Opinion
No: MO:20-CV-00269-DC
2021-11-02
Cruz E. SANCHEZ v. Mike GRIFFIS, FNU Mancha, FNU McNeil, FNU Durham, FNU Galvan, FNU Garcia, FNU Salgado, FNU Ibarra
Cruz E. Sanchez, Tulia, TX, Pro Se. Richard Layne Rouse, Shafer, Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, Odessa, TX, for Sheriff Mike Griffis, Chief Deputy FNU Mancha, Captain FNU McNeil, Lieutenant FNU Durham, Sgt. FNU Galvan, Corporal FNU Garcia, Officer FNU Salgado, Officer FNU Ibarra.
Cruz E. Sanchez, Tulia, TX, Pro Se.
Richard Layne Rouse, Shafer, Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, Odessa, TX, for Sheriff Mike Griffis, Chief Deputy FNU Mancha, Captain FNU McNeil, Lieutenant FNU Durham, Sgt. FNU Galvan, Corporal FNU Garcia, Officer FNU Salgado, Officer FNU Ibarra.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DAVID COUNTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Cruz E. Sanchez seeks "3.5 million dollars" in monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "pain and suffering" arising from the two-related October 20, 2020 alleged use-of-force incidents by two of the named Ector County Defendants that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee in the Ector County Detention Center (ECDC). [docket number 1 at 6]. For relief, Plaintiff also asks for "Officers Salgado and Ibarra to get charged for assault." [Id. ] (spelling error in original).
According to Plaintiff, Defendants Salgado and Ybarra slammed him to the ground with such force that it fractured his ribs, punctured and collapsed his left lung, leading to two surgeries and to being hospitalized for five days. [docket number 1 at 3].
Defendants' legal names are Mike Griffis, Eddie Mancha, Steven McNeill, Vanessa Durham, Israel Galvan, Eduardo Garcia, Benjamin Salgado, and Nicholas Ybarra, hereinafter referred to as the Ector County Defendants.
Plaintiff is now incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's Tulia Unit.
The Ector County Defendants filed an Answer on January 18, 2021. [docket number 36]. This Court then entered a Scheduling Order for dispositive motions on January 20, 2021. [docket number 37]. On March 8, 2021, the Ector County Defendants filed both a Motion to Dismiss and a 408-page Motion for Summary Judgment, with a 212-page attachment thereto. [docket numbers 43, 44 & 45, respectively]. On April 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Response to the Ector County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [docket number 60]. On May 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed his own 29-page Motion for Summary Judgment. [docket number 71]. Therefore, this case is ripe for disposition. After due consideration, the Court will grant the Ector County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [docket number 44].
I. § 1983 claims in general
Section 1983 creates a private right of action to redress the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 82, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) ; Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n , 453 U.S. 1, 19, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) ; Maine v. Thiboutot , 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. " Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’ " Albright v. Oliver , 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) ); accord Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 393–94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ; City of Okla. City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ; Young v. City of Killeen , 775 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir. 1985) ; Carbonell v. La. Dep't of Health & Human Resources , 772 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1985).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 330, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) ; Augustine v. Doe , 740 F.2d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must support his claims with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. See Schultea v. Wood , 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) ; Fee v. Herndon , 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990) ; Jacquez v. Procunier , 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986) ; Angel v. City of Fairfield , 793 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1986) ; Elliott v. Perez , 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 1985).
The plaintiff must also prove that the alleged constitutional or statutory deprivation was intentional or due to deliberate indifference—not the result of mere negligence. See Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 828–29, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ; Davidson v. Cannon , 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) ; Daniels , 474 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. 662 ; Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The negligent deprivation of life, liberty, or property is not a constitutional violation. See Campbell v. City of San Antonio , 43 F.3d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1995) ; Fraire v. City of Arlington , 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992) ; Herrera v. Millsap , 862 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1989) ; Simmons v. McElveen , 846 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1988) ; Young , 775 F.2d at 1353. Moreover, to hold a defendant liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must adduce facts demonstrating the defendant's participation in the alleged wrong. See Murphy v. Kellar , 950 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1992) ; Jacquez , 801 F.2d at 793.
II. Pro se pleadings
Allegations made in a pro se complaint are held "to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). To hold a pro se plaintiff to strict compliance "would be inequitable" as courts would punish a pro se plaintiff "for lacking the linguistic and analytical skills of a trained lawyer." Perez v. United States , 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002). To avoid such a result, "courts have adopted the rule that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are liberally construed." Id. Even though pleadings by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard, courts must be able to draw the reasonable inference from the pleadings that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Courts should not dismiss a pro se complaint without "providing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, unless it is obvious from the record that the plaintiff has pled his best case." Hale v. King , 642 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011). This Court finds having filed an original Complaint, a Memorandum in Support, an Affidavit in Support, and a Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has pleaded his best case.
III. No right to have Defendants Salgado and Ybarra prosecuted for assault
Plaintiff seeks to have the specific guards, Defendants Salgado and Ybarra, who allegedly assaulted him, prosecuted for assault. This allegation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to have anyone criminally prosecuted. See Oliver v. Collins , 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff did not have the constitutional right to a criminal prosecution against prison guards who allegedly beat him); Green v. Revel , 413 F. App'x 698, 700 (5th Cir. 2011) ("To the extent that [the plaintiff] sought a criminal investigation of the [alleged] rape [by his cellmate], [the plaintiff] did not have a constitutional right to have a criminal investigation conducted or the offender prosecuted"). The Supreme Court has held that private citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another. Linda R.S. v. Richard D. , 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973).
Plaintiff simply has no constitutional right to have an officer criminally prosecuted. Busick v. Neal , 380 F. App'x 392 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Autrey v. State of Mississippi , 66 F. App'x 523 (5th Cir. 2003) ; see also, e.g., Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp. , 680 F.3d 887, 901 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring) (the victim "needs to show how he was injured by what the defendants did to him, rather than by what they didn't do to other people"); Parkhurst v. Tabor , 569 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 2009) ("federal courts have maintained the distinction in standing between those prosecuted by the state and those who would urge the prosecution of others"); and Sattler v. Johnson , 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting claim that crime victims have "an enforceable right as a member of the public at large and as a victim to have the defendants criminally prosecuted"). Therefore, this portion of Plaintiff's § 1983 case is dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. Standard of review
The Ector County Defendants move for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [docket number 44]. Under this rule, a reviewing court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to provide "specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A reviewing court "must view the evidence introduced and all factual inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment[.]" Smith v. Regional Trans. Auth. , 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016).
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate in any case where the critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the non-movant. Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 (5th Cir. 1994). However, all evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc. , 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the summary judgment evidence which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 256–57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Hearsay, conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1) ; see, e.g., Eason v. Thaler , 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996) ; McIntosh v. Partridge , 540 F.3d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 2008) ; see also Little , 37 F.3d at 1075 (noting that a non-movant's burden is "not satisfied with ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts’ ") (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).
Summary judgment is mandated if the non-movant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to their case on which they bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Wenner v. Tex. Lottery Comm'n , 123 F.3d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1997). "In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. , 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the non-movant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. ; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc. , 953 F.2d 909, 915–16 & n. 7 (5th Cir. 1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Disputed fact issues that are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Generally, the non–movant must bring forward evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact only after the movant shows entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001). However, when, as in this case, a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant is not entitled to immunity by showing a violation of an actual constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Escobar v. Montee , 895 F.3d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 2018) ; Romero v. City of Grapevine , 888 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 2018).
The Fifth Circuit has held verified allegations in a prisoner–plaintiff's complaint allegations "are deemed competent summary judgment evidence." Al–Ra'id v. Ingle , 69 F.3d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, even verified allegations are insufficient to defeat summary judgment if they are nothing more than "conclusory allegations," "unsubstantiated assertions," or constitute "only a scintilla of evidence." Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). As in every summary judgment case, the non–movant's evidence must raise more than some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Funches v. Progressive Tractor & Implement Co. , 905 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). A genuine issue of fact does not exist "if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." City of Alexandria v. Brown , 740 F.3d 339, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). If the moving party supports his motion with evidence, the non-moving party cannot simply rely on conclusory legal allegations but must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248–255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; see also Clark v. America's Favorite Chicken Co. , 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that unsupported allegations, affidavits, or depositions merely setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment).
V. Handling of grievances
To the extent Plaintiff complains about Defendants McNeill's investigation of the use-of-force incidents, this fails to state a claim for relief. Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected interest in having their grievances resolved to their satisfaction. See Geiger v. Jowers , 404 F.3d 371, 373–74 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Geiger does not have a federally protected liberty interest in having these grievances resolved to his satisfaction."); Taylor v. Cockrell , 92 F. App'x 77, 78 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing cases for the proposition that failure to investigate grievances falls short of establishing a federal claim); see also Mahogany v. Miller , 252 F. App'x 593, 595 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that the plaintiff had no actionable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on prison officials' failure to process his grievances because he had no protected liberty interest in the processing of grievances); Lijadu v. I.N.S. , Civ. A. No. 06-0518, 2007 WL 837285, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 21, 2007) ("[D]etainees do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure –– much less one that complies with their own personal preferences." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Robinson v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation , 185 F. App'x 347, 348 (5th Cir. 2006) ("The alleged failure to investigate complaints and to take action in response to them does not provide a basis for a civil rights suit."); see, e.g., Ralston v. Kasper , No. 9:18-CV-83, 2018 WL 7152549, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2018) (recommending the dismissal of plaintiff's claim that defendants "failed to respond to his complaints, failed to investigate his allegations, and failed to pursue criminal charges against those who took improper actions" because plaintiff failed to allege a violation of a constitutional right).
A prison system is not required to establish grievance procedures, and the failure of a jail or prison to establish or adhere to a grievance procedure does not rise to the level of an actionable constitutional claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b) ; see also Archie v. May , Civ. No. 13-3185, 2014 WL 993506, at *3 & n. 1 (W.D. La. Mar. 13, 2014) (collecting cases). Accordingly, inmates have no basis for a civil rights lawsuit simply because they are unhappy with grievance procedures. See id. Therefore, summary judgment is granted to Defendant McNeill concerning his handling of Plaintiff's use-of-force grievances.
VI. The defense of qualified immunity
The applicable substantive law involves the defense of qualified immunity in the context of an excessive force claim. Qualified immunity has been described as " ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’ " Staten v. Adams , 939 F. Supp. 2d 715, 723 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (quoting Saucier , 533 U.S. at 199–200, 121 S.Ct. 2151 ), aff'd , 615 F. App'x 223 (5th Cir. 2015). Qualified immunity "provides ample protections to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). It is a shield from " ‘undue interference’ " with a government official's duties and " ‘potentially disabling threats of liability.’ " Collie v. Barron , 747 F. App'x 950, 952 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 806, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ).
Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (but see Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (overruling Saucier's requirement that qualified immunity analysis proceeds in a particular sequence)).
When resolving questions of qualified immunity, reviewing courts "engage in a two–pronged inquiry." Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 655, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam). Under the first prong, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff "make out a violation of a constitutional right." Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Tex. , 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 69, 202 L.Ed.2d 23 (2018) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ); Bush v. Strain , 513 F.3d 492, 500 (5th Cir. 2008). The second prong requires the Court to determine whether the right in question was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. Darden , 880 F.3d at 727 ; Bush , 513 F.3d at 500. This Court has discretion to decide the order in which it analyzes the prongs; however, deciding the prongs in order is often beneficial. See Tolan , 572 U.S. at 656, 134 S.Ct. 1861 ; Darden , 880 F.3d at 727.
"A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available." King v. Handorf , 821 F.3d. 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, "who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law." Dyer v. Houston , 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Qualified immunity is a complete defense, and [a defendant is] entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity unless [the plaintiff] can show triable issues as to whether [the defendant] violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable officer would have been aware." Brewer v. Hayne , 860 F.3d 819, 824 (5th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff does not satisfy this burden with conclusory allegations based on speculation or unsubstantiated assertions of wrongdoing. See Mitchell v. Mills , 895 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2018) ; Williams-Boldware v. Denton County, Texas , 741 F.3d 635, 643–44 (5th Cir. 2014).
To defeat qualified immunity and prevail on a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment a prisoner must show that force was "purposely or knowingly used against him" in a manner that was "objectively unreasonable." Kingsley v. Hendrickson , 576 U.S. 389, 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (clarifying that "the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim is solely an objective one"); see also Thompson v. Beasley , 309 F.R.D. 236, 246–47 (N.D. Miss. 2015) (calling into question pre- Kingsley precedent from the Fifth Circuit) (citations omitted). A pretrial detainee can prevail only if he shows that the defendants applied force in a manner that was not "rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose" or that the actions were "excessive in relation to that purpose." Kingsley , 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ).
Whether an officer's actions are objectively reasonable "turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’ " Kingsley , 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ). "A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. The "calculus of reasonableness" must take into account the fact that officers "are often forced to make split-second judgments –– circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving –– about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham , 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. A reviewing court must also consider policies and practices judged necessary by jail officials for the legitimate interests of preserving internal order, discipline, and institutional security. Kingsley , 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (citing Bell , 441 U.S. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ).
The Supreme Court has observed that "[e]nsuring security and order at [an] institution is a permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted inmates, or both." Bell , 441 U.S. at 561, 99 S.Ct. 1861. And the Supreme Court has also made clear that "not ... every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (citing Johnson v. Glick , 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights")).
VII. Qualified immunity analysis
In this case, the Court finds Defendants Salgado and Ybarra have established entitlement to summary judgment based on evidence supporting the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry — whether a constitutional violation has been established — because both Defendants' use-of-force was objectively reasonable. See Tolan , 572 U.S. at 656, 134 S.Ct. 1861 ; Darden , 880 F.3d at 727. This Court need not, therefore, inquire into the second prong — whether the right in question was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. Darden , 880 F.3d at 727 ; Bush , 513 F.3d at 500.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Salgado and Ybarra used excessive force — thereby violating his constitutional rights — when taking Plaintiff to the medical station. [docket numbers 1 & 15]. The summary judgment evidence establishes the actions of Defendants Salgado and Ybarra were objectively reasonable when the totality of the circumstances was reviewed based on the Kingsley factors. The Kingsley factors are similar to those set out in Hudson v. McMillian , in which the subjective standard was applied. Compare Kingsley , 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466, with Hudson , 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995. The Hudson factors included the extent of the injury, the need for the force, the relationship between the need for and the force used, the threat reasonably perceived, and any efforts to temper the severity of the force. Hudson , 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995. Accordingly, the Court finds there was no excessive use-of-force, and therefore, no violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Plaintiff's use-of-force claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment because the incident occurred while Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. See Kingsley , 576 U.S. at 396–97, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (abrogating lower courts' application of Eighth Amendment excessive force standards from Hudson , 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 to pretrial detainees). To sufficiently state an excessive force claim, "a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposefully and knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable." Id. "[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’ " Id. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ). The reasonableness of the force used must be assessed "from the perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant officer" and with "deference to policies and practices needed to maintain order and institutional security." Id. at 399–400, 135 S.Ct. 2466.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects an arrestee or pretrial detainee from excessive force that amounts to punishment. Kingsley , 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (citing Graham , 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ). Excessive force that violates the Fourteenth Amendment requires showing: (1) an action taken with an expressed intent to punish; (2) not "rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose; or (3) that "appear[s] excessive in relation to that purpose." Id. (citing United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("[T]he punitive-regulatory distinction turns on ‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the action] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].’ ")). A court applies an objective reasonableness standard to determine whether the officer's force was excessive in the circumstances presented.
In determining the objective reasonableness of an officer's use of force, a court should consider the following non-exclusive list of factors: (1) the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; (2) the extent of the plaintiff's injury; (3) any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of force; (4) the severity of the security problem at issue; (5) the threat reasonably perceived by the defendant; and (6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Id. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (citation omitted).
Officials are justified in using some degree of force "in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline" where a prisoner refuses to cooperate with legitimate directives of an official. Gonzales v. Rowe , No. 5:20-CV-052-BQ, 2020 WL 4811005, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2020) (finding "some degree of force" by officers was justified where inmate "refus[ed] to comply with the Officers' repeated orders to lie on the cell's floor" because "[d]isobeying orders poses a threat to the order and security of an institution") (citing Minix v. Blevins , No. 6:06-CV-306, 2007 WL 1217883, at *24 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2007) ) (recognizing that even where prisoner believes an order to be unjustified or improper, such belief does not give him the right to disobey at his whim); Calhoun v. Wyatt , No. 6:11-CV-4, 2013 WL 1882367, at *6 (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2013) (noting that inmate's refusal to obey orders "set the stage for the use of force"); Rios v. McBain , No. 5:04-CV-84, 2005 WL 1026192, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2005) (noting that "open defiance of orders plainly poses a threat to the security of the institution, regardless of whether or not the defiance is emanating from within a locked cell"), R. & R. adopted by 2005 WL 1026192 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2005).
Thus, Plaintiff's actions, i.e., walking briskly away from guards without the required shackles to enter the medical station in defiance of repeated verbal orders, authorized some degree of force to maintain or restore discipline. The force applied, when examined under the Kingsley factors within the context of the facts and circumstances described by Plaintiff, does not demonstrate objective unreasonableness on the part of Defendants Salgado and Ybarra. See, e.g., Diaz v. Ray , 5:17-CV-025-BQ, 2017 WL 8790964, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2017) (applying Kingsley factors and dismissing pretrial detainee's excessive force claim where he failed to show the officer's use of force was objectively unreasonable — detainee suffered only minimal physical injury after officer applied force to obtain compliance with disobeyed order and maintain institutional discipline and security).
As such, a reasonable officer could believe that some use-of-force was objectively reasonable due to the threat presented by Plaintiff's utter refusal to follow orders. Thus, the fifth Kingsley factor (i.e., the threat to institutional order reasonably perceived by the officer) weighs heavily in favor of finding that each Defendants' alleged use-of-force was objectively reasonable. See Kingsley , 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466.
The first and third Kingsley factors (i.e., the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used, and any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of force) also weigh in Defendants Salgado and Ybarra's favor. See id. In the uncontradicted video-recorded evidence submitted, in the first use-of-force incident, after walking swiftly and far-ahead of the Defendants who were supposed to be escorting him to Medical, Defendant Salgado can be seen giving orders to Plaintiff who was apparently oblivious to such orders. It was at this time Defendant Salgado lifted Plaintiff off the ground and brusquely placed him on the floor. Plaintiff still refused to allow himself to be handcuffed or controlled in any way. That's when Defendant Salgado applied two compliance strikes to Plaintiff's mid-section, upon which, Plaintiff then allowed himself to be handcuffed.
In the second use-of-force incident, which occurred moments after the first incident, Plaintiff was still being escorted to Medical when Plaintiff suddenly pulled away from Defendant Ybarra's arm-grip. Defendant Ybarra then guided Plaintiff to the floor, where he, Defendant Salgado, and one other non-defendant guard placed Plaintiff into shackles while Plaintiff visibly resisted.
Under the circumstances, and given the video-recorded evidence, the Court cannot conclude that either Defendant used force that was beyond what was needed in the first or second use-of-force incidents, or that Defendants made no effort to limit the amount of force used. The first and third Kingsley factors weigh against Plaintiff in both use-of-force instances.
When considering the need for the application of force, the Court must consider the context. Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at a correctional institution where order must be maintained at all times lest there be utter chaos. Additionally, this was no ordinary pretrial detainee, but one who was known to be routinely non-compliant and a somewhat dangerous maximum-security inmate. The use of force was not excessive to the need regarding either the first or second use-of-force incidents, and the first Kingsley factor weighs against Plaintiff in this regard as well.
The fourth and sixth Kingsley factors (i.e., the severity of the security problem at issue and Plaintiff's active resistance) also weigh in Defendants Salgado and Ybarra's favor. The video-recorded evidence reflects that both Defendants had a difficult time trying to control and restrain Plaintiff in either use-of-force instance, as Plaintiff was not following commands and was actively resisting attempts to control him. Accordingly, the video-recorded evidence supports a finding that the security issue presented by Plaintiff defying Defendants' orders and attempts at control was particularly severe, and it demonstrates Plaintiff's active resistance to handcuffing, and in the second instance, shackling. The fourth and sixth Kingsley factors therefore weigh against Plaintiff.
The second Kingsley factor—the extent of the injury suffered—weighs against Plaintiff, although only slightly. Even if Plaintiff's injuries were severe, this alone is not fatal to Defendants Salgado and Ybarra's qualified immunity claim: a prisoner need not "show more than a ‘de minimis’ injury to establish a claim of excessive force" because the Supreme Court has instructed courts to " ‘decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury.’ " Wilson v. Rheams , 494 F. App'x 469, 470 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy , 559 U.S. 34, 34, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 175 L.Ed.2d 995 (2010), and citing Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 6–7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) ).
Considering the nature of the force used rather than the extent of the injury (which was horrific), the Court finds Defendants used force which was not grossly disproportionate to the need and was not in any way calculated to injure Plaintiff as severely as he was, in fact, injured. The core inquiry focuses on the nature of the force used; a plaintiff need not show that his injuries were significant, although the extent of the injury may provide some indication of the amount of force applied and may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Gaddy , 559 U.S. 34, 37-39 & n. 2, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 175 L.Ed.2d 995 (2010). "Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts." Id. at 38, 130 S.Ct. 1175.
"The question under this analysis is whether the force applied was in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Noel v. Webre , 426 F. App'x 247, 249–50 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Hudson , 503 U.S. at 5–10, 112 S.Ct. 995 ; Valencia v. Wiggins , 981 F.2d 1440, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993) ). "[T]he trier of fact must reflect in this calculus that the detention facility official may have had to act quickly and decisively," id. at 1446, and the official is therefore "entitled to wide-ranging deference," Baldwin v. Stalder , 137 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 1998). It is not necessary for a pretrial detainee to suffer a significant injury, but he must have suffered at least some injury that is more than de minimis. Galada v. Payne , 421 F. App'x 460, 462 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also, e.g., Hudson , 503 U.S. at 9–10, 112 S.Ct. 995 (refusing to require significant injury in Eighth Amendment excessive force claim because "contemporary standards of decency always are violated" "[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm ... whether or not significant injury is evident," but "exclud[ing] from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind’ ") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Noel , 426 F. App'x at 249–50 (affirming dismissal of pretrial detainee's excessive force claim where there was evidence that officer had restrained pretrial detainee to protect other officers and prevent detainee from biting her). "[I]t is clear [regarding the need for the application of force] that the use of force is permissible in a variety of situations, not only when it is necessary to protect oneself from an imminent physical attack by an inmate." Brown v. Gusman , CA No. 15-1491-DEK, 2015 WL 6827260, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2015). "For example, the use of force is also appropriate when necessary to control a ‘recalcitrant inmate.’ " Id. (citing Jones v. Shields , 207 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2000) ).
This Court takes into account the factors from Kingsley , and in so doing, concludes Defendants Salgado and Ybarra are entitled to summary judgment. "[T]he core judicial inquiry" is "whether force was applied in good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Wilkins v. Gaddy , 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 175 L.Ed.2d 995 (2010) (quoting Hudson , 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995 ). This has not changed under Kingsley. Considering the summary judgment evidence, the applicable Kingsley factors, and the proper core inquiry, the Court finds both Defendants' use-of-force against Plaintiff was applied in good faith in an effort to restore internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. See Kingsley , 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466. In sum, the Court finds Defendants' two, close-in-succession, use-of-force incidents were objectively reasonable under the circumstances that confronted them, entitling Defendants Salgado and Ybarra to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
The unrebutted summary judgment video-recorded evidence demonstrates both Defendants deployed force in a reasonable manner as well as tempered in severity for the purpose of gaining Plaintiff's compliance with direct orders. Indeed, "[t]he Fifth Circuit has consistently found no excessive force where prison officials employ force against inmates refusing to comply with orders." Schneider v. Kaelin , No. C. 12-233, 2013 WL 1867611, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2013) (citing Thomas v. Comstock , 222 F. App'x 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)). "As a detainee, [Plaintiff] has no authority to make that kind of executive decision" and ignore an officer's commands. See e.g., Reeves v. Franey , 3:18-CV-03232-X, 2021 WL 409737, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2021).
Absent evidence that force was used in a manner unrelated to a legitimate non-punitive purpose or that the force used was excessive to the need, Plaintiff fails to show that either Defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in these circumstances. See Tennyson v. Villarreal , 801 F. App'x 295 (5th Cir. 2020) (reversing denial of summary judgment for officers who took a noncompliant pretrial detainee to the ground in order to handcuff him behind his back). Because Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine fact issue about whether excessive force was used in violation of clearly established law, Defendants Salgado and Ybarra are entitled to qualified immunity. To the extent that Defendants Salgado and Ybarra used limited force for the legitimate purpose of obtaining Plaintiff's compliance with instructions to maintain institutional order and security, these factors weigh in favor of finding that the alleged use of force was objectively reasonable. See Kingsley , 576 U.S. at 397, 135 S.Ct. 2466.
Accordingly, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no genuine dispute of any material fact regarding whether excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment was used against Plaintiff by Defendants Salgado and Ybarra. Thus, both Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as well as summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's excessive use-of-force claim.
In sum, weighing the factors set forth in Kingsley , Plaintiff's allegations fail to establish that Defendants Salgado and Ybarra's use-of-force was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claim for excessive use-of-force against Defendants Salgado and Ybarra.
VIII. Vicarious liability
Plaintiff is suing Defendants Griffis, McNeill, Durham, and Mancha because they are responsible for the welfare of all inmates within ECDC. Therefore, Plaintiff is suing Defendants Griffis, McNeill, Durham, and Mancha because of their positions and supervisory roles within ECDC, and not because of anything they had to do with the use-of-force incidents in this case.
Plaintiff's vicarious liability claim against Defendants Griffis, McNeill, Durham, and Mancha is not a viable constitutional claim. A supervisory official is not liable for the acts of his subordinates unless: (1) he affirmatively participated in an act that caused a constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implemented an unconstitutional policy that resulted in injury to the plaintiff. Mouille v. City of Live Oak , 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Thompkins v. Belt , 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987) ). A prisoner must sufficiently allege facts showing either personal involvement or implementation of an unconstitutional policy to make a supervisor responsible under § 1983, as prison supervisors "are not liable for the actions of their subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability." Thompkins , 828 F.2d at 303.
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not stated a viable constitutional claim; thus, he cannot state a claim for supervisory liability. See Mouille , 977 F.2d at 929. Even assuming he alleged a constitutional violation, Plaintiff, however, has not asserted a non-frivolous claim against Defendants Griffis, McNeill, Durham, and Mancha for supervisory liability. Based upon the facts as alleged by Plaintiff, he has not pleaded a viable supervisory liability claim because he has not demonstrated that these Defendants were personally involved in any of the alleged constitutional violations. Thompkins , 828 F.2d at 303.
Similarly, Plaintiff has not stated a non-frivolous claim against Defendants Griffis, McNeill, Durham, and Mancha based on the alleged implementation of an unconstitutional policy. Plaintiff has not pleaded facts demonstrating that Defendants Griffis, McNeill, Durham, and Mancha implemented an unconstitutional policy. "Supervisory liability may exist under § 1983 ‘without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.’ " Brown v. Cain , 546 F. App'x 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Thompkins , 828 F.2d at 304 ).
All Plaintiff has alleged is that Defendants Griffis, McNeill, Durham, and Mancha had supervisory responsibility over the welfare of ECDC's inmates. This is insufficient to state a constitutional claim. Therefore, summary judgment is granted for Defendants Griffis, McNeill, Durham, and Mancha.
IX. Official capacity claims against the Ector County Defendants
A plaintiff can sue an individual state or municipal government official under § 1983 through one of two theories of liability: (1) an individual capacity theory, or (2) an official capacity theory. See Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165–66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (discussing the importance of distinguishing between official capacity and individual capacity suits under § 1983 ). In an individual-capacity suit, a plaintiff seeks to impose personal liability on a government official for actions he or she takes under color of state law. See id. at 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099. By contrast, an official capacity suit against an individual government official "generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Id. Here, Plaintiff has asserted § 1983 claims against the Ector County Defendants in both capacities.
An official capacity claim is merely another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the individual defendant is an agent. See Hafer v. Melo , 502 U.S. 21, 26–27, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) ; Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). A suit against the Ector County Defendants in their official capacity is therefore a suit against their employer, Ector County, Texas. Kentucky , 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099. Municipalities, including counties and cities, may be held liable under § 1983. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur., LLC v. Tunica County , 543 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 2008). A § 1983 does not allow a municipality to be held vicariously liable for their employees' actions on a theory of respondeat superior , however. See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) ; Monell v. N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691–95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Plaintiff must show an "underlying claim of a violation of rights," as well as "a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom." Cox v. City of Dallas , 430 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 2005). The official policy requirement means that municipal liability under § 1983 is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 479–80, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). However, insofar as the Ector County Defendants were sued in their official capacity, that portion of the suit fails, summary judgment on this claim is granted for the Ector County Defendants, and the Court will now analyze the claims as asserted against Ector County alone.
The municipal liability analysis also applies to Texas counties. See Prince v. Curry , 423 Fed.Appx. 447, 450 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2011) ; Brady v. Fort Bend County , 145 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1998).
X. Ector County claims
Plaintiff's claims against Ector County itself should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to identify a policy or custom as the moving force behind the alleged violations.
A county may be held liable under § 1983 only for its own illegal acts, not pursuant to a theory of vicarious liability. Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 60, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). To succeed on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must establish, not only that an individual state actor violated his constitutional rights, but that "(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right." Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex. , 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Piotrowski v. City of Hous. , 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) ). "Official [local-government] policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick , 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350 ; see also Peterson , 588 F.3d at 850.
Plaintiff fails to cite to any specific policy that "was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right." See Peterson , 588 F.3d at 847. Plaintiff's allegations are nothing more than a formulaic recitation of negligence. These statements fail to identify any particular policy, but, more fundamentally, neither state whether the infringing policy or policies were formal written policies, decisions by policymakers, or persistent and widespread practices. Indeed, Plaintiff's Complaint focuses on the single incident in which he was involved, rather than suggesting a persistent and widespread practice. See id. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to plead facts connecting the offending policy or policies to each alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff simply presented no evidence to support this claim, therefore, his claim of a constitutional violation by Ector County fails and summary judgment is granted for the Ector County Defendants.
XI. Individual capacity claims against Defendant Griffis
Individual capacity suits seek to impose liability upon a government official as an individual while official-capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell , 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Thus, "an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity." Kentucky , 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (citation omitted).
Pursuant to Texas law, a plaintiff can only sue a county sheriff in his or her individual capacity. See Morris v. Copeland , 944 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. App.––Corpus Christi 1997, no writ) ; Doe v. Angelina Cty., Tex. , 733 F.Supp. 245, 259 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (dismissing false imprisonment claim against county sheriff in his official capacity). Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court will presume that Plaintiff is bringing a claim against Defendant Griffis in his individual capacity. See Leal v. McHugh , 731 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2013).
Supervisory officials cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates based on any theory of vicarious or respondeat superior liability. See Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of North Richmond Hills , 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). In order to prevail against a supervisor under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the supervisor's conduct directly caused a constitutional violation; or (2) that the supervisor was "deliberately indifferent" to a violation of a constitutional right. Breaux v. City of Garland , 205 F.3d 150, 161 (5th Cir. 2000). The acts of a subordinate "trigger no individual § 1983 liability." Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office , 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999). There must be some showing of personal involvement by a particular individual defendant to prevail against that individual. Id. A plaintiff cannot make generalized allegations. Howard v. Fortenberry , 723 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff does not identify any personal involvement by Sheriff Griffis, however, and Sheriff Griffis cannot be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional actions of the guards. See Champagne , 188 F.3d at 314 (no individual liability under § 1983 where complaint alleges no personal involvement by the defendant in violating plaintiff's rights by working him beyond his capabilities in prison); see also Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully , 406 F.3d at 381. Because he has not alleged that Sheriff Griffis was personally involved in any alleged violations of his civil rights, his federal claims against him should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Johnson v. Valdez , No. 3:13-CV-2173-B, 2013 WL 5489957, at *2 (dismissing claims against a sheriff for failure to allege any personal involvement); Carson v. Dallas Cty. Jail , No. 3:13-CV-0678-K, 2013 WL 3324222, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2013) (dismissing claims against a sheriff and other supervisory officials for failure to allege any personal involvement). Therefore, summary judgment is granted in favor of Sheriff Griffis for failure of Plaintiff to allege any personal involvement.
XII. Bystander-liability
As for Defendants Galvan and Garcia, who were present but not alleged to have struck Plaintiff (he does not allege they used any force against him); rather, he contends only that they were witnesses to the alleged assaults by Defendants Salgado and Ybarra. The Court interprets this as a § 1983 claim based on the bystander-liability theory. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Kindred , 845 F.3d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 2017) ; Hale v. Townley , 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995).
An officer may be liable under § 1983 in an excessive force case under a theory of bystander-liability if the officer: (1) knows a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act. Hamilton , 845 F.3d at 663 ; Whitley v. Hanna , 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013). The rationale underlying the bystander-liability theory is that a bystanding officer, by choosing not to intervene, functionally participates in the unconstitutional act of his fellow officer. Whitley , 726 F.3d at 647. However, bystander liability arises only where the plaintiff alleges and proves another officer's use of excessive force. Kitchen v. Dallas Cnty. , 759 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds, Kingsley v. Hendrickson , 576 U.S. 389, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) ; Hale , 45 F.3d at 919. Moreover, mere presence at the scene is insufficient to render an officer legally responsible for constitutional violation under § 1983 based on bystander-liability. Whitley , 726 F.3d at 646–47 ; see Blakely v. Kelly , No. 3:16-CV-2801-K-BN, 2020 WL 890383, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2020), report and recommendation adopted , 2020 WL 888522 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2020) (holding that "mere presence at the scene, without more, does not by some mysterious alchemy" render an officer "legally responsible under section 1983 for the actions of a fellow officer.") (quoting Calvi v. Knox Cnty. , 470 F.3d 422, 428 & n. 3 (1st Cir. 2006) ). Plaintiff's bystander claims against Defendants Galvan and Garcia suffers from both deficiencies.
First, as detailed above, the summary judgment evidence establishes there was no violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by any of the law enforcement defendants based on excessive use-of-force. Accordingly, there can be no bystander-liability by Defendants Galvan and Garcia. See Kitchen , 759 F.3d at 477. Second, the mere presence of Defendants Galvan and Garcia, without more, is insufficient to render them legally responsible for the actions of the other officers. See Whitley , 726 F.3d at 646–47. In other words, Plaintiff's verified allegations lack the factual specificity to make out a bystander–liability claim against Defendants Galvan and Garcia, which therefore defeats an excessive force claim based on the bystander theory, thereby requiring the Court to find the officers are entitled to qualified immunity in the alternative. See, e.g., Shaw v. Villanueva , 918 F.3d 414, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2019). XIII. Motions to exclude or strike evidence concerning Plaintiff's incarceration history
Plaintiff filed two Motions seeking to have this Court exclude or strike evidence of his prior incarcerations, inmate classification, and arrest history as irrelevant to the determination of whether he was subjected to an unconstitutional use-of-force. [docket numbers 87 & 88]. A pretrial detainee can prevail against a claim of qualified immunity only if he shows that the defendants applied force in a manner that was not "rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose" or that the actions were "excessive in relation to that purpose." Kingsley , 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting Bell , 99 S. Ct. at 1886 ). For the Court to determine that, the Court must be aware of who Plaintiff was in relation to the use-of-force. Was Plaintiff a minimum-security detainee who posed no risk to the guards based on his history? Or instead, was Plaintiff a maximum-security detainee who by prior acts and encounters with the guards, showed himself to be a danger not only to the guards but to the security of the institution itself and to the safety of the civilians working in the jail? Plaintiff clearly showed himself to be the latter, and that is important for this Court to know.
Courts have recognized that a pretrial detainee's refusal to comply with repeated orders justifies the use of some degree of force by officers. See Gonzales v. Rowe , Civil No. 5:20-052-BQ, 2020 WL 4811005, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2020) (citing Calhoun v. Wyatt , Civil Action No. 6:11-4, 2013 WL 1882367, at *6 (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2013) (noting that inmate's refusal to obey orders "set the stage for the use of force")). Because Plaintiff was an inmate assigned to a maximum-security level at ECDC, Defendants reasonably perceived that Plaintiff's disruptive actions were an immediate threat. See Rios v. McBain , Civil No. 5:04-84, 2005 WL 1026192, at *7 (E.D. Tex. April 28, 2005) (noting that "open defiance of orders plainly poses a threat to the security of the institution, regardless of whether or not the defiance is emanating from within a locked cell"). The Court can no more ignore Plaintiff's extensive history, especially within ECDC, than this Court can ignore Plaintiff's claims about Defendant Ybarra's character for being fired from ECDC for supposedly trafficking in tobacco to the inmates. Plaintiff's Motions are therefore denied. [docket numbers 87 & 88].
XIV. State law claims
To the extent Plaintiff has any remaining state law claims, the Court dismisses these under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Since this Court no longer has original jurisdiction because it has already dismissed the federal claims, supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims should be declined. This is also true because of the interests of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness will be served by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims.
In this circuit, the general rule is to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims are dismissed or eliminated prior to trial. See Wong v. Stripling , 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989). However, this rule is neither mandatory nor absolute. See id. Rather, the Fifth Circuit reviews a district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. See Batiste v. Island Records, Inc. , 179 F.3d 217, 226 (5th Cir. 1999) ; see also Robertson v. Neuromedical Center , 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[D]istrict court has wide discretion"). Given that wide discretion, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims as all federal claims over which this Court had original jurisdiction have been dismissed.
XV. Conclusion
The Court grants the Ector County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses with prejudice all of Plaintiff's claims against them. [docket number 44]. However, any pending state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. Lastly, Plaintiff's Motions to exclude or strike evidence concerning Plaintiff's incarceration history are denied. [docket numbers 87 & 88].
It is so ORDERED.