Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2087-GTV.
July 24, 2000.
William F. Dunn, Kansas City, KS, for John Sanders, plaintiff.
John D. Tongier, Holbrook, Heaven Osborn, P.A., Merriam, KS, for Unified Government of Wyandotte Coutny/Kansas City, Kansas, and Mame Pearson, defendants.
Hal D. Meltzer, Turner Boisseau, Chartered, Overland Park, KS, for Dr. John Gambrell, defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff John Sanders brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas, Mayme Pearson, and Dr. John Gambrell, alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by denying him adequate medical treatment while he was incarcerated. The case is before the court on Defendant Mayme Pearson's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
I. Factual Background
The following facts are either uncontroverted or based on evidence submitted in summary judgment papers and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Immaterial facts and facts not supported by the record are omitted.
Plaintiff John Sanders suffers from "several serious medical conditions, including end-stage liver disease, cancer, hypertension, coronary artery disease, and diabetes." This case concerns his incarceration at the Wyandotte County Detention Center ("WCDC") from August 1, 1997 to August 26, 1997.
On August 4, August 15, and August 25, 1997, Plaintiff filed Inmate Communication Forms with WCDC personnel complaining of inadequate medical and dietary care. In addition to filing Inmate Communication Forms, Plaintiff made verbal requests for medical assistance and dietary care throughout his stay at WCDC.
Plaintiff alleges that during his incarceration, WCDC personnel "provided wholly inadequate medical attention and care" to him, and refused to provide him with his previously prescribed medication, to conduct a medical examination of him, or to provide him with "adequate dietary care."
Plaintiff alleges that at the time of his incarceration, Defendant Mayme Pearson was a captain in the Sheriff's Department and was responsible for responding to inmates' complaints. Pearson asserts, however, that she had no control over medical treatment of prisoners, but simply passed complaints on to medical personnel. Although Pearson acknowledges that she is familiar with Plaintiff, she stated in an affidavit that she does not remember being informed of any complaints made by him. Plaintiff stated in an affidavit, however, that he complained directly to Pearson on several occasions, and that she responded by "referring [him] to Prison Health Services for [his] medical complaints and to Armark Foods, apparently a corporation based in Missouri, for [his] dietary complaints."
At least one of the Inmate Communication Forms Plaintiff filed was addressed by Plaintiff to "Capt. Pearson." On the form, Plaintiff wrote, "I am aware that Sheriffs Dept has nothing to do with Kitchen Armark Does however I am on a Special Diet I have Liver Cancer please help cause I am not getting my meals. Which is a part of my medical treatment." [sic]
On August 25, 1997, Plaintiff began experiencing unbearable abdominal pains and uncontrollable vomiting. Plaintiff was admitted into a local hospital on August 26, 1997, and treated for dehydration, nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain. He was released the next day from both WCDC and the hospital.
II. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The requirement of a "genuine" issue of fact means that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. See id. Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden may be met by showing that there is a lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. at 325. Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact left for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. See id. The court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984).
III. Analysis
Defendant Mayme Pearson argues that, as an employee of the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department, she is entitled to qualified immunity.
When performing discretionary functions, government officials are entitled to qualified immunity; in other words, such government officials are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." . . . Once the defendant has properly raised the defense of qualified immunity in a summary judgment motion, [the court applies] a two-part framework. First the plaintiff must show the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right; second the plaintiff must show the right the defendant's conduct violated was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known the conduct violated the right. . . . In considering whether the plaintiff makes such a showing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
The court must first decide whether Pearson's conduct violated a constitutional right.
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of prisoners in their custody. . . . An Eighth Amendment claim has both an objective component — whether the deprivation is sufficiently serious — and a subjective component — whether the official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. In cases challenging the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, the subjective standard is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. . . . For a prison official to be found liable of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, the official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must draw the inference.Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 809 (10th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court concludes that Plaintiff has shown that Pearson's conduct violated a constitutional right. Over approximately 25 days in detention, Plaintiff's weight dropped, he could not eat, he was in severe pain, and he "finally began to vomit uncontrollably." Plaintiff made his first written complaint on the fourth day of his detention, but he does not appear to have been given any medical treatment until his admission into the hospital some three weeks later. Such a deprivation is sufficiently serious to raise Eighth Amendment concerns; the objective component of Plaintiff's claim has been satisfied.
The subjective component of Plaintiff's claim has been satisfied as well. Plaintiff alleges that Pearson was a Captain in the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department, and stated in an affidavit that "as such [she] was responsible for the well being of inmates and specifically responsible for responding to inmate complaints." Plaintiff also stated that Pearson never forwarded his complaints on to medical personnel, and that she "[referred him] to Prison Health Services for [his] medical complaints and to Armark Foods for [his] dietary complaints."
The court determines that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to: (1) whether Pearson received Plaintiff's complaints; (2) whether Pearson possessed sufficient authority to assist Plaintiff in resolving his complaints; (3) whether Pearson responded to the complaints by referring Plaintiff to Prison Health Services and Armark Foods; and (4) whether such referrals effectively denied Plaintiff the opportunity to obtain adequate medical treatment. If a trier of fact were to find for Plaintiff on these issues, Plaintiff would have shown that Pearson acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's health and safety. The subjective component of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is satisfied.
In addition to showing that Pearson's conduct violated a constitutional right, Plaintiff must show that "the right . . . violated was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known the conduct violated the right." Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1347. It is clearly established that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners," such as has been alleged here, "constitutes the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). A reasonable person in Pearson's position would have known this. The court concludes that Pearson is not entitled to summary judgment on her defense of qualified immunity.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendant Mayme Pearson's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13) is denied.