Opinion
No. 2:19-cv-00092-KJM-DB
07-02-2020
CLARICE SANDERS-HOLLIS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Defendant California Department of Social Services moves to dismiss plaintiff Clarice Sanders-Hollis's first amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot., ECF No. 23. Plaintiff opposes the motion, Opp'n, ECF No. 25, and defendant has replied, Reply, ECF No. 28. On December 11, 2019, the court submitted the matter without hearing and resolves the motion here. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
In its moving papers, defendant notes that plaintiff erroneously names defendant as the State of California, Health and Human Services Agency, rather than its proper name California Department of Social Services. Mot. at 2 n.1. --------
I. DISCUSSION
The court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this matter and incorporates by reference its summary of the claims and applicable legal standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) articulated in its prior order granting defendant's motion to dismiss. See Prior Order at 1-2, ECF No. 18. Accordingly, the court proceeds directly to the issues raised in defendant's motion.
A. Exhaustion
Defendant's first motion to dismiss challenged the sufficiency of plaintiff's original complaint due to a lack of factual support, see ECF No. 3, and the court granted the motion for that reason, see generally Prior Order. Here, defendant contends that plaintiff's Title VII, ADEA and FEHA claims as currently alleged must be dismissed for failure to plead facts showing exhaustion of administrative remedies. Mot. at 4-6.
"Exhausting administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC or the appropriate state agency is a statutory pre-requisite for an employee to pursue litigation under both Title VII and the ADEA." Ramirez v. Kingman Hosp. Inc., 374 F. Supp. 3d 832, 854 (D. Ariz. 2019) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)); see Garcia v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1214-15 (E.D. Cal. 2006) ("Under California law, the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under FEHA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts." (citing Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 70 (2000)).
Here, the court need not address the administrative process by which a claim is adequately exhausted because the first amended complaint is devoid of factual allegations that plaintiff did in fact exhaust her administrative remedies. See generally First Am. Compl. ("FAC"), ECF No. 22. The complaint contains only the bare allegation that plaintiff "has received Right to Sue letters from the California Department of Fair Housing and Employment and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and has thus exhausted all necessary administrative remedies." FAC ¶ 24. This conclusory assertion fails to satisfy even the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). For example, the complaint fails to state the date on which plaintiff submitted her claims to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and California Department of Fair Housing and Employment, the charge numbers for those claims, or the dates on which she received her right to sue letters from those agencies. Because exhaustion is jurisdictional, the complaint must contain, at a minimum, sufficient detail to assure the court it has jurisdiction to consider the matter before it. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Exhaustion of administrative remedies under Title VII requires that the complainant file a timely charge with the EEOC, thereby allowing the agency time to investigate the charge." (emphasis added)). The conclusory allegations here provide the court no means of evaluating whether the administrative, and thus jurisdictional, prerequisites of plaintiff's claims have been satisfied. For this reason, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff's Title VII, ADEA and FEHA claims encompassing all nine causes of action are dismissed.
B. Leave to Amend
Despite the first amended complaint's lack of detail, plaintiff's opposition indicates she can cure the ills described above. See Opp'n at 5 ("Plaintiff can easily plead these facts, parties, individuals, the contents and dates of the DFEH/EEOC charges and subsequent events, the contents of dates of the DFEH/EEOC right to sue letters, and any other factual detail required."). Accordingly, plaintiff is granted one final opportunity to amend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ("The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.").
II. CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 23, is GRANTED, and plaintiff is granted one final opportunity to amend. Plaintiff's second amended complaint shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 2, 2020.
/s/_________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE