Opinion
C095949
02-23-2023
In re D.W., Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. D.Z., Defendant and Appellant. SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. STK-JD-DP-2021-0000220.
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
Appellant D.Z. (mother), mother of minor D.W. (the minor), appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders, finding the minor comes within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), adjudging the minor a dependent and removing him from parental custody. (§§ 300, 361, 395.) Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to support jurisdiction and removal. We shall affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Originating Circumstances
On March 21, 2021, Child Protective Services (CPS) received a report that mother and H.W., who was then identified as mother's aunt, had presented at the hospital for delivery of mother's unborn child, the subject minor. Mother provided the hospital with H.W.'s insurance information and attempted to use H.W.'s identity for the delivery. Mother and H.W. advised that they had done this because H.W. would be taking custody of the newborn and they wanted H.W. to be listed on the birth certificate as the minor's mother. They were informed that this could not be done. Mother reported the father was a married man and did not want contact with mother or the minor. H.W. advised that she had resources, owning a home, business, and several LLCs, and was prepared to care for the newborn minor. Mother reported she had no income and resided with H.W. Mother also reported she planned to return to her home country of China but did not specify a date.
On May 27, 2021, H.W. - who then identified herself as mother's friend - contacted CPS and reported that she had been caring for the two-month-old minor since birth because mother was not around. H.W. reported the minor's father refused to provide for, or be involved with, the minor and threatened that if anyone should bring the minor around, he would shoot them. H.W. explained that mother signed some paperwork when the minor was born to permit H.W. to get shots and medical care for the minor, but H.W. was not sure if she still had this authority. H.W. reported she was struggling to provide for the minor and was unsure whether she could continue to provide and was afraid to approach the father for assistance. She was, however, indecisive as to whether she wished for CPS to take custody of the minor that day. When asked if she would wait 10 days for CPS to come out, H.W. stated she needed someone to come out that day because she may need to give the minor up. But she also advised that she wanted mother to sign legal documentation to permit her to care for the minor and, although she had tried to contact mother through an instant messaging application they used, mother had not contacted her. The social worker was unable to locate mother but closed the referral because it appeared the situation had stabilized.
On June 2, 2021, Stockton police brought the minor to a children's shelter after H.W. had contacted police and reported she was no longer willing or able to care for the minor. H.W., who again identified herself as a friend of mother, was evasive as to why mother could not care for the minor. According to H.W., she and mother had emigrated from China together and kept in contact through a Chinese messaging application because mother did not have a working cell phone. The minor's alleged father denied paternity. The responding police officer reported mother may have recently returned from New York looking for work, and had met with H.W. and the minor earlier that day with the intent of meeting the alleged father in a parking lot. The alleged father would not meet them, so mother left the minor with H.W. Mother's whereabouts were unknown, and attempts to contact mother were unsuccessful. H.W. said she was willing to adopt the minor despite forfeiting him to the police.
When the social worker contacted H.W. the following day, H.W. reported she had been taking care of the minor since birth. H.W. expressed her love for and desire to adopt the minor, but stated that mother would not sign the paperwork. H.W. stated she did, however, have a paper that allowed her to provide medical care for the minor. H.W. reported the alleged father threatened to harm them (mother and H.W.) and the minor if they contacted him. H.W. reported she was scared because the alleged father had called H.W. the day before asking, "why the fuck did CPS call me, I was with my wife and children."
H.W. had sent a message to mother on the messaging application they used to communicate, stating the police had the minor but had not heard back from mother. She agreed to send the social worker's contact information to mother via the messaging application. H.W. stated that she loves the minor and wants to adopt him but, for their own protection, she could not continue to care for him without it being legal. Dependency Petition and Jurisdiction
The San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minor alleging, under subdivisions (b) and (g), that mother had failed to protect and provide for him. The petition alleged mother had made insufficient arrangements for the minor's care in that she had failed to provide the caretaker with appropriate paperwork and the minor had been detained after the caretaker, with whom mother left the minor, reported she was no longer able to care for the minor. The alleged father denied paternity and did not make provisions for the minor. Neither parents' whereabouts nor circumstances were known. The minor was ordered detained.
An amended section 300 petition was filed on August 19, 2021. The amended petition further alleged the caretaker had not heard from mother for a significant period of time, mother had failed to receive prenatal care and she failed to bond with the minor because she left the minor with H.W. upon delivering him. The amended petition also alleged, referencing a police report, that mother had wanted to abandon the minor in the parking lot on June 1, 2021, after the alleged father had refused to pick up the minor and after he threatened to shoot anyone who caused his family to break up. Mother left the minor in the parking lot with H.W. when the police arrived.
The referenced police report was attached to the jurisdiction report. The police report indicated H.W. identified herself as mother's friend. She reported that mother had signed paperwork at the hospital allowing H.W. to take the minor home after his birth, as mother was unable to care for or provide for the minor. Mother had come by her house that day and they had gone together, with the minor, to a parking lot because they were going to call the alleged father to figure out what to do with the minor. When they called the alleged father, he stated he did not want to pick up the baby and threatened to shoot anyone who exposed him or caused his family to break up. H.W. then tried to call the CPS worker she had worked with before, but the social worker did not answer the telephone. H.W. told mother she was going to call the police for help. Mother told H.W. she wanted to abandon the baby and left the area on foot. H.W. reported she did not know where mother lived and did not have a phone number for mother. H.W. wanted to surrender the minor to CPS or law enforcement because it was the right thing to do.
Mother appeared at the jurisdiction hearing, which had been continued to provide her with an interpreter. She identified H.W., who was also present, as her cousin, with whom she said she lived. The juvenile court took jurisdiction, finding the allegations in the petition true, and ordered supervised visitation for mother.
The juvenile court appears to have held a second jurisdiction hearing on October 19 and 26, and November 2, 2021. The social worker testified that she spoke with mother at the initial jurisdiction hearing and mother told her she had been living with H.W. the entire time, which conflicted with what H.W. had reported. Mother requested the minor be returned to her, whereupon she planned to have H.W. be given guardianship because H.W. had the resources to care for him. Mother said H.W. had been raising the minor since birth and appeared unaware that H.W. had turned the minor over to law enforcement or CPS. The social worker also reported that she had tried to set up visitation for mother, but mother was adamant that H.W. be present for her visits. Mother said she wanted H.W. present because she spoke English and because she had raised the minor. The social worker assured her that an interpreter would be available, and mother eventually agreed to visits without H.W. present and had been successfully visiting twice a week for two hours.
It appears the juvenile court was employing a local practice of "splitting" jurisdiction by parent - a practice we have since held is procedurally incorrect. (See In re A.J. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 7, 14.)
Mother also asked to do her other services with H.W., again citing H.W.'s ability to speak English, even though she was told an interpreter would be provided. She refused to participate in counseling, even with a Mandarin-speaking counselor, causing the Agency to question whether mother wanted to reunify with the minor, or whether she only wanted H.W. to have guardianship. The social worker noted that mother and H.W. had stated, at the hospital, that they gave the minor "W." as a last name because H.W. was going to take care of him, but the power of attorney to permit H.W. to obtain care for the minor that was submitted to the court was not notarized and the guardianship papers were incomplete.
The Agency was also concerned about H.W.'s identity, as mother had identified her, on various occasions, as her aunt, cousin, or friend, and H.W. had been called by various different first names. The Agency was also concerned about the differing stories it was being provided about where mother was living and how much contact she had with H.W.
At the October 19, 2021 hearing, mother testified H.W. is her cousin. She claimed she brought the minor home from the hospital after he was born, and she had been living with H.W. since that time. H.W., however, had provided care for the minor. Mother also testified she left for New York to look for employment a few days after the minor was born because the alleged father would not provide child support. She returned briefly, for two days, in April to sign documents to permit H.W. to care for the minor and to permit H.W. to take the minor to the hospital, if necessary, and to look for the alleged father in an attempt to get child support. Mother did not see the minor during her brief return and claimed she slept in the park near the alleged father's house. Mother then returned to New York.
Mother testified that her return was around April 10 or April 19, and that she signed "the document" on that date. The unnotarized document, however, was dated May 4, 2021.
Mother testified she came back to California again on June 1, 2021. On that day, she saw the minor and had contact with the alleged father. Mother stated the alleged father had claimed to have been looking for her, H.W., and the minor all day; he threatened them and said H.W.'s family would be doomed if she took care of the minor. Mother claimed she was very afraid, so she told H.W. to give the minor to the police for "temporary protection." Mother then left and went to the alleged father's home and waited for him there, instead of staying with H.W. and the minor and waiting for the police. Mother also claimed she did not appear at the first two hearings because she was afraid of the alleged father. She said the alleged father had demanded she give up custody of the minor and threatened her, but not H.W. She did not, however, report the threats to the police or seek a restraining order. She also approached the alleged father for money during that time.
Mother claimed she believed she could turn her child over to the police for protection and retrieve him at a later date because it was her understanding that people could do that in China. It was her understanding that, in China, if she were to explain the situation to the police, she could leave her child with the police, and it would not be a problem to get the child back. She admitted, however, that she did not personally turn the minor over to police in this case, nor did she explain anything to the police at any time. Instead, she left the minor with H.W. and left with the hope that she could get some money from the alleged father.
Mother testified she would not return to New York if the minor were returned to her custody. She would stay in H.W.'s home and they would care for the minor together. She would ask H.W. for help with support for the minor, but would not give her guardianship.
At the continued hearing on October 26, 2021, mother testified she was no longer living with H.W. She was, instead, borrowing money from H.W. to live at an unspecified location in the Bay Area and was looking for a job. Mother testified that if the minor were to be returned to her custody, she would move back with H.W. and they would both provide care for the minor. She was willing to get a restraining order but believed the alleged father would not threaten her if she did not return to him for child support. Mother admitted the alleged father had given her $3,000 when she was pregnant and gave her another $10,000 when she approached him on June 21, 2021 (after the minor was detained). He told her not to come back to him again.
The hearing was again continued to November 2, 2021, to allow for H.W.'s testimony, but at the continued hearing the parties elected not to call H.W. as a witness. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the amended petition. The disposition hearing was set for December 8, 2021.
Disposition
In the Agency's disposition report, filed December 1, 2021, the social worker reported the Agency remained unclear where mother was residing, as mother had indicated she had moved to the Bay Area (renting a room in Milpitas with H.W. paying all of her bills), but on other occasions, had said she lives with H.W. Mother continued to identify only H.W. as a possible placement. Mother maintained that she would like the minor to be with H.W. because she believed H.W. was more suitable to care for the minor - despite H.W. having relinquished custody of the minor with the statement that she was no longer able or willing to care for him. H.W. was scheduled for a placement orientation on June 10, 2021, and instructed to obtain a safety fence around her pool, but H.W. did not follow through with either the orientation or the fence.
Mother's supervised visits with the minor continued to be consistent and appropriate. She demonstrated empathy and affection and was building a bond with the minor. Supervision was lifted in November 2021.
Mother's stated goal was to reunify with the minor and for H.W. to assist in raising the minor. She made, however, concerning statements about having H.W. "reunify" with the minor, instead of her. Despite H.W. turning the minor over to CPS, mother continued to inquire about H.W. receiving guardianship, participating in services with her, and visiting the minor. The Agency recommended individual counseling and completion of parenting classes for mother. Mother made little effort to begin counseling and claimed to have no need for the service.
On December 8, 2021, mother requested the case be transferred to Santa Clara County. Her counsel represented that she was residing in Milpitas and planned to stay there. The Agency and minor's counsel opposed the transfer, arguing it was not convinced mother lived in Milpitas, that she had previously indicated she was going back and forth between Milpitas and Stockton, that she had provided two different Milpitas addresses, that she did not provide a lease or bills in her name, and that H.W. was seen leaving the address when the Agency went to check the home. Mother's counsel responded that mother's belongings were at the Milpitas address. The juvenile court did not transfer the case.
Mother renewed her request to transfer on January 19, 2022. Mother's counsel stated mother had provided a copy of the lease to the social worker. The Agency again opposed the request, arguing that mother had been "bouncing around" and not forthcoming about her residence and there were concerns, based on mother's conduct at the time the social worker initially visited the address, that mother was not actually living there. County counsel also noted that the lease had H.W.'s name as the landlord, was signed but not dated, and listed only the minor, and not mother, as the occupant. The juvenile court denied the renewed request to transfer the case.
The contested disposition hearing took place on March 15 and 21, 2022. The primary subjects of mother's testimony related to where she lived and who she planned to have raise the minor. Mother was asked why the minor did not have mother's last name. Mother testified she had tried to give the minor H.W.'s last name because she appreciated H.W.'s help, but the hospital misspelled it.
The court adopted the disposition report as to the still-absent alleged father on December 8, 2021, and adjudged the minor a dependent child and ordered him removed from parental custody at that time, again "splitting" the hearing as to each parent. (See In re A.J., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.)
Mother testified she resided in Milpitas at the address the social worker had twice visited. At the December visit, she showed the social worker the common areas and the room she rented at the house. She acknowledged that the man who opened the door for the social worker when she visited in March 2022 told the worker mother did not live at that address, but said the man had only been living there for a week at the time. When asked who also lived at the residence, mother identified the landlords (husband and wife), "and then a kid, and then another child"; but later identified the landlords (husband and wife), the man who opened the door, and herself and said no children lived in the home. Mother testified she signed the lease agreement on December 1, 2021, and identified her signature on a document shown to her at the hearing. County counsel objected, arguing the lease listed H.W. as the landlord, did not provide an occupancy effective date and listed the minor, but not mother, as the tenant. The court received it into evidence, noting those complaints could be made in argument.
The lease and the social worker's notes regarding the visits to Milpitas were provided to the juvenile court in the form of exhibits submitted by mother, but they are not contained in the record on appeal.
Mother then testified that H.W. was not her landlord but had the same last name as her landlord and a similar first name, with one differing letter. Mother would not permit the social worker to meet her landlord to verify matters because she did not want her landlord to know about the Agency's involvement with the minor. H.W. continued to pay mother's bills, including rent. Mother explained that a relative would pay H.W. back. Mother was asked where H.W. lived and mother said H.W. lived in Milpitas. At the continued hearing, mother said H.W. was no longer living in Milpitas and she did not know where H.W. currently resided.
Prior to living at her current residence in Milpitas, mother said she lived at another address in Milpitas. Before that, she testified she lived with her cousin. When pressed further, mother admitted she had also provided an address in downtown Stockton where she lived for two months. She subsequently testified she did not actually live at the downtown Stockton location but only rented it for two months, with the intent of turning it into a business. Mother said she moved to Milpitas to look for employment, which she thought would be easier because there was a large Chinese population there, but she had not yet found a job.
By the time of the hearings, mother had completed two parenting classes and individual counseling. Mother said she had learned how to discipline, protect, and educate her child. Mother testified that she did not do anything that failed to protect her child in this case - she maintained the only thing she did was protect him by giving him to the police. She still intended to have H.W. take care of and protect the minor. If the minor were returned to her custody, she would have H.W. help raise him. But she would follow the court's orders, even if the court ordered her not to speak with H.W.
After noting it had an issue with mother's credibility, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a dependent, ordered him removed from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for mother. The case plan included maintaining stable and suitable housing, parenting education, and personal counseling.
DISCUSSION
I
Jurisdiction
Mother first contends the evidence was insufficient to support jurisdiction over the minor. We disagree.
The juvenile court has jurisdiction to declare a child to be a dependent of the court pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(A) of section 300 when, as alleged in the petition in this case, the child "has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] the failure or inability of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child." Section 300, subdivision (g), also permits the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over a minor when there is proof that "[t]he child has been left without any provision for support." (In re E.A. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 648, 661-662.)
Subdivision (g) of section 300 also permits jurisdiction when the whereabouts of the parent is unknown and reasonable efforts to locate the parent have been unsuccessful. (In re E.A., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 661-662.) That basis for jurisdiction, however, is inapplicable here because mother's whereabouts were known at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.
"[T]he circumstance justifying the dependency must exist at the time of the hearing." (In re Aaron S. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 202, 208.) Thus, there must be proof the parent currently left the minor without provision for support, "not that [the parent] had failed to do so at some prior point in time." (Id. at p. 209.) A reviewing court may affirm a jurisdictional ruling if the evidence supports any of the grounds concerning the children. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875; In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Thus, dependency jurisdiction is appropriate where substantial evidence supports at least one jurisdictional finding, even if there are other findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979.)
The Agency has the burden to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a); In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318.) We review the jurisdictional finding for substantial evidence, reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court. (In re I.J., at p. 773.) Mother, as appellant, has the burden of proving the evidence was insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
The evidence adduced at jurisdiction supports the finding that mother left the minor without provisions for support, a condition remained at the time of the jurisdiction hearing (§ 300, subd. (g)), and failed to protect him when she abandoned him in the parking lot (§ 300, subd. (b)).
Mother left the minor with H.W. a few days after his birth without any provisions for support or legal means by which H.W. could properly care for the minor. Mother did not provide financial support nor provide any properly executed legal documentation for H.W. to legally care for the minor. Mother did not have any physical contact with the minor and, except for sporadic contact through a phone app, provide any way for H.W. to contact her. Indeed, H.W. did not know mother's whereabouts at the time she turned the minor over to law enforcement, an "arrangement" that was insufficient to provide for the minor's care.
It was clear that mother continued to intend, if the child were returned to her custody, to have H.W. provide support for the minor, although the details of her plans varied. Mother, herself, had no means to support him. Yet, H.W. had indicated that, while she was willing to adopt the minor, she was unwilling or unable to continue to otherwise provide support for him. There was no evidence H.W. had changed her mind and was now, once again, willing to support the minor she had twice indicated she was unwilling or unable to support. Moreover, mother had still not signed any valid legal documentation providing H.W. legal authority to care for the minor.
In In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, the mother, who was incarcerated when she gave birth, sent her child to live with the grandparents. Although the mother attempted to create a formal custody arrangement, the appropriate documents never were filed. The court found the failure to give the grandparents the necessary legal authority to care for the child constituted substantial evidence supporting the jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (g). (In re Athena P., at p. 630.) Here, as in Athena P., mother intended to leave the minor for an extended period but still failed to provide H.W. with sufficient legal authority to care for the minor, a condition that continued to exist at the time of the conclusion of the second jurisdiction hearing.
Mother's past conduct was also probative of the current risk to the minor should the court not assume jurisdiction. Mother was still unemployed - a circumstance which, according to mother, had resulted in mother's decision to leave the minor in H.W.'s care when she went to New York, and later, to move away from H.W. and live at an unspecified location in the "Bay Area." It is reasonable to infer that mother would, once again, place the minor at risk by leaving him without adequate provisions for support.
Moreover, after the minor was detained, mother did not make any inquiries about the minor for almost a month; instead, she spent that time contacting the alleged father to get money for support for the detained minor, despite her contention she was afraid of him and her acknowledgment that his threats were a result of her attempts to contact him. This decision shows mother continued to lack the protective capacity necessary to provide safety for the minor. It was reasonable to infer that she would continue to place the minor at substantial risk by failing to protect the minor.
Finally, we reject mother's contention that the basis for jurisdiction was a single incident that was unlikely to reoccur - that it resulted from her cultural misunderstanding of the consequences of turning the minor over to the police in an emergency. While mother claimed at the jurisdiction hearing that she had instructed H.W. to give the minor to police for his temporary protection, with the mistaken cultural belief that she could later easily retrieve the minor, substantial evidence not only belies this claim, it further evidences the substantial risk of harm to the young minor. Although H.W. later reported that she was afraid of the alleged father's threats, she did not say she called police upon mother's instruction or because the minor needed protection from the alleged father's threats. H.W. told police mother wanted to abandon the minor in the parking lot after the alleged father refused to meet them. And when the social worker finally spoke with mother at the initial jurisdiction hearing, mother appeared to be unaware that H.W. had turned the minor over to law enforcement or CPS, again evidencing the substantial risk of harm to the minor.
While mother may have believed H.W. was an appropriate long-term care solution, H.W. had contacted CPS indicating she could no longer provide care for the minor and was unable to reach mother, and shortly thereafter, called and surrendered the minor to the police with the same explanation. Nonetheless, mother told the social worker she still had no resources, was completely reliant on H.W., and that her plan for the minor remained to have H.W. provide for the minor. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
II
Removal
Mother also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the dispositional findings and orders resulting in the removal of the minor from her custody. Again, we disagree. The same evidence that supports the jurisdictional findings provides substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's removal order.
To support an order removing a child from parental custody, the court must find clear and convincing evidence "[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody." (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) The court also must "make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor" and "state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based." (§ 361, subd. (e).)
"In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in the parent's physical custody, the juvenile court may consider the parent's past conduct and current circumstances, and the parent's response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention." (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332; accord, In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) "A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of (1) parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and (2) potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child." (In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.)
"The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order." (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 462 [applying § 361, subd. (c) within context of a § 387 removal].) When reviewing removal findings," '[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.'" (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1239-1240; see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1004-1005.)
While mother did care for the minor during her monitored visits, she did not, at the time of disposition, have any confirmed resources to provide for the minor. Mother provided numerous vague and varying stories about where she was living at various times since the minor's birth, with her residence in Milpitas at the time of the hearing remaining unconfirmed. As we previously noted, neither the lease document nor the social worker's notes regarding the visits to Milpitas were included in the record on appeal. As the appellant, mother has the duty to present error affirmatively by an adequate record; error is never presumed. (In re D.W. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 413, 417418.) On the record here, there is insufficient evidence of a lease constituting persuasive evidence of mother's claimed residency. The only evidence regarding the lease is mother's testimony that does not establish a written lease was signed by a landlord or had her listed as a tenant.
Nor is there evidence in the record that the social worker had been shown sufficient proof of mother's residency. Mother testified she showed the social worker her alleged belongings at the first visit. But at the social worker's most recent visit, the worker was told by the man answering the door that mother did not live there. Although mother claimed that the man had only lived there a week and thus did not know mother lived there, the juvenile court expressly found mother lacked credibility.
In addition to not having a confirmed safe or stable residence, mother also had no income or means to support the minor other than her complete reliance on H.W. Indeed, the evidence supported a finding that mother did not, in fact, intend to provide for or care for the minor if he were returned, but instead, intended to return to her previous arrangement of having H.W. provide for and care for the minor - an arrangement that had failed and for which there was no indication of a change of circumstances to suggest it would not fail again.
Mother's stated goal was to reunify with the minor and for H.W. to assist in raising the minor. But while mother is, as she now argues, entitled to make suitable arrangements to assist her in providing adequate and safe care for the minor, the evidence that H.W. was willing and suitable to do so was lacking. H.W. previously stated she was no longer willing or able to provide care for the minor and while at one point she claimed an interest in formal adoption, at no time did she subsequently indicate that she was interested in resuming custody of the minor, nor did she take the necessary steps to be considered for placement. Nonetheless, it was reasonable to infer that, should the minor be returned to mother, mother would, once again, leave the minor with H.W. and the minor would be in the same situation as that which gave rise to jurisdiction. The juvenile court's order removing the minor from parental custody was supported by the evidence.
We find no abuse of discretion in ordering the minor removed from mother's custody.
III
Right to Due Process
Mother claims that the taking of jurisdiction without substantial evidence and the alleged abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in removing the minor violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We reject these assertions.
"Whether a right to due process is violated . . . will vary according to the facts of each case." (In re Daniel C. H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814, 833.) Courts" 'look to "the private interest that will be affected by the agency's action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest, the interest in informing parents of the basis for and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story, and the agency's interest in expeditious decisionmaking as affected by the burden caused by an additional procedural requirement." '" (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 515.)
Here, mother was represented by counsel, received notice of each of the hearings, was present at the hearings with the assistance of language interpreters and, through counsel, presented her side of the events in issue and questioned witnesses at the contested hearings. She was not deprived of the essential or fundamental elements of procedural due process. As such, her claims of due process violations are without merit or substantial evidence. Accordingly, these claims fail.
DISPOSITION
The orders and judgment of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: ROBIE, Acting P. J., DUARTE, J.