. See, e.g., San Jacinto River Auth. v. Simmons, 167 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (finding the requisite knowledge where the plaintiff knew of a “slip hazard”); Allen, 2021 WL 5154221, at *4 (finding the requisite knowledge where the plaintiff knew of a “tripping hazard[]”)
It is undisputed that SJRA is a governmental unit as defined by the TTCA. See San Jacinto River Authority v. Simmons, 167 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.); Wickham v. San Jacinto River Authority, 979 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet denied) (referring to SJRA as a "[g]overnmental entity"). Under the TTCA, "a governmental unit is liable for 'personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of . . . real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.'"
However, it is clear from the context that he meant that the lightning strike did not damage the filters; he did not testify that they were actually operating at that specific time. See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Simmons, 167 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding no TTCA waiver when deposition testimony describing generalized scenario that misuse of motor-driven belt press caused overflow of biosolids in container, resulting in plaintiff's slip and fall, but testimony was unaccompanied by indication that the scenario actually occurred). Anderson testified that if these conditions occurred, it could take up to an hour for any overflow attributable to the lake pumps and filters to begin.
By her own admission, she knew, either from facts within her then-present or past knowledge, of the danger. SeeMiller, 102 S.W.3d at 709 ; San Jacinto River Auth. v. Simmons, 167 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tex.App.–Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (employee who had worked at the facility for several years was aware at the time he slipped and fell that there was biosolid material that could possibly collect and potentially make the area slippery, therefore “by his own admission, the possibility of an excessively slippery work-area on the day of the accident [was] well-known to [him], or could have been inferred by him from facts within his then-present or past knowledge [,]” and it barred his recovery); City of Deer Park v. Hawkins, No. 14–13–00695–CV, 2014 WL 953427, at *1, *2–5, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 2687, at **1–2, 6–11 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] March 11, 2014, pet. denied) (licensee who fell into City trash bin testified that he knew that it was open and obvious that if someone fell into the bin they would fall fifteen feet and be injured, and the licensee's claim was barred because he could not prove he did not know of the dangerous condition); Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Bowen, No. 14–09–00968–CV, 2011 WL 1045454, at *1–2,
As we have previously stated, "A special defect is distinguished by some unusual quality outside the ordinary course of events." San Jacinto River Auth. v. Simmons, 167 S.W.3d 603, 609 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The alleged defect in this case is a slippery, wet floor.
Recently, the Beaumont Court of Appeals analyzed a similar scenario where the appellee slipped and fell at a sewage treatment facility where he was employed. See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Simmons, 167 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The appellee testified that prior to the day he fell, he encountered slippery bio-solid material in the area where he worked "every day," and when he arrived at the sewage facility on the day of the accident, he knew that the area where he worked could be "wet and muddy.