Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies

42 Citing cases

  1. McKenney v. Quality Foods, Inc.

    156 Cal.App.2d 349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)   Cited 11 times
    In McKenney, a customer (plaintiff) was shopping in defendant's grocery store when she slipped and fell on a piece of lettuce that was on the floor near checkstand number 5. "About five minutes before the accident, the attendant at checkstand number 5 removed lettuce or cabbage leaves from merchandise she was ringing up on the cash register."

    It is logical to infer that the papers made the footing more slippery than the normal floor surface, thereby causing the fall. Although not on all fours factually, Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497 [ 259 P.2d 1010] supports the view that the jury could logically have concluded the fall resulted from the loose papers. In the MacFarlane case plaintiff fell and immediately afterward felt a sticky substance on her hands.

  2. Hilyar v. Union Ice Co.

    45 Cal.2d 30 (Cal. 1955)   Cited 52 times
    In Hilyar v. Union Ice Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 30 [ 286 P.2d 21], the court reversed a nonsuit in a five-and-one-half-year-old boy's action for injuries against the driver of an ice truck which struck the boy, even though the driver did not see the child and had warned children to stay away from the truck.

    [10] In Dunn v. Pacific Gas Elec. Co., supra, 43 Cal.2d 265, 278-279, it was held that an absence of eyewitnesses and evidence as to the manner in which the accident occurred was not fatal to plaintiff's case. [11] In Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010], where a judgment of nonsuit was reversed, and where there were no eyewitnesses, it was said: "`It is not necessary, in order to establish a theory by circumstantial evidence, that the facts be such and so related to each other that such theory is the only conclusion that can fairly or reasonably be drawn therefrom. . . .'" ( Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 36 Cal.App.2d 602, 617 [ 98 P.2d 239].) [12] "The plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence does not have to exclude the possibility of every other reasonable inference possibly derivable from the facts proved.

  3. Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp

    47 Cal.2d 509 (Cal. 1956)   Cited 96 times
    In Leonard, it was held that the res ipsa loquitur inference against a defendant was dispelled as a matter of law by a codefendant's testimony harmful to himself but favorable to the defendant, in the absence of any rational basis for disbelieving the testimony.

    b silento! (For statements and restatements of the rule, see: Schaufele v. Doyle (1890), 86 Cal. 107 [ 24 P. 834]; Archibald Estate v. Matteson (1907), 5 Cal.App. 441 [ 90 P. 723]; Hercules Oil etc. Co. v. Hocknell (1907), 5 Cal.App. 702 [ 91 P. 341]; Leitch v. Marx (1913), 21 Cal.App. 208 [ 131 P. 328]; Fildew v. Shattuck Nimmo W. Co. (1918), 39 Cal.App. 42 [ 177 P. 866]; Scott v. Sciaroni (1924), 66 Cal.App. 577 [ 226 P. 827]; Dawson v. Tulare Union High Sch. (1929), 98 Cal.App. 138 [ 276 P. 424]; Nicholas v. Jacobson (1931), 113 Cal.App. 382 [ 298 P. 505]; Green v. Newmark (1933), 136 Cal.App. 32 [ 28 P.2d 395]; Cash v. Los AngelesRy. Corp. (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d 738 [ 45 P.2d 280]; Estate ofCushing (1939), 30 Cal.App.2d 340 [ 86 P.2d 375]; Knecht v. Lombardo (1939), 33 Cal.App.2d 447 [ 91 P.2d 917]; Kersten v. Young (1942), 52 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 125 P.2d 501]; Estate ofRabinowitz (1943), 48 Cal.App.2d 106 [ 135 P.2d 579]; MacDonald v. Jackson (1953), 117 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 256 P.2d 591]; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies (1953), 119 Cal.App.2d 497 [ 259 P.2d 1010]; Lehman v. Richfield Oil Corp. (1953), 121 Cal.App.2d 261 [ 263 P.2d 13]; and, more recently, Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal.2d 92 [ 272 P.2d 26]; Dunn v. Pacific Gas Elec. Co., 43 Cal.2d 265 [ 272 P.2d 745]; McBride v. Atchison, T. S.F. Ry. Co., 44 Cal.2d 113 [ 279 P.2d 966]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d 310 [ 282 P.2d 12]; Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal.2d 30 [ 286 P.2d 21]; Raymond v. Independent Growers, Inc., 133 Cal.App.2d 154 [ 284 P.2d 57]; Hale v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 Cal.App.2d 124 [ 276 P.2d 118]; Copeland v. Rabing, 110 Cal.App.2d 631 [ 243 P.2d 119]; Finley v. City County of SanFrancisco, 115 Cal.App.2d 116 [ 251 P.2d 687]; Turner v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 117 Cal.App.2d 109 [ 254 P.2d 970]; Zar v. Alafetich, 126 Cal.App.2d 643 [ 272 P.2d 922]; Weber v. Marine Cooks' Stewards' Assn., 123 Cal.App.2d 328 [ 266 P.2d 801]; Markwell v. Swift Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 245 [ 272 P.2d 47]; Powell v. Jones, 133 Cal.App.2d 601 [ 284 P.2d 856]; Ka

  4. Aguimatang v. California State Lottery

    234 Cal.App.3d 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 75 times
    Rejecting appellants' references to trial briefs where they apparently expected the reviewing court "to ferret through 1,400 pages of summary judgment papers in order to locate the challenged evidence"

    An inference cannot be based on mere possibilities; it must be based on probabilities. ( People v. Mayo, supra, 194 Cal.App.2d at p. 536; People v. Berti (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 872 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 514]; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010].) With these rules in mind, we turn to the evidence appellants submitted in opposition to the motion.

  5. Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell

    70 Cal.App.3d 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 56 times

    (Cf. Dougherty v. Lee, 74 Cal.App.2d 132 [ 168 P.2d 54]; Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal.App.2d 43 [ 208 P.2d 445]; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497 [ 259 P.2d 1010].)

  6. People v. Tatge

    219 Cal.App.2d 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 21 times
    In People v. Tatge, 219 Cal.App.2d 430 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 323], the prosecutrix testified that when she visited defendant she had not missed her period, was not late and that she never discussed abortion with the defendant.

    [7] Moreover, suspicion is not evidence; it merely raises a possibility and that is not sufficient basis for an inference of fact. ( Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010]; Brocato v. Standard Oil Co., 164 Cal.App.2d 749, 758 [ 331 P.2d 111]; Estate of Kuttler, 185 Cal.App.2d 189, 204, 205 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 160]; Estate of Teed, 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644 [ 247 P.2d 54].) In the Kuttler case, supra, it is said at page 204: "The Eramdjian case, supra [ 153 Cal.App.2d 590 ( 315 P.2d 19)], at page 602, says: "A legal inference cannot flow from the nonexistence of a fact; it can be drawn only from a fact actually established.

  7. People v. Singer

    217 Cal.App.2d 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 9 times

    There is nothing better than speculation and conjecture to back up the argument of appellant that some other person may have done so, and it is well settled that a mere possibility is not evidence. ( Sanders v. McFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010]; Brocato v. Standard Oil Co., 164 Cal.App.2d 749, 758 [ 331 P.2d 111]; Estate of Kuttler, 185 Cal.App.2d 189, 204, 205 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 160]; Estate of Teed, 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644 [ 247 P.2d 54].) It does not appear probable that appellant's counsel had reasonable expectation of proving this suggested misconduct of the police or of doing more than reaping a favorable reaction in favor of appellant.

  8. Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co.

    205 Cal.App.2d 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 35 times
    In Varas, it was held that evidence, showing that the threads on the gas cap of an earth-compacting machine permitted oil and gas to spray onto the operator while other feasible threads would not, was sufficient to avoid a nonsuit in an action for personal injuries to the operator resulting from his catching fire due to the oil and gas on his body.

    Where reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary that there be no possibility of deriving any other reasonable inference from the evidence. ( Johnson v. Nicholson, supra, 159 Cal.App.2d 395, 405; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010].) [16] From the conditions and circumstances shown by the record in the present case the inference could reasonably be drawn that a spark emanating from the machine was the cause of the ignition; such a result was one reasonably to be anticipated.

  9. Scott v. Federal Life Ins. Co.

    200 Cal.App.2d 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 21 times
    In Scott v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 200 Cal.App.2d 384, 391-392 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 258], the court said: "Waiver and estoppel, however, are frequently applied in insurance law in favor of the insured or the beneficiary under a policy.

    A mere possibility is not an inference and multiplication of possibilities does not create one. "`Whether a particular inference can be drawn from certain evidence is a question of law, but whether the inference shall be drawn, in any given case, is a question of fact for the jury.' [Citation.] An inference cannot be based on mere possibilities; it has been held that it must be based on probabilities. [Citations.] This accords with the general principle, enunciated more than once by this court, that in civil cases the rule of decision is a rule of probability only. [Citations.]" ( Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010].) "Liability is never premised upon purely speculative assumptions.

  10. Gentleman v. Nadell Co.

    197 Cal.App.2d 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961)   Cited 7 times

    ( Spolter v. Four-Wheel Brake Serv. Co., 99 Cal.App.2d 690, 693 [ 222 P.2d 307]; Wirz v. Wirz, 96 Cal.App.2d 171, 175 [ 214 P.2d 839, 15 A.L.R.2d 1129].)" ( Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [ 259 P.2d 1010]; see also Brocato v. Standard Oil Co., 164 Cal.App.2d 749, 758 [ 331 P.2d 111]; Robinson v. Board of Retirement, 140 Cal.App.2d 115, 118 [ 294 P.2d 724].) The trial judge was not required to accept the opinion of Captain Halter as the basis for a factual finding that the fire was caused by spontaneous ignition eventually resulting from the contact of inflammable liquid, which had leaked from its container, with some combustible material.