Opinion
No. C01-20857 RMW
March 5, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was heard on March 1, 2002. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The court has considered the papers submitted by the parties and the arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing, defendants' motion is granted.
Plaintiff San Jose Christian College ("SJCC") purchased the former St. Louise Hospital property in the City of Morgan Hill, intending to use the site for its college campus. SJCC has unsuccessfully applied to re-zone the property for educational use. The site is not presently operating as a hospital, but it is the only site within Morgan Hill presently zoned for hospital use. When the City denied the re-zoning application, it asserted several bases for its decision, including both the City's preference to retain the existing hospital zoning as well as the applicant's failure to comply with the City's CEQA-based re-zoning application requirements.
SJCC contends that Morgan Hill's process required for an application for re-zoning and Title 18 of the Morgan Hill Municipal Code violate the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. SJCC's previous motion for preliminary injunction was denied for failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and for failure to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm.
The material facts are not in dispute, which the parties conceded at oral argument. The case squarely presents issues of law which are resolvable on summary judgment.
Turning first to the constitutional analysis, a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest; even if there is an incidental burden on a particular religion or particular practice. Employment Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). A law is neutral if it does not discriminate on its face. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533. The law is generally applicable if it does not impose burdens only upon conduct motivated by religious belief. Id. at 543. Zoning laws are generally applicable laws and are subject to rational basis review when challenged under the Free Exercise Clause. See Christian Gospel Church v. City and County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1990); cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 535, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2172, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997).
Morgan Hill's municipal code and zoning ordinance, including the PUD zoning requirements, pass these tests. Churches are not treated any differently than other assemblies and church schools are treated no differently than any other school. The City's denial of the re-zoning application thus did not violate plaintiffs Free Exercise or other First Amendment rights. Christian Gospel Church, 896 F.2d at 1226. Similarly, plaintiffs equal protection claim fails. There is no showing that the PUD zoning scheme implicates a suspect class or a fundamental right. Thus, the rational basis analysis applies, and the City's zoning requirements and decision to deny the re-zoning application passes constitutional muster.
Turning next to the RLUIPA claim, it too fails. Under the Act; "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that the imposition of the burden on that person, assembly or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest" 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). In order to establish a prima facie case that RLUIPA has been violated, SJCC must present evidence that the City's denial of the re-zoning application "imposed a substantial burden" on the "religious exercise" of a person, institution or assembly. SJCC has failed to make this showing.
Among other things, the Act requires equal treatment of religious institutions, prohibits, its discrimination against religious institutions, and prohibits exclusion of religious assemblies from, or unreasonable limitations on religious structures within, jurisdictions. § 2000cc(b)(1)-(3). Plaintiff has offered no evidence to establish that Morgan Hill's zoning ordinance, on its face or in application, treats religious institutions unequally, discriminates against religious institutions, excludes religious assemblies, or places undue limitations on religious structures within its jurisdiction.
Specifically, SJCC has failed to establish that the defendants' denial of the re-zoning application has imposed a substantial burden on their religious exercise. The Ninth Circuit has stated:
The Act does not define "substantial burden" but the legislative history evidences a Congressional intent that the standard under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(1994), should apply. Req. for Judicial Notice, Exh. B at 4.
In order to show a free exercise violation using the "substantial burden" test, the religious adherent . . . has the obligation to prove that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of his or her religion . . . by preventing or aging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith mandates. This interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine."Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987). Based on the undisputed facts presented, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the burden has been imposed by the defendants' denial of the re-zoning application is "substantial," or legally significant. See Chistian Gospal Church, 896 F.2d at 1226.
Plaintiff argues that the "central tenet" portion of the Ninth Circuit standard is no longer good law in view of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990). Plaintiff may be correct. Nevertheless, the burden imposed must still be "substantial."
Moreover, RLUIPA does not grant religious institutions immunity from land use regulations. As noted in the legislative history, "[T]his Act does not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use regulation, nor does it relieve religious institutions from applying for variances, special permits or exceptions, hardship approval, or other relief provisions in land use regulations, where available without discrimination or unfair delay." Senate Legislative History at 27; Defendants' Request For Judicial Notice, Exit B. SJCC's failure to comply with those requirements, including the requirement to comply with CEQA, is fatal to its claim.
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to judgment on plaintiffs claims.
III. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff San Jose Christian College take nothing by way of its complaint and that judgment be entered in favor of defendants City of Morgan Hill, Dennis Kennedy, Larry Carr, Steve Tate, Hedy L. Chang and Greg Sellers.