Opinion
6:23-cv-01745-MK
05-10-2024
DEBORAH SANDERL, an individual; NATALIE STRONG, an individual; STEPHANIE CAMPBELL, an individual; TRACEY CONNELL, an individual; LISA CARCHIDI, an individual; WENCESLINA CARNAHAN, an individual; WILLIAM CECRLE, an individual; JENESSA HUDSON-SCHILLING, an individual; ANNA JOHNSON, an individual; JONATHAN RIEKKOLA, an individual; ELIZABETH SCHULZ, an individual; HEIDI SHARP, an individual; JOHANNAH STEPHENS, an individual; MISKA STORY, an individual; KELLY TELFER, an individual; WILLIAM VANDERMEER, an individual; REBECCA WARD, an individual; ALISON HOCKER, an individual; SAREN LOVE, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. ST. CHARLES HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., a corporation, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs filed this action against their employer St. Charles Health System, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging state and federal law claims of employment discrimination. Pls.'s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73,79, 82, ECF No. 16. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11), Defendant's Motion to Strike the Declaration of Caroline Janzen (ECF No. 18), and Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19). For the reasons below, Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint should be granted. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike the Declaration of Caroline Janzen should then be stayed pending resolution of the court's acceptance of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are accepted as true for the purpose of this Findings and Recommendation.
I. Factual Background
All Plaintiffs worked for Defendant in the healthcare field. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 9, 12, 16, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 44, 47, 50, 54, 57, 60, 63, 67, ECF No. 16. On August 4, 2021, Governor Brown announced a mandate that all health care workers must be fully vaccinated or subject to weekly COVID-19 testing. The Oregon Health Authority subsequently determined that weekly testing would not be sufficiently effective in addressing patient and coworker safety risks, and the mandate was changed to require that all health care workers be fully vaccinated. In the summer of 2021, Defendant allegedly “imposed a vaccine mandate to its employees.” Id. at ¶ 7. In November 2021, the U.S. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services imposed a nationwide vaccine mandate for healthcare workers. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the federal vaccine mandate and affirmed that the vaccine was “necessary to promote and protect patient health and safety.” Biden v. Missouri, 595 U.S. 87, 93 (2022).
Both the state and federal vaccine mandates allowed for exceptions based on religious or disability-related accommodation requests but required that such accommodations not pose a health risk to others, primarily patients and coworkers. Accordingly, Defendant “permitted employees to apply for religious or medical exceptions to the vaccine.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 7.
All Plaintiffs allege they hold “sincere and profound religious beliefs that prevent them from being able to take the available COVID-19 vaccines.” Id.; see Id. at ¶¶ 9, 13, 18, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 45, 48, 51, 55, 58, 61, 64, 68 (describing Plaintiffs' individual religious beliefs). All Plaintiffs also allegedly applied for religious exemptions to the vaccine mandate. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 13, 18, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 45, 48, 51, 55, 58, 61, 64, 68. Additionally, Plaintiff Sanderl applied for a medical exemption “due to past medical complications.” Id. at ¶ 9. Most of Plaintiffs' exemption requests were granted, but instead of accommodating Plaintiffs, Defendant allegedly terminated Plaintiffs or encouraged them to resign. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 13, 18, 22, 25, 28, 31, 37, 40, 43, 45, 48, 51, 55, 58, 61, 64, 68. Before Plaintiffs' terminations, Defendant also placed Plaintiffs on unpaid leave. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 13, 18, 22, 25, 31, 37, 40, 43, 45, 48, 51, 58, 61, 64, 68. Unlike the other Plaintiffs, Plaintiff Hudson-Schilling's request was denied, and she was terminated. Id. at ¶ 34. Plaintiff Hudson-Schilling alleges that Defendant told her that her request was denied because “she did not seem to have a religious belief and it seemed more like a personal or medical belief.” Id.
II. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs Deborah Sanderl, Natalie Strong, Stephanie Campbell, and Tracey Connel first filed suit in Deschutes County Circuit Court on August 21, 2023, alleging state law claims of employment discrimination based on religious faith and disability. Notice Removal 13-15, ECF No. 1. On October 24, 2023, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a federal law claim of employment discrimination. Id. at 40-41. On November 27, 2023, Defendant removed to this Court, asserting federal question jurisdiction of the federal law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction of the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). Id. at 3-4.
On January 26, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Connel's federal law claim and Plaintiff Sanderl's state law, disability discrimination claim. Mot. Dismiss 2, 11, ECF No. 11. On February 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss attaching a declaration from Plaintiffs' attorney. Pls.' Resp. Mot. Dismiss 8, ECF No. 14; Decl. Caroline Janzen 2, ECF No. 15. The Declaration stated Plaintiff Connel received her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) letter on July 26, 2023, allegedly undermining Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Connel's claim. Decl. Caroline Janzen 2. On February 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, which joined 15 new Plaintiffs and stated a federal employment discrimination claim for all Plaintiffs. Pls.' Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 44, 47, 50, 54, 57, 60, 63, 67, 82. Plaintiffs did not seek Defendant's written consent nor the court's leave to amend the operative Complaint. Pls.' Resp. Mot. Strike Second Am. Compl. 3, ECF No. 20. On February 22, 2024, Defendant filed its Reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 17, and filed a Motion to Strike the declaration from Plaintiffs' attorney in support of Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Def.'s Reply ECF No. 17; Mot. Strike Decl. Caroline Janzen 4. On March 1, 2024, Defendant filed its Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Mot. Strike Pls.' Second Am. Compl. 3.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Motions to Strike - Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f)
A court may strike from a pleading “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). The purpose of Rule 12(f) is to help “avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994)). The disposition of a motion to strike is within the discretion of the district court. See Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Gemini Mgmt., 921 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1990). However, motions to strike are generally disfavored and infrequently granted. See Bogazici Hava Tasimaciligi A.S. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 932 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991).
Courts may not resolve disputed and substantial factual or legal issues in deciding a motion to strike. Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973. “A motion to strike should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Levi v. Chapman, No. 6:22-CV-01813-MK, 2023 WL 3412894, at *1 (D. Or. May 12, 2023) (citations omitted).
II. Motion to Dismiss - Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Los Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017). A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
If a motion to dismiss is granted, the “court should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (following a motion to dismiss, “a district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”) (quotation omitted)).
III. Leave to Amend - Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides:
“(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e) or (f), whichever is earlier.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
Leave to amend should be liberally granted. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see Chodos v. W. Publ'g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that is it generally the Ninth Circuit's policy to grant leave to amend with “extreme liberality”). Specifically, without “any apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bath faith or dilatory motive on a part of [Plaintiffs], repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave [to amend], as the rules require, should be ‘freely given.'” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves the Court to strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and the Declaration of Caroline Janzen. Mot. Strike Pls.' Second Am. Compl. 2; Mot. Strike Decl. Caroline Janzen 4. Additionally, Defendant moves to dismiss claims within Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, arguing Plaintiff Connel's federal law claim is “time-barred” and Plaintiff Sanderl failed to “adequately allege she is a qualified individual with a disability” and state her claim. Mot. Dismiss 2.
I. Motions to Strike
Defendant moves the Court to strike both: (1) Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and (2) the Declaration of Caroline Janzen. Mot. Strike Pls.' Second Am. Compl. 2; Mot. Strike Decl. Caroline Janzen 2. The Court addresses each motion in turn.
a. Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for three reasons: (1) Plaintiffs did not seek Defendant's consent nor leave to amend to file under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15; (2) Plaintiffs filed both a response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the Second Amended Complaint; and (3) Plaintiffs failed to provide a redlined copy of the proposed amendments as required by LR 15-1(b). Mot. Strike Pls.' Second Am. Compl. 3-4. The Court finds that Plaintiffs did not need leave of the Court or Defendant's consent to file the Second Amended Complaint and nothing prohibits a plaintiff from filing both a response to a motion and an amended complaint; but Defendant's motion to strike should be granted because Plaintiffs failed to comply with LR 15-1(b).
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint in state court, under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, and a Second Amended Complaint after Defendant removed to this court. Notice Removal 40-41; Second Am. Compl. ¶ 88. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff can file an amended pleading as a matter of course 21 days after service of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B). In this case, Plaintiffs did so. Mot. Dismiss (served January 26, 2024); Second Am. Compl. (filed February 16, 2024). In asking the Court to strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Defendant asks the Court to find that amendments made in state court count as amendments for the purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). However, the Court is not aware of any controlling precedent that requires consideration of amendments made in state court. Because Plaintiffs are entitled to amend once as a matter of course under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B), Plaintiffs did not need leave to amend their Complaint at this juncture.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint should be stricken because “it is inconsistent to file both a Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the” Second Amended Complaint. Mot. Strike Pls.' Second Am. Compl. 3. Similarly, the Court is not aware of any controlling precedent that prohibits Plaintiffs from filing both a response to a motion to dismiss and an amended complaint. Defendant's citation to Contreras v. Gomez, 48 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1995) is unpersuasive. Mot. Strike Pls.' Second Am. Compl. 4. There, the Ninth Circuit held it was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss an action after the plaintiff failed to file either a second amended complaint or a response to the defendant's motion to dismiss. Nothing in Contreras prohibits a district court from allowing leave to amend despite already filling a response.
However, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint violates the Local Rules regarding filing an amended complaint by failing to attach a copy of the amended pleading edited to show how the amended pleading differs from the superseded pleading. LR 15-1(b) states:
(b) Exhibit Requirements for Amended Pleadings
A copy of the proposed amended or amended pleading that shows - through redlining, underlining, strikeouts, or other similarly effective methods - how the amended pleading differs from the operative or superseded pleading must be attached as an exhibit to:
(1) A motion for leave to file the amended pleading; or
(2) An amended pleading filed as a matter of course pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1) or with written consent of the opposing parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).
Self-represented persons who are in custody are exempted from the exhibit requirement.
Here, Plaintiffs admit “a lack of technical compliance with . . . the local rule.” Pls.' Resp. Mot. Strike Second Am. Compl. 3. Evident in Plaintiffs' discussion of their technical violation of the local rules, is a thinly veiled disregard for the rules. It appears to this Court that Plaintiffs do not believe rules apply to them. When filing their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs did not attach the redlined copy required by LR 15-1(b)(2). See Second Am. Compl. Because Plaintiffs failed to comply with LR 15-1(b)(2), Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint should be granted.
Plaintiffs have now filed an amended complaint “once as a matter of course” under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). If Plaintiffs seek to file another amended complaint, Plaintiffs now must file a motion or obtain Defendant's written consent under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). If Plaintiffs file a motion consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this District, then the Court will take it under advisement.
b. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Declaration of Caroline Janzen
Defendant also moves to strike the Declaration of Caroline Janzen, because the Declaration adds facts outside Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint but does not incorporate any document by reference nor allege facts that can be judicially noticed. Mot. Strike Decl. Caroline Janzen 3. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and the Declaration of Caroline Janzen both allege that Plaintiff Connel's EEOC letter was received on July 26th, 2023, which is relevant to Defendant's statute of limitations defense. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 23; Decl. Caroline Janzen 2. Since the Second Amended Complaint incorporates the facts of the Declaration of Caroline Janzen, Defendant's Motion to Strike should be stayed pending resolution of the Court's acceptance of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.
II. Motion to Dismiss
Additionally, Defendant moves to dismiss claims within Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. Mot. Dismiss 2, 5. When a complaint is amended, the “amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.” Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that a motion to dismiss a first amended complaint is moot after a second amended complaint has been filed) (citing Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir.1997) (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2012)). Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint should be stayed for 30 days to allow Plaintiffs to file a motion to amend their complaint if they choose to do so.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons above, Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19) should be GRANTED. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Declaration of Caroline Janzen (ECF No. 18) and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) should be STAYED for 30 days to allow Plaintiffs to file a motion to amend their complaint if they choose to do so. If Plaintiffs to do not file a motion to amend within 30 days of this Findings and Recommendation, the stay should be lifted and the Court will take under advisement Defendant's extant motions.
If Plaintiffs file a motion consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this District, then the Court will take it under advisement. If the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint, the Court will grant Defendant leave to supplement its motion to dismiss. If Plaintiffs file a motion to amend and the Court denies it, the Court will lift the stay on Defendant's motion to dismiss the first amended complaint and the motion to strike the declaration and take them under advisement.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).