Sanchez v. Blustein, Shapiro, Rich & Barone LLP

4 Citing cases

  1. Keswani v. Athwal

    20-CV-10578 (RA) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 14, 2021)   Cited 2 times

    “Stating that a particular obligation is a ‘debt' under the FDCPA is a legal conclusion, . . . so if a complaint does not plead facts that could plausibly lead to the inference that the debt attempted to be collected was a consumer debt, the complaint fails to state a FDCPA claim and must be dismissed.” Sanchez v. Blustein, Shapiro, Rich & Barone LLP, No. 13-CV-8886 CS, 2014 WL 7339193, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (dismissing pro se complaint in FDCPA action where Plaintiff “plead[ed] no facts regarding the nature of the debt”). Although the failure to plead any facts about the specific nature of this debt is reason alone for dismissal, the few facts that the Court may consider on this motion raise doubt as to whether the underlying transaction qualifies as a consumer debt.

  2. Paushok v. Ganbold

    20 Civ. 4769 (JPC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2021)

    "[M]ere conclusory statements" claiming that the debt arose from a consumer transaction are not sufficient to meet this requirement. Scarola Malone & Zubatov LLP, 638 F. App'x at 102-03 (requiring that a plaintiff's allegations be "supported by facts from which the inference could be reasonably drawn that collection efforts arose from a consumer transaction" and finding that the plaintiff's assertion that the debt was "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes" to be contravened by other facts in the complaint); see Maleh, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 271 (collecting cases where "courts have concluded that plaintiffs who recite the statutory definition of 'debt' rather than plead facts regarding the debt's nature have not adequately pleaded an FDCPA claim"); Sanchez v. Blustein, Shapiro, Rich & Barone LLP, No. 13 Civ. 8886 (CS), 2014 WL 7339193, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) ("Stating that a particular obligation is a 'debt' under the FDCPA is a legal conclusion, so if a complaint does not plead facts that could plausibly lead to the inference that the debt attempted to be collected was a consumer debt, the complaint fails to state a FDCPA claim and must be dismissed." (internal citation omitted)).

  3. Cassidy v. Madoff

    8:18-cv-00394 (BKS/DJS) (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 31, 2019)   Cited 4 times

    "Because . . . business expenses do not constitute consumer debt, [Pioneer's collection activities] are not 'in connection with the collection of any debt' covered by the FDCPA, and thus cannot form the basis of a FDCPA claim." Sanchez v. Blustein, Shapiro, Rich & Barone LLP, No. 13-cv-8886, 2014 WL 7339193, at *8, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176814, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (dismissing FDCPA claims where, based on the "pleadings and documents" before the Court, it was "apparent that the common charges at issue were business expenses accrued by corporate entities that Plaintiff used as investment vehicles"); see also Spira v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. 09-cv-8412, 2010 WL 3910290, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107828, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff's FDCPA claim, finding the FDCPA did not apply "to Plaintiff's case since his business loan does not constitute a consumer debt as defined by the statute"), aff'd, 466 F. App'x 20 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hartel, 741 F. Supp. 1139, 1139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (granting summary judgment dismissing FDCPA claims, concluding that promissory notes used to pay for partnership interest in "tax-shelter limited partnership which was formed to purchase and operate hotels and motels" were not consumer debt under the FDCPA). Accordingly, because it is apparent f

  4. Washington v. Westchester Cnty. Dept of Corr.

    13 Civ. 5322 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015)   Cited 29 times

    As Plaintiff has already been afforded a chance to cure deficiencies, along with a roadmap outlining that cure, and has still failed to do so, the Court will not grant him further leave to amend. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Blustein, Shapiro, Rich & Barone LLP, No. 13 Civ. 8886 (CS), 2014 WL 7339193, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) ("[Pro se] Plaintiff's failure to fix deficiencies in his previous pleadings, after being provided notice of the deficiencies, is alone sufficient ground to deny leave to amend sua sponte."). Moreover, after reviewing the record, the Court concludes that a more particularized pleading will not cure the deficiencies identified herein and in the Court's April 24, 2014 Opinion.