Opinion
Index No. 24774/2018E
11-07-2018
SANCHEZ, VICTORIA v. SIMPSON, ARIELLA D., et al
Unpublished Opinion
The following papers numbered 8 to 16 in the NYSCEF System were read on this motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT (LIABILITY) noticed on July 18, 2018 and duly submitted as No. __ on the Motion Calendar of September 7, 2018.
| NYSCEF Doc. Nos. | |
| Notice of Motion - Exhibits and Affidavits Annexed | 8-14 |
| Notice of Cross-Motion - Exhibits and Affidavits Annexed | |
| Answering Affidavit and Exhibits | 15 |
| Replying Affidavit and Exhibits | 16 |
| Stipulations |
Upon the foregoing papers, plaintiff s motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of defendants' liability for causing the subject motor vehicle accident and plaintiff s freedom from comparative fault is granted, in accordance with the annexed decision and order.
DECISION AND ORDER
JOHN R. HIGGITT, A.J.S.C.
This is a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries plaintiff sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff had been stopped at the stop sign on the West 230th Street on-ramp of the Major Deegan Expressway. At that time, a vehicle operated defendant Ariella D. Simpson and owned by defendants Joseph D. Simpsons and Judith Simpson struck plaintiff's vehicle in the rear. Plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment on the issues of defendants' liability and her freedom from comparative fault. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff s motion is granted.
"A rear-end collision with a stationary vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence requiring a judgment in favor of the stationary vehicle unless defendant proffers a nonnegligent explanation for the failure to maintain a safe distance ... A driver is expected to drive at a sufficiently safe speed and to maintain enough distance between himself [or herself] and cars ahead of him [or her] so as to avoid collisions with stopped vehicles, taking into account weather and road conditions" (LaMasa v Bachman, 56 A.D.3d 340, 340 [1st Dept 2008]). I he happening of a rear-end collision is itself a prima facie case of negligence of the rearmost driver in a chain confronted with a stopped or stopping vehicle (see Cabrera v Rodriguez, 72 A.D.3d 553 [1st Dept 2010]).
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129(a) states that a "driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway" (see Darmento v Pacific Molasses Co., 81 N.Y.2d 985, 988 [1993]). Based on the plain language of the statute, a violation is clear when a driver follows another too closely without adequate reason and that conduct results in a collision (id.).
Here, plaintiff satisfied her prima facie burden of establishing her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability (see CPLR 3212[b]). Plaintiff submitted a copy of the pleadings and her affidavit. Plaintiff s affidavit sets forth sufficient details as to how the accident occurred, namely that plaintiff s vehicle was stopped at a stop sign when defendants' vehicle impacted the rear end of plaintiffs vehicle without warning, causing the plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiffs evidence set forth sufficient detail as to how the accident occurred, satisfying the prima facie burden for summary judgment. Moreover, plaintiff s evidence established her freedom from comparative fault.
In opposition, defendants failed to raise a triable issue of material fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 [1980]). The affirmation of counsel alone is not sufficient to rebut plaintiffs prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment (see id.). In addition, bald, conclusory allegations, even if believable, are not enough to withstand summary judgment (see Ehrlich v American Moninger Greenhouse Mfg. Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 255 [1970]). Defendants argue that the motion is premature because no discovery has taken place. However, plaintiffs motion is not considered premature when the information as to why the accident occurred reasonably rests within defendants' own knowledge and could be asserted their own sworn attestations (Rodriguez v Garcia, 154 A.D.3d 581, 581 [1st Dept 2017]; see Castaneda v DO & CO New York Catering, Inc., 144 A.D.3d 407 [1st Dept 2016]). The mere hope that a party might be able to uncover some evidence during the discovery process is insufficient to deny summary judgment (see Castaneda, supra; Avant v Cepin Livery Corp., 74 A.D.3d 533 [1st Dept 2010]).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants' liability for causing the subject motor vehicle accident and plaintiffs freedom from comparative fault is granted; and it is further
ORDERED, that defendants' second affirmative defense alleging plaintiffs culpable conduct is dismissed.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.