Opinion
14664
April 11, 1938.
Before DENNIS, J., Marlboro, July, 1937. Affirmed.
Suit by Tom Sanders and others, employees of Marlboro Mills No. 5, as representatives of the group of employees and local union No. 1912, U.T.W.A., against the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, Marlboro Mills, a corporation, and others to enjoin the corporation from paying over to the Textile Workers Organizing Committee certain moneys apparently authorized under an employment contract to be deducted from wages of employees of the Marlboro Cotton Mills, wherein defendant filed a demurrer. From an order sustaining the demurrer plaintiffs appeal.
The order of Judge Dennis is as follows:
The above-entitled case came on for a hearing before me at chambers in Darlington, S.C. the 26th day of August, 1937. On July 15, 1937, the plaintiffs herein began the said cause by service of summons and verified complaint on the defendants, and made application, based upon the verified complaint, for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant Marlboro Mills from paying over to its codefendants, the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, certain moneys apparently authorized under an employment contract, to be deducted from the wages of the employees of the Marlboro Cotton Mills. I thereupon on the 15th day of July, 1937, issued a temporary restraining order restraining the defendant, Marlboro Cotton Mills, from paying over any moneys to the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, and Committee of Industrial Organizers, or any local of the respective labor organizations, until the further order of this Court.
The defendant, the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, through its counsel, John W. Crews, of Columbia, S.C. and Stevenson Lindsay, of Bennettsville, S.C. duly demurred to the complaint and gave notice to counsel for plaintiffs that they would move before me at Darlington, S.C., on August 16th, for an order dissolving the injunction order and would at the same time move to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds set out in the demurrer; that both motions would be based on the pleadings in the cause. By agreement of counsel the hearing was postponed until August 26, 1937.
The demurrer raised the point that the complaint did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action warranting equitable relief and the issuance of a restraining order.
After hearing arguments of counsel for defendant the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, and the counsel for plaintiffs, I am of the opinion that the complaint does not set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunctive relief.
It is therefore ordered and decreed that the restraining order heretofore issued by me on July 15, 1937, be and the same is hereby vacated and set aside, and the demurrer is sustained. Let the plaintiffs have 20 days from the date of this order to amend their complaint in such manner as they may be advised, and let the defendants have 20 days from the service of any amended complaint in which to plead by way of answer, demurrer, or any other plea as they may deem advisable.
Messrs. G.W. Freeman, Jr., and N.W. Edens, for appellants, cite: Temporary injunction: 92 S.C. 342; 75 S.E., 705; 66 S.C. 1; 44 S.E., 80; 27 S.C. 408; 3 S.E., 781. Jurisdiction: 113 S.C. 470; 101 S.E., 818. Demurrer: 41 S.C. 70; 19 S.E., 203; 22 S.C. 318; 3 S.E., 473.
Messrs. Stevenson Lindsay and John W. Crews, for respondent Textile Workers Organizing Committee, cite: Validity of contract: 257 U.S. 184; 69 L.Ed., 189; 278 Fed., 57; 157 Fed., 833; 178 S.E., 38; 140 N.E., 285; 39 L.R.A., 105; 68 L.R.A., 752; 37 L.R.A., 802; 145 S.C. 520; 144 S.E., 231; 5 C.J., 869; 5 Ann. Cas., 65; 565 L.R.A., 602; 101 A.S.R., 233; 14 S.C. 112; 37 A.S.R., 724; 278 Fed., 56. Preliminary injunction: 96 S.C. 290; 80 S.E., 470; 159 S.C. 1; 156 S.E., 1; 196 U.S. 375; 49 L.Ed., 518; 245 U.S. 229; 62 L.Ed., 260; Ann. Cas., 1918-B, 48; 61 S.C. 191; 39 S.E., 345. Demurrer: 13 S.E., 643; 112 S.C. 68; 46 S.E., 793; 146 S.C. 225; 143 S.E., 796; 130 S.C. 18; 125 S.E., 191; 62 S.C. 196; 40 S.E., 169; 43 S.E., 542; 36 L.R.A., 566; 175 Fed., 365; 117 P., 767. Where parties have adequate remedy at law no injunction will be issued: 146 S.C. 225; 143 S.E., 796; 40 S.C. 85; 48 S.E., 186; 181 S.C. 369; 187 S.E., 536. Fraud: 96 S.C. 24; 80 S.E., 437; 3 Strob., 64; 2 McC., 127; 3 Brev., 64; 52 So., 722. Allegations on information and belief: 130 S.C. 18; 125 S.E., 191; 117 Fed., 965; 219 Fed., 624; 175 Fed., 265; 68 L.R.A., 752; 49 Am. Rep., 109; 50 N.E., 476. Contract: 22 A.L.R., 114; 244 S.W. 469; 191 N.W., 210; 107 S.W. 408; L.R.A., 1917-F, 775; 157 Fed., 883; 140 N.E., 285; 178 S.E., 38; 39 L.R.A., 105; 21 L.R.A., 455.
Mr. D.D. Carroll, for respondent, Marlboro Cotton Mill.
April 11, 1938.
The order of Judge Dennis, which will be reported, sufficiently states the purpose of this action. The one exception of the appellants, plaintiffs below, is as follows: "That his Honor committed error in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint and in refusing the restraining orders as requested therein."
The action was brought under Section 566 of the Code of 1932; and it is conceded that injunctive relief thereunder cannot be demanded as a matter of right, but is a matter that rests in the sound discretion of the Judge to whom application is made therefor. The contention is that the appellants, under the facts alleged in the complaint, are entitled to the equitable relief which they seek, and that, therefore, the Circuit Judge erred in the exercise of his discretion.
We do not think so. It appears to be admitted that the contract of employment referred to in the circuit order, and which is made a part of the complaint, was legally entered into, and that the defendant, Textile Workers Organizing Committee, was duly authorized to make such contract with the management of the Marlboro Cotton Mills No. 5. The plaintiffs do not ask for the cancellation of this contract or for the revocation of the authority of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee to act for the employees.
The complaint contains no allegation that the appellants are without an adequate remedy at law, and no facts are stated, such as insolvency of the defendants, which would tend to show this to be true. As to any irreparable loss that the plaintiffs might suffer, and which is necessary to be shown in order to obtain the injunctive relief sought, counsel for appellants refer to certain allegations of the complaint, and argue that they "are sufficient to establish that the plaintiffs are about to suffer irreparable injury and damage." From a careful analysis of these allegations, however, we are convinced that such a conclusion is not justified under the facts alleged. As set out in the agreed statement of counsel, the sole purpose of this suit was to obtain injunctive relief; and the Circuit Judge was undoubtedly correct in concluding that the facts stated in the complaint are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action for such relief. It may not soundly be held, therefore, liberally construing the complaint as we should, that Judge Dennis abused his discretion. There is reserved to the appellants by the Court's order the right to amend their complaint, if they be so advised: and this they may now do.
The order appealed from is affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STABLER and MESSRS. JUSTICES BONHAM, BAKER and FISHBURNE concur.
MR. JUSTICE CARTER did not participate on account of illness.