Opinion
No. SPNH 9610-48736
March 10, 1997
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REARGUE
In addition to the reasons given in my February 18, 1997 memorandum of decision, the instant case is distinguishable from DiCostanzo v. Tripoli, 137 Conn. 513, 515 (1951), on which the defendant relies, and from the cases cited in DiCostanzo — Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603 (1950), and Wittenberg v. Brown, 6 Conn. Sup. 326 (1938) — in that here, the rent did not have to be agreed upon, expressly or implicitly, each month. Rather paragraph 20 of the lease fixed the rent for every month during which the defendant held over. In the context of these facts, the plaintiff's demand for increased rent was, at best, an offer which the defendant was free to reject, and did. This, however, left the rent which had been fixed pursuant to paragraph 20, as well as the month-to-month tenancy itself, extant.
Paragraph twentieth states: "In the event that the Tenant shall remain in the demised premises after the expiration of the term of this lease without having executed a new written lease with the Landlord, such holding over shall not constitute a renewal or extension of this lease. The Landlord may, at its option, elect to treat the Tenant as one who has not removed at the end of his term, and at its option, to construe such holding over as a tenancy from month to month, subject to all the terms and conditions of this lease, except as to the duration thereof, and in that event the Tenant shall pay monthly rent in advance at the rate provided herein as effective during the last month of the demised term."
Moreover, if the "lapse of time" ground in the notice to quit were invalid as the defendant claims, the first ground stated in the notice to quit would be valid: "You originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated."
The motion to reargue is denied.
BY THE COURT
Bruce L. Levin Judge of the Superior Court