Opinion
Nos. 05-04-00321-CR, 05-04-00322-CR
Opinion issued November 16, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F03-41067-Mh and F03-41068-MH. Affirmed as modified.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
OPINION
Lhuneery Romel Sanders waived a jury trial, entered non-negotiated guilty pleas to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and evading arrest or detention, and pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph in each indictment. The trial court found appellant guilty and the enhancement paragraphs true. The judge sentenced appellant to ten years' confinement in each case, and made an affirmative finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle, during the commission of the aggravated assault. In two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the convictions. We affirm the trial court's judgments. Appellant argues the evidence is factually insufficient because there was no evidence he evaded arrest or assaulted the complainant with a motor vehicle; no police officer testimony corroborated any evidence that appellant evaded arrest; and appellant only entered guilty pleas so he could get probation for alcohol treatment. The State responds appellant may not raise a claim of factual insufficiency on appeal following a plea of guilty, and, in the alternative, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the convictions. When a defendant pleads guilty, the State must introduce sufficient evidence into the record to support the plea and show the defendant is guilty, and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05); see also Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). We do not apply the Jackson "rationality" test in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant voluntarily enters a plea of guilty. See Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d at 791. Rather, we affirm the trial court's judgment if the evidence introduced embraces every essential element of the offense charged and is sufficient to establish a defendant's guilt. See Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant, in writing, waives the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses and consents to the introduction of documentary evidence in support of the judgment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. Assuming, without deciding, that a factual sufficiency review applies, we must determine whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both supporting and against the finding, demonstrates that the fact finder was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Evidence can be factually insufficient when: (1) considered by itself, the evidence supporting the verdict is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; or (2) contrary evidence exists that is strong enough such that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See id. at 484-85. A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). A person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.04(a) (Vernon 2003). Appellant pleaded guilty to the two offenses and judicially confessed to committing both offenses as alleged in the indictments. The State offered appellant's signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence in each case into evidence without objection. A judicial confession admitted into evidence and contained in the transcript is sufficient to prove appellant's guilt. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Appellant testified he was drunk and could not recall the events leading up to his arrest, but denied he evaded arrest or detention. To the extent he could remember, appellant did not dispute what was written in the offense report by the arresting officer. Appellant also testified he never threatened the complainant, Talena Turner, but they did scuffle in the car. Appellant asked the judge to place him on probation so he could get treatment for alcoholism. Turner testified that the statements made by the arresting officer in his offense report were incorrect, including that the officer saw appellant's vehicle traveling at eighty miles per hour and going in the wrong direction; the officer saw another vehicle swerve to avoid a head-on collision with appellant's vehicle; the officer saw Turner jump from the vehicle when it stopped and lay down on the ground crying; the officer heard Turner repeatedly say she was in fear for her life, appellant was going to kill her by running head-on into another vehicle, and appellant unbuckled her seatbelt while he was driving. Turner testified appellant drove down the wrong side of the street only because she was hitting appellant while they argued about another woman. Appellant stopped the vehicle when he saw the patrol car's overhead lights flashing, and both she and appellant got out of the vehicle. Turner did not recall appellant threatening her, and testified she would not take such threats seriously. Turner admitted she asked the officer for an ambulance because she injured her shoulder during her scuffle with appellant. It was the fact finder's role to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, to believe or disbelieve the witnesses' testimony, and to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). After conducting a neutral review of the record, we conclude the evidence of guilt is not too weak to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is the contrary evidence so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85. Accordingly, we overrule appellants points of error. We note that the trial court's judgment in cause no. 05-04-00321-CR incorrectly shows the plea to the enhancement paragraph and the trial court's finding on enhancement as "N/A." The record shows appellant pleaded true to an enhancement paragraph and the trial court found the enhancement paragraph true. We have the power to modify incorrect judgments when we have the necessary information to do so. See Tex.R.App.P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, we modify the trial court's judgment to show appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph and the trial court found the enhancement paragraph true. In cause no. 05-04-00322-CR, we affirm the trial court's judgment. In cause no. 05-04-00321-CR, we modify the trial court's judgment to show plea to enhancement paragraph was "true to 2nd" and findings on enhancement were "2nd found true," and we affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.