Opinion
Civil Action 20-1005
08-21-2023
RAMON SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN SILBAUGH, LIEUTENANT LEWIS, STEVEN LONGSTREATH, PSYCHOLOGIST WHITMAN, PSYCHIATRIST PUSHKALAI PILLAI, Defendants.
Honorable W. Scott Hardy, United States District Judge
RE: ECF NO. 171
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Maureen P. Kelly, United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
Ramon Sanchez (“Plaintiff') is an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix (“SCI - Phoenix”). In his Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 65, Sanchez asserts claims against employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and Defendant Pushkalai Pillai (“Pillai”), a DOC-contracted mental health provider, related to the adequacy of treatment for mental illness during his incarceration at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI - Greene”). Pillai presents a Motion for Summary Judgment based on the lack of evidence supporting Plaintiffs claim for her alleged deliberate indifference to his condition. ECF No. 171.
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Pillai's Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff has been incarcerated in DOC custody since April 11, 2003. ECF No. 172-4. Throughout his incarceration, Plaintiff was placed on various mental health rosters. The rosters are used by DOC to classify inmates based on current mental health conditions and treatment. Before Plaintiff s transfer to SCI - Greene, Plaintiff was housed at SCI - Huntingdon. There, non-party mental health professionals moved Plaintiff from the active “C” mental health roster to the inactive “B” mental health roster. Id.; ECF No. 172 ¶ 32; ECF No. 177 at 32. Inmates on the “B” mental health roster have a history of receiving psychiatric treatment, but have no current need for psychiatric care. ECF No. 172 ¶ 9; ECF No. 177 at 25. Inmates on the “C” mental health roster are actively receiving mental health care but do not suffer from a serious mental illness. ECF No. 172 ¶ 10; ECF No. 177 at 25. Inmates on the “D” mental health roster are actively receiving mental health care and are considered by the DOC to suffer from a serious mental illness, or a disorder that causes the inmate to experience significant functional impairment. ECF No. 172 ¶ 11;ECF No. 177 at 27. Placement on a roster guides the provision of treatment and frequency of services for an inmate.
In the fall of 2017, Plaintiff was advised by SCI - Huntingdon staff that he would be moved to the Security Threat Group Management Unit (“STGMU”) because of his history of violence, gang involvement, and possession of weapons. ECF No. 172 ¶¶ 13, 33; ECF No. 177 at 32. After learning he would be moved, Plaintiff began to complain of the lack of mental health treatment, but he refused to be seen by staff not selected or preferred by him. ECF No. 172-3 at 14-17. In December 2017, Plaintiff assaulted his cellmate and was placed in the psychiatric observation cell (“POC”) after self-reporting suicidal and homicidal ideation. ECF No. 177 at 41, 43. Plaintiff was seen by a mental health professional who recorded Plaintiff s report that he swallowed medication and a metal object. Plaintiffs records reflect that he “has a history of acting out to get what he wants which can be a danger to himself... No indication for psychiatric medication. Inmate refusing to leave POC stating he is suicidal and homicidal.” ECF No. 172-3 at 28. A second treating mental health professional observed that upon examination:
Plaintiff objects to the authenticity of the medical and mental health records presented by Pillai because the records bear a facility name that Plaintiff was not housed when the motion was filed. ECF Nos. 176, 192. In response to Plaintiff s accusation that the records are fabricated, Pillai presents the affidavit of Lisa Wheeler, a nurse at SCI -Albion. ECF No. 191-1. Wheeler states that when the records were produced in connection with this case, Plaintiff was housed at SCI - Albion. As a result, the records contain the notation of that facility. Id. Plaintiff presents no reasonable basis to contest Wheeler's affidavit or to infer that any other records were fabricated because those records bear a notation from Plaintiffs current facility. See, e.g., ECF No. 172 at 52. Simply, Plaintiffs speculation and conclusory allegations about the authenticity of the documents based on the facility where the documents were printed is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact related to the record of Pillai's provision of mental health treatment or her assessment of Plaintiff s condition on the dates at issue. Jones v. Hendricks, 173 Fed.Appx. 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2006), citing Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark N.J. v DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) does not allow a party opposing summary judgment to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions).
Mr. Sanchez was respectful and appropriate in his interactions with this writer today. He was alert, oriented to person, place and time and able to focus appropriately on the conversation which lasted just over 20 minutes. We discussed challenging his all or nothing belief system, accepting assistance from identified supports without looking for reasons/excuses to reject their assistance and taking a more proactive (and appropriate) approach to addressing his perceived mental health concerns. Mr. Sanchez reported feeling homicidal and suicidal but offered no specific plan of action to harm himself. He also reported experiencing auditory hallucinations “pretty much all of the time” yet there was no evidence of his attending to internal stimuli and his focus and attentiveness to the topics discussed belies his claim of the voices interfering with his ability to function. Mr. Sanchez also reported he experienced a “blackout” during which time he states “they told me I hurt my cellie.” It would appear by reports from staff that his actions in the RHU were well thought out and not a result of a mental health issue or “blackout.” He was encouraged to address this specific concern with the Security Office.Id. at 29. Over the next month, Plaintiffs self-reported condition improved as he awaited participation in STGMU, with no suicidal or homicidal ideation or indications, and he remained on the B mental health roster. Id. at 32-37.
DOC transferred Plaintiff to SCI - Greene on February 22, 2018, with a continued designation on the “B” mental health roster. ECF No. 172 ¶¶ 34, 35. Upon arrival, Plaintiffs current diagnoses were identified as (1) antisocial personality disorder; (2) malingering; (3) unspecified disruptive, impulse-control and conduct disorder. ECF No. 172-3 at 39. In March 2018, Plaintiff complained of mental health symptoms and requested medication. Id. at 41. Plaintiff was seen by non-party SCI - Greene mental health professionals, prescribed medication, and was placed on the C mental health roster. Id. at 44. He requested a medication change in June 2018 to anon-formulary drug. Id. 46-48. Based on his report of symptoms, the treating professional increased the dose of his current medication and concluded that his request for a specific drug was for “possible secondary gain.” Id. Plaintiff continued to complain of side effects and inadequate relief, and a non-party provider changed his medication to his preferred drug on June 19, 2018. Id. at 52.
On September 17, 2018, Plaintiff reported to corrections staff that he ingested a razor, several batteries, and 60 tablets of 40 mg. Geodon. Id. at 55. He was transferred to a local hospital and underwent surgery to remove the items he swallowed.
Plaintiff met with Defendant Pillai for the first time on October 1, 2018, after Plaintiff requested mental health assistance on his return from the hospital. ECF No. 172 ¶¶ 1-3, 7; ECF No. 172-3 at 57; ECF No. 177 ¶ 52. Pillai reviewed Plaintiffs records and noted he had been prescribed Geodon and carried a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. Pillai prescribed Rameron to help Plaintiff with anxiety and depression. ECF No. 172-3 at 57-59. Plaintiff also complained about the frequency of his mental health treatment. Pillai noted Plaintiff had been seen less than 90 days before his suicide attempt. Pillai saw him the next day and observed that Plaintiff was more cooperative, not suffering from hallucinations, suicidal or homicidal ideations, and was logical and directed, though he demonstrated poor insight and judgment. Id. at 62.
Plaintiff disputes much of the factual content set forth in DOC's diagnostic and treatment records after his suicide attempt. ECF No. 177. Plaintiff asserts that the only accurate information is in the mental health assessments and social history compiled from his childhood as part of the death penalty phase of his underlying 2003 criminal conviction and statements from fellow inmates. See, e.g., ECF No. 177 ¶¶ 31, 57; ECF No. 178 at 43-69. Plaintiff presents the declarations of several inmates that refer to periods of incarceration before or well after Pillai participated in Plaintiffs care, or relate to care provided by other mental health professionals and DOC staff. See, e.g., ECF No. 176 at 11-12 (statement relates to Plaintiffs condition and observation by other mental health before Pillai's involvement in care); Id. at 14-22 (same); ECF No. 177 at 26 (inmate states he was incarcerated with Plaintiff in 2017 “up to 2018” and was hospitalized with him in 2017, but Plaintiff arrived at SCI - Greene in March 2018 and was hospitalized in September 2018); ECF No. 176 at 24 (inmate attests to facts related to Plaintiffs suicide attempt in September 2018 but states he was not incarcerated in Plaintiffs unit until 2019); Id. at 25-26 (same). Plaintiff does not establish the relevance of evidence of Plaintiff s condition and treatment at times other than the two month at issue here, or involving providers other than Pillai and, therefore, the evidence does not raise an issue of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
Over the next week, Plaintiff was seen by several other mental health professionals who noted that Plaintiff stated he was experiencing hallucinations and threatened self-harm and homicidal ideation if returned to the STGMU. Id. at 64-77. Plaintiff voiced his desire to be placed in a Mental Health Unit (“MHU”). A provider noted, “[t]here does appear to be some manipulation to avoid return to STGMU.” No evidence of responding to internal stimuli was noted to corroborate Plaintiffs claims of hallucinations. The provider noted a recommendation for a treatment plan that included admission to the POC.
Pillai next saw Plaintiff on October 8, 2018, and observed that Plaintiffs symptoms “seem[] to be his convenient related” with no consistent symptoms, and that Plaintiff used threats of suicide and homicide “to get a single cell” assignment and a change to his current housing block. Id. 78-81. Pillai saw Plaintiff daily through October 11, 2018, and determined that based on Plaintiffs major suicidal attempt, the “302” process would be used to permit further evaluation in an MHU. Id. 80-94.
Over the next 10 days, Plaintiff remained in the POC awaiting transfer to the MHU and was seen by non-party mental health professionals nearly every day. Plaintiff s medication was again adjusted to treat symptoms of depression. A mental health professional noted that Plaintiff was awaiting transfer and did not voice active symptoms “unless discussing return to STGMU. There is a degree of utilization of mental health symptoms for secondary gains.” Id. at 107.
Pillai saw Plaintiff on October 22, 2018, and observed that Plaintiff “will make his room disaster by throwing waste every where. Due to his recent serious suicidal attempt[,] team and MHM administration also recommending MHU.” Id. at 120.
Plaintiff was transferred to the MHU at SCI - Camp Hill on October 24, 2018, and remained there for observation and treatment until November 2, 2018. Id. at 124-251. During his stay, mental health professionals concluded that Plaintiff used manipulative behavior and did not otherwise suffer any unstable, uncontrolled, or acute condition that required resolution or identification. Id. at 244. SCI - Camp Hill staff altered Plaintiffs medication and discharged him as having received the maximum benefit of treatment at their facility, with diagnoses of adjustment disorder, disturbance of emotions and conduct, and antisocial personality disorder. Id. at 184-86. 251. The MHU discharge included a treatment plan for individual psychotherapy to encourage insight and compliance with treatment, and no restrictions on housing. Id. 238-40, 250-51; ECF No. 177 ¶ 90.
Upon his return to SCI- Greene on November 2, 2018, Plaintiff complained that he was refused psychiatric treatment at SCI - Camp Hill because “someone emailed them and said he had stolen cuff key.” ECF No. 172-3 at 252. Plaintiff reported hearing voices telling him to hurt himself and others. As a result, his intake counselor referred Plaintiff for an urgent mental health appointment. Plaintiff was seen that day by a non-party provider who admitted Plaintiff to the POC with complaints of hallucinations and suicidal and homicidal ideation. Id. at 253-260.
Pillai next examined Plaintiff on November 6, 2018. Id. at 262. Pillai observed that “[Patient] remains the same. Adamant about getting MH trt. His cell floor was filthy with garbage. When [patient] was told that his behavior is expression of anger, [h]e became more angry and start cutting his wrist with his nails but superficial. Unable to find any MH symptoms. Continue to use suicide as a way to avoid STGMU.” Id. Pillai noted Plaintiff's claims of hallucinations were inconsistent, and that while he was irrational and illogical, he was not suffering delusions, but was claiming suicidal and homicidal ideation. Pillai also noted that Plaintiff was angry that he was not being placed in a mental health unit permanently. Id. at 264.
Pillai conducted a full examination on November 8, 2018, and noted no abnormal physical movements. Plaintiff was cooperative, though his cell was messy, and he was disheveled, irritable, angry, paranoid, and exhibited bizarre behavior. Pillai determined that an alternative to STGMU should be investigated. Id. at 262-65. Plaintiffs erratic behavior continued each time Pillai saw Plaintiff over the next week and this prompted Pillai to add a new psychiatric diagnosis of “posttraumatic stress disorder, no dissociative symptoms” to Plaintiffs chart. Id. at 271. On November 13, 2018, Pillai recommended that Plaintiff be placed on the D mental health roster, reflecting that Plaintiff suffered an active serious mental illness. Id. at 272-79. Two days later, Pillai again assessed Plaintiff and determined that he would need another inpatient evaluation, preferably conducted at SCI - Rockview. Id. at 280-81. Plaintiff was seen by other providers until November 19, 2018, when Pillai completed a full mental status evaluation and again noted that Plaintiff was not improving and would be referred for an inpatient diagnostic evaluation based on continuous suicidal thoughts. Id. at 286-89. Throughout this period, there is no record by any provider of blood stains on Plaintiffs cell walls or window, or self-injury beyond scratching his wrists leaving superficial wounds that did not require treatment.
On November 21, 2018, a non-party mental health provider discharged Plaintiff from the POC to return to his former housing unit. The provider described Plaintiffs improvement as follows:
Inmate admitted to POC on return from MHU after reporting he would harm himself if sent back to STGMU. Inmate has engaged in superficial cutting with his fingernail to his arm since being in the POC but otherwise has not engaged in any self harm despite having most items including clothing and being on regular watch. Behavior has remained consistent throughout POC admission with conditional threats of self harm if returned to STGMU and feeling that his mental health needs are not being taken seriously. Discussed that POC is not a housing unit and STGMU remove is reportedly in process but STGMU is his current housing unit so would need to return until removed. Inmate voices concern that he will be “forgotten” if returned to the STGMU, He provides that suicidal thoughts are chronic in nature. No intent or plan currently. No evidence of psychosis. Agreeable to plan of meeting with provider weekly on STGMU and asking to speak with psych staff if feeling overwhelmed rather than engage in self harm. There is no indication for ongoing POC placement and no acute mental health concerns that would warrant MHU admission. Inmate is at chronic risk of self harm but no acute risk at this time. Has established therapeutic rapport with this provider that will aid in treatment moving forward.Id. at 292-93. Sanchez was returned to his housing unit and was in no distress, with no suicidal or homicidal ideations recorded by the non-party provider. Id. at 294. He was to be seen by psychiatry the next week, and then weekly “for mental health stability while in STGMU.” Id. It was also recommended that DOC psychology professionals engage in Sanchez's care to improve coping skills and anger management. Id.
Plaintiff began this litigation on July 6, 2020, with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. Upon resolution of motions to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, followed by the operative Second Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 61, 65. Plaintiff alleges that Pillai was deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs after Plaintiff returned to SCI - Greene from medical treatment for his September 2018 suicide attempt. ECF No. 65 at 13-15. Plaintiff alleges that despite the presence of blood, feces, and trash covering his cell, and his obvious response to auditory and visual hallucinations, Pillai told him “there is nothing wrong with you, it's behavioral not psychological, you go back to the restrictive housing unit.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff asserts he overhead a conversation when a guard allegedly questioned Pillai's determination that Plaintiff was displaying behavioral symptoms. Id. at 15; 23-24. These allegations are the basis of Plaintiffs claim that Pillai violated his Eighth Amendment rights through deliberate indifference to his mental health condition.
Defendants renewed their motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for Plaintiff s failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. ECF Nos. 74 and 77. The Court denied Pillai's motion to dismiss because Plaintiffs allegations were sufficient to state a claim at the motion to dismiss stage of the litigation. ECF Nos. 92, 112. Plaintiff then moved to amend his complaint to add claims for specific injunctive relief and to increase the monetary damages sought in this action. ECF No. 97. Plaintiffs motion was denied on July 7, 2021. ECF Nos. 102, 122. The parties engaged in discovery and Defendants objected to several of Plaintiff s requests for production of documents as irrelevant, overbroad, or subject to legitimate security concerns. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel and, upon review, the Court agreed with many of Defendants' objections and denied in part and granted in part portions of the relief requested. ECF Nos. 142, 157, 160. Plaintiff filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, but his appeal was dismissed for failure to timely prosecute. ECF No. 165.
In accordance with an Amended Case Management Order, Pillai filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, a Concise Statement of Material Facts with exhibits, and Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 167, 171, 172, 173. Plaintiff has filed a Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, a Counter Statement of Facts, and an Affidavit. ECF No. 176-178. Pillai filed a Reply Brief, ECF No. 191, and Plaintiff filed a supplemental Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment to challenge the authenticity of his medical records based on the location of the facility where the records were printed. ECF No. 192.
Plaintiff also filed a motion to reopen discovery to obtain all records of his mental health treatment while in DOC custody since 2003. ECF No. 196. Plaintiff stated the records were necessary to counter Pillai's use of “excerpts” in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion was denied because Pillai served Plaintiff with a copy of his treatment records for the period 2017 through November 29, 2018, and Plaintiff does not state a claim related to any treatment after that date. ECF No. 204. Plaintiff also failed to establish the relevance of records from any other period to his mental health condition at the time at issue.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly entered “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “[A] fact is ‘material' where ‘its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.'” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist, 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “A dispute is ‘genuine' if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Clews v. Cnty. of Schuylkill, 12 F.4th 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that the undisputed evidence is insufficient to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004).
“[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted). In making this assessment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matreale v. New Jersey Dep't of Mil. & Veterans Affs., 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129,130 (3d Cir. 2001). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial,” Rule 56 requires the entry of summary judgment because such a failure “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v, Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and thus his filings are to be construed liberally. In examining the record, and in consideration of Plaintiff s status, the factual allegations set forth in his verified Complaint will be considered as evidence if they are based on his personal knowledge. Jackson v. Armel, No. 17-1237, 2020 WL 2104748, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2020) (citing Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating verified complaint as an affidavit on summary judgment motion)). See also Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that an affidavit is “about the best that can be expected from [a pro se prisoner] at the summary judgment phase of the proceedings”).
Nonetheless, at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the Court need not credit any bald assertions or legal conclusions unaccompanied by evidentiary support. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). “[A] pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). See also Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F.Supp.2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Winfield v. Mazurkiewicz, No. 11-584, 2012 WL 4343176, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21,2012).
C. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts that Pillai violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because Pillai failed to provide adequate and necessary mental health services after he returned from the hospital in September 2018. Plaintiff alleges Pillai ignored blood on Plaintiffs cell window, and feces, urine, and garbage on his cell floor. Plaintiff contends the condition of his cell pointed to the urgent need for mental health intervention and treatment. Pillai denies Plaintiffs allegations and argues that summary judgment should be granted in his favor because the evidence presented does not establish that he was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff s serious mental health needs. ECF No. 173 at 3. For the reasons that follow, the Court should grant summary judgment because the record does not permit a reasonable jury to find that Pillai acted with deliberate indifference.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from being deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To sustain an Eighth Amendment violation related to an alleged deprivation of medical treatment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). A serious medical need may also be found to exist where the denial or delay of treatment causes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id.
To establish deliberate indifference, a “plaintiff must make an ‘objective' showing that the deprivation was ‘sufficiently serious,' or that the result of defendant's denial was sufficiently serious. Additionally, the plaintiff must make a ‘subjective' showing that defendant acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002), citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,298 (1991). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Wilson v. Burks, 423 F. App'x. 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011), quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Generally, deliberate indifference occurs when prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment, thus exposing the inmate ‘to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury' or, knowing of the need for medical care, intentionally refuse to provide it.” Washington v. Rozich, 734 Fed.Appx. 798, 800 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
When a prisoner has received some amount of medical treatment, it is difficult to establish deliberate indifference, because prison officials are afforded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners. Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993). Allegations of mere negligent treatment or even medical malpractice do not trigger the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, at 105-06. The Third Circuit has explained:
“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Deference is given to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment... [which] remains a question of sound professional judgment.” Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)) (alterations in original).Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 228 (3d Cir. 2017).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff suffered a serious mental health need during the period at issue. Even so, no reasonable juror could conclude that Pillai was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs mental health condition or alleged suffering. Plaintiffs mental health records establish that Pillai and other mental health professionals provided Plaintiff mental health assessments and care on a near daily basis after Plaintiff returned from the hospital following his suicide attempt in September 2018. On Pillai's first encounter with Plaintiff, she prescribed medication to treat Plaintiffs depression and anxiety. ECF No. 172-3 at 57. Over the following days, Pillai noted that Plaintiffs suffering was not alleviated despite medication and ongoing encounters with mental health professionals in the POC. Pillai recommended that Plaintiff be evaluated at a DOC MHU for diagnostic and treatment purposes. Upon Plaintiffs return to SCI - Greene, Pillai observed no improvement in Plaintiffs condition and so recommended further evaluation at a different MHU, as well as a change in Plaintiffs housing assignment. Pillai downgraded Plaintiff s mental health status to the D roster to reflect that Plaintiff was suffering from severe mental illness and required more intensive intervention.
The record establishes that during time at issue, multiple mental health professionals at different facilities determined that Plaintiffs complaints and behavior were manifestations of his desire to be removed from the SGMTU, and were inconsistent with hallucinations or severe mental illness. Thus, there is no evidence that Pillai's treatment or recommendations departed from any recognized professional standard of care. Though Plaintiff disagrees with Pillai's treatment decisions and her assessment of his condition, “a mere disagreement in treatment is not an actionable constitutional violation.” Washington, 734 Fed.Appx. at 798 (citing Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346). To the extent his disagreement may allege a claim for negligence, simple negligence cannot support an Eighth Amendment claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Thus, it is recommended that the Court grant Pillai's motion for summary judgment.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Pushkalai Pillai, ECF No. 171.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties may file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within 14 days in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.