Opinion
NO. 01-16-00525-CR
11-16-2017
JOSE LUIS SANCHEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 262nd District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1468361
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following his 2015 indictment for continuous sexual abuse of a child, Jose Luis Sanchez, who had been an elementary school teacher, was tried before a jury. The jury found Sanchez guilty of the charge, and the trial court sentenced him to 30 years' imprisonment.
On appeal, Sanchez contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach him and his expert with a written "directive," which the vice principal of the elementary school where Sanchez taught gave him in 2011 following an investigation into a complaint that Sanchez had improper contact with a student. We conclude that Sanchez waived any complaint concerning the directive's use to impeach his expert and that the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the State to impeach Sanchez with the directive, and therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sanchez started his teaching career in Mexico as an elementary school teacher with a specialty in mathematics. He and his wife moved to the United States in 2002. In 2007, after he acquired certification to teach in Texas, he was hired at an elementary school in Alvin Independent School District, where he remained until 2011. Following stints at Bryan I.S.D. and Channelview I.S.D., Aldine I.S.D. hired Sanchez to teach second-grade bilingual classes for the 2013-2014 academic year. The Aldine I.S.D. retained him the following school year to teach first grade.
During spring break in March 2015, a second-grader, who had been in Sanchez's first-grade class the previous year, told her mother that on multiple occasions Sanchez had touched her genitals, touched her breasts, tried to kiss her, and grabbed her hand to place on his genitals. The child's mother told her husband, who contacted police. The next day, the family met with Officer S. Terrell of the Aldine I.S.D. Police Department.
After Terrell interviewed the family, he and Lieutenant K. Northey began an investigation. Sanchez agreed to speak with Terrell and Northey. In the interview, Sanchez denied the girl's allegations of inappropriate conduct. Sanchez admitted he received a complaint of inappropriately hugging a female student while he was teaching at Alvin I.S.D. several years earlier, but stated that the district did not fire him or take any disciplinary action against him.
During the investigation, three more female students came forward and accused Sanchez of mistreating them in ways similar to those reported by the initial student. The four students were interviewed at the Children's Assessment Center, where they provided further details concerning Sanchez's assaults. Based on the results of the investigation, Sanchez was arrested and charged with indecency with a child.
At trial, Sanchez testified in his own defense. On direct examination, Sanchez described his reasons for leaving Alvin I.S.D. in 2011 as stemming from "a situation with the administrators" and explained that the administrators were trying to get rid of experienced teachers like him because they earned higher pay. He also had "personal problems" with the principal and assistant principal at Alvin I.S.D., which he attributed to a lack of professionalism on their part. Although he admitted to having been accused of hugging a student, he testified that "[t]he school and the district personnel carried out the investigation, and nothing happened because nothing had taken place. It had all been something false." The direct examination continued:
Q. Were you suspended for that?
A. No.
Q. Were you fired for that?
A. No.
Q. Did law enforcement come and talk to you about that?
A. No.
Q. Did CPS come and talk to you about that?
A. No.
Q. So aside from that, you have had a, essentially, a pretty good career as a teacher up until today?
A. That's right.
The State cross-examined Sanchez with the 2011 directive Sanchez received from Alvin I.S.D. Sanchez acknowledged having received the directive and that his handwriting appears on the document, but he denied the allegations made in the directive and testified that he refused to sign it for that reason. Although the directive was not admitted into evidence and is not otherwise in the appellate record, the testimony about it demonstrates that it documents interviews with approximately half of the students in Sanchez's homeroom class as well as with several staff members in which the interviewees described Sanchez's inappropriate conduct with female students. It directed Sanchez to (1) stop massaging the shoulders and stroking the hair of a particular female student; (2) stop having students eat lunch in his classroom; (3) stop showing favoritism to the female students in his classroom; and (4) stop using the term "mis novias" (my girlfriends) to refer to certain female students. It also prohibited Sanchez from inviting students to places outside of the school without parental involvement and consent. Sanchez resigned from Alvin I.S.D. approximately one month after receiving the directive.
The defense also called Dr. Jerome Brown, a forensic psychologist, who testified on Sanchez's behalf. Brown mentioned that Sanchez had a "stellar career as a primary and secondary teacher," but when asked, he admitted that he had not seen the Alvin I.S.D. written directive. After this admission, the State cross-examined Brown on the directive's contents. Defense counsel objected to the State's questions based on relevance and as having been asked and answered. The trial court overruled the objections.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
Sanchez contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach both him and his expert with the 2011 Alvin I.S.D. directive. We review a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Walker v. State, 321 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. dism'd). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). When considering a trial court's decision to admit evidence, we will not reverse the trial court's ruling unless it falls outside the "zone of reasonable disagreement." Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). We will uphold a trial court's evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
II. Sanchez waived his complaint concerning the State's impeachment of his expert witness.
According to Sanchez, the trial court should not have allowed the State to use the directive to impeach his expert witness, Dr. Brown. The State responds that Sanchez failed to preserve this issue for review.
A. Preservation of error
To preserve the issue of erroneously admitted evidence, a party must make a timely and specific objection and obtain a ruling from the trial court. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Martinez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The purpose of requiring a specific objection in the trial court is twofold: (1) to inform the trial court of the basis of the objection and give it the opportunity to rule, and (2) to give opposing counsel the opportunity to respond. Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A party "must be specific enough so as to 'let the trial [court] know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and do so clearly enough for the [trial court] to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.'" Id. at 313 (quoting Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
An appellant's issue on appeal must comport with the objection he made at trial. Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). "An objection stating one legal theory may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal." Rothstein v. State, 267 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd). A party fails to preserve error when the contention urged on appeal varies from the complaint made in the trial court. See Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
We consider the context of the complaint to determine if the party preserved error. Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 313. If the record demonstrates that the trial court and opposing counsel understood the objection as raising the same issue that the party now urges on appeal, waiver will not result from a general or imprecise objection. See id.; Rothstein, 267 S.W.3d at 373-74. If the context shows that the appellant failed to effectively communicate his argument, then it is not preserved for appeal. Lankston, 827 S.W.2d at 909.
B. Analysis
In the trial court, Sanchez objected to the State's cross-examination of Dr. Brown based on the Alvin I.S.D. directive based on relevance and as having been asked and answered. Sanchez relies on two cases in support of his appellate argument, both of which predate the Court of Criminal Appeals' promulgation of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence in 1986: Webber v. State, 472 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), and McNaulty v. State, 135 S.W.2d 987 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940). These cases held that the trial court erred in allowing cross-examination of the defendant's character witness based on allegations of prior misconduct by the defendant. See Webber, 472 S.W.2d at 137-38; McNaulty, 135 S.W.2d at 988.
Webber and McNaulty address improper impeachment, an issue that differs from the objections that Sanchez interposed in the trial court. As the State points out, Sanchez's issue on appeal does not challenge the relevance of the subject matter or whether the State's questions had been asked and answered. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court understood Sanchez's objection as the same issue he now raises on appeal. We therefore hold that Sanchez waived the issue with respect to the State's cross-examination of the defense's expert witness. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at 313.
II. The trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the State to cross-examine Sanchez about receiving Alvin I.S.D.'s 2011 directive.
Sanchez next complains that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State, through cross-examination, to inform the jury of what he describes as unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct against him. The State responds that the trial court acted within its discretion to allow the cross-examination because it corrected the false impression left from Sanchez's voluntary testimony on direct examination.
A witness may be cross-examined on any relevant matter, including credibility. TEX. R. EVID. 611(b). Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and "the fact is of consequence in determining the action." TEX. R. EVID. 401. A party has the right to pursue all avenues of cross-examination reasonably calculated to expose bias, motive, or interest for the witness to testify. Thus, the scope of appropriate cross-examination is necessarily broad. Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Pertinent to this case, "[w]hen a witness makes a broad statement of good conduct or character on a collateral issue, the opposing party may cross-examine the witness with specific instances rebutting that false impression." Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 453-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The defense may open the door to rebuttal evidence by eliciting a defensive theory on direct examination. Roberts v. State, 29 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). Alternatively, a defendant who voluntarily or nonresponsively testifies concerning extraneous matters on cross-examination opens the door to having the State correct any false impression presented by the defendant's testimony. See id. (citing, inter alia, Martinez v. State, 728 S.W.2d 360, 361-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
In his direct examination, Sanchez painted the picture of a having had a spotless disciplinary record during his teaching career. He denied having any inappropriate contact with the female students and suggested that the Aldine school officials had fabricated the allegations against him. These representations opened the door to evidence of Sanchez's disciplinary record. The contents of the Alvin I.S.D. directive raise doubt about the veracity of Sanchez's testimony.
Sanchez cites Martinez and Shipman v. State, 604 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), to contend that the State is not allowed to admit evidence of collateral matters for impeachment purposes. Martinez and Shipman, however, focus on whether the State has improperly elicited evidence of a collateral matter on cross-examination to then impeach the witness. See Martinez, 728 S.W.2d at 361; Shipman, 604 S.W.2d at 183. As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Martinez,
In the instant case, unlike the defendant in Shipman, appellant was not "set-up" on a collateral issue and then contradicted. Appellant voluntarily testified as to his prior criminal history without any prompting or maneuvering by the prosecutor and in so doing he falsely asserted that he had never been arrested before. . . . We hold that when a defendant voluntarily testifies as to his prior criminal record without any prompting or maneuvering on the part of the State's attorney and in so doing he leaves a false impression with the jury, the State is allowed to correct that false impression . . .Id.
This case is similarly distinguishable from Shipman. The State did not seek to admit the Alvin directive as evidence; it used it for impeachment on cross-examination, to counter the impression introduced by Sanchez's voluntary testimony on direct examination. The directive demonstrates that Sanchez's past behavior around female students had been the subject of a prior investigation, which led to an official communication to Sanchez specifically instructing him to curb his behavior around female students. The questions concerning the directive were both directly relevant to the charges against him in this case and elicited to correct a false impression made by the Sanchez's voluntary testimony. We therefore hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the State to cross-examine Sanchez based on the directive.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Brown. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).