Sanders v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Ex parte Sanders

    NO. WR-86,787-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 7, 2017)

    The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Sanders v. State, No. 10-14-00211-CR (Tex. App. — Waco, May 7, 2015) (not designated for publication).

  2. Castilleja v. State

    No. 10-19-00116-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 4, 2021)

    Therefore, he concedes that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson standard of review. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, No. 10-14-00211-CR, 2015 WL 2170229, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco May 7, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("By asking this Court to only review the factual sufficiency of the evidence, Sanders concedes the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson standard of review."). Even if we were to examine the evidence under Jackson, we would hold that the evidence that we have outlined is sufficient.

  3. McDaniel v. State

    No. 10-19-00076-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 13, 2019)

    McDaniel does not argue that the evidence regarding the last incident of sexual abuse was legally insufficient, thus conceding that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review. See Garcia, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 195, at *6 (citing Sanders v. State, No. 10-14-00211-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4704, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 7, 2015, pet. ref'd) ("By asking this Court to only review the factual sufficiency of the evidence, Sanders concedes the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson standard of review.")). Accordingly, we overrule McDaniel's first issue.

  4. Zahirniak v. State

    No. 10-16-00336-CR (Tex. App. Apr. 24, 2019)   Cited 2 times

    Appellant makes no claim that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction, thus conceding that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, No. 10-14-00211-CR, 2015 WL 2170229, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco May 7, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("By asking this Court to only review the factual sufficiency of the evidence, Sanders concedes the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson standard of review."). Appellant refers to another case from this Court in which the PDR was pending.

  5. Thomas v. State

    No. 10-17-00049-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 22, 2017)   Cited 3 times

    All other cases to the contrary, including Clewis, are overruled"); Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104, 109-10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the single sufficiency standard in criminal cases under the factual-conclusivity clause and stating that, "[a]lthough an intermediate appellate court's decision shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has the authority to determine questions of law, including the standard of review that an intermediate appellate court must use in conducting factual review." (internal citations omitted)); see also Sanders v. State, No. 10-14-00211-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4704, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 7, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Therefore, because we are bound to follow the Court of Criminal Appeals, we only apply the Jackson sufficiency standard of review to complaints styled as legal or factual sufficiency challenges concerning the elements of a criminal offense.

  6. Burns v. State

    No. 10-16-00357-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 28, 2017)   Cited 4 times

    See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902, 912 (concluding that there is "no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the . . . factual-sufficiency standard, and these two standards have become indistinguishable" and holding the following: "As the Court with final appellate jurisdiction in this State, we decide that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. All other cases to the contrary, including Clewis, are overruled"); Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Sanders v. State, No. 10-14-00211-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4704, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 7, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We therefore overrule Burns's second issue.

  7. Garcia v. State

    No. 10-16-00045-CR (Tex. App. Jan. 11, 2017)   Cited 7 times

    See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (concluding that there is "no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the . . . factual-sufficiency standard, and these two standards have become indistinguishable" and holding the following: "As the Court with final appellate jurisdiction in this State, we decide that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. All other cases to the contrary, including Clewis, are overruled."); Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Sanders v. State, No. 10-14-00211-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4704, at *2 (Tex. App.—May 7, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Garcia does not argue that the evidence regarding the metal pipe was legally insufficient, thus conceding that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review.