It is logical to infer that the papers made the footing more slippery than the normal floor surface, thereby causing the fall. Although not on all fours factually, Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497 [ 259 P.2d 1010] supports the view that the jury could logically have concluded the fall resulted from the loose papers. In the MacFarlane case plaintiff fell and immediately afterward felt a sticky substance on her hands.
[10] In Dunn v. Pacific Gas Elec. Co., supra, 43 Cal.2d 265, 278-279, it was held that an absence of eyewitnesses and evidence as to the manner in which the accident occurred was not fatal to plaintiff's case. [11] In Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010], where a judgment of nonsuit was reversed, and where there were no eyewitnesses, it was said: "`It is not necessary, in order to establish a theory by circumstantial evidence, that the facts be such and so related to each other that such theory is the only conclusion that can fairly or reasonably be drawn therefrom. . . .'" ( Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 36 Cal.App.2d 602, 617 [ 98 P.2d 239].) [12] "The plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence does not have to exclude the possibility of every other reasonable inference possibly derivable from the facts proved.
b silento! (For statements and restatements of the rule, see: Schaufele v. Doyle (1890), 86 Cal. 107 [ 24 P. 834]; Archibald Estate v. Matteson (1907), 5 Cal.App. 441 [ 90 P. 723]; Hercules Oil etc. Co. v. Hocknell (1907), 5 Cal.App. 702 [ 91 P. 341]; Leitch v. Marx (1913), 21 Cal.App. 208 [ 131 P. 328]; Fildew v. Shattuck Nimmo W. Co. (1918), 39 Cal.App. 42 [ 177 P. 866]; Scott v. Sciaroni (1924), 66 Cal.App. 577 [ 226 P. 827]; Dawson v. Tulare Union High Sch. (1929), 98 Cal.App. 138 [ 276 P. 424]; Nicholas v. Jacobson (1931), 113 Cal.App. 382 [ 298 P. 505]; Green v. Newmark (1933), 136 Cal.App. 32 [ 28 P.2d 395]; Cash v. Los AngelesRy. Corp. (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d 738 [ 45 P.2d 280]; Estate ofCushing (1939), 30 Cal.App.2d 340 [ 86 P.2d 375]; Knecht v. Lombardo (1939), 33 Cal.App.2d 447 [ 91 P.2d 917]; Kersten v. Young (1942), 52 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 125 P.2d 501]; Estate ofRabinowitz (1943), 48 Cal.App.2d 106 [ 135 P.2d 579]; MacDonald v. Jackson (1953), 117 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 256 P.2d 591]; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies (1953), 119 Cal.App.2d 497 [ 259 P.2d 1010]; Lehman v. Richfield Oil Corp. (1953), 121 Cal.App.2d 261 [ 263 P.2d 13]; and, more recently, Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal.2d 92 [ 272 P.2d 26]; Dunn v. Pacific Gas Elec. Co., 43 Cal.2d 265 [ 272 P.2d 745]; McBride v. Atchison, T. S.F. Ry. Co., 44 Cal.2d 113 [ 279 P.2d 966]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d 310 [ 282 P.2d 12]; Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal.2d 30 [ 286 P.2d 21]; Raymond v. Independent Growers, Inc., 133 Cal.App.2d 154 [ 284 P.2d 57]; Hale v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 Cal.App.2d 124 [ 276 P.2d 118]; Copeland v. Rabing, 110 Cal.App.2d 631 [ 243 P.2d 119]; Finley v. City County of SanFrancisco, 115 Cal.App.2d 116 [ 251 P.2d 687]; Turner v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 117 Cal.App.2d 109 [ 254 P.2d 970]; Zar v. Alafetich, 126 Cal.App.2d 643 [ 272 P.2d 922]; Weber v. Marine Cooks' Stewards' Assn., 123 Cal.App.2d 328 [ 266 P.2d 801]; Markwell v. Swift Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 245 [ 272 P.2d 47]; Powell v. Jones, 133 Cal.App.2d 601 [ 284 P.2d 856]; Ka
An inference cannot be based on mere possibilities; it must be based on probabilities. ( People v. Mayo, supra, 194 Cal.App.2d at p. 536; People v. Berti (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 872 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 514]; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010].) With these rules in mind, we turn to the evidence appellants submitted in opposition to the motion.
(Cf. Dougherty v. Lee, 74 Cal.App.2d 132 [ 168 P.2d 54]; Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal.App.2d 43 [ 208 P.2d 445]; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497 [ 259 P.2d 1010].)
[7] Moreover, suspicion is not evidence; it merely raises a possibility and that is not sufficient basis for an inference of fact. ( Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010]; Brocato v. Standard Oil Co., 164 Cal.App.2d 749, 758 [ 331 P.2d 111]; Estate of Kuttler, 185 Cal.App.2d 189, 204, 205 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 160]; Estate of Teed, 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644 [ 247 P.2d 54].) In the Kuttler case, supra, it is said at page 204: "The Eramdjian case, supra [ 153 Cal.App.2d 590 ( 315 P.2d 19)], at page 602, says: "A legal inference cannot flow from the nonexistence of a fact; it can be drawn only from a fact actually established.
There is nothing better than speculation and conjecture to back up the argument of appellant that some other person may have done so, and it is well settled that a mere possibility is not evidence. ( Sanders v. McFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010]; Brocato v. Standard Oil Co., 164 Cal.App.2d 749, 758 [ 331 P.2d 111]; Estate of Kuttler, 185 Cal.App.2d 189, 204, 205 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 160]; Estate of Teed, 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644 [ 247 P.2d 54].) It does not appear probable that appellant's counsel had reasonable expectation of proving this suggested misconduct of the police or of doing more than reaping a favorable reaction in favor of appellant.
Where reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary that there be no possibility of deriving any other reasonable inference from the evidence. ( Johnson v. Nicholson, supra, 159 Cal.App.2d 395, 405; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010].) [16] From the conditions and circumstances shown by the record in the present case the inference could reasonably be drawn that a spark emanating from the machine was the cause of the ignition; such a result was one reasonably to be anticipated.
A mere possibility is not an inference and multiplication of possibilities does not create one. "`Whether a particular inference can be drawn from certain evidence is a question of law, but whether the inference shall be drawn, in any given case, is a question of fact for the jury.' [Citation.] An inference cannot be based on mere possibilities; it has been held that it must be based on probabilities. [Citations.] This accords with the general principle, enunciated more than once by this court, that in civil cases the rule of decision is a rule of probability only. [Citations.]" ( Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010].) "Liability is never premised upon purely speculative assumptions.
( Spolter v. Four-Wheel Brake Serv. Co., 99 Cal.App.2d 690, 693 [ 222 P.2d 307]; Wirz v. Wirz, 96 Cal.App.2d 171, 175 [ 214 P.2d 839, 15 A.L.R.2d 1129].)" ( Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010]; see also Brocato v. Standard Oil Co., 164 Cal.App.2d 749, 758 [ 331 P.2d 111]; Robinson v. Board of Retirement, 140 Cal.App.2d 115, 118 [ 294 P.2d 724].) The trial judge was not required to accept the opinion of Captain Halter as the basis for a factual finding that the fire was caused by spontaneous ignition eventually resulting from the contact of inflammable liquid, which had leaked from its container, with some combustible material.