Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CV-8153
July 31, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, upon consideration of Defendant's motion and Plaintiff's Response, this Court will grant Defendant's motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on August 22, 2002. Defendants removed this case to Federal Court on October 28, 2002. Plaintiff was employed by Pathmark Foods ("Pathmark") for two and half years and was a member of the "Local 1034 Union," and alleges in his complaint that the Defendants are liable to him for "the intentional tort of wrongful discharge via procedural discrimination." Plaintiff also alleges that under the collective bargaining agreement he is entitled to "specific procedural requirements" before Pathmark could terminate him. In his letter dated April 7, 2003, Plaintiff withdrew "any an [sic] all putative references to any collective bargaining contracts or procedures, with the exception of the conspiracy count alleged against the Union defendants; and is only suing for harassment, conspiracy, and corporate subterfuge." Plaintiff refused to participate in the arbitration hearing that was held on May 9, 2003, because he is "suing the administration that conducts those mock hearings and attacking that process." See Plaintiff Response to the Defendants' Counterclaim Against: Plaintiff's Request for Speedy Trial, Summary Judgment, Amend Complaint at 1 ¶ 1 (Doc. 10).
Corporate subterfuge means "any plan or trick to escape something unpleasant." THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WEBSTER'S CONCISE DICTIONARY (2002 ed.).
Defendants filed this motion on November 1, 2002, alleging that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) because the terms and conditions of his employment are covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Article 9 of the collective bargaining agreement states that termination of an employee is only for just and sufficient cause. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Exhibit A at 12). Article 10 sets forth the grievance and arbitration procedure to be applied "should differences arise as to the interpretation or meaning of the provisions of this Agreement." Id. Further, Article 10, step 4, provides if the "parties are unable to resolve the said grievance, it shall then be referred to an arbitrator, mutually selected by the parties or appointed in accordance with the then existing rules of the American Arbitration Association, if no mutual selection is made." Id. at 13.
DISCUSSION
The issue in this case is whether an employee covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that provides him with a contractual remedy for wrongful termination may enforce his state-law remedy "for harassment, conspiracy, and corporate subterfuge."
Section 301(a) of the LMRA of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
The Supreme Court has also stated that "Section 301 not only gives federal-court jurisdiction over controversies involving collective-bargaining agreements, but also `authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements.'" Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 401, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1880, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, L. Ed.2d 972 (1957)).
In Lingle, the Supreme Court addressed this issue, of whether an employee covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that provides her with a contractual remedy for discharge without just cause may enforce her state-law remedy for retaliatory discharge. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401. The petitioner was employed by a manufacturing plant in Herrin, Illinois. On December 5, 1984, she notified respondent that she had been injured in the course of her employment and requested compensation for medical expenses pursuant to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. On December 11, 1984, respondent discharged her for filing a "false worker's compensation claim." Id. The union representing petitioner promptly filed a grievance pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement. The agreement protected the employees from discharge except for "proper" or "just" cause, and established a procedure for the arbitration of grievances. Id. The arbitrator ruled in the petitioner's favor and ordered respondent to reinstate her with full backpay. Id. at 402.
On July 9, 1985, the petitioner filed an action against her employer alleging that she had been discharged for exercising her rights under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. Id. The District Court dismissed the complaint because it concluded that the "`claim for retaliatory discharge is `inextricably interwined' with the collective bargaining provision prohibiting wrongful discharge or discharge without just cause' and that allowing the state-law action to proceed would undermine the arbitration procedures set forth in the parties' contract." Id. at 402. The Court of Appeals agreed that the state-law claim was pre-empted by Section 301. The Supreme Court held that "the state-law remedy in this case is `independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of `independent' that matters for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at 407.
In this case, the Plaintiff is stating a claim for hostile work environment (i.e. harassment). Under Pennsylvania law, there is not a cause of action for intentional tort of wrongful discharge via procedural discrimination, corporate subterfuge, and conspiracy. While this Court recognizes that there are certain cases in which a Plaintiff's state law claims are not pre-empted by Section 301, this case does fall within the Lingle exception set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407. Plaintiff's state law claims are not independent of the collective-bargaining agreement and pre-empted by Section 301 of the LMRA. Plaintiff must follow article 10 of the collective bargaining agreement to have his grievances and wrongful termination resolved. If his grievances and wrongful termination are not resolved, then both parties must submit to an arbitration hearing under Article 10, step 4. Even if plaintiff could bring an action "independent of the collective-bargaining agreement" under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) for hostile work environment, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a formal complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC). Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, therefore, the Court will grant the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff, in essence, is alleging that the Defendants conspired to harass him.
In order to bring a civil action under the PHRA, a plaintiff must first file an administrative charge of discrimination with the PHRC within 180 days of the alleged act of discrimination. See 43 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 959(h) (West 2001).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, this Court will grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. An appropriate Order follows.