Opinion
02-CV-0919E(Sr).
March 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
Plaintiff Patricia M. Sanderson, proceeding pro se, commenced this discrimination action on December 20, 2002 against her former employer, defendant Columbus McKinnon Corporation, alleging that she faced discrimination on account of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq., and New York Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (McKinney 2004). In particular, plaintiff claims that her compensation was discriminatory and that she was subjected to discriminatory management decisions. On June 28, 2004 defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP") alleging that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion will be granted and plaintiff's claims will be dismissed.
This Court will analyze plaintiff's federal and state law claims together because the Second Circuit applies federal standards of proof to discrimination claims brought under NYHRL. Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 2003); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that claims under NYHRL are analytically inseparable from Title VII claims).
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff — the non-moving party —, are found as follows and are undisputed except where otherwise noted. Plaintiff was hired by defendant on June 26, 2000 as a Business Analyst in defendant's Information Services Department. Business Analysts are generally responsible for working as conduits between defendant's business personnel and its computer programmers, with every Business Analyst responsible for different segments of defendant's business. Each Business Analyst, therefore, has unique duties and responsibilities. Plaintiff's position, for example, focused on accounting and, more specifically, on defendant's general ledger, while other Business Analysts worked on computer programs involving such areas as manufacturing and bills of materials or on different aspects of defendant's accounting needs. As such, plaintiff was hired over other candidates, including male candidates, because of her experience in accounting just as other Business Analysts were hired for their specific experiences and expertises.
Plaintiff's initial salary upon being hired by defendant was $42,800. This amount was based on plaintiff's prior experience, her salary history and her salary demands at the time of her hire. Plaintiff had previously worked as a self-employed consultant for approximately seven years, sometimes on a part-time basis. She also had worked as a controller for Integrated Delivery Technologies for approximately nine months. Prior to being hired by defendant, plaintiff was earning $19 per hour, totaling approximately $40,000 per year. Plaintiff wanted to earn about $45,000 per year when hired by defendant. Said demand was communicated to Lori Diringer, defendant's Director of Information Services, who, with the approval of defendant's Human Resources Manager Deborah Dittmar, assigned plaintiff a starting salary of $42,800 per year, with which plaintiff was content at the time.
This figure is based on a 40 hour work week for 52 weeks a year.
During her employment with defendant, plaintiff received two salary raises. In May 2001, almost a year after the commencement of her employment, plaintiff's salary was raised to $45,000 pursuant to a satisfactory review. Plaintiff's salary was again raised in June 2002 by 20 percent, thereby elevating her annual salary to $54,000. This raise came after plaintiff met with defendant's General Counsel Timothy Harvey to complain that her salary was discriminatory and informed Harvey that defendant's female employees were considering taking legal action in connection with pay discrepancies between male and female employees.
All the male Business Analysts received higher salaries than plaintiff — viz., during plaintiff's employment with defendant, the male Business Analysts earned between $60,000 and $82,000 per year compared to plaintiff's highest salary of $54,000. All but one of the male Business Analysts — Alan Detlef —, however, had earned close to, if not more than, $60,000 per year before commencing their Business Analyst positions. Detlef began his tenure as a Business Analyst in 1996 at a lower salary but subsequently received several raises based on his satisfactory performance. During the period that plaintiff was employed by defendant, Detlef earned between $59,000 and $69,700. Moreover, the male Business Analysts had superior computer skills, which plaintiff does not dispute.
Plaintiff additionally alleges that defendant's management decisions regarding the flexibility of plaintiff's work hours were discriminatory. Under defendant's "flex time" policy, the employees in plaintiff's department were allowed flexible work schedules. Plaintiff, for instance, was permitted to work from 7:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. each day and received Tuesday afternoons off in weeks that she did not travel. Plaintiff claims that she was discriminated against when she was denied the ability to use flex time to take her father-in-law to the doctor. Plaintiff claims that, although she could have taken vacation time for that purpose, she wanted to save such time for "emergency situations." Plaintiff also alleges that she was charged with a full-day vacation when she should have been charged for only a half-day for taking a day off around the time her father-in-law had surgery. Plaintiff claims that a half-day charge was appropriate because, although she did take the entire day off, she had been working "a lot of hours" at that time and she had been previously permitted to take only a half-day off for similar conduct.
Plaintiff furthermore claims that she faced discrimination because she was not permitted to work more frequently from her home and that during a business trip to Indiana she was placed in a hotel where she did not feel safe. Plaintiff claims that Diringer did not permit her to take an earlier flight or to switch hotels despite her complaints of the hotel's inadequacies. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on August 2, 2002 and resigned from her employment with defendant in January 2003.
Summary judgment may be granted if the evidence offered shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCvP 56(c). There is no genuine issue for trial unless the evidence offered favoring the non-moving party would be sufficient to sustain a jury's verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, when reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome of an issue, summary judgment is appropriate on that issue. Id. at 251-252. The moving party initially bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact is present but the opposing party must then "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 250. If the non-moving party fails to establish, after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the existence of an element essential to that party's claim and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is appropriate because such failure to establish an essential element of the case renders all other facts immaterial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986).
When assessing the record in making a summary judgment determination, a court must view all ambiguities and factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). However, the non-moving party "cannot defeat the motion by relying on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." FRCvP 56(e); Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996).
To make out a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the EPA, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) defendant paid different wages to the male employees, (2) those male employees performed equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility and (3) those jobs were performed under similar working conditions. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 (1992); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1310 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). While wage discrimination claims under Title VII and NYHRL are generally analyzed under the same standard as EPA claims, Title VII and NYHRL claims also require the plaintiff to produce evidence of discriminatory animus in order to make out a prima facie case of intentional gender-based wage discrimination. Tomka, at 1312-1313. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of wage discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to "justify the wage differential by proving that the disparity results from (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex." Aldrich, at 524; see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Tomka, at 1310. A gender neutral job classification system, without more, is insufficient to meet an employer's burden to show that a wage discrepancy is caused by a factor other than sex. Aldrich, at 525. Such classification system serves "as a factor-other-than-sex defense to sex-based wage discrimination claims only when the employer proves that the job classification system resulting in differential pay is rooted in legitimate business-related differences in work responsibilities and qualifications for the particular position at issue." Ibid. The plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that these asserted gender-neutral reasons for differences in pay are mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 526.
In moving for summary judgment on plaintiff's EPA claim, defendant asserts that plaintiff, although a member of a protected class, cannot show that she was paid less than non-members of her class who performed equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility and thus fails to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination. Plaintiff, in order to establish the second element of a wage discrimination claim, need not show that her job was identical to a higher paid position but that the two positions are "substantially equal." Tomka, at 1310. Jobs that are "merely comparable" or that have the same job title or description but different job content — viz., different tasks and responsibilities —, however, are insufficient to satisfy plaintiff's burden. Ibid. If the additional tasks or responsibilities of one job in comparison to those of another job are substantial, then the jobs are not considered congruent and the work performed is not considered equal under the EPA regardless of sharing the same job title or description. Gerbush v. Hunt Real Estate Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
Defendant also asserts that plaintiff's claim is time-barred to the extent that she seeks to recover for any period beyond the 300 days prior to her filing her charge with the EEOC. The Court need not, however, address this issue because plaintiff's claim, in its entirety, cannot establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination or disparate treatment.
Plaintiff has failed to show that her position is "substantially equal" to the position of the male Business Analysts. Although she has shown that she was paid less than the male Business Analysts, she cannot establish that the work performed by plaintiff as compared to that performed by her male colleagues was substantially similar. To establish that the jobs were substantially similar, plaintiff relies on the uniform job description applicable to all Business Analysts. The record reveals, however, that the uniform job description is largely irrelevant because the actual job responsibilities of Business Analysts vary substantially based on the segment of defendant's business in which they are involved. Although Business Analysts share the general responsibility of working as conduits between defendant's business personnel and its computer programmers, each Business Analyst is responsible for a different segment of defendant's business and, as such, has unique duties and responsibilities — e.g., some are responsible for computer programming while plaintiff focused on accounting. The responsibilities varied even among the three Business Analysts who concentrated on accounting or higher level financial work — to wit, plaintiff was responsible for the general ledger, while one of the other Business Analysts was responsible for job cost and bills of material and the other was responsible for accounts payable and accounts receivable. Moreover, plaintiff acknowledges that each Business Analyst had "different areas of expertise and differing areas of knowledge", thus making each Business Analyst's job "very different". (Sanderson Dep. at 301.) These material differences among Business Analysts preclude plaintiff from asserting that her job was substantially similar to that of other Business Analysts. See Pfeiffer v. Lewis County, 308 F. Supp. 2d 88, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that, while there are some common grounds in the job tasks, "the performance of some common tasks does not make jobs substantially equal when material differences also exist"). Therefore, plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the EPA, Title VII and NYHRL.
Assuming arguendo, however, that plaintiff has met her prima facie burden, she is unable to satisfy her ultimate burden of demonstrating that any compensation discrepancies were due to her gender. Defendant claims that plaintiff's lower compensation is due to two legitimate business-related differences in work responsibilities and qualifications — viz., (1) plaintiff's prior salary history and salary demands and (2) plaintiff's relevant experience in the information services field. It is undisputed that plaintiff made, at the most, $40,000 a year prior to commencing her employment with defendant and requested a salary of $45,000. Plaintiff's starting salary, just as that of the other Business Analysts, was based on her salary history and demand. Furthermore, when plaintiff commenced her employment with defendant, she had little, if any, experience in a traditional information services environment where sophisticated and detailed modifications of computer software were the principal component of her employment. All the other Business Analysts had significant experience in the field. See Calvello v. Electr. Data Systems, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8744, at *16 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2004) ("Differences in [the employees'] experience and training would also justify the differences in their salaries."). In response, plaintiff does not show that these gender-neutral reasons for differences in pay are mere pretext for discrimination. She provides no evidence beyond the differences in salaries to support her claim, which is insufficient to carry her burden. See Tomka, at 1313 (holding that differences in pay alone cannot sustain a pay discrimination claim). Therefore, plaintiff's wage discrimination claims will be dismissed.
Plaintiff also has brought a claim under Title VII alleging that she has been subjected to disparate treatment. Title VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer * * * to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin * * *." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, Title VII claims are analyzed pursuant to the burden-shifting framework espoused in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its offspring. In bringing a case under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of making out a prima facie case of discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) ; Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-253 (1981). If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the alleged employment action. Burdine, at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, at 802). Finally, "should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, at 804).
To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must allege that she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was performing her job satisfactorily, (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, at 802; Graham v. Long Island Rail Road, 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). In moving for summary judgment, defendant asserts that plaintiff cannot identify an adverse employment action that can be the basis of a viable discrimination claim in that her complaints are aimed at ordinary workplace inconveniences not protected under Title VII. Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to the following adverse employment actions: (1) she was not permitted to use flex time to take her father-in-law to the doctor, (2) she was required to take a full-day vacation around the time of her father-in-law's surgery, (3) she was not permitted to take an earlier flight to or to stay in a different hotel while in Indiana and (4) she was not permitted to work more frequently from home.
The Second Circuit has held that a plaintiff must "endure a `materially adverse change' in the terms and conditions of her employment" in order to show an adverse employment action — to wit, "a change in working conditions must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Galabya v. New York City Bd. Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted). Examples of what constitute a materially adverse change include "a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices . . . unique to a particular situation." Ibid. (citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff may have alleged actions resulting in an inconvenience, but nothing that materially changes the terms or conditions of her employment. In fact, her salary increased significantly and she received positive reviews throughout her employment. Additionally, she benefitted from tuition reimbursement, implementation bonuses and flex time. See Phillips v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the employee's "trivial complaints about an unpleasant working environment" do not constitute adverse employment actions). As such, plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action.
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action, she cannot demonstrate that such occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. First, Diringer was responsible for hiring plaintiff and for the allegedly adverse actions. Diringer, however, is a female and gave plaintiff positive reviews and increased her salary. There is a strong presumption against discrimination where, as here, the same supervisor who hired the employee is alleged to have taken adverse actions against the employee within a few years. Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997); Dedyo v. Baker Eng'g N.Y., Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998). Furthermore, the fact that plaintiff's supervisor is also female undermines her claim of gender-based discrimination. Clark v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). Plaintiff, moreover, gave Diringer positive reviews while working for defendant. Therefore, plaintiff has not met her burden in showing disparate treatment and her claims will be dismissed.
Finally, as plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this Court will assume that plaintiff would have asserted a hostile work environment claim and will address such. For plaintiff to establish a Title VII violation based on a hostile work environment claim, she must show "(1) that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her work environment, and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer." Richardson v. New York Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). The discriminatory intimidation alleged by plaintiff must be "offensive or pervasive enough that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and must have been actually perceived by [plaintiff] as abusive." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). In determining whether an environment is hostile, this Court must look at the totality of the circumstances of the alleged conduct including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris, at 23. To withstand summary judgment, a "plaintiff must demonstrate either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous or concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment." Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2000). Isolated incidents of discriminatory comments or conduct — unless extremely serious — are not sufficient to establish a hostile working environment. See, e.g., Mormol v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 58 (2d cir. 2004). Plaintiff clearly has not presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact with regard to a potential hostile work environment. The alleged incidents were not frequent, severe or continuous. Plaintiff's claims, therefore, will be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety, that plaintiff's claims are dismissed and that the Clerk of this Court shall close this case.