Therefore, he concedes that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson standard of review. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, No. 10-14-00211-CR, 2015 WL 2170229, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco May 7, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("By asking this Court to only review the factual sufficiency of the evidence, Sanders concedes the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson standard of review."). Even if we were to examine the evidence under Jackson, we would hold that the evidence that we have outlined is sufficient.
McDaniel does not argue that the evidence regarding the last incident of sexual abuse was legally insufficient, thus conceding that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review. See Garcia, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 195, at *6 (citing Sanders v. State, No. 10-14-00211-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4704, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 7, 2015, pet. ref'd) ("By asking this Court to only review the factual sufficiency of the evidence, Sanders concedes the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson standard of review.")). Accordingly, we overrule McDaniel's first issue.