Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-1956-R.
August 13, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Glenn R. Sandefer ("Sandefer") asserts claims against the City of Quinlan and Officer Terry McLain ("McLain") for (1) wrongful arrest and (2) use of excessive force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now before this Court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 10, 2001. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED and Sandefer's claims are DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
On June 25, 1999, Sandefer and his neighbor Loy Sewell ("Sewell") performed a controlled bur of debris on their properties in Hunt County, Texas. Sandefer and Sewell monitored the burn from Sandefer's van which was parked adjacent to the state road bordering the property. As he sat in his van and monitored the fire, Sandefer drank three to four beers, but he denies being intoxicated.
This property is located two and one half miles east of the City of Quinlan and four and one half miles west of the City of Tawakoni. The eight acres are bounded on the north by State Highway 276, on the west by Whisker's Road, and on the south by Pat's Point Road.
Johnny Finch ("Finch"), a volunteer firefighter with the City of West Tawakoni, noticed the fire and drove to the site for investigation. He approached the van to question Sandefer and Sewell and asked to see their drivers' licenses. Because Sandefer and Sewell perceived Finch as belligerent, they asked him to leave the premises. Finch complied, but during the short encounter reached the conclusion that Sandefer was intoxicated.
Later that evening the dispatcher for the City of West Tawakoni Volunteer Fire Department received a call unrelated to Finch's visit from a concerned citizen regarding the controlled bur. The dispatcher sent two members of the West Tawakoni Volunteer Fire Department, including Finch, to the scene. At the site, the two briefly watched Sandefer and Sewell in the van and then approached them for questioning. The firefighters requested to see their drivers' licenses and stated that they had called the police. Sandefer then admits to refusing to produce identification, instead turning on the van and driving thirty to fifty feet into the property, but denies striking anyone while moving the van. The firefighters, however, allege that one of the volunteers was struck by the side view mirror. Sewell left the property, and the firefighters returned to their vehicles.
Meanwhile, representatives of both the West Tawakoni Police Department and the Quinlan Police Department, including Officers Knapp and McLain responded to the firefighters call for additional assistance and reported to the property. The police officers met with Finch and the other firefighter for a briefing of the situation. The firefighters told the officers that Sandefer refused to produce identification, appeared intoxicated, was drinking in his van, and had assaulted them when moving his van. According to Sandefer, McLain then approached the van and identified himself as a police officer. The officers dispute this fact and instead offer evidence that Officer Knapp, a reserve officer with the Quinlan Police Department approached the van and engaged in the ensuing events. Sandefer asserts that McLain approached the van to ask Sandefer for identification and initially observed an odor of alcohol emanating from the van. The officer noted that Sandefer's speech was slurred and his eyes were bloodshot. Additionally, the front of Sandefer's pants appeared wet, and there was a slight smell of urine. Sandefer acknowledges that he refused to produce identification and instead remained in the van and began consuming another beer. McLain asked Sandefer to put the beer down, and after Sandefer refused, McLain asked him to step out of the van.
Sandefer declined and alleges that McLain then reached into the vehicle and pulled Sandefer from the van, pushed his head against the side of the van, and then pushed Sandefer face first into the terrain. The City of Quinlan contests this fact, instead alleging that Officer Knapp removed Sandefer from the van by grasping his arm and using an approved pressure point technique. According to Officer Knapp, the two fell because the terrain was rough and uneven, and it was difficult for both he and Sandefer to keep their balance. Sandefer further alleges that McLain then handcuffed him, pulled him from the ground, and placed him in the police car. Sandefer was then taken to the Quinlan Police Department and booked for public intoxication. As a result of these events, Sandefer received various scratches, bruises, and back pain.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass'n. of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). An issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988); Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633,640 (5th Cir. 1985). In addition, when both parties have submitted contradictory evidence, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. at 325. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. JURISDICTION
As a preliminary matter, Sandefer argues that McLain lacked jurisdiction for the arrest because he was not employed by Hunt County. However, under Texas law an officer has jurisdiction when making an arrest outside of his home jurisdiction so long as it is within a jurisdiction covered by a mutual aid agreement. Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The Cities of Quinlan and West Tawakoni, as well as Hunt County are parties to a Mutual Aid Law Enforcement Agreement which confers jurisdiction on a law enforcement officer to make arrests outside the jurisdiction in which he is employed if the arrest occurs within an area covered by the agreement. Sandefer alleges he was arrested in Hunt County by Officer McLain, a member of the Quinlan Police Department. Because Officer McLain was employed by the Quinlan Police Department, which subscribed to a mutual aid agreement, McLain acted with jurisdiction in arresting Sandefer in Hunt County, which also subscribed to the agreement.
C. OFFICER McLAIN
1. SANDEFER'S ALLEGATIONS
Sandefer alleges that McLain deprived him of equal protection of the law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by wrongfully arresting him and using excessive force during the arrest. McLain moves for summary judgment primarily on the grounds of qualified immunity. As secondary grounds for summary judgment McLain asserts (1) that he did not utilize force against Sandefer, (2) that he did not arrest Sandefer, (3) that even if he had arrested Sandefer, he had probable cause and lacked malice, (4) that Sandefer has failed to make a redressible action against McLain, (5) that McLain has official immunity, and (6) that Sandefer cannot claim punitive damages.
2. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary functions from liability "unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1995). The analysis of qualified immunity requires a two step process. First the court must determine if the plaintiff alleged a violation of a constitutional right. Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995). Second, if a constitutional violation is alleged, the court must decide if the conduct was objectively reasonable light of the clearly established law at the time the conduct occurred. Id. Law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly commit a constitutional violation are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hunger v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).
a. Wrongful Arrest
An individual has a federally protected right to be free from unlawful arrest and detention resulting in a significant restraint of liberty and violation of this right can be grounds for a suit under § 1983. See Dennis v. Warren, 779 F.2d 245,247 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest be supported by either a properly issued arrest warrant or probable cause. In Texas, a police officer may arrest without a warrant "persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show such person have been guilty of some felony . . . breach of the peace . . . or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the laws." Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon 2000). A party commits an assault if he intentionally or knowingly causes offensive or provocative physical contact with another. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01 (Vernon 1994).
Sandefer alleges that McLain wrongfully arrested him. Wrongful arrest is a constitutional violation, and Sandefer thus satisfies the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Therefore, the Court must determine if there is any possibility that a jury could find that McLain's conduct on June 25, 1999 was unreasonable. See Hale, 45 F.3d at 917. As Sandefer alleges that McLain arrested him, this court will proceed in its analysis assuming Sandefer's version of the facts. However, the Court here notes that city records indicate Officer Knapp rather than Officer McLain was responsible for any contact with Sandefer.
According to conversations with the firefighters from West Tawakoni as well as his own observations, Officer McLain had the following information about Sandefer when making the decision to arrest: (1) that Sandefer had been drinking in a motor vehicle, (2) that he refused to present identification, and (3) that someone had been struck when Sandefer moved his van. Sandefer himself admits that he refused to leave his van when instructed by law enforcement officers and that he refused to submit to other law enforcement questioning. Under the circumstances it is clear that McLain had probable cause to arrest Sandefer. See Gibson, 44 F.3d at 277-78 (disallowing judicial "second-guessing" of an officer who exercises reasonable discretion for arrest based on his perception of the circumstances of the scene). In order to succeed on a summary judgment motion for wrongful arrest on the basis of qualified immunity, McLain need not prove that his beliefs were correct, but rather that his actions were grounded in facts provided to him by a competent source. Here, Officer McLain witnessed Sandefer drinking in a motor vehicle and had determined that he would need to drive on a public roadway at some point in the near future to return home. His observations of Sandefer's intoxication were also supported by the report of earlier events he had received from other law enforcement officers. Further, Sandefer himself admits that he refused the officers' verbal attempts to determine his sobriety level. These circumstances indicate that Officer McLain's arrest of Sandefer on grounds of public intoxication was reasonable, and he is thus entitled to qualified immunity on Sandefer's wrongful arrest claim. See Glenn, 242 F.3d at 312.
b. Excessive Force
To succeed on an excessive force claim, the plaintiff must show (1) an injury (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff need not demonstrate a significant injury, but still must have suffered from some form of injury. Id. This injury must be more than de minimus and the court evaluates the injury in the context in which the force was deployed. Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314. Although a physical confrontation results whenever a detainee is searched or arrested by an officer, the resulting injuries do not always rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Williams, 180 F.3d at 704.
Sandefer complains that he received various scratches and bruises and experienced back pain as a result of being thrown to the ground by Officer McLain. The court must first determine if these injuries rise to the level of a constitutional violation. In Williams, the court held that loss of breath and dizziness from an alleged choking incident did not represent a cognizable injury. Id. at 703. Similarly, in Glenn, the court failed to find excessive force when the plaintiff alleged that the officer placed the handcuffs on her too tightly thereby causing her wrist to swell. Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314. A second choking, however, can be sufficient to assert a constitutional violation when motivated entirely by malice and when the force is not legitimately exercised in the context of a police officer's duties. Williams, 180 F.3d at 704. Furthermore, in the Fifth Circuit what constitutes an injury in an excessive force claim is subjective and must be "defined entirely by the context in which the injury arises." Id.
Sandefer's complaint, affidavit, and deposition allege that he received various scratches and bruises while McLain tried to place him under arrest. The Fifth Circuit requires this Court to evaluate the excessive force claim in the context in which the injuries arose. Sandefer acknowledges that he was pulled from the van only after he refused to answer the officer's verbal questions. Officer McLain, however, still had an obligation to protect the public safety and investigate Sandefer's intoxication. Since McLain could not secure verbal compliance or compel Sandefer to voluntarily exit his vehicle, he was forced to pull Sandefer from the van to determine his level of intoxication. When an officer pulls a suspect from a vehicle, scratches and bruises will not be uncommon; these physical confrontations do not necessarily constitute constitutional injuries. Under these circumstances, McLain did not act with malice, but rather took the actions he deemed necessary to protect the public safety. In the context of the encounter between Sandefer and McLain, one which occurred without malice and only after Sandefer refused to cooperate, Sandefer's injuries fail to rise to the level of a constitutional violation discussed in Williams. See Williams, 180 F.3d at 703.
Sandefer also alleges this incident led to severe back pain. If supported by proper evidence, severe back pain resulting from an officer's contact with an arrestee could be an injury of constitutional concern. However, Sandefer's evidence fails to establish that this injury resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need, and, therefore, he fails the second prong of the Williams test. See id. At the summary judgment stage, there should be evidence in the record supporting Sandefer's allegations that the severe back pain was a direct result of McLain's contact. Instead, the record shows that Sandefer experienced frequent and severe back pain prior to the accident, and he has proffered no medical evidence that indicates his condition was worsened after his encounter with McLain. Even if these pains constitute an injury, Sandefer has failed to demonstrate that the injury in question resulted only from McLain's alleged excessive force. Sandefer therefore fails to establish a prima facie case, and McLain is entitled to qualified immunity for the entire excessive force claim as well.
C. CITY OF QUINLAN
1. SANDEFER'S ALLEGATIONS
Sandefer alleges that the City of Quinlan knowingly, recklessly, or with gross negligence failed to instruct, supervise, control and discipline Officer McLain in his duties to refrain from (1) harassing a citizen acting in accordance with the law, (2) arresting a citizen acting lawfully, (3) assaulting and beating a citizen, (4) conspiring to violate Sandefer's rights, and (5) otherwise depriving Sandefer of his constitutional rights and privileges. A governmental entity can be sued and subjected to monetary damages and injunctive relief under § 1983 only if its official policy or custom causes a person to be deprived of a federally protected right. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). However, if a "plaintiff has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force" is moot. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). The City of Quinlan has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that lack of a constitutional deprivation by McLain precludes Sandefer's claims. Alternatively, the city argues (1) that it is not liable under respondeat superior, (2) that the incident did not arise from a constitutionally deficient custom, policy, or practice, (3) that there were no constitutional deficiencies, (4) that Sandefer has failed to make a redressible action, (5) sovereign immunity, and (6) inability to claim punitive damages.
2. LACK OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION PRECLUDES SANDEFER'S CLAIMS.
In Texas, probable cause is determined by the concrete factual situation presented in each individual case. Hooper v. State, 516 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975). Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information would lead of man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that he will find the instrumentalities or evidence pertaining to a crime. Id. Before making the arrest, McLain was told that Sandefer was drinking in a motor vehicle, that he refused to produce identification, and that he had struck a volunteer firefighter when moving his van. With this information, it could not have been unreasonable for McLain to believe that there was probable cause to arrest Sandefer. In Texas, this belief suffices to create actual probable cause for Sandefer's arrest. Furthermore, as previously discussed, Sandefer has failed to establish the prima facie case of excessive force. Therefore, from the arrest and the surrounding circumstances, Sandefer did not encounter any constitutional deficiencies.
Without deprivation of a federally protected right, an essential element of element of municipal liability is missing.Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir. 1997). Even if a certain municipal policy were found to be unconstitutional, a plaintiff suffering no constitutional harm cannot prevail. Id.; See also City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). As this Court has already determined that Officer McLain had probable cause for Sandefer's arrest and that he did not engage in the use of excessive force, Sandefer's allegations of constitutional violations have been undermined. The Court need not reach the question of whether or not the City of Quinlan failed to instruct, supervise, control and discipline Officer McLain in his duties as a police officer and therefore, must grant summary judgment to the City of Quinlan regarding Sandefer's § 1983 claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, McLain and the City of Quinlan's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Sandefer's claims are DISMISSED.