immunity, see Plumhoff, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2022-23 (emphasizing that "a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it");(5) the harassment claim is inadequate because the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (stating that "exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory"); Washington, 273 F. App'x at 576-77 (applying § 1997e(a)), a directive to clean a dirty cell does not violate any constitutional provision, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (noting that prisoner retains constitutional remedy for "calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs"); Sanchez v. Earls, 534 F. App'x 577, 579 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (concluding that no constitutional violation occurred because inmate did not experience atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, inmate did not show that he was treated differently than similarly situated inmates and inmate failed to allege facts suggesting he was deprived of minimal life necessities), the defense of qualified immunity is applicable, see Plumhoff, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2022-23 (emphasizing that "a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it"), and the plaintiff did not suffer a physical injury, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also Williams, 662 F.3d at 1011-12 (discussing the availability of compensatory and punitive damages); Royal, 375 F.3d at 723 (concluding that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) limits the recovery for mental or emo
Defendants offer no legal authority that requires a plaintiff to plead the exhaustion of administrative remedies outside the context of prisoners' actions, and the Court's research has found none. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Earls, 534 F. App'x 577, 578-79 (8th Cir. 2013) (observing that Patel requires "a prisoner-plaintiff [to] show he 'has exhausted alternative means of accommodating his religious needs' to prove a substantial burden under RLUIPA or the Free Exercise Clause" (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Patel, 515 F.3d at 815)). Accordingly, Defendants' objection based on Patel is overruled.
(Al-Kadi Dep. at 20-21, 39, 79.) See also Sanchez v. Earls, 534 F. App'x 577, 578 (8th Cir. 2013) (no substantial burden for denial of crucifix to inmate because he did not allege that another crucifix would have been inadequate); Hudson v. Dennehy, 538 F. Supp. 2d 400, 412 (D. Mass. 2008) (prayer towels given to Muslim inmates served same purpose as prayer rugs; thus, no substantial burden on inmates' religious exercise), judgment entered, No. CIV.A. 01-12145-RGS, 2008 WL 1451984 (D. Mass. Apr. 11, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Crawford v. Clarke, 578 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2009).
For prisoners, a constitutionally protected interest will be found, and the protections of due process will come into play, only when a prisoner has suffered "an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life so as to give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest." Sanchez v. Earls, 534 Fed. Appx. 577 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, (1995); Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir.2002) (holding disciplinary segregation is not an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin); Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding prisoner has no constitutional right to a particular job assignment); Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding prisoner has no constitutional right to a particular housing unit); Lyon v. Farrier, 730 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding prisoner has no property interest in contraband)). Additionally, in Phillips, the Eighth Circuit held that a prisoner has no liberty interest in having prison officials follow prison regulations.
And even at the pleading stage, the Court finds that Cavanaugh has not alleged sufficient facts to suggest that his ability to practice FSMism—whatever that means—is substantially burdened. See , Williams v. City of St. Louis , 626 Fed.Appx. 197, 198–99 (8th Cir.2015) ; Sanchez v. Earls , 534 Fed.Appx. 577, 578–79 (8th Cir.2013). His claims are simply not facially plausible.