And while Tilman appears to have agreed to the permanent restraining order here, "[a] defendant's acquiescence to an illegal sentence, either through plea negotiations or a failure to object to the sentence, cannot render an otherwise illegal sentence valid through waiver." Sanders v. State , 259 Ga. App. 422, 423 (1), 577 S.E.2d 94 (2003) ; accord Humphrey v. State , 297 Ga. 349, 350, 773 S.E.2d 760 (2015) ("[T]he consent of the parties cannot validate a void sentence."); Nazario v. State , 293 Ga. 480, 487 (2) (c), 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013) ("Void convictions and illegal sentences have never been subject to general waiver rules."). Thus, acquiescence via a plea bargain "has no force where the record shows that the bargain at issue was for the imposition of an illegal sentence."
In the present civil proceeding, such assertions can support a negative inference. See In the Interest of K. N. C. , 264 Ga. App. 475, 481 (4) (a), 590 S.E.2d 792 (2003), citing Sanders v. State , 259 Ga. App. 422, 425 (2), 577 S.E.2d 94 (2003) ("[A]lthough a person does have a right to invoke the privilege in a civil case in order to protect himself, when he does so, an inference against his interest may be drawn by the factfinder.").In February 2015, after a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order nunc pro tunc November 2014 adjudicating the children dependent.
Crimley v. State of Ga. , 330 Ga.App. 639, 641, 768 S.E.2d 813 (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). โIn a civil in rem forfeiture action, a claimant's answer must be in strict compliance with the special pleading requirements of OCGA ยง 16โ13โ49 (o) (3).โ ArreolaโSoto v. State of Georgia , 314 Ga.App. 165, 166, 723 S.E.2d 482 (2012) ; see Sanders v. State , 259 Ga.App. 422, 425, 577 S.E.2d 94 (2003) (a forfeiture action under OCGA ยง 16โ13โ49 is a civil proceeding). Where the answer does not contain those requisite facts to support the claimant's ownership assertions, it does not comply with the statute's specific pleading requirements.
"A defendant's acquiescence to an illegal sentence, either through plea negotiations or a failure to object to the sentence, cannot render an otherwise illegal sentence valid through waiver." Sanders v. State of Ga., 259 Ga. App. 422, 423 (1) ( 577 SE2d 94) (2003). And following a trial, convictions and sentences for offenses which are included in others are void and may not be waived by failure to raise the issue at trial.
See id. Finally, with regard to Hall's role in bringing about the August 2005 order, "[a] defendant's acquiescence to an illegal sentence, either through plea negotiations or a failure to object to the sentence, cannot render an otherwise illegal sentence valid through waiver." Sanders v. State of Ga., 259 Ga. App. 422, 423 ( 577 SE2d 94) (2003). See also Sumner v. State, 284 Ga. App. 308, 312 (1) ( 643 SE2d 831) (2007) (same).
Moreover, even assuming that Sumner indicated his agreement to this condition when he subsequently signed a waiver concerning written restitution findings, "[a] defendant's acquiescence to an illegal sentence, either through plea negotiations or a failure to object to the sentence, cannot render an otherwise illegal sentence valid through waiver." Sanders v. State of Ga., 259 Ga. App. 422, 423 (1) ( 577 SE2d 94) (2003). That is because "[a] void sentence in law amounts to no sentence at all.
Sanders v. State of Ga. Thus, the issue was properly before this Court, despite the lack of an objection below. Sanders v. State of Ga., 259 Ga. App. 422, 423 (1) ( 577 SE2d 94) (2003). 2.
Significantly, however, the factfinder in a civil case is entitled to draw an adverse inference from a party's refusal to produce documents and may infer that the documents would have been harmful. See In the Matter of Henley, 271 Ga. 21, 22 (2) ( 518 SE2d 418) (1999) (noting that an "adverse inference . . . could have been drawn had [defendant] refused production based upon his privilege against self-incrimination"); Sanders v. State of Ga., 259 Ga. App. 422, 425-426 (2) ( 577 SE2d 94) (2003); In the Interest of M.V., 253 Ga. App. 669, 672 ( 560 SE2d 125) (2002). The refusal to produce the documents constitutes "an implied admission that [the documents] would tend to prove that the [party] committed the act" of which he is accused.
We disagree. A forfeiture action is a civil proceeding, see Sanders v. State of Ga., 259 Ga. App. 422, 425 (2) ( 577 SE2d 94) (2003), and so neither the State nor the trial court was required to provide Portee with legal counsel or advice. See Finch, 216 Ga. App. at 452 (3).
The State is not required to provide such facts at the first stage of this kind of forfeiture proceeding, however. It is true that had the matter gotten as far as the filing of a complaint, the State would have had to plead facts showing a connection between the seized property and drug-related activity, and would then have the burden of proving those facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See OCGA ยง 16-13-49 (n) (5) (requiring complaint only "[i]f a claim is filed"); Sanders v. State, 259 Ga. App. 422, 425 (2) ( 577 SE2d 94) (2003) (setting burden on State). However, Germain and Jeanlouis' claims asserted only that their property "was not directly or indirectly used or intended for use" in violation of Georgia anti-drug statutes, and that the property was not part of the proceeds of such illegal activity.