Sanders v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta

20 Citing cases

  1. Cunningham v. Cunningham

    197 S.E.2d 731 (Ga. 1973)   Cited 1 times

    "`The law favors the vesting of estates at the earliest possible time; and where there are divesting clauses in a will, the law is disposed to give them such effect as to vest the estate indefeasibly at the earliest possible moment. Language doubtful in its meaning should not be construed to lessen the fee previously devised.' Crumley v. Scales, 135 Ga. 300, 308 ( 69 S.E. 531); Daniel v. Daniel, 152 Ga. 610 ( 110 S.E. 721); Sanders v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450, 452 ( 6 S.E.2d 294)." Busbee v. Haley, 220 Ga. 874, 878 ( 142 S.E.2d 786).

  2. Stringfellow v. Harman

    60 S.E.2d 139 (Ga. 1950)   Cited 8 times

    When the testator died, with Horace Stringfellow III in life, the plaintiff in error took at that time an interest vested in title, subject to open and let in afterborn brothers and sisters, and subject to be entirely defeated by the death of his mother without children surviving. See Sanders v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450 ( 6 S.E.2d 294); Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Spearman, 176 Ga. 236 ( 167 S.E. 603); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 197 Ga. 303 ( 29 S.E.2d 74); Sumpter v. Carter, 115 Ga. 893 ( 42 S.E. 324). The next significant event which occurred was the death of Horace Stringfellow's mother.

  3. Piccione v. ARP

    302 Ga. 270 (Ga. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    [Cit.]Sanders v. First Nat. Bank , 189 Ga. 450, 453 (1), 6 S.E.2d 294 (1939). The purpose of the anti-lapse statute is to "obviate the effect of lapse by carrying out what the legislature has presumed the testator's intent would have been as to the disposition of the [testamentary] gift had [the testator] foreseen the possibility that the taker named in the will would die during the [testator's] lifetime."

  4. Wood v. Roberts

    260 S.E.2d 890 (Ga. 1979)

    "We have repeatedly held that a remainder will never be construed to be contingent when it can be construed as vested. Miller v. Brown, 215 Ga. 148 ( 109 S.E.2d 741) (1959); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 197 Ga. 303, 315 ( 29 S.E.2d 74) (1944); Wills and Administration in Georgia, Redfearn, 1965 Ed. § 177. `If the estate in remainder be a defeasible fee, the law favors the construction which makes the fee absolute at the earliest time consistent with the intent of the testator, as expressed in the will.' Sanders v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450, 452 (1) ( 6 S.E.2d 294) (1939). Such presumption will give way only if there is a clear intent to make the interest subject to a contingency.

  5. Dunn v. Sanders

    256 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    In our opinion, this gives the daughter a defeasible remainder in fee subject to an executory limitation in favor of the nieces and nephews named in Item 9. See Wisse v. Anderson, 235 Ga. 255 ( 219 S.E.2d 393) (1975); McDonald v. Suarez, 212 Ga. 360 ( 93 S.E.2d 16) (1956); Scranton-Lackawanna Trust Co. v. Bruen, 206 Ga. 872 ( 59 S.E.2d 397) (1950); Sanders v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450 ( 6 S.E.2d 294) (1930); Starnes v. Sanders, 151 Ga. 632 ( 108 S.E. 37) (1921); Matthews v. Hudson, 81 Ga. 120 ( 7 S.E. 286) (1888). See generally Pindar, Ga. Real Estate Law, §§ 7-6, 7-56.

  6. Raney v. Smith

    251 S.E.2d 554 (Ga. 1979)   Cited 3 times

    Miller v. Brown, 215 Ga. 148 ( 109 S.E.2d 741) (1959); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 197 Ga. 303, 315 ( 29 S.E.2d 74) (1944); Wills and Administration in Georgia, Redfearn, 1965 Ed. § 177. "If the estate in remainder be a defeasible fee, the law favors the construction which makes the fee absolute at the earliest time consistent with the intent of the testator, as expressed in the will." Sanders v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450, 452 (1) ( 6 S.E.2d 294) (1939). Such presumption will give way only if there is a clear intent to make the interest subject to a contingency.

  7. Busbee v. Haley

    142 S.E.2d 786 (Ga. 1965)   Cited 6 times

    Language doubtful in its meaning should not be construed to lessen the fee previously devised." Crumley v. Scales, 135 Ga. 300, 308 ( 69 S.E. 531); Daniel v. Daniel, 152 Ga. 610 ( 110 S.E. 721); Sanders v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450, 452 ( 6 S.E.2d 294). From all of the language of the will it is plain that the point of determination of the beneficiaries under the will is the time of the division of the testator's estate, five years after the date of his death. "Estates by implication are not favored."

  8. Stephens v. Stephens

    130 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 1963)   Cited 5 times

    ephens is a valid, subsisting, executory trust, the life income beneficiary being Mrs. Grace Moore Stephens. They insist that the trust must remain executory because, under Code § 108-111, "something remains to be done by the trustee ... the doing of which requires him to retain the legal estate," to wit: the trustee is directed to exercise a discretion to encroach upon the corpus of the trust fund "to meet any emergency which might beset ... [Mrs. Grace Moore Stephens], or to maintain her in the manner in which she is accustomed to living." Plaintiffs in error urge that it was possible under some circumstances to create in Georgia in 1946 a subsisting, executory trust for an adult who was sui juris, citing the following cases: Edmondson v. Dyson, 2 Ga. 307 (2, 3), supra; George P. Thomas Co. v. Crawford, 57 Ga. 211 (1); Moore v. Sinnott, 117 Ga. 1010 (1, 2) ( 44 S.E. 810); Macy v. Hays, 163 Ga. 478, 487 ( 136 S.E. 517); Jackson v. Franklin, 179 Ga. 840 ( 177 S.E. 731, 97 ALR 1064); Sanders v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450 (3) ( 6 S.E.2d 294). None of the cases cited by plaintiffs in error supports their contention that the trust which W. P. Stephens intended to create by paragraph 6 of his will is a subsisting, executory trust.

  9. McDonald v. Suarez

    93 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1956)   Cited 13 times

    " P. 12, "Defeasible Fees," by Wm. H. Agnor. The essentials of a defeasible fee are that the devisee must first take an estate in fee, which may run indefinitely, subject to being defeated by some contingency which may occur after the devisee's estate has become vested. Sanders v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450 ( 6 S.E.2d 294). The right of the testator to place such a limitation upon an estate devised by his will is not such a condition repugnant to the estate granted, as is prohibited by Code § 85-903. See Kinard v. Hale, 128 Ga. 485 ( 57 S.E. 761).

  10. Love v. McManus

    67 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 1951)   Cited 4 times

    Burton v. Patton, 162 Ga. 610 (2) ( 134 S.E. 603), it is held: "Where a testator devises certain described realty to a named person as trustee for A `during her natural life, and after her death to her children then in life, and representatives of any children who may have died leaving children, the children of deceased child or children taking their father's or mother's share', the terms of the devise are broad enough to embrace the fee in the premises described and this fee being carved up into an estate for life in favor of one beneficiary and remainders in behalf of the other beneficiaries, who are uncertain and unascertained, the will should be construed as clothing the trustee with full title, and the title as to the remainders should be considered as abiding in the named trustee so long, at least, as the identical persons who are to take and enjoy it are not ascertainable. Up to that time the trust is executory, and the remainder is an equitable, not a legal, estate." See also Sanders v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450 ( 6 S.E.2d 294); Budreau v. Mingledorff, 207 Ga. 538 ( 63 S.E. 326), and cases there cited. The trial court did not err in holding that items 17 and 18 of the will created a valid executory trust rather than a passive and executed trust, and that the assignments executed by David Love and Lydia Jean Love McManus to Mrs. Charlotte J. Love did not cause a merger of interests and estates, and the trust to become executed.