Arnolt, 52 Ill. 2d at 35, 282 N.E.2d at 148-49. However, where the evidence is undisputed or susceptible to only one possible interpretation, the question may be decided as a matter of law. Simpson v. City of Chicago, 233 Ill. App. 3d 791, 792, 599 N.E.2d 1043, 1044 (1992); Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill. App. 3d 356, 361, 714 N.E.2d 547, 551 (1999). The question as to what activities can be deemed to constitute executing or enforcing the law appears to have been determined on a case-by-case basis.

Arnolt, 52 Ill. 2d at 35, 282 N.E.2d at 148-49. However, where the evidence is undisputed or susceptible to only one possible interpretation, the question may be decided as a matter of law. Simpson v. City of Chicago, 233 Ill. App. 3d 791, 792, 599 N.E.2d 1043, 1044 (1992); Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill. App. 3d 356, 361, 714 N.E.2d 547, 551 (1999). The question as to what activities can be deemed to constitute executing or enforcing the law appears to have been determined on a case-by-case basis.

Accordingly, plaintiff has forfeited this issue. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill. App. 3d 356, 366, 714 N.E.2d 547, 555 (1999) (finding the plaintiff forfeited an issue on appeal where its argument contained only a conclusory statement that the trial court erred "because 'no contrary verdict based upon the evidence could stand' ").¶ 64 Even if plaintiff had properly presented an argument on the issue, we would find no error. Plaintiff filed its motion pursuant to section 2-1203 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2012)), asserting the trial court should grant rehearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment "to allow the court to take into consideration documentary evidence of the understanding and intent of then [c]ity manager Tom Hamilton stated at a public hearing November 17, 1986."

Accordingly, plaintiff has forfeited this issue. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill. App. 3d 356, 366, 714 N.E.2d 547, 555 (1999) (finding the plaintiff forfeited an issue on appeal where its argument contained only a conclusory statement that the trial court erred "because 'no contrary verdict based upon the evidence could stand' "). ¶ 65 Even if plaintiff had properly presented an argument on the issue, we would find no error. Plaintiff filed its motion pursuant to section 2-1203 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2012)), asserting the trial court should grant rehearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment "to allow the court to take into consideration documentary evidence of the understanding and intent of then [c]ity manager Tom Hamilton stated at a public hearing November 17, 1986." Essentially, plaintiff sought to present to the court "newly" discovered evidence.

" Hudson, 378 Ill.App.3d at 393, 317 Ill.Dec. 262, 881 N.E.2d 430.¶ 27 Likewise, in Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill.App.3d 356, 239 Ill.Dec. 628, 714 N.E.2d 547 (1999), a police officer heard an emergency call that another officer had been attacked. Shortly after the police officer proceeded to respond to the area in his squad car, the police dispatcher confirmed over the radio that the original officers involved did not need further backup.

The question of whether officers were executing or enforcing the law may be resolved by the court as a matter of law where the facts alleged support only one conclusion. Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill. App. 3d 356, 361, 714 N.E.2d 547 (1999). For example, a police officer responding to an emergency is considered to be executing or enforcing a law.

Illinois case law is unclear on what conduct by a driver of an emergency vehicle may qualify as willful and wanton. Simpson relies on two Illinois cases, both involving automobile accidents by officials responding to emergency calls, to support his contention that summary judgment was proper: Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill.App.3d 356, 239 Ill.Dec. 628, 714 N.E.2d 547 (1999) and Hampton v. Cashmore, 265 Ill.App.3d 23, 202 Ill.Dec. 237, 637 N.E.2d 776 (1994). Sanders, however, is inapposite.

One Illinois Appellate Court has held that section 11-205 establishes a standard of ordinary care and that this standard trumps section 2-202 in the case of a law enforcement officer driving an emergency vehicle. Bradshaw v. City of Metropolis, 293 Ill. App.3d 389, 688 N.E.2d 332, 335 (5th Dist. 1997). Though the majority of the Illinois Appellate Courts have held that section 2-202, not section 11-205, supplies the governing standard with respect to law enforcement officers engaged in enforcing the law, see Young v. Forgas, 308 Ill. App.3d 553, 720 N.E.2d 360, 364-65 (4th Dist. 1999); Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill. App.3d 356, 714 N.E.2d 547, 552-53 (1st Dist. 1999); Carter v. DuPage County Sheriff, 304 Ill. App.3d 443, 710 N.E.2d 1263, 1267-68 (2d Dist. 1999), Bradshaw illustrates the point that the two statutes do not necessarily point in the same direction. Even if section 11-205 sets a recklessness standard, it imposes conditions not found in section 2-202: the emergency vehicle driver must be responding to an emergency call, may proceed through a stop light only after he has slowed down to the extent necessary for safe operation, and may exceed the speed limit only if doing so does not endanger life or property — requirements that are lacking in section 2-202. Thus it appears that the two standards are not, in fact, equivalent.

Every other district of our appellate court has rejected this holding. Carter v. Du Page County Sheriff, 304 Ill.App.3d 443, 449–50, 238 Ill.Dec. 161, 710 N.E.2d 1263 (2d Dist.1999); Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill.App.3d 356, 363, 239 Ill.Dec. 628, 714 N.E.2d 547 (1st Dist.1999); Young v. Forgas, 308 Ill.App.3d 553, 560, 241 Ill.Dec. 905, 720 N.E.2d 360 (4th Dist.1999); Lanning v. Harris, 342 Ill.App.3d 965, 967–68, 277 Ill.Dec. 581, 796 N.E.2d 667 (3d Dist.2003). We do likewise.

Every other district of our appellate court has rejected this holding. Carter v. Du Page County Sheriff, 304 Ill. App. 3d 443, 449-50 (2d Dist. 1999); Sanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill. App. 3d 356, 363 (1st Dist. 1999); Young v. Forgas, 308 Ill. App. 3d 553, 560 (4th Dist. 1999); Lanning v. Harris, 342 Ill. App. 3d 965, 967-68 (3d Dist. 2003). We do likewise.