, 186. No firearm was ever recovered.
[¶9] The State charged Sandlin with murder and level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a handgun. A four-day jury trial began on November 27, 2023. The Ormans and Hayes testified that Riley was unarmed on the night of the shooting and that there was no struggle before Sandlin shot Riley with what they described as a "silver" or "chrome" revolver. Tr. Vol. 2 at at 73, 152, 230. The recording of Sandlin's police interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. On November 29, Investigator Rumsey testified that during the previous day's lunch break, Sandlin "pointed out to [Rumsey] that had [he] done [his] job, this wouldn't have happened." Tr. Vol. 4 at 28.
[¶10] Outside the presence of the jury, Sandlin proffered testimony from longtime acquaintance Larry Chaney that approximately one week before his death, Riley tried to sell Chaney "a blue steel snub-nosed revolver with wooden handles[.]" Tr. Vol. 2 at 219. The trial court ruled that it would not admit Chaney's testimony. Sandlin also requested a self-defense instruction, and the court denied his request.
[¶11] The jury found Sandlin guilty as charged. The State moved to dismiss the handgun count, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction only on the murder count. The court sentenced Sandlin to sixty years executed. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 - The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sandlin's request for a self-defense instruction.
[¶12] After the trial court ruled on the admissibility of Chaney's testimony, the parties discussed jury instructions. The court stated, "I will obviously give ... my same instructions, definitions, all pattern instructions[.]" Tr. Vol. 4 at 46. Defense counsel stated that, in addition to an instruction on reckless homicide, he would "be seeking the self-defense instruction primarily." Id. at 47. The trial court took the matter under advisement and ultimately refused to give a self-defense instruction.
[¶13] Sandlin argues that this ruling is erroneous. The State contends that because Sandlin failed "to tender a self-defense instruction to the trial court, [he] has waived his claim of error concerning the instructions." Appellee's Br. at 13 (citing, inter alia, Ortiz v. State, 766 N.E.2d 370, 375 (Ind. 2002) ("Failure to tender an instruction results in waiver of the issue for review.")). We agree with Sandlin that it was "clear that both the court and the parties understood Sandlin's request was for the pattern jury instruction to be used." Reply Br. at 9. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver here.
[¶14] We review a trial court's refusal to give a proposed instruction for an abuse of discretion. Forte v. State, 759 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2001). We consider whether the instruction correctly states the law, whether there is evidence in the record to support it, and whether its substance is covered by other instructions. Id. "[A] defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of defense which has some foundation in the evidence." Creager v. State, 737 N.E.2d 771, 777 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied (2001). "This rule applies even if the evidence is weak and inconsistent." Id. "[O]nly a scintilla of evidence is necessary to support the giving of a self-defense instruction[.]" Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 248 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001).
[¶15] Indiana Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 10.0300 reads as follows:
It is an issue whether the Defendant acted in [self-defense] [defense of another person].
A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect (himself/herself from what he/she) or (someone else) from what the Defendant reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not have a duty to retreat, only if he/she reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary [to prevent serious bodily injury to himself/herself or a third person] [to prevent the commission of a forcible felony].
[However, a person may not use force if:
(he/she is committing a crime and there is an immediate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation_____ (use a descriptive term based on evidence to describe confrontation).
(or)
(he/she is escaping after the commission of a crime and there is an immediate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation _____ (use a descriptive term based on evidence to describe confrontation).
(or)
(he/she provokes a fight with another person with intent to cause bodily injury to that person).
(or)
(he/she has willingly entered into a fight with another person or started the fight, unless he withdraws from the fight and
communicates to the other person his intent to withdraw and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the fight).]
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not act in self-defense.
[¶16] Whether the instruction correctly states the law is not at issue, and its substance is not covered by other instructions. The question here is whether there is evidence in the record to support it. We conclude that there is not.
[¶17] Per his own version of events, Sandlin used force to protect himself from Riley, who had "pulled a gun on [him] as soon as he walked in the door[,]" by spinning Riley's hand around and taking the revolver away from him. Tr. Vol. 3 at 167. At that point, Sandlin did not need to use deadly force to protect himself from Riley. See Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Ind. 1988) ("the law of self defense is a law of necessity; the right of self-defense arises only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity; and never must the necessity be greater than when the force employed defensively is deadly") (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied)). But then Sandlin stuck the revolver in Riley's face, and, according to Sandlin, it accidentally discharged. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a self-defense instruction. See id.; see also Gunn v. State, 365 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (Ind.Ct.App. 1977) ("[S]elf-defense is available to the accused who accidentally kills his assailant while properly exerting force to assure his own safety.") (emphasis added).
Section 2 - We need not address Sandlin's argument that the trial court erred in excluding Chaney's testimony.
[¶18] Sandlin also argues that the trial court erred in excluding Chaney's testimony. Sandlin claims that the testimony "tended to show that it was ... probable that Riley had a firearm during his encounter with Sandlin" and "lent substantial credibility to Sandlin's claim that it was Riley who was the initial aggressor in [Brandon Orman's] house, and that Sandlin acted in self-defense when he wrestled the gun from Riley." Appellant's Br. at 14. Because we have determined that Sandlin was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, we need not address this argument. Consequently, we affirm his murder conviction.
[¶19] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.