Opinion
A154005
10-17-2018
In re M.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Y.G., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City and County Super. Ct. No. JD17-3217)
M.P.'s mother, Y.G. (Mother), appeals from a finding made at the six-month review hearing that she received reasonable reunification services (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)(8)). She contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) provided her with reasonable services. We agree and reverse.
We use the first initial of the minor's and Mother's dual surnames in the interests of protective nondisclosure and simplicity.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jurisdiction and Disposition
In June 2017, Mother was arrested for domestic violence, concealing a knife, and willful cruelty to a child. Mother's boyfriend reported to police that Mother had pushed, punched, and bit him, chased him down the street, and threatened to cut him with a knife. Mother told police she was angry with her boyfriend because he drank a large quantity of alcohol. Police observed that the boyfriend slurred his words, smelled of alcohol, and had bite marks on his person. They also found a knife concealed under Mother's clothes. When arrested, Mother said no one was available to watch M.P., who had been in the house alone and asleep throughout the incident. Three-year-old M.P. was removed from Mother's Daly City home and placed in a Modesto foster home.
Mother's boyfriend is not M.P.'s father. The child's alleged father, D.P., was deported to Honduras in March 2017 and is not a party to this appeal.
The San Mateo County Human Services Agency filed its combined jurisdiction and disposition report on August 11, 2017. Mother claimed to have bitten her boyfriend "in self-defense" and denied substance abuse, mental health, or domestic violence concerns. The boyfriend told the social worker M.P. was not very verbal and was difficult to understand when she spoke. The report attached a case plan that proposed Mother participate in an individual mental health assessment, follow any resulting recommended treatment plan, visit M.P., and take parenting classes. Mother's proposed case plan service objectives included meeting M.P.'s needs, paying attention and monitoring her health and well-being, and complying with the court's orders.
At the August 15, 2017 combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the San Mateo County juvenile court found M.P. came within its dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect). In particular, the sustained petition alleged M.P. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to Mother's domestic violence, failure to supervise M.P. or provide appropriate caretakers, as well as Mother's failure to learn from prior voluntary services. M.P. was declared a dependent of the juvenile court and removed from parental custody. The San Mateo County Human Services Agency was ordered to "provide reunification services," and Mother was ordered to "participate in the reunification services stated in the case plan." (Italics added.) The court also ordered up to 10 therapeutic visitation sessions and supervised visitation between Mother and M.P. for a total of 16 hours per month.
In 2016, a neglect referral was substantiated based on concerns Mother was using drugs, not following up with M.P.'s medical appointments, and leaving the then two-year-old child with the maternal grandparents, who used methamphetamines.
Transfer to San Francisco County
Mother moved to San Francisco in July 2017. In September, the San Mateo County Human Services Agency petitioned the juvenile court to transfer the case. The social worker reported making arrangements for Mother to receive services in San Francisco through the Homeless Prenatal Program (HPP). The San Mateo County juvenile court granted the transfer petition on September 13. On October 5, Mother appeared in the San Francisco City and County juvenile court, and the court accepted the transfer and appointed counsel.
In advance of the six-month review hearing, originally calendared for February 13, 2018, the Agency filed a status review report on January 29. The Agency social worker, Jacqueline Fuentes, reported Mother and her boyfriend were living together in San Francisco, and Mother was expecting another child. Mother's pregnancy was considered "high risk," and she required weekly monitoring. Fuentes expressed concerns regarding M.P.'s possible developmental delays, as well as M.P. biting Mother during a visit and displaying sexualized behavior in the foster home.
When M.P. first went into foster care, at age three, she had an extremely limited vocabulary, was not toilet trained, and was not eating solid food.
Fuentes described Mother's visitation with M.P. after the transfer. The ordered 16 hours of supervised visitation per month had not been achieved during any month in the reporting period. Fuentes explained: "The [Agency] is still processing the intercountry [sic] transfer paperwork and has thus been unable to connect [Mother] to an eligibility worker, which is preventing her from obtaining bus passes and transportation money." The Agency provided $20 from petty cash to defray gas costs for visits after the transfer, but Fuentes noted $20 "by no means covers the gas costs from San Francisco to Modesto." Public transit was not viable because a round trip took an entire day and because of Mother's pregnancy. Fuentes had been in communication with the eligibility supervisor, as well as the San Mateo County social worker and eligibility workers, in an attempt to secure all necessary documentation.
Since November 14, 2017, Mother had been scheduled for weekly three-hour visits in Modesto, where M.P. remained placed, "based on [Mother's] preference to travel there." The foster family had agreed to transport M.P. to San Francisco for a four-hour visit once per month. In October, only one hour of visitation occurred because delay in the intercounty transfer of eligibility documents precluded Mother from obtaining bus passes and transportation money. The one hour occurred because Fuentes personally transported Mother to Modesto. In November, Mother had a single visit for two and one-half hours. She did not show up for one visit, and the single visit ended 30 minutes early because she had an appointment. In December, Mother had five hours of visitation: she did not show for one visit; one three-hour visit occurred as scheduled; one scheduled visit lasted only two hours because the foster mother's son had been in an accident; a third visit was cancelled due to insufficient Agency staffing between Christmas and New Year's Eve. In January, Mother only had a total of two and one-half hours of visitation due to continuing transportation difficulties.
As of January 8, 2018, Mother requested visitation be moved to Antioch because of "difficulty getting to Modesto." Fuentes arranged for technicians to transport Mother and M.P. to Antioch and indicated "[M]other [could] get bus passes and a transportation check to visit [M.P in Antioch] independently" once an eligibility worker was assigned. Mother's visits went well and were appropriate. The visitation supervisor observed: "[Mother's] attendance is not perfect; however, I believe this is due to transportation challenges. If [Mother] is able to continue to do well during visitation, I would like to propose that visitation transition from supervised to monitored."
Fuentes summarized her efforts to monitor Mother's case plan. The goal of meeting M.P.'s physical, emotional, medical, and educational needs was in progress as Mother kept in contact with the foster mother about the child's needs. Mother's goal of paying attention to M.P.'s health, safety, and well-being was deemed in progress because, while visitation was occurring, Mother had not started a parenting class. Mother began parenting education at HPP in November, but the class was a pregnancy support group. She was to attend the correct parenting class January through March 2018.
Fuentes wrote, without further explanation, that Mother was still waiting to begin therapeutic visits with M.P. Similarly, no services had been offered with respect to Mother's case plan requirement to "participate in an individual mental health assessment and comply with any treatment plan." Fuentes stated Mother had not begun mental health services because an "[i]ndividual mental health assessment" was not in the San Mateo County dispositional order "and as such cannot be enforced upon [Mother.]" Because "it would be beneficial for [Mother] to participate in mental health therapy as a means to . . . learn alternative coping skills," and because "the reason for [juvenile court] involvement [was] not being addressed via the current case plan," Fuentes suggested the court order a mental health assessment at the six-month review hearing. Fuentes also noted the current case plan failed to address domestic violence and the development of healthy relationships.
Six-Month Review Hearing
On February 15, 2018, the matter was set for a March 29 contested six-month hearing. In the interim, the court ordered the Agency to provide transportation assistance to Mother, as well as referrals for mental health services and couple's counseling. At the March 29 hearing, the January 2018 status review report was admitted into evidence. Fuentes testified she was assigned the case on October 17, 2017, after disposition and transfer. She did not receive the physical file until sometime in November 2017.
Fuentes met with Mother monthly beginning in October, and they reviewed the case plan. Fuentes testified the San Mateo County Human Services Agency had recommended Mother undergo individual psychological assessment, participate in therapeutic visits with M.P., monitor M.P.'s well-being, and participate in parent education. However, Fuentes testified the only portion of the case plan ordered by the San Mateo County juvenile court was parenting education and therapeutic visitation. According to Fuentes, the San Mateo County juvenile court had not ordered a psychological assessment or individual therapy for Mother, and thus no referrals were given until March 2018.
While Fuentes was preparing the six-month review report, she came to believe the San Mateo County case plan was inadequate, and individual therapy was necessary to address the underlying reasons for M.P.'s dependency. Fuentes also concluded Mother should participate in a domestic violence intervention program of some sort—either through individual therapy or a formalized group program. Mother began weekly individual therapy in March 2018, and she started a domestic violence program the Friday before the trial. Fuentes was not sure whether Mother had learned enough to properly care for M.P. Further details from Fuentes's testimony are provided, as relevant, in the discussion section post.
As a result of the events underlying jurisdiction, Mother was convicted of domestic violence and ordered, among other things, to participate in a 52-week batterer's program. In February or March 2018, Mother started the program to which she had been referred by the San Mateo County criminal court, but it was not a Spanish-language program. In February 2018, Fuentes referred Mother to a more appropriate domestic violence program with Families Moving Forward, which Mother started just prior to the six-month review hearing.
Mother testified she moved to San Francisco, in July 2017, and met with Fuentes on October 5, 2017. She contacted Fuentes many times requesting assistance with visitation transportation but was told the Agency did not have her case yet. Between July and October 2017, while San Mateo County was still monitoring the case, Mother visited M.P. in Redwood City. After the transfer, she cancelled many visits in Modesto due to transportation issues. Mother provided her own transportation to Modesto by public transit or paying family members to take her. Visits moved to Antioch in January 2018 and were then weekly for three hours. The additional four hours per month were to occur when the foster mother brought M.P. to San Francisco, but three of those four visits had been cancelled because M.P. was sick. One visit occurred but was cut short because the foster father arrived late. Mother testified she attended all visits since January, but later testified she missed one visit the previous Tuesday. Mother continued to minimize the domestic violence that brought the case before the juvenile court.
Neither Mother nor M.P.'s father sought immediate return of M.P., but they both urged the juvenile court to find reasonable services were not provided. In effect, they argued Mother should be entitled to another "full year" of services "instead of the remaining six months" because services had just been put in place. The Agency argued Mother should receive six more months of services, but no more, because M.P. was three years old at removal. (See § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) M.P.'s counsel agreed with the Agency's recommendation.
The juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, reasonable services had been provided and Mother had made adequate progress towards mitigating the problems leading to dependency, but that return of M.P. to Mother's custody would be detrimental and reunification was likely in the next six months. The matter was continued to the 12-month review. The juvenile court observed, "to the extent there are wide and varied discrepancies between [Mother]'s testimony and [Fuentes's] testimony, I believe [Fuentes]." The court added that much of what Mother said, including that no visits occurred in December, seemed "untrue." The court also ordered individual therapy and a psychological evaluation for Mother. The court explained, "There needs to be probably a psychological assessment that hasn't happened. And certainly, it sounds like a judge wanted that but then forgot to order that in San Mateo. The services haven't been perfect, but certainly on the part of . . . [Fuentes], the services that she has worked hard to get [Mother] have been more than reasonable. They are simply incomplete right now." Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
"Typically, when a child is removed from a parent, the child and parent are entitled to 12 months of child welfare services to facilitate family reunification. These services may be extended to a maximum of 18 months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).)" (Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1345.) Section 366.21, subd. (e)(8), provides that at the six-month review hearing, "[i]f the child is not returned to his or her parent . . . , the court shall determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian. The court shall order that those services be initiated, continued, or terminated." Mother contends the court's reasonable services finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. We agree. A. Appealability
The Agency contends the juvenile court's reasonable services finding is not directly appealable and asks us to dismiss the appeal, citing Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147 (Melinda K.). In Melinda K., the Second District Court of Appeal held "there is no right to appeal a finding that reasonable reunification services were provided to the parent or legal guardian unless the court takes adverse action based on that finding." (Id. at p. 1154, italics added.) In that case, the mother was not aggrieved by the reasonable services finding because the court found her in compliance with the case plan, complimented her progress, continued services for at least another six months, and found a substantial probability the child would be returned to her within six months. (Id. at p. 1156.) Accordingly, "no negative consequence flowed from the reasonable services finding." (Id. at p. 1153.) The reviewing court cautioned that its conclusion would be different if the mother was arguing "some adverse action against her" based on the reasonable services finding. (Id. at p. 1154.) For example, the court said its determination on the propriety of the mother's appeal would be different "[w]here the two findings of reasonable services and detriment are intertwined" and "resulted in some negative consequence to the parent." (Ibid.)
The Melinda K. court exercised its discretion to treat the mother's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate and considered the merits of her claim, reasoning that, otherwise, she would be left without any means to challenge the finding "which may ultimately have a significant effect on the dependency proceedings." (Melinda K., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1156-1157.) "Despite our conclusion that a reasonable services finding, by itself, is not appealable, we recognize that postdisposition orders in dependency proceedings are comprised of numerous findings and that many of those findings are premised on related findings which have been made during previous hearings. Generally, the findings made at each hearing—to the extent they are against a parent or legal guardian's interest in reunification—will form the basis of an adverse order which is immediately appealable. In certain circumstances though, as evidenced by the instant matter, it is possible that a finding which is not appealable now may later become part of the factual basis for a subsequent appealable order. But it is impermissible to challenge an earlier finding by way of an appeal from a subsequent order. . . . [¶] Thus, mother cannot appeal the reasonable services finding now, nor can she raise the issue by way of an appeal from any subsequent adverse order." (Id. at p. 1156.)
The Agency contends Mother, like the parent in Melinda K., cannot show she was aggrieved by the juvenile court's six-month review order, as an additional six months of reunification services were ordered. However, we have previously disagreed with Melinda K. and held a reasonable services finding, made in similar circumstances, was appealable. (See In re T.W.-1 (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 339, 345, fn. 6 (T.W.-1) [" 'reasonable services finding contained within the order made at the six-month review hearing is adverse to [a parent's] interest in reunification' " and " 'finding and order made at the six-month review hearing is therefore appealable' "], quoting In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 696.)
In re T.G., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 687, distinguished Melinda K. on the basis that the juvenile court "did not find [T.G.'s parent] in compliance with the case plan," but instead found his progress "inadequate." (T.G., at p. 693.) The T.G. court also observed an unsupported reasonable services finding "can put the interests of parents and children in reunification at a significant procedural disadvantage" due to the usual limitation of 12 months of reunification services. (Id. at p. 695.) Several other procedural disadvantages could result from an erroneous reasonable services finding: "[A] heightened showing is required at the time of the 12-month review in order to continue services to the statutory maximum of 18 months. . . . [¶] . . . Under these circumstances, it is obvious it would be significantly more difficult for a parent to either reunify with a child or to satisfy the heightened showing required for a continuation of reunification services if the parent was not provided with reasonable services during the first six months of the reunification period. [¶] . . . [Furthermore,] a parent whose services are terminated at the 12-month review period based in part on an erroneous finding of reasonable services during the first six months of reunification, would be unable to challenge that finding by way of an appeal from a subsequent adverse order at the time of the 12-month review hearing." (Id. at pp. 695-696.) The reasonable services finding made at the six-month review hearing was held appealable under section 395 because the reviewing court could not "say for certain that no negative consequences flowed from the [juvenile] court's finding." (T.G., at p. 694; see id. at p. 696.) We reached a similar result in T.W.-1, when the juvenile court had made an unsupported reasonable services finding and "also found Father had not complied with the case plan." (T.W.-1, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 345, & fn. 6.)
"A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment." (§ 395, subd. (a)(1).)
Here, the juvenile court found Mother's compliance with the case plan was "adequate." But, unlike in Melinda K., the juvenile court made clear its detriment finding was intertwined with the fact services were "incomplete." The juvenile court explained: "There was a lot more to this domestic violence incident than [Mother] is admitting to or talking about. And [Fuentes] was spot on when she testified . . . [Mother] is . . . not coming to terms with what she did or what the incident was all about, or how services could be used to address the reason for the entry of the [Agency] into [their] lives. So it's hard when you have a client who is not being honest about what took place and what's really needed in terms of services. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . There's a lot to the incident. The bite mark was so serious that [Mother's boyfriend] carries a scar with him on his flesh. It was a serious thing, and it hasn't yet been addressed." At another point, the juvenile court said, "[Mother] may need more than six [more] months [of] services. . . . She needs a psych assessment and some sort of honesty about what brought her here. . . . [¶] So I am not going to say there's no reasonable services, but I will say that probably she needs more than six more months of services; she just does." Because the detriment and reasonable services findings are intertwined in this case and may negatively impact Mother's chance at reunification at the 12-month review, we conclude Mother was aggrieved, and the reasonable services finding is appealable. (See Melinda K., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1154-1156; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 974-975.) B. Substantial Evidence
We review a reunification services finding for substantial evidence. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.) "A finding that reasonable reunification services have been provided must be made upon clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.] 'When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value—to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citations.]' [Citation.] [¶] When applying the substantial evidence test, however, we bear in mind the heightened burden of proof. [Citation.] 'Under this burden of proof, "evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' " (Ibid.)
"Reunification services need not be perfect. [Citation.] But they should be tailored to the specific needs of the particular family. [Citation.] Services will be found reasonable if the [Agency] has 'identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult (such as helping to provide transportation . . . ).' " (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972-973.) " 'The standard is not whether the services were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.' " (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598-599.)
In T.W.-1, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th 339, we reversed the juvenile court's reasonable services finding as unsupported when, by the time of the six-month review, the father had only been provided with a necessary referral more than three months after disposition, the case plan remained inadequate because it did not address substance abuse or housing, and the father only had one telephone call with his daughters (despite the case plan's provision for weekly calls). (Id. at pp. 345-347.)
Here, although Mother was not deprived of visitation to the same extent the father was in T.W.-1., it is apparent that at no point in the six-month review period did the Agency provide the full 16 hours of Mother's ordered visitation. We must assume visits were originally conducted in Modesto at Mother's request because the juvenile court explicitly found Fuentes credible on this point. Nevertheless, it is undisputed the Agency was also aware Mother was, understandably, experiencing challenges in transporting herself to Modesto between October 2017 and January 2018. It is the Agency's responsibility to make an effort "to provide reasonable reunification services in spite of difficulties in doing so or the prospects of success." (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451.)
The record does not support the Agency's assertion that, in the time period before January 2018, offering visitation in Antioch made transportation any less challenging. Fuentes did not testify that Mother refused an offer by the Agency to transport her to Antioch between October and January. To the contrary, at the time Fuentes wrote the six-month review report, the Agency was still processing transfer paperwork and had been unable to connect Mother to an eligibility worker. The record suggests it was only in January 2018 that Fuentes began attempting to arrange Agency transportation for Mother. Other than the three-month delay in obtaining an eligibility worker in San Francisco after the transfer, itself unreasonable in the absence of justification, the record does not explain the Agency's failure to make reasonable efforts to assist with transportation until January. " ' "Visitation is a critical component, probably the most critical component, of a reunification plan." ' " (T.W.-1, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 347.) "To promote reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible." (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 972.) Mother did not choose to have M.P. placed in foster care outside of either San Mateo or San Francisco counties. Yet, during a three-month period in the beginning of reunification (October through January), the Agency occasionally provided Mother with $20 and transported her on one occasion. The Agency did not make reasonable efforts to facilitate visitation until at least three months after the transfer.
The facts before us are in other respects similar to those presented in T.W.-1. Mother's reunification plan also required her to complete a mental health assessment, comply with any recommended treatment plan, participate in therapeutic visitation, and complete a parenting class. Fuentes testified Mother was not provided a referral for parenting education, but she was nevertheless connected with HPP by the San Mateo County social worker and eventually completed an appropriate class after Fuentes contacted Mother's HPP advocate and helped her enroll in the more appropriate parenting class in January 2018.
Therapeutic visitation had not begun by the time of the six-month review hearing. After the service was ordered at disposition, Fuentes submitted a referral for this service on November 1, 2017. The delay until November is adequately explained by the delay inherent in an intercounty transfer. However, the Agency's attempts to explain the postreferral delay are less compelling. Fuentes explained the latter delay by stating it was difficult to find a provider that was both Spanish speaking and could travel 60 miles outside of San Francisco to the Antioch Visitation Center. However, in November 2017, visitation was not occurring in Antioch. In any event, three months after the referral was made (in February 2018), the Agency's preferred provider, Foster Care Mental Health, identified a non-Spanish-speaking therapist. Later in February, Foster Care Mental Health connected Mother to Spanish-speaking clinician, who had been scheduled to begin therapeutic visitation two weeks prior to the contested six-month review hearing. The session had not taken place because Mother was sick. Another therapeutic visit was rescheduled because it was set for the day of the hearing. Mother's first therapeutic visit would be the Thursday after the hearing and weekly thereafter for two or three hours.
To be sure, M.P.'s placement in Modesto and Mother's language needs rendered the Agency's ability to provide services more difficult. But these circumstances were not surprises, and the record does not suggest the Agency made any efforts to locate an available Spanish-speaking therapist outside of San Francisco—either in Stanislaus County (where visits were occurring between November and January) or Contra Costa County (where visits were occurring after January). Furthermore, the record contains no explanation why it took the Agency's preferred provider three months to identify an English-language therapist. "It is 'the social worker's job to maintain adequate contact with the service providers' " (T.W.-1, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 347) and to make an effort "to provide reasonable reunification services in spite of difficulties in doing so or the prospects of success." (In re Taylor J., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451.) The Agency did not show it fulfilled its obligation to make "some effort" to overcome obstacles to the provision of reunification services. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 973, italics omitted.)
In March 2018, Mother had only recently started weekly individual therapy. Fuentes testified a referral was previously unsuccessful because a psychological evaluation had not been ordered by the San Mateo County juvenile court. When writing the six-month review report in January 2018, Fuentes recommended therapy as a new requirement and asked the San Francisco City and County juvenile court to order a psychological evaluation. Thus, the Agency argues the delay in providing Mother with therapy and a mental health assessment cannot be held against it because the San Mateo County juvenile court failed to order this component of the case plan at the original dispositional hearing in August 2017. However, the record does not support the juvenile court's implicit finding that Mother's mental health assessment and therapy were not ordered at the original disposition hearing in August 2017. The case plan, recommending such services was attached to the jurisdictional/dispositional report and the San Mateo County juvenile court, in its dispositional order, referenced this case plan and then ordered San Mateo County Human Services Agency to "provide reunification services" and Mother to "participate in the reunification services stated in the case plan." (Italics added.)
The San Mateo County juvenile court's findings and orders after dispositional hearing states that the court had read the social worker's report and case plan both dated August 15, 2017. The minute order also states: "The Court has read, considered, and admitted into evidence the . . . social study report dated: 8/15/17." Despite these clear indications the juvenile court was incorporating the case plan attached to the San Mateo County Human Services Agency's August 15 report, the record is ambiguous to the extent another page entitled "Additional Court Orders" does not have a box checked indicating Mother "is to participate in and successfully complete [a] psychological evaluation." The reporter's transcript from the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing is not in the record before us.
Fuentes apparently recognized, at some point before the six-month review hearing, that individual therapy was key to addressing the root of the problem requiring dependency jurisdiction. Yet, there is no evidence Fuentes asked Mother to undergo a psychological assessment and Mother refused because the assessment had not been "court ordered." If the ambiguity in the record created confusion (or a funding problem for the Agency), it was the Agency's burden—as the party responsible for identifying, providing, and facilitating necessary services—to file a section 388 petition. (See In re Taylor J., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452 [social services agency, "not the parent or the court, is charged by the Legislature with providing reasonable family reunification services"]; In re Mark N. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1014 [parent "not required to complain about the lack of reunification services as a prerequisite to the [Agency] fulfilling its statutory obligations"], superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1503-1504; § 361.5, subd. (a).) The Agency has not demonstrated it sought to remedy any inadequacy in the case plan in a timely manner after the transfer. Instead, the issue was not presented to the San Francisco City and County juvenile court until almost February 2018. Mother did not receive any individual therapy until March 2018. That Mother started a domestic violence program days before the six-month review hearing does not excuse the delay in providing mental health services to her. Again, the Agency does not persuasively explain the significant delay in connecting Mother with an appropriate domestic violence program.
Between August 2017 and March 2018, Mother received no therapeutic visits, no individual therapy, and no domestic violence programming despite these having been critical components of her case plan. Between October 2017 and January 2018, the Agency also delayed in providing reasonable transportation assistance to facilitate visitation. Mother was not responsible for these delays and would not be able to reunify with M.P. having received only a parenting class and insufficient visitation. It is simply not enough that everything was finally put into place around the time of the six-month review hearing—Mother was essentially starting from square one. Substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's reasonable services finding.
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order of March 29, 2018, is reversed only with regard to its finding reasonable services were provided to Mother. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to enter a new finding that reasonable services were not provided and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/_________
BRUINIERS, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
JONES, P. J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.