Opinion
No. HHB CV-07-5003802 S
March 11, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT CROWLEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In this action, the plaintiff, Amy Sanders [Sanders], seeks compensation against R.R. Hiltbrand Construction, LLC [Hiltbrand] for injuries she allegedly sustained as the result of falling on debris located in the parking lot of her employer, Crowley Ford [Crowley]. Crowley had unemployment compensation insurance and is immune from suit from Sanders. Sanders alleges that Hiltbrand, which had performed work in the area of the parking lot, was responsible for the debris. Crowley intervened, seeking reimbursement of its workers' compensation lien. Hiltbrand counterclaimed (145.00) against Crowley on a theory of common-law indemnification, seeking indemnification, attorneys fees, costs and expenses.
Crowley filed a motion to strike (156.00) the counterclaim, claiming the counterclaim is barred by the exclusivity of the workers' compensation statute, General Statutes § 31-284(a) and that there is no legal basis for Hiltbrand's claim of attorneys fees, costs and expenses. The court, Pittman, J., entertained argument on the motion and Hiltbrand's objection (159.00) to the motion and on July 2, 2010 (156.01) denied the motion to strike, based on Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 561 A.2d 432 (1989), Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 964, 694 A.2d 788 (1997) concerning the claim of common-law indemnification and Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of N.Y v. Musante, Berman and Steinberg, 133 Conn. 536, 52 A.2d 862 (1947) as to the claim of attorneys fees, costs and expenses.
On January 20, 2011, Crowley filed a motion for summary judgment (192.00) on the same grounds. Hiltbrand filed an objection to the motion, also opposing on the same grounds as asserted in the motion to strike, but adding an additional argument that Crowley's arguments were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
An additional argument that Crowley's memorandum in support of summary judgment attached unauthenticated documents was cured by Crowley prior to oral argument on February 7, 2011.
LEGAL STANDARD:
Summary judgment ". . . shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. In deciding a motion for summary judgment a trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hertz Corp. v. Federal Insurance Company, 245 Conn. 374, 381 (1998). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under the applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hurley v. Heart Physicians P.C., 278 Conn. 305, 314, 898 A.2 777 (2006).
"A motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any issues exist. Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988). Summary judgment "is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 751, 660 A.2d 810 (1995). "[A] summary disposition . . . should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party." (Intemal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 752. "[A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." Id.
"A genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact . . . and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 378, 260 A.2d 596 (1969). "[T]he `genuine issue' aspect of summary judgment procedure requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 378-79. "Issue of fact encompasses not only evidentiary facts in issue but also questions as to how the trier would characterize such evidentiary facts and what inferences and conclusions it would draw from them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
ANALYSIS
The court begins with Hiltbrand's claim that Crowley is precluded from presenting its arguments by res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action. Gateway, Kelso Co. v. West Hartford No. 1, LLC, 126 Conn.App. 578, 583-84 (2011). Likewise, res judicata, or claim preclusion prohibits the relitigation of a claim that claim was already decided or might have been made in another action. DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 123 Conn.App. 583, 590, 2 A.3d 963 (2010). Crowley's arguments are not barred by either collateral estoppel or res judicata as neither is applicable.
What does apply is the doctrine of "the law of the case." The law of the case doctrine provides that "[w]here a matter has previously been ruled upon interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if it is of the opinion that the issue was correctly decided, in the absence of some new or overriding circumstance . . . A judge is not bound to follow the decisions of another judge made at an earlier stage of the proceedings, and if the same point is again raised he has the same right to reconsider the question as if he had himself made the original decision . . . [O]ne judge may, in a proper case, vacate, modify, or depart from an interlocutory order or ruling of another judge in the same case, upon a question of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) General Electric Capital Corp. v. Rizvi, 113 Conn.App. 673, 681, 971 A.2d 41 (2009).
I.
As to the first issue, whether or not there is an exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions of General Statutes § 31-284(a) as the Supreme Court found in Ferryman, the issue of independent legal relationship between Crowley and Hiltbrand must be resolved. Crowley reasserts its argument that Hiltbrand has not pleaded any information about an independent legal relationship. The court, Pittman, J., has resolved this issue by declaring that Hiltbrand has alleged "the precise elements required by the holding in Ferryman." 156.01, Memorandum of Decision on Motion to Strike. That is the law of the case.
To be successful on a motion for summary judgment, Crowley would have to establish that, as to the allegation of an independent legal relationship as alleged in the counterclaim, there is no genuine issue of material fact. It has not done so. Although Crowley asserts that Hiltbrand "has failed to identify any contractual obligation regarding indemnity" and "no contractual relationship exists between the parties," Crowley bears the burden of showing that this issue in not in dispute. Crowley has not met that burden.
Hiltbrand claims the independent legal relationship arises from a contract. There is a dispute as to the existence of such contract. Ken Crowley of Crowley testified that there was no contract. Robert Hiltbrand of Hiltbrand testified that there was. Both testimonies are contained in 192.00, Crowley's Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment, Exhibit C. There is a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was an independent legal relationship between these two parties and if an obligation to indemnify arose from that relationship. Hiltbrand's claim of indemnification arises out of this alleged contract.
If Crowley's assertion that there was no independent legal duty was uncontested, summary judgment may be appropriate. However, that assertion is claimed by Hiltbrand in its counterclaim and each party's principal has testified differently. Therefore, the court cannot determine as a matter of law that there was in existence an independent duty or implied promise of indemnity. Ferryman, supra, 212 Conn. at 144-45.
II.
The second issue, applicability of attorneys fees, costs and expenses is not properly the subject of a motion for summary judgment. It is, and was, more properly the subject of a motion to strike. Upon that issue, the court, Pittman, J., has ruled and that also is the law of the case. General Electric Capital Corp. v. Rizvi, supra.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER:
The defendant Crowley's motion for summary judgment (192.00) is denied. The counterclaimant Hiltbrand's objection (194.00) to the motion is sustained.