" Id. The corroborating evidence "must connect the accused with the crime and be independent of the evidence given by the accomplice. . . . The test for determining the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence is whether, if the accomplice's testimony were eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission." Sanders v. State, 838 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Ark. 1992). The corroborating evidence must be "stronger evidence than that which merely raises a suspicion of guilt. . . . However, it is something less than that evidence necessary[,] in and of itself, to sustain a conviction."
See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992). Id. at 108, 883 S.W.2d at 832.
This conviction was affirmed on appeal. Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1162 ("LaSalle II"). Because there is an unrelated murder case involving Sanders that is relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, we refer to our prior opinions by the name of the victim(s) in each case, as Sanders does in his brief.
As a result, the trial court is not made aware of the deficiency. Walker, 318 Ark. at 108, 883 S.W.2d at 832 (citing Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 383 S.W.2d 359 (1992)). Thus, this court has made it clear that a defendant, in making his motions for directed verdict, must anticipate an instruction on lesser included offenses and specifically address the elements of that lesser included offense on which he wishes to challenge the State's proof in his motion.
We affirmed the judgment. Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992). The mandate was issued October 23, 1992.
As a result, the trial court is not made aware of the deficiency. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992). Since the 1988 amendment to Rule 36.21(b), we have repeatedly required that a motion for a directed verdict state the specific grounds of the motion.
The appellant, Raymond C. Sanders, has brought three previous criminal appeals before this court. Sanders v. State, 305 Ark. 112, 805 S.W.2d 953 (1991) (Sanders I); Sanders v. State, 308 Ark. 178, 824 S.W.2d 353 (1992) (Sanders II); Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992) (Sanders III). One of the appeals (Sanders II) arose from his convictions of the capital murders involved in the present appeal, while the other two (Sanders I and III) concerned an unrelated capital murder. In the current appeal, only the resentencing proceedings, mandated by this court's partial reversal and remand in Sanders II, supra, are under consideration.
It goes without saying that a reopened hearing is not a new trial. In the context of criminal trials, however, we have repeatedly held that the reopening of the case-in-chief for the taking of additional evidence is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court and that we will not reverse the decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992); Cameron v. State, 278 Ark. 357, 645 S.W.2d 943 (1983); Williams v. State, 262 Ark. 219, 555 S.W.2d 231 (1977). See also Holloway v. State, 312 Ark. 306, 849 S.W.2d 473 (1993).
We have held that it is discretionary with the trial court whether to permit a party to reopen a case either before or after the jury begins deliberating. Holloway v. State, 312 Ark. 306, 849 S.W.2d 473 (1993); Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992); Curtis v. State, 279 Ark. 64, 648 S.W.2d 487 (1983); Powell v. State, 270 Ark. 236, 605 S.W.2d 2 (1980). Clearly, though, a decision to permit additional evidence to go to the jury after its retirement must be exercised sparingly and only when the exigencies of the situation warrant it.
These principles have recently been reaffirmed in Owens v. State, 313 Ark. 520, 856 S.W.2d 288 (1993), where we held, quoting Grigsby, that when the defendant had been placed at the scene of the crime approximately one hour before the body of a murder victim was discovered and when money previously in the victim's possession was missing, the jury was justified in deciding that the robbery and murder were one continuous transaction. So, too, in Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992), we found sufficient circumstantial corroborating evidence to establish robbery as the underlying felony in a capital felony murder case. There, the owner of a building in which the victim engaged in a bootlegging enterprise testified that he had visited the victim on the night of the murder and that he found him alone, in good health, and well-provisioned with beer and whiskey.