Opinion
A153380
02-15-2018
DAVID SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 17013355) BY THE COURT:
Humes, P.J., Dondero, J., and Banke, J.
Petitioner David Sanchez is charged with murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and various drug and firearms offenses. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court challenging respondent superior court's order setting his bail at $1,000,000. The Attorney General agrees that Sanchez is entitled to a new bail hearing. As we explain, we will treat the petition as one for a writ of mandate and order issuance of a peremptory writ.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 31, 2017, the San Francisco District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging petitioner with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)); possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378); possession for sale of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351); possession of methamphetamine and cocaine with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)); and carrying a concealed firearm on his person (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(2)). Petitioner is also charged with enhancements for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)) and for personal infliction of great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The superior court initially set bail at $10,000,000, but after petitioner moved for a reduction in the amount, his bail was reduced to $1,000,000. Petitioner contended that he could not afford to post bail in that amount, but the superior court refused his request to reduce bail to $200,000. Defense counsel then requested that bail be set at $500,000, but the court refused a further reduction.
On November 6, 2017, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from the superior court. He contended that setting bail in an amount he could not afford amounted to a de facto detention order, and he argued that before imposing a financial condition on his release, the court was obligated to inquire into and take evidence concerning his ability to pay. Petitioner asserted that the failure to inquire into his financial condition violated his rights to equal protection and due process.
A preliminary hearing was held on November 13, 14, and 16, 2017, after which petitioner was held to answer on all charges. At the close of that hearing, defense counsel renewed petitioner's request for bail reduction. The court denied the request on grounds of public safety. The information was filed on November 27, 2017.
On January 8, 2018, the superior court denied petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Sanchez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court on January 18, 2018. As he did in the superior court, petitioner contended that jailing a person by imposing unattainable financial conditions violates the equal protection and due process clauses. He further contended that setting bail in an amount he could not pay amounted to a de facto detention order in violation of the due process clause.
After receiving the petition for writ of habeas corpus, we requested an informal response from the Attorney General. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(b)(1).) The Attorney General filed an informal response on January 29, 2018, and petitioner filed a reply on February 2.
In his informal response, the Attorney General took the position that petitioner is entitled to the relief sought in his habeas petition, i.e., a new bail hearing at which the court considers both petitioner's ability to pay the set amount of bail and alternative methods of ensuring petitioner's appearance at trial. The Attorney General further took the position that the superior court's imposition of unaffordable bail, without express findings that detention is the least restrictive available means to ensure petitioner's appearance at trial and/or to protect the victim and public safety, entitles petitioner to a new bail hearing.
On February 8, 2018, we issued an order noting that the parties appeared to agree that we should grant the relief requested in the petition. We requested that the parties file letter briefs stating whether they would waive issuance of an order to show cause, the filing of a return and traverse, and oral argument and stipulate to immediate issuance of the remittitur, if we chose to proceed by way of habeas corpus. Our February 8 order also notified the parties that we might construe the petition as one seeking a writ of mandate and proceed by issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180 (Palma).) Our order asked the parties to state whether they had any objection to our use of the Palma procedure and whether they would stipulate to an immediate issuance of the remittitur.
On February 13, 2018, the parties filed their letter briefs. Neither objects to the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in this case, and both have stipulated to immediate issuance of the remittitur.
DISCUSSION
In his petition, Sanchez seeks either an order releasing him on his own recognizance or an expedited bail hearing at which the court considers both his ability to pay the set amount of bail and alternative methods of ensuring his appearance at trial. As noted in our statement of facts, the Attorney General agrees that petitioner is entitled to the latter relief.
Although Sanchez's petition sought a writ of habeas corpus, we have discretion to treat a habeas petition as one for writ of mandate. (Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 509, 511-512 [treating habeas petition as one for writ of mandamus]; see People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340 ["Assuming the pleading that has been filed meets or can be amended to meet the prerequisites for a petition for writ of mandate, a court in its discretion may treat a motion or a petition for a different writ as a mislabeled petition for writ of mandate."].) We will exercise that discretion here.
In limited circumstances, we may issue a peremptory writ in the first instance without prior issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240 (Lewis).) Such a writ may issue "when it appears that the petition and opposing papers on file adequately address the issues raised by the petition, that no factual dispute exists, and that the additional briefing that would follow issuance of an alternative writ is unnecessary to disposition of the petition." (Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 178.) In addition, "[a] court may issue a peremptory writ in the first instance ' "only when petitioner's entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue—for example, when such entitlement is conceded or when there has been clear error under well-settled principles of law and undisputed facts—or where there is an unusual urgency requiring acceleration of the normal process." ' " (Lewis, supra, at p. 1241, italics added.) All of these requirements are met here.
We solicited and received an informal response to the petition from the Attorney General. The informal response adequately addressed the issues raised by the petition and agreed that petitioner was entitled to relief. No factual dispute exists. The parties received notice that we were contemplating issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance, and they were given the opportunity to voice any objections they might have to that procedure. Neither party objects, and both have stipulated to immediate issuance of the remittitur. All of these factors support our use of the accelerated Palma procedure. (Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 416.) Moreover, " 'there is an unusual urgency requiring acceleration of the normal process.' " (Lewis, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1258.) "Having complied with the procedural prerequisites, we are authorized to issue a peremptory writ in the first instance." (C.C. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1023.)
Only one potential dispute arose in the parties' briefs—as to the proper scope of pretrial detention under California law. In that regard, the Attorney General's informal response raised an issue concerning the interplay of article I, section 12 and article I, section 28 of the California Constitution. But because the issue was not raised below, we decline to address it at this time. (See Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP v. Superior Court (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1236-1237.) Any dispute over the effect these provisions have on either the setting of bail or the scope of pretrial detention should be litigated in the superior court in the first instance, and should this remain an issue, it may be raised, on a fully developed record, in an appropriate challenge to further bail setting proceedings. --------
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its order of October 6, 2017, setting petitioner's bail at $1,000,000, and remanding the matter to respondent to conduct a new bail hearing in The People v. David Sanchez, San Francisco County Superior Court case No. 17013355. At that hearing, respondent court shall consider any admissible evidence offered regarding petitioner's ability to pay the set amount of bail and shall also consider alternative methods of ensuring petitioner's appearance at trial. Should respondent court conclude that detention is the least restrictive available means to ensure petitioner's appearance at trial and/or to protect the victim and public safety, it shall conduct a hearing and make the findings required by California Constitution, article I, section 12.
Respondent court shall schedule the new bail hearing as soon as possible and shall endeavor to conduct it within five court days after issuance of this opinion. To prevent further delays in the superior court proceedings, this decision shall be final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) The remittitur shall issue immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.272(c)(1), 8.490(d).)