Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. JV79524.
Judge of the Contra Costa Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Sixteen-year-old A.G. appeals from the juvenile court’s order returning her to the custody, care, and control of her father, respondent E.G. (father). She argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion at a post-permanency hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3 when it found that sending her to live with father in Atlanta would be in her best interest. We disagree and affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The early factual and procedural background of these proceedings has been summarized in two nonpublished opinions addressing father’s prior challenges to juvenile court orders (In re A.G. (Aug. 26, 2010, A127725) (A.G. I); In re A.G. (Jan. 31, 2011, A129114) (A.G. II)), and we briefly repeat the relevant facts included in those opinions.
Father has lived in Atlanta since before dependency proceedings were initiated. He and the minor’s mother, appellant Gretchen L. (mother), divorced when the minor was seven years old, and they were involved in protracted family court proceedings regarding custody of the minor and rules governing father’s contact with her. Father had been ordered to have no contact with the minor from January 2002 to January 2005 because of violations of visitation rules. Father and the minor apparently had little contact after that, seeing each other no more than once or twice a year at a visitation center.
San Mateo County Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a juvenile dependency petition on May 20, 2009, pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), and (c) (serious emotional damage), alleging that mother had physically abused the minor and had substance abuse problems. The minor was ordered detained and placed with family members. She was later adjudged a dependent child following a dispositional hearing on July 28, 2009, and the juvenile court ordered that reunification services be provided to mother. Although reunification services were not ordered for father at that time, the juvenile court ordered visitation between father and the minor, and the minor visited father in August 2009.
A supplemental petition filed on November 13, 2009, alleged that the minor should be placed in a foster home because her family members could no longer care for her. The petition further alleged that “father’s communication with the child has upset the child and the child is now refusing to have any communications with the father.” The social worker reported that the minor had been having nightmares involving father and that father’s communications “can be perceived as insensitive and blameful by the child.” The minor was again ordered detained, and the juvenile court ordered that there be no further e-mail communication between father and the minor.
At a combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on the supplemental petition on December 29, 2009, the juvenile court sustained the supplemental petition, found that return of the minor to the custody of either parent would be detrimental to her, and ordered that reunification services be provided to father, with continued services to mother. Father’s case plan consisted of joint therapy with the minor, a parenting class, and supervised visitation.
This court rejected father’s challenge to the terms of visitation in A.G. I, supra, A127725.
At a January 28, 2010 review hearing, the juvenile court ordered that father not contact the minor or anyone in her foster family and that he stay at least 100 yards away from them, after it was revealed that father had obtained the address of the foster home through an internet search. Father later filed a petition to vacate the no contact order pursuant to section 388 so that he could fly to the Bay Area for joint counseling with the minor, and the juvenile court granted the unopposed petition on June 1, 2010.
The social worker reported in an addendum report dated May 6, 2010, that although the Agency recommended joint therapy between father and the minor, the minor continued to protest that she did not want to speak with father. At a review hearing in July 2010, the social worker testified about the challenges in arranging joint therapy for the minor and father due to an extended vacation father took and the minor’s resistance to the joint therapy. She reported that the minor’s therapist thought there would be an “emotional detriment” to the minor if she addressed her relationship with father at the same time she was addressing issues with mother, and the minor repeatedly had said that she did not want to see or speak with father. At the conclusion of the review hearing, the juvenile court continued the minor as a dependent child and ordered an additional six months of reunification services for both parents. Father appealed from the order, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the finding that he had received reasonable reunification services. This court affirmed in A.G. II, supra, A129114.
The Agency stated in an interim review report dated September 21, 2010, that the minor had recently started high school and was doing well as she balanced various activities, such as playing on a varsity volleyball team, completing schoolwork, and attending appointments related to her case plan to reunify with mother and father. In August, the minor participated in two dyad therapy sessions with father. They also had a supervised dinner visit, and the social worker reported that the minor appeared comfortable with father, who asked appropriate questions about the minor’s life.
The minor and father participated in an additional dyad therapy session in September, which reportedly did not go well because the minor was upset that father was making plans for future visits, whereas she preferred to reunify with mother. The minor’s attitude was “ ‘night and day’ ” during a supervised visit the next day, according to father. It was the social worker’s opinion, however, that the minor “has made up in her mind that she does not want to give one hundred percent effort to reunification with her father as she feels that it is going to ‘get in the way’ of reunification with the mother.” On September 22, 2010, the juvenile court granted father’s request for a change in court order (§ 388), which permitted increased frequency of visitation and the possibility of supervision being delegated to a responsible adult other than the social worker. The court also continued the minor as a dependent child.
Reunification efforts with mother ultimately were unsuccessful, however. On May 6, 2011, the juvenile court terminated reunification services to mother at the Agency’s recommendation. We focus primarily on the events relevant to the order placing the minor with father, and highlight mother’s involvement in the proceedings only when relevant to a review of the placement order.
The Agency submitted a status review report dated January 13, 2011, in advance of a 12-month review for father. The social worker reported that father continued to make efforts to rebuild his relationship with the minor, despite her resistance. He and his fiancée had traveled to California for visitation and participated in biweekly dyad therapy. The minor traveled to visit father twice in late 2010, once at Thanksgiving and once for the holiday week in December. Father reported that the minor appeared to enjoy various activities he planned, yet she would state that “she would have more fun with her friends in California.” Father also reported that the minor could be “extremely rude” during visits. The social worker stated that although the minor still had a strained relationship with father, father continued to want to work on their relationship. The social worker also observed that the minor had stated repeatedly that she would “do everything to sabotage [the] reunification process with her father so that she [would] not have to reside with him.” “[T]he topic of reunification with her father makes [the minor] extremely distressed and [she] communicates through tears but articulates that she does not feel that reunification is in her best interest as she does not want to leave her family and friends in California, ” according to the social worker.
The social worker also reported that the foster family with whom the minor had resided since November 2009 had notified the Agency that her caregiver no longer wanted her in the home, because the caregiver did not think she could help the minor any longer, in part because of the minor’s “difficult personality and frequent clashes of manner between the youth and the caregiver, the youth’s negative energy within the home and the youth’s longing to constantly be with friends and not a[]part of the foster family.” The minor was moved to a new foster home on January 22, 2011. She urged father’s fiancée during a later visit to convince father not to object to her remaining in foster care.
The minor underwent a psychological evaluation, and a psychologist reported that the minor had “ample psychological resources to cope with the demands in her life. She demonstrates a wide range of personal, social, emotional and cognitive skills to enable her to function at an optimal and stable level. She tests as more capable than most teenagers to manage the complications of life without succumbing to emotional outbursts, excessive frustration or impulsive actions.”
In additional reports filed in advance of the 12-month review hearing, the Agency reported on the minor’s continued resistance to reunification with father, characterizing father’s efforts to rebuild his relationship with the minor as “a difficult feat.” The social worker stated in a March 11, 2011 addendum report that “while there are no risk factors that the youth is exposed to when visiting with her father, it appears that while the father would like more communication, the youth avoids sincere interaction with the father.” The social worker later reported, in an addendum report dated May 6, 2011, that father had become so frustrated that he stated that “he would be fine with terminating his reunification, ” and that “ ‘I’m not planning anything anymore.... She thinks strangers are better than her parents.’ ”
The minor was continued as a dependent child following a hearing on May 6, 2011. The juvenile court ordered that father continue to receive reunification services, over the minor’s objection. The court further ordered that the minor go on an extended visit with father from June 13 through July 25, 2011. The minor filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, which the juvenile court denied. The minor also appealed from the court’s order, then abandoned it after mother and father made arrangements for the minor to participate in volleyball camps in both Georgia and the Bay Area. (No. A132357.)
The Agency filed a status review report dated July 12, 2011, in advance of an 18-month review hearing as to father. The social worker reported that the then-ongoing visit to Atlanta had involved “some complications, ” as father reported that the minor’s attitude toward him was sometimes “disrespectful and dismissive.” The minor, in turn, complained that father was “insensitive to her feelings, ” and that he yelled at her and made her “feel uncomfortable.” Father acknowledged that his relationship with his daughter was strained, but it was his opinion that he could provide the most stability for the minor. The social worker reported, however, that when the minor returned from her summer visit with father, she would be placed in a new foster family, one chosen by the minor after she met them through her boyfriend’s family. As of the preparation of the July 12 status review report, the social worker’s opinion was that “forcing the youth to relocate [to be in Atlanta with father] would not be in her emotional best interest, ” because of the positive relationships and environment she had established in California. The emotional impact of moving to Atlanta would be detrimental to the minor given her “strained relationship” with father, according to the social worker.
The Agency’s recommendation changed about a month later, as stated in an August 19, 2011 addendum report. The social worker reported that additional updates about the minor’s extended summer visit with father revealed that it appeared that the minor enjoyed the visit, and communicated this to father’s fiancée. The minor was able to (1) travel to North Carolina for a family vacation where she enjoyed time at a lake, (2) visit a resort in Florida where she made friends, and (3) participate in several volleyball clinics and camps, which she “truly enjoyed.” Father’s fiancée later reported that the minor said she enjoyed “the best summer ever.” The minor had demonstrated an ability to adapt to her circumstances, according to the social worker, and although the worker did “not want to minimize the youth’s unenthusiastic feelings towards ultimately residing with the father, it should be noted that the youth was able to make friends and adjust during the time that she spent with the father.” The social worker also emphasized that father was the non-offending parent in these proceedings. She noted that the minor may have been resistant to engaging in a relationship with father because “she was always told by her mother that her father did not want her, ” as revealed during the visit, whereas father assured the minor that he loved her very much and had always wanted a relationship with her. Although relocating to Atlanta would be “an emotional disruption” for the minor, the social worker had not observed any behaviors that would indicate the move would be emotionally detrimental to her. Moreover, if the minor was not returned to father, she could spend the following three years in foster care. The social worker further observed that “it is also difficult to allow a fifteen year old youth to simply determine what is best for her, given the chaotic household that was role modeled throughout her childhood.”
The minor’s then-current foster father submitted a letter to the juvenile court stating that the minor was “happy and flourishing right where she is.” The foster father “begg[ed]” the court to order that the minor remain in the foster family’s care, where she could “focus on her goals and dreams.”
Following an 18-month review hearing on September 2, 2011, the juvenile court continued the minor as a dependent child, terminated reunification services to father, and ordered a permanent plan of long-term foster care with the family that had written the letter to the juvenile court. No hearing transcript appears in the record on appeal, so it is unclear what factors played a role in the juvenile court’s ruling. However, we infer from the record that the decision was a close one. The juvenile court stated at a later hearing that it had been willing to let the minor stay in her then-current foster placement, because there was “just over the top of enough detriment” in returning the minor to father’s care.
Father later testified that the minor sent him a text message the day after the 18-month review hearing stating, “I’m no longer in contact with you; you are blocked.” Father sent the minor a text message in October offering to have her visit her cousins over the Columbus Day holiday, but she did not respond. In November, the social worker notified father “out of the blue” that the minor would travel to Atlanta for Thanksgiving. Father was concerned before the visit that the minor was being coerced into visiting him against her will and would not have a good attitude about the trip, and he asked for the minor’s reassurance that she would “interact with him” and “be nice to him.” He continued to be suspicious about the minor’s motives after he spoke with her on the telephone, and he could hear mother in the background yelling that the reason the minor was visiting was “to get something from” father, which father thought might be a reference to volleyball club fees. Father again sought reassurances that the minor was visiting voluntarily, and he informed the social worker that he would purchase the minor a flexible ticket so that they could end the visit early if she was not enjoying herself. As father later testified, “Why prolong this visit; this is a visit. She’s not coming to live with me; she has a home. She’s not happy; I’m not happy, well, why torment each other. Let’s just end it early. I’ll send her back. If it doesn’t work out, that’s okay.” He rearranged his Thanksgiving plans to accommodate the minor’s visit, paying extra for a suite at the place where they planned to spend the holiday.
By all accounts, the Thanksgiving visit did not end well. Father reported that the minor appeared to enjoy herself during a dinner party, and she told him that the party was “the best dinner party.” However, father reported that the minor “basically was behaving the same way she behaved in the summer, avoiding me, staying in her room, texting to whoever. We were in the car for seven hours at one point; she chose to text [her foster family] throughout the whole—throughout the whole time and not talk to me, to avoid me.” Father sent the minor home early (on the day after Thanksgiving) because the minor did not live up to her “promise” to have a more positive attitude, and she was “mean and cruel” to him during the visit. He was disappointed and upset, because he had had “high hopes from” the minor. Father made sure that the minor’s foster parents were at home so that she had a place to go, later explaining that it was not as if he put her on a plane and forced her to “fend for [her]self.” He did not have contact with the minor following the visit, and he did not send her a Christmas present.
The minor’s foster parents reported on February 2, 2012, that they could no longer have the minor live with them, because caring for her was detrimental to the foster mother’s mental and physical health. The minor was then placed with a previous foster mother. In a status review report dated February 21, 2012, that was submitted in advance of a post-permanency review hearing (§ 366.3), the Agency recommended that the minor be continued as a dependent child, with long-term placement and a goal of independent living as the permanent plan.
Father reported to the social worker that he wanted the minor to be placed with him, to provide her with more stability than she would receive in foster care, and he opined that it would only be a matter of time before the minor was placed in yet another foster home. A social worker who was new to the case since the Agency previously recommended that the minor be returned to father prepared an addendum report dated February 28, 2012. The new social worker reported that she raised concerns with father that if the minor was placed with him, he might send her back to California, as he had done at Thanksgiving. Father stated that if the minor was placed with him, “ ‘we would manage. I would not send her back.’ ” He acknowledged that it would be difficult for the minor to relocate, but stated that the minor would make friends and adapt.
The Agency recommended that the minor continue to be placed in long-term foster care. Before the hearing addressing the issue, the minor continued to report to the social worker that she did not want to live with father. The minor felt that father had “disown[ed]” her when he ended their Thanksgiving visit over a “misunderstanding, ” and stated that “ ‘that is not how you treat somebody that you love.’ ” Mother also raised concerns that the minor did not have family (other than father) or any support system in Atlanta. In an addendum report dated May 14, 2012, the Agency acknowledged that father had made efforts to have the minor in his home, but it continued to recommend placement in long-term foster care. Attached to the report was a 12-page letter from father with a summary of events related to the minor over the previous six months. Father wrote that he had told the minor during the Thanksgiving visit that if the minor chose to live with a foster family instead of with him, that would be the last time they would have contact with one another. Father later testified regarding this “ultimatum, ” explaining that the minor was “always going to be No. 1 with me. I’ll always take care of her. But if she chooses to be with strangers, I can’t help it. The Court empowered her.” He further testified that he did not consider his statement to the minor to be an ultimatum, but that he was “being realistic.”
A contested hearing was held on May 14, 2012. Father, the sole witness, testified that the “only way” he thought a good relationship with the minor could be established was if the minor came to live with him. Father was concerned about the minor continuing in foster care, explaining: “I believe that she’s in danger. This is a catastrophe on its way. It’s already happened. It’s happened. It’s going to happen again. It’s going to get worse. I see it happening down the road. It’s—it’s something I can’t bear to live with. It’s—the placements are having an emotional toll on her. And it’s tearing me apart; it’s killing me.” Father stated that he and his fiancée “know we can give [the minor] more than whatever the Agency can offer her or whatever a foster family can offer her. She’s always No. 1. She will never be kicked out, no matter what, no matter how horrible she might behave.” It was father’s opinion that “[t]he foster care system isn’t to protect children from their parents because they don’t like them, or I don’t want to move to Atlanta because I have my friends and my teachers.” Father further testified, “There is no danger for her to go back to her family. She just doesn’t want to. It’s not convenient. She has her friends. If I were in her shoes I’d do the same thing. I understand that’s a teenager. I’d do the same thing.”
Father had had minimal contact with the minor since their Thanksgiving visit the previous November. He had sent her about three text messages, including one to wish her a happy birthday, and he had had one telephone conversation with her that lasted about 10 minutes. As for whether he would send the minor back to California if she came to live with him as he had done at Thanksgiving, father testified that “[t]he visit was different circumstances. The only tool in my tool box for discipline is to send a message and send her back and send her home to where she lives, that this [the visit] isn’t working, ” whereas “[w]hen she’s living with me, it’s totally different. I’m not going to send her back to foster care because this isn’t what I signed up for. There are different—there will be a whole set of tools in my tool box. [The minor] has plenty of privileges and as every parent does discipline, they might take some privileges away. If she’s rude, talking on the phone. And you know, I don’t have control of her phone. But if it was under my control, I might shut down her texting. If she’s not—she’ll have a driver’s license. I might take away that privilege of driving. I might ground her. There’s a whole bunch of tools in a parent’s tool box.”
Father also acknowledged that he had not engaged in therapy since the hearing in September 2011, protesting that he was not under a court order to do so, and stating that although he was depressed, “if my daughter comes and lives with me it will be great.” He also testified that he was on disability, apparently because of the depression he suffered.
Counsel for the Agency, mother, and the minor argued that placing the minor with father would not be in her best interest. Father’s counsel acknowledged that father sometimes could be stubborn and could possibly be a more sensitive parent, but he argued that returning the minor to father would be in her best interest in the long run.
Although the Agency took this position below, it did not appeal from the juvenile court’s order. On September 4, 2012, the Agency wrote a letter informing this court that it did not intend to file a brief in this appeal, and that it should not be designated as respondent in the matter, because the juvenile court’s order was contrary to the Agency’s recommendations.
The juvenile court sided with father, and ordered that the minor be returned to father’s care, custody, and control at the end of the school year. The court proceeded under the presumption that long-term foster care was in the minor’s best interest (§ 366.3, subd. (f)), but stated that it was concerned whether the minor would find a permanent home in her current foster placement after previous placements had failed. The court concluded that there was no risk of physical harm to the minor to be placed with father. As for possible emotional detriment, placement with father “won’t be easy and it won’t be nice and it won’t be simple, ” but it would be in the minor’s best interest.
Mother and the minor timely appealed, and the minor also filed a motion for reconsideration and a request that the juvenile court stay its order pending her appeal. The juvenile court denied both the motion for reconsideration and the request for a stay. The minor then filed a petition for a writ of supersedeas in this court, and requested an immediate stay of the juvenile court’s order. This court denied both the temporary stay request and the supersedeas petition.
The record on appeal contains Agency addendum reports filed after the juvenile court’s order that detail the minor’s distress over the placement decision, as well as efforts to work out a visitation schedule with mother; however, it is unclear whether the teenaged minor in fact traveled to live with father at the end of the school year, as ordered. While recognizing that circumstances may have changed since the juvenile court issued its May 14, 2012 order, we of course review the correctness of the lower court’s order as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters that were before the juvenile court for its consideration. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.)
II. Discussion
The minor argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it concluded that returning her to father was in her best interest. Section 366.3, subdivision (d) provides that the juvenile court or an appropriate local agency must periodically review the status of a child whose permanent plan is long-term foster care. The reviewing body shall inquire about the progress being made to provide the minor a permanent home, consider the minor’s safety, and make determinations regarding various matters, which the juvenile court did here. (§ 366.3, subd. (e); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.740(b)(1).)
Mother did not file appellate briefs, but filed joinders in the minor’s opening and reply briefs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).)
Those matters include the necessity for, and appropriateness of, the placement; actions necessary to maintain relationships with individuals important to the minor; the continuing appropriateness and extent of compliance with the permanent plan; the extent of the social services agency’s compliance with the case plan in making reasonable efforts either to return the child to the safe home of the parent or to complete steps necessary to finalizing the minor’s permanent plan; the adequacy of services provided to the minor; the extent of the parents’ progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care; and the likely date by which the minor may be returned to, and safely maintained in, the home, placed for adoption, legal guardianship, or another planned permanent living arrangement. (§ 366.3, subd. (e).)
All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
The juvenile court assumed, and the minor contends on appeal, that there was a presumption at the hearing that out-of-home placement was in the minor’s best interest, pursuant to section 366.3, subdivision (f). The statute provides that, where a parent’s parental rights have not been permanently terminated, it shall be presumed that continued care is in the best interest of the child, unless the parent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that further reunification efforts are the best alternative for the minor. (§ 366.3, subd. (f); see also rule 5.740(b)(7).) In those cases, the court may order up to six months of reunification services to return the child to a safe home environment, with up to an additional six months of family maintenance services as needed. (§ 366.3, subd. (f).) This subdivision is thus directed at parents for whom reunification services have been terminated, and who request an additional reunification period while the minor continues in out-of-home care, an event that could potentially disrupt an otherwise stable, long-term placement.
Here, by contrast, father was not requesting more reunification services. Instead, he contended that the minor should be returned to his care, in order to provide a more stable environment instead of the minor possibly being moved to yet another foster home. Such a request is governed by section 366.3, subdivision (h), which provides that at the review hearing held for a minor in long-term foster care, the juvenile court must consider all permanency planning options for the child, “including whether the child should be returned to the home of the parent.” (See also rule 5.740(b)(8).) The court shall order a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 unless it determines by clear and convincing evidence that there is a “compelling reason” for determining that such a hearing is not in the minor’s best interest. (§ 366.3, subd. (h); rule 5.740(b)(9); see also In re J.F. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 321, 330.) A “compelling reason” exists when the child is being returned to the parent’s home, the child is not a proper subject for adoption, or no one is willing to accept legal guardianship. (§ 366.3, subd. (h); rule 5.740(b)(9); J.F. at p. 330.) In directing the juvenile court to consider returning the child to the parent’s home at this stage of proceedings, the Legislature recognizes that “long-term foster care is not necessarily a stable placement.” (J.F. at p. 334.) The focus at this stage of dependency proceedings is on the best interest of the dependent child (In re Jacob P. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 819, 829), and both subdivisions (f) and (h) of section 366.3 are consistent with this focus. Subdivision (h), applicable here, recognizes that even after previous reunification efforts have failed, placement with the parent may nonetheless be in the minor’s best interest.
The juvenile court made such a finding here, concluding that father was devoted to providing a stable home for the minor. The parties contend, and we agree, that such a placement decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which we will not find where substantial evidence supports the determination that the placement was in the minor’s best interest. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1087.) We will not disturb the juvenile court’s ruling unless we conclude that the court “ ‘ “exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” (Stephanie M. at p. 318.) When two or more inferences reasonably can be deduced from the facts, we have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the lower court. (Id. at p. 319.)
The minor essentially asks this court to impermissibly substitute our decision for that of the juvenile court. For example, the juvenile court specifically acknowledged here that two possible inferences could be deduced from the evidence about father sending the minor home early from her Thanksgiving 2011 visit. The court stated that one possible inference was that sending the minor home early when she did not comply with various conditions “could be seen as very harsh and a rejection of” the minor. However, the court found that father’s testimony at the hearing “made sense, ” because father believed “that it should be a good visit for both of them. And that if it wasn’t a good visit, that she could go home, because that was where she was going to go. [¶] And to the Court, that does make sense from a rational standpoint.” On appeal, the minor focuses only on the former interpretation of the evidence, and ignores the juvenile court’s alternate interpretation.
The minor also highlights evidence of the indisputably strained relationship between the minor and father throughout these dependency proceedings, and particularly the difficulties the two faced in the first year after proceedings first began about three-and-a-half years ago, as well as on other facts favorable to her position, i.e., that the minor has family, friends, and a support network in the Bay Area, and she does not want to live with father. Contrary to the minor’s argument, however, there is ample evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s ruling. The minor had experienced multiple failed foster placements, the most recent one in a home where the foster father had “begg[ed]” the court to place the minor, only to report less than six months later that the placement was taking a toll on the foster mother’s mental and physical health. Father, by contrast, repeatedly had offered to provide a stable home for the minor, and he had hosted the minor on visits in his home that she appeared to enjoy despite her resistance. The juvenile court acknowledged that father previously had stated he was frustrated with the minor and no longer was interested in reunifying with her, but the court noted that father always came back and made efforts to accommodate the minor, and he was willing to undergo any necessary therapy with the minor if she came to live with him. The court also observed that “I think [father] has actually thought through a lot of how he would handle disagreements that he felt he would have with” the minor if she came to live with him.
In placing the minor with father, the juvenile court stated that it had observed “growth” in father, and the minor also had “come a long way, ” meaning that she was capable of adjusting to a cross-country move. The court specifically addressed potential emotional detriment in having the minor placed with father as opposed to staying in another foster-care placement, stating, “Now, I don’t see that [emotional detriment]. I don’t have that same optimism [regarding placement in foster care]. And I do believe that [father] has matured and I do believe that with [the] assistance [of father’s fiancée], that this would be in [the minor’s] best interest.” We thus reject the minor’s suggestion that the juvenile court did not consider the minor’s emotional health when making its placement order.
The juvenile court was in the best position to evaluate father’s demeanor when testifying and to determine the minor’s best interests after considering all the evidence and observing the relevant participants over time. We stress that the judge who made the placement order is the same judge who presided over the July 2010 review hearing and several hearings in 2011, including the one where the court originally ordered long-term foster care as the permanent plan because of concerns that a move would possibly be emotionally detrimental to the minor. To underscore the fact that it would be inappropriate to substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, we note that the reporter’s transcript on appeal does not include transcripts for any of the hearings held in 2011. Although the clerk’s transcript contains a partial transcript of the proceedings of May 6, 2011, when the court ordered that the minor have an extended visit with father, the transcript is not complete, so this court has a grossly inadequate record with which to review father’s previous testimonies for further insight into his past reunification efforts. By contrast, the juvenile court stated it had learned about father “over time” after hearing him testify “in many hearings.” Because the court’s placement decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, we will defer to its reasonable deduction from the facts. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.)
III. Disposition
The juvenile court’s order placing the minor with father is affirmed.
We concur: Reardon, Acting P.J., Rivera, J.