See generally 49 ALR3d 13; 50 ALR3d 596; 138 ALR 500. A few states have recognized a need for statutory protection for landowners who make large investments toward developing property before applying for a building permit. See Sandler v. Bd. of Adjustment, 113 N.J. Super. 333 ( 273 A.2d 775) (1971); Harris v. Planning Commission of Ridgefield, 151 Conn. 95 ( 193 A.2d 499) (1963); Smith v. Bd. of Appeals, 339 Mass. 399 ( 159 N.E.2d 324) (1959). This 15-acre tract lies in Land Lot 328, 23rd Dist., 3rd Section, which is in the unincorporated area of Floyd County.

In our review of the statute we are compelled to give primary regard to the fundamental purpose for which it was enacted. At the same time we should strive to avoid an anomalous, unreasonable, inconceivable, or absurd result. N.J. Builders v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338 (1972); Union County Bd. of Freeholders v. Union County Park Comm'n., 41 N.J. 333, 341 (1964); Robson v. Rodriquez, 26 N.J. 517, 528 (1958); Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 113 N.J. Super. 333, 345 (App.Div. 197 1). . . . .

In our view of the statute we are compelled to give primary regard to the fundamental purpose for which it was enacted. At the same time we should strive to avoid an anamolous, unreasonable, inconceivable or absurd result. New Jersey Builders v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338 (1972); Union County Board of Freeholders v. Union County Park Commission, 41 N.J. 333, 341 (1964); Robson v. Rodriguez, 26 N.J. 517, 528 (1958); Sandler v. Springfield Township Board of Adjustment, 113 N.J. Super. 333, 345 (App.Div. 1971). [132 N.J. Super. at 433]

In my view the ancillary receiver's possession of Ambassador's New Jersey assets would lead to a result in conflict with the fundamental purpose for which the Uniform Act and our legislation was enacted. I decline to reach such an anomalous result. New Jersey Builders v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338 (1972); Union Cty. Bd. of Freeholders v. Union Cty. Park Comm., 41 N.J. 333, 341 (1964); Robson v. Rodriquez, 26 N.J. 517, 528 (1958); Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 113 N.J. Super. 333, 345 (App.Div. 1971); New Capital Bar and Grill Corp. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 25 N.J. 155, 169 (1957). Considering the underlying background and objectives of this legislation, I conclude that the construction to be accorded it should be governed by the "commonsense of the situation," Jersey City Chap. Prop. Owners v. City Council, 55 N.J. 86, 100 (1969) and that the "internal sense of the act" should control.

505 (App.Div. 1978); a use variance, Dimitrov v. Carlson, 138 N.J. Super. 52 (App.Div. 1975), certif. den. 70 N.J. 275 (1976); and a final subdivision approval, Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 113 N.J. Super. 333 (App.Div. 1971). While these decisions seem to leave open the possibility that municipal action short of the issuance of a building permit could encourage reliance and confer vested rights, they indicate that such a finding could be made only in an exceptional situation.

With varying turns of expression, the courts of New Jersey have consistently expressed the same view. E.g., Leitner v. Citizens Cas. Co., 135 N.J.L. 608, 611-612 (E. A. 1947); State v. Spindel, 24 N.J. 395, 402-403 (1957); New Capitol Bar Grill Corp. v. Employment Security Div., 25 N.J. 155, 160 (1957); Dvorkin v. Dover Tp., 29 N.J. 303, 313 (1959); State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966); J.C. Chap. Prop. Owner's Assoc. v. Jersey City Council, 55 N.J. 86, 100 (1969); Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adj., 113 N.J. Super. 333, 345 (App.Div. 1971). When confronted with words whose literal application would cause absurd, anomalous or otherwise inconceivable results, the courts must always be prepared to ask whether the "instant case involves a situation which apparently escaped the attention of the draftsman . . . or at least was one where it was felt that the situation did not require an express statutory provision."

This is even so where the municipality amends its ordinance in direct response to the application. Morris v. Postma, 41 N.J. 354, 362 (1964); Allendale Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Grosman, 30 N.J. 273, 277 (1959), app. dism. 361 U.S. 536, 80 S.Ct. 587, 4 L.Ed.2d 538 (1960); Hill Homeowners Ass'n v. Passaic, 156 N.J. Super. 505, 512 (App.Div. 1978); Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adj., 113 N.J. Super. 333 (App.Div. 197 1); Crecca v. Nucera, 52 N.J. Super. 279, 284 (App.Div. 195 8). Thus, the regulatory ordinance effective August 23 must control plaintiff's application. Subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-46 requires that the municipality notify the developer of any defect in an application for developments within 45 days of submission.

Alexander v. N.J. Power Light Co., 21 N.J. 373, 378-379 (1956). See also, Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adj., 113 N.J. Super. 333, 345 (App.Div. 1971), where, after citing Alexander, supra, the court stated "[E]ven specific language may be avoided to escape a result it would be `inconceivable' to think the Legislature intended." Statutes are to be interpreted in the light of their purpose and logic.

See also, Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 32 N.J. 448 (1960); Morris v. Postma, 41 N.J. 354 (1964); Roselle v. Moonachie, 49 N.J. Super. 35 (App.Div. 1958), reaffirming 48 N.J. Super. 17 (App.Div. 1957); Sautto v. Edenboro Apartments, Inc., 84 N.J. Super. 461 (App.Div. 1964), certif. den. 43 N.J. 353 (1964); Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adj., 113 N.J. Super. 333 (App.Div. 1971); Camparo v. Woodbridge Tp., 91 N.J. Super. 585 (App.Div. 1966), certif den. 48 N.J. 137 (1966); Annotation, "Retroactive effect of zoning regulation, in absence of saving clause, on pending application for building permit," 50 A.L.R.3d 596 (1973). As stated by the Supreme Court in the Tremarco case:

Specific language can be avoided in interpreting a statute in order to escape what the Legislature might see as an inconceivable result from its intent. See Sandler v. Springfield Tp. Bd. of Adj., 113 N.J. Super. 333 (App.Div. 1970). Courts will not construe certain clauses in a statute in such a manner as to render the whole act impotent. State v. Deckert, 69 N.J. Super. 105 (Law Div. 1961).