Opinion
No. 1D19-4461
04-08-2021
Antjuan Javien SANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Justin F. Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren L. Shippy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Justin F. Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren L. Shippy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Rowe, J.
Antjuan Javien Sanders appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, but with an entitlement to a judicial review after twenty-five years. Sanders asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, and imposed sentence. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm.
Facts
Sanders was indicted for first-degree premeditated or felony murder of a fifty-eight-year-old woman who lived in his neighborhood. He was seventeen years old at the time of the murder.
Motion to Suppress
Before trial, Sanders moved to suppress statements he made to the police a year after the victim's death. He argued that the police used improper tactics and did not give a proper Miranda warning. To refute this argument, the State presented the testimony of the two officers who questioned Sanders.
Investigator Lionil Martinez testified that Sanders was at a road prison when the police decided to bring him in for questioning. Officers transported Sanders to the sheriff's office for the interview and Sanders was chained to a table. Martinez then advised Sanders of his Miranda rights by reading to Sanders a standardized waiver of rights form. Martinez agreed that he did not expressly ask Sanders to waive his rights. He handed Sanders the waiver form and asked him to sign it. Martinez described Sanders as calm and able to answer his questions. Martinez denied that he threatened or in any way coerced Sanders. Sergeant Jayson Barnes also testified. Like Martinez, Barnes denied threatening, coercing, or intimidating Sanders.
Sanders testified that he was eighteen years old when the police interviewed him. Sanders stated that he had a tenth-grade education. Although it was not the first time Sanders had ever been read his Miranda warnings, he claimed that he did not understand that he was waiving his Miranda rights when he signed the form provided by the officers. Nor did he realize that he could consult with a court-appointed attorney before answering any questions.
The trial court reviewed the video recording of Sanders’ custodial interrogation by the police. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Sanders knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and that the officers did not engage in coercive conduct.
Trial
Edward Juncker, the victim's boyfriend, testified at trial. On the day of the murder, Juncker planned to meet the victim at her home. The victim told Juncker she would leave a spare key for him outside. But when he arrived, the victim's car was in the driveway and the parking lights were on. Juncker saw the victim's purse and checkbook in the car. So he knocked on the house door. But she did not answer. All the doors were locked. Juncker could not find the spare key the victim said she would leave for him. He called her on the phone, but she did not answer. After several hours passed with no word from the victim, Juncker called the police.
Deputy Philip Goble responded to Juncker's call and went to the victim's home to conduct a welfare check. When he knocked on the door and no one answered, Goble peered through a bedroom window. He saw the victim naked lying half on and half off the bed. Goble opened the window and called out to her, but she was unresponsive. Goble's partner, Deputy Holyfield, then entered through the window and unlocked the front door. When the officers approached the victim, she showed no vital signs. She was unresponsive and cold to the touch. Goble observed no signs of forced entry, but the bedroom window would not latch shut.
The victim's daughters reported that someone had used the victim's credit cards in the days after her death. Investigators then ordered an autopsy. Dr. Andrea Minyard conducted the autopsy. She did not see any obvious signs of trauma. But an internal examination revealed possible injuries that could point to a violent death. And the victim showed petechial hemorrhages on her eyes and bruises on her tongue. Based on the inconclusive results from the examination, Dr. Minyard at first characterized the cause and manner of the victim's death as undetermined.
But Dr. Minyard's opinion changed after she received the DNA analysis of biological samples she collected from the victim during the autopsy. The DNA analyst found DNA profiles foreign to the victim on the vaginal and anal swabs collected during the autopsy. The analyst determined that DNA on the vaginal swabs matched Sanders’ DNA profile and that Sanders was also a contributor to the DNA found on the anal swabs.
The DNA results led the police to interview Sanders. The interview took place a year after the murder, and the police recorded the interrogation. At trial, the State played the video for the jury. The video depicts Investigator Martinez informing Sanders of his rights. After Sanders signed a waiver of rights form, the officers told Sanders that they were investigating a homicide. They showed him a picture of the victim. Sanders denied that he knew the victim. But he said he had seen her jogging in the neighborhood.
Martinez then revealed to Sanders that his DNA was found on the victim. Martinez told Sanders this was his chance to tell his side of the story. Sanders confessed, "It started off as a theft." He claimed that he wanted to find items, such as smart phones, that he could sell. He entered the victim's house, but then he heard footsteps and realized he was not alone. As the victim was coming through the doorway of her bedroom, Sanders seized her and choked her to the point of unconsciousness. Sanders stated that he then dragged the victim back into her bedroom, and "jack[ed] off and ejaculat[ed] onto her crotch." After he denied penetrating the victim, the police told him that his semen was found inside the victim's vagina. Sanders confessed that he had vaginal and anal sex with the victim. Afterwards, Sanders took the victim's two cell phones and her credit cards.
When Dr. Minyard learned about the DNA results and Sanders’ confession, she amended the autopsy report. She explained that the new information confirmed that strangulation was the cause of the petechial hemorrhages and bruises she observed on the victim. Dr. Minyard determined that the victim died from strangulation and the manner of death was homicide.
After Dr. Minyard testified, the State played a video of a jail visitation between Sanders and two unidentified men. One of them asked Sanders what happened. Sanders said that "it was supposed to be a burglary" and that he "wasn't supposed to kill nobody." When one of the men said, "they say you killed her and then you raped her," Sanders denied that he raped the victim. He claimed that he slept with the victim the day before her death.
The State then rested. Sanders’ counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. He conceded that the State presented sufficient evidence for a prima facie case of felony murder. But he argued that the State did not present a prima facie case of premeditated murder. The trial court denied the motion.
The defense then presented its case. Sanders took the stand and denied killing the victim. He claimed that he went to the victim's home the day before she died and the two had consensual vaginal intercourse. When he left the house, the victim was alive. Sanders denied returning to her house the next day. And he claimed that he did not hear of the victim's death until his interview with the police. As for that interview, Sanders contended that when he signed the waiver form, he did not understand that he was waiving his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. Sanders admitted that he confessed to choking and having sex with the victim. But he did so because he was going along with what the officers told him. And even though he admitted to stealing the victim's phones, he insisted that the victim gave him her credit cards.
The defense then rested. The jury found Sanders guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Sanders to life in prison without the possibility for parole, but with an entitlement to a judicial review after twenty-five years. This timely appeal follows.
Analysis
Sanders raises three arguments for reversal of his judgment and sentence. First, he argues that the trial court should have suppressed his confession. Second, he asserts he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. And third, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing a life sentence. We address each argument in turn.
Suppression
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. Smith v. State , 95 So. 3d 966, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). We review the court's factual findings for competent, substantial evidence; and we review the court's legal conclusions de novo. Id.
Sanders first argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress his confession because the officers did not adequately inform him of his right to have an attorney present during questioning. But the record refutes this argument. The transcript and video recording of the confession shows that Sanders’ interview began with the officers reading him a standardized waiver form. The form informed Sanders of the following rights:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court.
3. You have the right to have a lawyer present while being questioned.
4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, a lawyer will be appointed for you, without costs before questioning.
5. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering questions at any time.
Even so, Sanders argues that the above language failed to put him on notice that he had a right to court-appointed counsel during questioning. His argument fails because the Florida Supreme Court has rejected the argument in a case involving similar circumstances. See Traylor v. State , 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992). There, the supreme court approved a waiver form that included language much like the language from the form read to Sanders. Id. at 971 (quoting the language of the waiver form used in that case and concluding that it adequately informed Traylor of his right to counsel). Thus, Sanders’ claim that the officers did not adequately inform him of his right to counsel fails.
Sanders next argues that the trial court should have suppressed his confession because the officers used improper interrogation techniques that rendered his confession involuntary. When determining whether a confession is involuntary, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant was able to "make a choice free from unrealistic hope and delusions as to his true position, due to the officer's conduct." Ramirez v. State , 15 So. 3d 852, 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). There must be a causal connection "between the improper promise or coercive conduct and the defendant's subsequent confession." Gaskey v. State , 270 So. 3d 1276, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Again, the transcript and video recording of the interrogation refute Sanders’ argument that the officers’ conduct was coercive.
The interrogation lasted a little over an hour. The officers never threatened Sanders with harm, never promised Sanders that he would receive any sort of special treatment in exchange for confession, and never did they engage in any coercive tactics during the interrogation. Although Sanders argues that it was coercive for the officers to encourage him to provide his side of the story, such conduct is not coercive. See Martin v. State , 107 So. 3d 281, 305 (Fla. 2012) ("[E]ncouraging a suspect to cooperate with law enforcement is not coercive conduct."). And so, based on our review of the record, the trial court did not err when it denied the motion to suppress. Sanders’ confession was voluntary, the police adequately advised Sanders of his right to have counsel present during the interrogation, and Sanders’ confession was not the product of coercive tactics.
Judgment of Acquittal
Next, Sanders argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We review the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. See Moran v. State , 278 So. 3d 905, 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). If there is competent, substantial evidence to establish every element of the crime, then judgment of acquittal is improper. Bush v. State , 295 So. 3d 179, 200 (Fla. 2020). When reviewing a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the State. Id.
The State charged Sanders with first-degree premeditated murder and, in the alternative, first-degree felony murder. Defense counsel conceded at trial that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Sanders of felony murder. And so, the only issue preserved for appellate review is whether there was sufficient evidence of first-degree premeditated murder. See Newsome v. State , 199 So. 3d 510, 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (explaining that to preserve an argument for appellate review, "the precise legal argument as to why the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction must be presented to the trial court"). Based on our review of the record, we find that the evidence was sufficient to show that Sanders’ murder of the victim was premeditated.
"Premeditation is a fully-formed conscious purpose to kill, which exists in the mind of the perpetrator for a sufficient length of time to permit reflection." Ford v. State , 267 So. 3d 1070, 1075 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). It can form in a moment and need exist only "for such time as will allow the accused to be conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and the probable result of that act." Id. (quoting DeAngelo v. State , 616 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1993) ). Sanders confessed that he choked the victim to the point of unconsciousness after he realized that she was home. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the time between Sanders’ realizing the victim was home and deciding to strangle her to death was sufficient time for Sanders to form an intent to kill her. See Glover v. State , 226 So. 3d 795, 805 (Fla. 2017) ("Premeditation may be formed in a moment and need only exist for such a time as will allow the accused to be conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and the probable result of that act." (quoting Morrison v. State , 818 So. 2d 432, 452 (Fla. 2002) )). Because the evidence was sufficient to show premeditation, the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for judgment of acquittal.
Sentencing
In his final claim of error, Sanders asserts that the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence of life without parole even though Sanders was a juvenile when he committed the murder. Sanders argues that his sentence should be reversed because (1) the trial court did not find that Sanders was a "rare, incorrigible offender"; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the factual findings in the sentencing order; and (3) the trial court improperly considered victim impact testimony.
We review the trial court's factual findings in a sentencing order to determine whether they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Jackson v. State , 276 So. 3d 73, 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). And we review the trial court's imposition of sentence based on those findings for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Because Sanders was seventeen years old when he committed the murder, the trial court had to hold a sentencing hearing before imposing a life sentence or sentencing Sanders to a term of years equal to life imprisonment. See § 921.1401(1), Fla. Stat. And the trial court had to consider ten statutory factors "relevant to the offense and the defendant's youth and attendant circumstances." § 921.1401(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). The trial court entered a six-page sentencing order analyzing each of the ten sentencing factors in section 921.1401(2). But Sanders argues that competent, substantial evidence does not support the trial court's findings on "[t]he possibility of rehabilitating the defendant." The trial court made these findings:
The Court recognizes that juveniles are more capable of change than are adults. Dr. Spencer also believes that the Defendant, like most people, is capable of change with the passage of enough time, effort, and abundant therapy. The Defendant's family agrees.
Dr. Spencer indicated that there is a possibility of rehabilitating the Defendant, and that it helps that the Defendant also has a supportive family willing to contribute to rehabilitating the Defendant. However, Dr. Spencer could not quantify the exact probability that the Defendant is capable of rehabilitation. Furthermore, the Defendant's family could not point to any positive accomplishments the Defendant achieved in the last several years, and instead they focused on hobbies that the Defendant gave up years before the murder.
This Court finds that while juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, no amount of therapy can ever change the fact that the Defendant is a convicted murderer, who murdered a defenseless woman ... without any apparent provocation
Sanders asserts based on the trial court's finding that "no amount of therapy can ever change the fact that [Sanders] is a convicted murder, who murdered a defenseless woman ... without any provocation," that the court's findings on the prospects for his rehabilitation are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. But Sanders reads the trial court's finding on "no amount of therapy" in isolation, ignoring the trial court's other findings evaluating Sanders’ potential for rehabilitation based on statements from Dr. Spencer and Sanders’ family. We disagree with Sanders’ reading of the trial court's findings and hold that competent, substantial evidence supports the court's findings on Sanders’ potential for rehabilitation and each of the court's other findings under section 921.1401. See Jackson , 276 So. 3d at 75.
But even if the trial court's findings on each of the ten statutory factors were sufficient, Sanders argues on appeal—though he did not do so in the trial court—that his life sentence is still unlawful because the trial court also had to make a finding that he was a "rare, incorrigible offender." Sanders points to language in several opinions from the United States Supreme Court emphasizing that life sentences for juvenile offenders should be rare and uncommon. See Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) (observing that "a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children"); Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 ("[W]e think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon."). And so, based on those decisions and a recent grant of certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court, Sanders argues that before a trial court may impose a life sentence, it must explicitly make a finding of incorrigibility. See Jones v. State , 285 So. 3d 626 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), cert. granted , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1293, 206 L.Ed.2d 374 (2020) (assessing whether the Eighth Amendment requires a trial court to find that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole). Sanders’ argument fails for lack of preservation. See Simmons v. State , 267 So. 3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (holding that the defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his argument on the trial court's findings under section 921.1401 when the defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection at sentencing). His argument also fails on the merits. It is true that the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that sentencing a juvenile to a life sentence without parole should be uncommon. But Sanders did not receive a life without parole sentence. Rather, he is entitled to judicial review of his sentence to determine whether based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, his sentence should be modified. § 921.1402(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Moreover, there is no requirement under section 921.1401(2), or any other controlling authority, for the trial court to make a specific finding of incorrigibility before sentencing a juvenile offender to life imprisonment. And as discussed above, the trial court made findings on Sanders’ potential for rehabilitation. For these reasons, the trial court did not have to make a specific finding that Sanders was an incorrigible defendant. Cf. Phillips v. State , 286 So. 3d 905, 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (explaining that the defendant did not receive an irrevocable life sentence and even if he had, the State has no burden "to prove that a juvenile offender falls within the rare category of offender who is irredeemable before the juvenile may be sentenced to life").
Finally, Sanders argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the victim's family to recommend an appropriate sentence for Sanders. The victim's daughters asked the court to impose the harshest possible penalty because death was not an option because of Sanders’ age. Sanders’ counsel objected to the daughters’ statements on grounds that the appropriate sentence was not meant to be part of a victim impact statement. The trial court overruled the objection and found that the victim's daughters could give an opinion on an appropriate sentence because Sanders’ family was asked about the sentence.
We find no error by the trial court because there is no prohibition on the trial court's receiving sentencing recommendations from the victim's family in the context of sentencing a juvenile. See Serrano v. State , 279 So. 3d 296, 303–04 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (discussing the trial court's consideration of the victim's family's wishes when imposing a sentence for a juvenile offender). And even if there were such a prohibition, the defense opened the door when defense counsel asked Sanders’ relatives about the sentence they hoped the court would impose. See Peterson v. State , 94 So. 3d 514, 534 (Fla. 2012) (discussing the concept of "opening the door").
Thus, for these reasons, we AFFIRM the trial court's imposition of judgment and sentence.
Osterhaus and Long, JJ., concur.