Opinion
No. 04-04-00052-CV
Delivered and Filed: March 23, 2005.
Appeal from the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2003-CI-12237, Honorable Janet Littlejohn, Judge Presiding.
Reversed and Remanded.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
San Sun Hat Cap (USA) Corporation appeals the trial court's order denying its application for temporary restraining order and dismissing its petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Because the issue in this appeal involves the application of well-settled principles of law, we reverse the trial court's judgment in this memorandum opinion and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4.
San Sun contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its petition without notice and without an opportunity to amend its pleadings. San Sun's lawsuit sought to restrain and enjoin Syliva S. Romo, the Bexar County Tax Assessor-Collector, from taking action to collect delinquent taxes allegedly owed by San Sun in regard to personal property it acquired from a bank. San Sun also sought a declaratory judgment that it did not owe the delinquent taxes and that the personal property is not subject to a lien in favor of Romo for the taxes. At a hearing on San Sun's application for temporary restraining order, the trial court granted an oral motion to dismiss San Sun's petition. The trial court's order does not specify the reason for the dismissal.
Fundamental principles of procedural due process demand notice and an opportunity to be heard before a trial court may enter an order dismissing a lawsuit. See Creel v. Dist. Attorney for Medina County, Tex., 818 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. 1991) (holding dismissal of petition was a denial of due process in the absence of notice and a hearing); Davis Family Trust v. Landtroop, No. 05-96-00165-CV, 1996 WL 730573, at *2 (Tex.App.-Dallas Dec. 20, 1996, no pet.) (noting dismissal in the absence of notice and a hearing violates due process); Interfirst Bank of Fort Worth, N.A. v. Estate of Henderson, 719 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1986, no writ) (noting dismissal where notice of hearing was on different subject matter violated due process). In her brief, Romo does not dispute that proper notice was not provided but contends that the procedural due process requirements apply only when a cause is dismissed for want of prosecution. Although numerous cases discuss procedural due process violations in the context of dismissals for want of prosecution, all of the cases cited above finding a violation of procedural due process rights do not arise in the context of dismissals for want of prosecution but in the context of dismissals for other reasons. Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides procedural due process protection, and constitutional protections are not limited to a particular type of case. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Romo next asserts that San Sun has failed to show that the trial court committed reversible error because the error did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Rendering an order of dismissal in the absence of proper notice is an improper judgment because it violates procedural due process. See Creel, 818 S.W.2d at 46; Davis Family Trust, 1996 WL 730573, at *2; Interfirst Bank of Fort Worth, N.A., 719 S.W.2d at 642. Romo finally contends that San Sun could simply refile its lawsuit; therefore, it should not be permitted to appeal. San Sun, however, is not required to refile its lawsuit and pay an additional filing fee if it can show on appeal that the trial court's dismissal order was an abuse of discretion.
The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing San Sun's lawsuit in the absence of proper notice. Accordingly, the trial court's order is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.