Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:01-CV-228-C
April 30, 2002
ORDER
Came to be considered on this day, Petitioner Carlos Ivan Sanchez's ("Petitioner") "Motion to Relief and to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3)" filed on November 27, 2001. Respondent United States of America ("Government") filed a "Response in Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and . . . Motion to Dismiss" with a brief in support thereof on January 25, 2002. Petitioner has bled a response and objections.
The Government has custody of Petitioner pursusat to a conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in criminal action no. 98-CR-757-01 in the United States District Court forte Southern District of Florida, Miami Division. Petitionerwas originally sentenced to 108 months' incarceration in a "sealed sentence," but on March 10, 2000, the sentencing court granted the Government's Rule 35 Motion to Reduce Sentence and reduced Petitioner's sentence to 66 mouths' imprisonment
Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the Big Spring Correctional Center Interstate Unit, a facility which contracts with the United States Bureau of Prisons, in Big Spring, Texas.
The Court understands Petitioner to raise the following grounds for review:
1. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has classified Petitioner as an "alien," which makes him ineligible for programs such as the Early Release Program, the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program, early release to a halfway house, assignment to a prison camp, and assignment to an industrial job with UNICOR, in violation of the constitutional right to equal protection.
2. Petitioner's counsel provided ineffective assistance at his plea of guilty because he failed to tell Petitioner that he would be deported as a result of this conviction and he failed w raise Petitioner's deportability as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
Sanchez states that this Court has jurisdiction over his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) because they concern the execution of his sentence and are being presented to a court in the district where he is incarcerated. Section 2241(c)(3) provides that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless. . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. . . ."
The United States Court of Appeals forte Fifth Circuit has determined that
[a] writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are distinct mechanisms for seeking post-conviction relief. A section 2.241 petition on behalf of a sentenced prisoner attacks the manner in which a sentence is carried out or the prison authorities' determination of its duration, and must be filed in the same district where the prisoner is incarcerated. A section 2255 motion, by contrast, `provides the primary means of collateral attack on a federal sentence.' Relief under section 2255 is warranted for errors cognizable on collateral review that occurred `at or prior to sentencing.' A section 2255 motion must be filed in the sentencing court.Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cox v. Warden, Federal Detention Ctr., 911 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1990)) (internal citations omitted).
To the extent that Sanchez is challenging the ineffective assistance of his counsel at his guilty plea and sentencing, the Court finds that he is challenging events which occurred at or before his sentencing and such claims must be raised in a motion under § 2255 in the district court where he was sentenced. See Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that although petitioner characterized his claim as a challenge to the legality of his detention under § 2241, he was actually challenging the manner in which his sentence was determined and the claim had to be raised in a § 2255 motion). Because Sanchez was sentenced in criminal action no. 98-CR-757-01 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or to construe his petition as a motion under § 2255. See Ojo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 106 F.3d 680, 683 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Although a § 2241 petition attacking matters within the province of § 2255 should be construed as a § 2255 petition, . . . a court without jurisdiction to hear a § 2255 petition can hardly be expected to do that"). Cf. Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d at 452 ("A section 2241 petition that seeks to challenge the validity of a federal sentence must either be dismissed or construed as a section 2255 motion.").
Because Sanchez was convicted and sentenced after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, he is subject to the statute of limitations enacted by the Act. Sanchez was sentenced on March 10, 2000, and his conviction became final on March 21, 2000, when the time expired for filing a direct appeal. Fed.R.App. p. 4(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as amended byte Act, Sanchez had to file his motion under § 2255 on or before March 21, 2001. Thus, even if the instant petition were construed to be a motion filed under § 2255, it was filed on November 27, 2001, over seven months alter the limitation period had expired.
As for Sanchez's complaints about the conditions of his incarceration, he has failed to show "a violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties" of the United States. Sanchez seeks to have his sentence shortened by "up to 12 months" because he has been denied the opportunities to participate in the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program and the industrial work program UNICOR; his alien status will prevent him from being assigned to a halfway house or a prison camp; and he has been denied due process and equal protection because the Bureau of Prisons "takes the position that aliens are ineligible for minimum-security classification."
"Congress has given federal prison officials full discretion to control" prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs in the federal prison system. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 8811.9 (1976) (citation omitted). Thus, "[p]risoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitation programs in federal prisons are not directly subject to `due process' protections." Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 49 (5th Cir. 1995). See United States v. Foote, Nos. 3:97-CR-263-R(01) and 3:99-CV-838-R, 2001 WL 671465, at 3 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 2001) ("A prisoner has neither a liberty nor a property interest in his security classification, which prison he will be housed in, or the amenities of prison life").
Sanchez also argues that because the Immigration and Naturalization Service has filed a detainer with the BOP, he is excluded from certain rehabilitation programs and eligibility for early release in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. This argument however, is without merit
Based on the discretion granted it under the statute, the BOP has categorically excluded from early release several groups of inmates who would otherwise be eligible under the statute. Prisoners who have an INS detainer filed against them are only one group. 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 (a)(1)(i). The regulation also categorically excludes: pretrial inmates, contractual boarders (such as inmates from the District of Columbia or the military), inmates with prior convictions of certain serious offenses, inmates ineligible for a later community based program determined according to the warden's professional discretion, and inmates whose current offense is a nonviolent felony under the statute but otherwise involved threats or risks of violence. 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 (a)(1).United States v. Lopez-Salas, 266 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the BOP, considers deportable aliens to be "a greater security risk" and therefore "subject to more onerous conditions of confinement. . . . Congress has virtually plenary power over immigration matters, and it has the right to determine the conditions upon which noncitizens are allowed to remain in this country." Id. at 849 n. 6 (quoting United States v. Navarro, 218 F.3d 895, 898 (8th Cir. 2000)). See Lato v. Attorney General of the United States, 773 F. Supp. 973, 977 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (noting that specialized groups such as aliens present security concerns because they present a greater risk of escape and are susceptible to harassment by citizen inmates). Thus, "excluding prisoners with detainers from participating in community-based treatment programs, and consequently from sentence reduction eligibility, is at least rationally related to the BOP's legitimate interest in preventing prisoners from fleeing detainers while participating in community treatment programs," and the distinctions based on alienage do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999). See Lato v. Attorney General of the United States, 773 F. Supp. at 977 ("Security and efficient management of resources are legitimate correctional concerns which are reasonably related to the orderly running of a prison and are not violative of an inmate's constitutional rights."); United States v. Foote, 2001 WL 671465, at *4 (finding that the BOP's "rule excluding prisoners with INS detainers from sentence reduction eligibility under the substance abuse treatment statute does not violate a prisoner's due process or equal action rights"). Accordingly, the Court finds that Sanchez has failed to demonstrate that he is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Sanchez's claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel should be dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction, but his claims regarding the conditions of his incarceration should be DENIED and dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
All relief not expressly granted is denied and any pending motions are denied.