Opinion
A152436
08-24-2018
In re ALEXANDER D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff, v. HEIDI S. et al., Defendants and Respondents; MICHAEL P., Objector and Appellant; ALEXANDER D., Objector and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. JD15-3101)
In a prior appeal arising from this matter, we affirmed the presumed parent status of Joel D. (Joel) and Donald Q. (Donald), but vacated the juvenile court's order granting Michael P. (Michael) presumed parent status. (In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475 (Alexander P.).) Michael now appeals from the juvenile court's order denying his subsequent motion for presumed father status. Michael argues the juvenile court erred by subjecting his presumption of parentage to Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c)'s detriment analysis. Michael further asserts the court was required to identify him as a presumed parent due to his execution of a voluntary declaration of paternity. The court's failure to do so, he contends, resulted in depriving him of his parental rights without a finding of unfitness. We disagree and affirm the order.
The minor filed a motion to dismiss Michael's appeal as moot on the basis that Michael only appealed from the order denying him presumed parent status and not the order terminating jurisdiction. However, the order terminating jurisdiction was a finding made in connection with the order denying Michael presumed parent status, entered on the same date and as part of the same minute order. Notices of appeal "must be liberally construed," and we conclude Michael's appeal may be reasonably construed to include the related findings, including the termination of jurisdiction. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).)
I. BACKGROUND
Certain portions of the factual and procedural background are taken from our partially published opinion issued in the prior appeal, Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th 475.
A. Initial Presumed Parent Proceedings and Prior Appeal
The minor was conceived during an intermittent three-year relationship between Heidi S. (Mother) and Michael, but neither believed Michael to be the child's biological father. (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 480.) Rather, Mother believed Joel to be the biological father of the minor. (Ibid.) Notwithstanding Michael's belief he was not the child's father, he remained in the relationship with Mother throughout her pregnancy. Michael was present at the birth in February 2012, executed a voluntary declaration of paternity, and was identified as the minor's father on the birth certificate. (Id. at pp. 480-481.) Michael also resided with Mother for much of the first year of the minor's life. (Id. at p. 481.)
"From before the minor's birth, the relationship between Mother and Michael was characterized by oppressive domestic violence. In January 2013, prior to the minor's first birthday, a criminal protective order issued to protect Mother from Michael. He was arrested for a separate act of domestic violence against her two months later and eventually suffered a misdemeanor conviction. A year later, in April 2014, another restraining order was granted in favor of Mother against Michael." (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 481.)
Following the first restraining order, Michael and Mother "entered into a mediated stipulation providing for joint legal and physical custody and allowing Michael substantial visitation with the minor. But after entry of the April 2014 restraining order, Mother was granted sole legal and physical custody of the minor, and Michael was restricted to twice weekly supervised visits." (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 481.)
In late 2013, Joel "submitted to a DNA test, which confirmed he is the minor's biological father. Beginning in September 2013 and continuing to the present day, Mother has permitted Joel to have weekly visits with the minor . . . . In April 2014, Joel filed an action to establish his paternity." (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 481.)
Also in 2013, "Mother began living with Donald . . . . They married in August 2014. Within their household, it is acknowledged that Donald is not the minor's biological father, and Donald respects Joel's role in the minor's life. Nonetheless, Donald has assumed 'the day-to-day physical and emotional responsibilities' of a father since he began living with Mother and the minor. . . . In a report prepared for the family court around June 2014, appointed counsel for the minor found the minor to be 'most comfortable' in the care of Donald, rather than Michael or Joel." (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 481-482.)
In August 2014, the family court conducted a joint hearing on Joel's paternity action and Michael's custody proceeding. (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 482.) Michael failed to appear due to a scheduling misunderstanding. (Ibid.) "Following the hearing, in a document entitled ' Findings and Order After Hearing' (August 2014 order), the family court set aside Michael's voluntary declaration of paternity, denied his claim of presumed parent status, vacated his visitation order, declared Joel to be a presumed parent, and awarded joint legal custody to Mother and Joel." (Ibid.) Michael subsequently "filed a request to set aside the orders entered in his absence and declare him to be the minor's legal father. . . . Following that hearing, in an order entered on March 17, 2015 (March 2015 order), the court vacated most of the orders entered after the August 2014 hearing and took 'the issue of paternity for both [Michael] and [Joel] under submission.' The March 2015 order, however, expressly preserved the finding of presumed parent status for Joel and the suspension of Michael's visitation." (Id. at pp. 482-483.)
Shortly thereafter and before any further ruling by the family court, the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) because of a domestic violence incident between Mother and Donald, which occurred in the minor's presence.
"Two weeks after the dependency petition was filed, on April 15, the family court consolidated the proceedings filed by Michael and Joel, and issued a statement of decision, findings and order, and two judgments, finding both Joel and Michael to be presumed parents of the minor." (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 483.) The court noted Michael's voluntary declaration of paternity was rebutted by the genetic test showing that Joel is the minor's biological father. Despite this, the family court concluded "it would not be in [the minor's] best interest for the [voluntary declaration of paternity] to be set [a]side because the child has formed an attachment and strong relationship with [Michael] in his first years of life," and Michael "seeks to continue his relationship with the child." "The court found that Joel was the minor's biological father and noted that through weekly visits Joel had formed a companionable relationship with the minor. The court declined to choose between them, finding the minor would suffer detriment if either was not declared to be a presumed parent. ([Fam. Code], § 7612, subd. (c).) The court also reinstated Michael's supervised visitation and entered judgments designating both men as the minor's father." (Ibid.)
Thereafter, the juvenile court "scheduled a hearing in the dependency proceedings 'for status of Parentage.' Prior to the hearing, Michael, Joel, and Donald all filed requests to be declared the minor's father. . . . [¶] On August 17, 2015, the juvenile court found Michael and Joel to be presumed parents on the basis of the family court's April 2015 order, deeming itself bound by that order. The court also found Donald to satisfy the requirements for presumed parent status and declared him to be the minor's third presumed parent, concluding it would be detrimental to the minor 'to limit this child's parentage to mother, [Joel], and [Michael].' " (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 483-484.)
Michael, Mother, Joel, and the minor appealed various aspects of the juvenile court's parentage rulings. Relevant to these proceedings, Mother, Joel, and the minor contended the court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent. (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 484.)
This court concluded, in part, the family court lacked jurisdiction to issue its April 2015 order regarding presumed parent status for Michael: "[T]he family court hearing Joel's and Michael's consolidated paternity/custody actions was divested of jurisdiction over paternity issues as of March 30, 2015, when this dependency proceeding was commenced. As a result, by the time the family court issued its April 2015 order on presumed parent status, it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction over the minor's paternity and visitation. The family court's rulings on these issues were therefore of no legal effect, and the juvenile court's conclusion that it was required to adopt the family court's findings was erroneous." (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 488.) We vacated the order finding Michael to be a presumed parent and remanded the matter to the trial court to "hear and render a decision on Michael's request for presumed parent status." (Id. at p. 499.) B. Subsequent Juvenile Court Proceedings
On remand, the juvenile court ordered briefing and scheduled a contested hearing on the issue of Michael's status. Michael argued the voluntary declaration of parentage and his demonstrated commitment to the minor established his status as a presumed parent. In response, the Agency contended Michael should not be elevated to presumed parent status because he lacked any existing relationship with the minor due to his lack of contact during the past three years. Mother also opposed Michael's request to be recognized as a presumed parent. She argued Michael had no meaningful relationship with the minor and asserted Michael was seeking presumed parent status as a mode of harassment.
In advance of the hearing on Michael's status, the Agency submitted an addendum report, which recommended the dependency be dismissed and legal and physical custody of the minor granted to Mother.
Following the hearing, the juvenile court denied Michael's motion for presumed father status and concluded "it would be a detriment to the child if [Michael] is brought into this case as a Presumed Father." The court awarded legal custody to Mother, Donald, and Joel, and physical custody to Mother and Donald. The court also dismissed the dependency petition and terminated jurisdiction. Michael timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
1. Uniform Parentage Act
" 'The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), Family Code section 7600 et seq., provides the statutory framework for judicial determinations of parentage, and governs private adoptions, paternity and custody disputes, and dependency proceedings.' " (In re D.A. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 811, 824.) "The paternity presumptions of the UPA ' "are driven by state interest in preserving the integrity of the family and legitimate concern for the welfare of the child." ' [Citation.] One purpose of the UPA is 'to distinguish those who have demonstrated a commitment to the child regardless of biology and grant them the "elevated status of presumed [parenthood]." ' " (Martinez v. Vaziri (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 373, 377.)
Under the UPA, a parentage action may be initiated by a child, the child's natural mother, a presumed parent, a prospective adoptive parent or, in specific circumstances, other interested parties. (Fam. Code, § 7630.) With regard to paternity, the UPA distinguishes between "alleged," "biological," and "presumed" fathers. (See Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 595-596.) "A man who may be the father of a child, but whose biological paternity has not been established, or, in the alternative, has not achieved presumed father status, is an 'alleged' father." (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15.) "A biological or natural father is one whose biological paternity has been established, but who has not achieved presumed father status . . . ." (Ibid.)
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.
Presumed parent status is governed by section 7611 of the UPA. In relevant part, section 7611 provides: "A person is presumed to be the natural parent of a child if the person meets the conditions provided in . . . Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) of Part 2 [which governs voluntary declarations of parentage] or in any of the following subdivisions: [¶] . . . [¶] (d) The presumed parent receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child." Presumed fathers are vested with greater parental rights than alleged or biological fathers. (In re Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 448-449.)
Not all presumptions of parentage result in presumed parent status. Rather, when multiple individuals claim presumptions under section 7611, section 7612 addresses how those claims must be resolved. Prior to 2013, section 7612 only provided for recognition of one presumed father. (Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1131 (Kevin Q.) [" 'Although more than one individual may fulfill the statutory criteria that give rise to a presumption of paternity, "there can be only one presumed father." ' "].) As a result, former section 7612 provided various mechanisms for assessing which presumption—in the event of multiple competing presumptions—would have priority and give rise to a presumed father. Former subdivision (a) provided, " 'Except as provided in . . . Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) [(voluntary declaration of paternity)] of Part 2 . . . , a presumption under Section 7611 is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.' " (Kevin Q., at p. 1133, fn. omitted.) Former subdivision (b) further stated: " 'If two or more presumptions arise under Section . . . 7611 that conflict with each other, . . . the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.' " (Kevin Q., at p. 1133.) Former subdivision (c) of section 7612 dictated that presumptions under section 7611 were rebutted by a judgment establishing paternity of the child by another man. (Kevin Q., at p. 1133.)
In 2013, the Legislature amended section 7612 to allow for the recognition of multiple presumed parents. (Stats. 2013, ch. 564, § 6.) While subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged, a new subdivision (c) provided: "In an appropriate action, a court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child's physical needs and the child's psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time. A finding of detriment to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any of the parents or persons with a claim to parentage." (§ 7612, subd. (c).) The Legislature also amended and relettered former subdivision (c) as subdivision (d). (§ 7612, subd. (d).) This new subdivision provided a presumption under section 7611 would be rebutted by a judgment establishing paternity by another man "[u]nless a court orders otherwise after making the determination specified in subdivision (c)." (§ 7612, subd. (d).)
Senate Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), which encompassed these amendments, indicated courts should only recognize additional parents in "rare cases" in which a child "truly has more than two parents" who are parents "in every way." (Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) § 1.) " 'In those rare cases, the Legislature sought to protect the child from the "devastating psychological and emotional impact" that would result from "[s]eparating [the] child from a parent." [Citation.] Accordingly, "an appropriate action" for application of section 7612, subdivision (c) is one in which there is an existing parent-child relationship between the child and the putative third parent, such that "recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child." ' " (In re M.Z. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 53, 65.)
At Michael's request, we have taken judicial notice of certain documents reflecting the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1349 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.).
2. Voluntary Declaration of Parentage
"Pursuant to section 7570, the Legislature 'hereby finds and declares' that there is a 'compelling state interest in establishing paternity for all children.' " (In re Brianna M. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1040-1041 (Brianna M.), citing § 7570, subd. (a).) Section 7570 further explains "establishing paternity is the first step" toward providing children with access to benefits, and "allowing for establishment of voluntary paternity will result in a significant increase in the ease of establishing paternity . . . and . . . decrease . . . the time and money required to establish paternity . . . ."
The California Supreme Court granted review of Brianna M. and subsequently dismissed the appeal due to petitioner's failure to file an opening brief. (In re Brianna M. (2014) 317 P.3d 1182; In re Brianna M. (2014) 330 P.3d 327.) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(2), "After decision on review by the Supreme Court, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court under (3), a published opinion of a Court of Appeal in the matter . . . is citable and has binding or precedential effect, except to the extent it is inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court or is disapproved by that court." Accordingly, Brianna M. is citable except to the extent it is inconsistent or disapproved by the subsequent Supreme Court decision.
Under section 7573, a voluntary declaration of paternity filed with the Department of Child Support Services "shall establish the paternity of a child . . . ." (§ 7573.) Sections 7575 and 7612 then provide various grounds upon which a voluntary declaration of paternity, signed after December 31, 1996, may be rescinded or declared invalid. (See § 7576.) These grounds include: (1) a request by either parent to rescind the declaration within 60 days from the date of its execution (§ 7575, subd. (a)); (2) a motion to set aside the declaration under Code of Civil Procedure, section 473 (§ 7575, subd. (c)(1)); (3) a motion for genetic testing, which is filed within two years of the child's birth, and that testing conclusively demonstrates the man who signed the voluntary declaration is not the father of the child (§ 7575, subd. (b)); (4) a petition by a presumed parent under section 7611 to set aside the declaration, which is filed within two years of the execution of the declaration (§ 7612, subd. (e)); (5) the existence of a presumed parent under sections 7540 or 7611, subdivisions (a), (b), or (c) at the time the declaration was executed (§ 7612, subds. (f)(1), (2)); and (6) the man signing the declaration is a sperm donor, consistent with section 7613, subdivision (b) (§ 7612, subd. (f)(3)). Section 7575, subdivision (c)(4) further notes: "Nothing in this section is intended to restrict a court from acting as a court of equity." Barring any such rescission, a voluntary declaration of paternity "shall have the same force and effect as a judgment for paternity issued by a court of competent jurisdiction." (§ 7573; Kevin Q., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141 ["Until the voluntary declaration of paternity is set aside, it has the 'force and effect' of a judgment."].) B. Standard of Review
Section 7577 provides further guidance as to voluntary declarations of paternity signed by a minor parent. We need not address that provision because neither Mother nor Michael were minors when they executed the voluntary declaration of paternity.
We apply a de novo standard when interpreting the relevant statutes. (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 122.) Application of the statutes to this case, however, requires an assessment of whether the juvenile court's findings "are supported by substantial evidence. This analysis is the same under either the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standard of review. (See In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123 [on abuse of discretion review, 'the substantial evidence test applies to pure findings of fact'].)" (In re Donovan L. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1088.)
We review the facts "most favorably to the judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in favor of the order." (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1650.) We are precluded from reweighing the evidence, evaluating the credibility of witnesses, or resolving evidentiary conflicts, instead examining the entire record to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found as it did. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) The appellant has the burden of showing that there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (Ibid.) C. Impact of Michael's Voluntary Declaration of Paternity
None of the respondents contend the voluntary declaration of paternity executed by Michael and Mother was challenged within the two-year period provided by section 7612, subdivision (e) or is otherwise invalid under section 7612, subdivision (f). We agree. Rather, the parties dispute what presumptions arise from the voluntary declaration of paternity and the scope of legal rights resulting from those presumptions. We address each issue in turn.
Michael executed the voluntary declaration of paternity in February 2012. (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 480-481.) While Joel took a DNA test in late 2013, he did not file a petition to establish his paternity until April 2014. (Id. at p. 481.) Accordingly, Joel's petition was outside the statutory window and could not contest the declaration's validity. (Accord, Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1349 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 14, 2011, p. 4 ["in order to provide for finality, this bill does not allow for an open ended period to challenge a voluntary declaration. Challenges must be made within two years of a declaration's execution. This is consistent with the timeframe to challenge other paternity presumptions."].)
1. Presumptions Arising from Voluntary Declaration of Paternity
Michael contends he is entitled to a conclusive presumption of parentage because he executed a voluntary declaration of paternity that was not challenged within the applicable time limits. We agree.
In determining whether the execution of a voluntary declaration of paternity entitles Michael to a conclusive presumption of parentage under the UPA and section 7570 et seq., "we apply the familiar rules governing statutory interpretation. 'Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent, giving effect to the law's purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.' [Citation] ' " 'When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain, commonsense meaning of the language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.' " ' [Citation.] 'To the extent statutory language is ambiguous or open to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may turn to legislative history for guidance.' [Citation.] Other ' " ' "extrinsic aids" ' " ' to the interpretation of a statute, available when the language is ' " 'unclear or ambiguous,' " ' are ' " ' "the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, . . . public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part." ' " ' [Citation.] ' " 'Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.' " ' " (Newark Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2015) 245 Cal.App.4th 887, 898-899.)
Section 7611 states an individual "is presumed to be the natural parent of a child if the person meets the conditions provided in . . . Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) of Part 2"—i.e., executed a valid voluntary declaration of paternity. This language is clear and unambiguous. None of the parties contend any grounds for rescinding or invalidating the voluntary declaration of paternity under section 7570 et seq. apply. Michael thus has a presumption of parentage under the express language of section 7611.
Moreover, this presumption is not rebuttable. Section 7612, subdivision (a) sets forth the standard for rebutting presumptions arising under section 7611. That subdivision, however, expressly exempts from its language presumptions arising from voluntary declarations of paternity. (§ 7612, subd. (a) ["Except as provided in . . . Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) of Part 2 . . . ."].)
While the minor does not contest the validity of the voluntary declaration of paternity, he argues Assembly Bill No. 1349 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) diminished the effect of the conclusive presumption of parentage. Assembly Bill No. 1349 amended section 7612 and related statutes to incorporate limited, specific grounds on which a voluntary declaration of paternity may either be set aside or deemed invalid. The only revisions to the statutory scheme related to incorporating these limited, specific grounds for contesting a voluntary declaration of paternity. (Assem. Bill No. 1349 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.).) Minor relies on statutory language stating, "In the event of a conflict between the presumption under Section 7611 and the voluntary declaration of paternity, the weightier considerations of policy and logic shall control." (§ 7612, subd. (e).) Minor, however, takes this language out of context. The cited language is only one portion of subdivision (e) of section 7612, the remainder of which exclusively addresses the two-year window within which a party may seek to set aside a voluntary declaration of paternity. In this context, it is clear this weighing test arises solely in connection with such a challenge. Nothing in the statutory language or the legislative history suggests the weighing language of subdivision (e) was intended for a broader purpose. Accordingly, we find this provision inapplicable because no party contends a petition was filed within the requisite two-year period to set aside Michael's voluntary declaration of paternity.
Michael executed a voluntary declaration of paternity, which has not been challenged under section 7612, subdivisions (e) or (f). Accordingly, Michael is entitled to a conclusive presumption of parentage.
2. Entitlement to Parental Rights
While the voluntary declaration of paternity gives Michael a conclusive presumption of parentage, we disagree this presumption trumps any other presumptions, excludes him from the analyses set forth in section 7612, subdivisions (b) and (c) (hereafter section 7612(b) and section 7612(c)), or mandates his designation as a presumed parent.
a. Application of Section 7612(b) and Section 7612(c) to Voluntary Declarations of Paternity
Unlike section 7612, subdivision (a) (section 7612(a)), which expressly excludes voluntary declarations of paternity from being rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, neither section 7612(b) nor section 7612(c)) contains any such exclusionary language. Had the Legislature intended to exclude voluntary declarations of paternity from section 7612(b) and section 7612(c), it could have expressly done so. (Accord, Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 811 ["The Legislature's failure to include an . . . exception within the statutory scheme is significant, because the Legislature knows how to craft such an exception when it wishes to do so."].) Indeed, the Legislature included such an exception in section 7612(a). Accordingly, the only reasonable interpretation of section 7612 is that voluntary declarations of paternity are only exempt from being rebutted "by clear and convincing evidence." Such declarations are not exempt from the weighing process under section 7612(b) or the detriment analysis under section 7612(c).
Michael also suggests section 7612(b) is limited to rebuttable presumptions arising under section 7611. But nothing in the statutory language supports this interpretation. (§ 7612, subd. (b).)
In response, Michael raises two arguments. First, Michael contends his presumption arising from the voluntary declaration of paternity rebuts Joel's and Donald's presumptions and, as a result, there are not two conflicting presumptions subject to the weighing process under section 7612(b). Michael relies on Kevin Q., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 1557, and In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279 (Levi H.), in support of his argument. Neither case is applicable.
Both Kevin Q. and Levi H. were decided prior to the 2013 amendment to section 7612, which allowed courts to recognize more than two presumed parents. As a result, the courts deciding Kevin Q. and Levi H. were required to select a single presumed parent. (Kevin Q., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131 ["How the various Family Code sections are reconciled and prioritized to identify a single presumed father is the subject of our inquiry here."]; Levi H., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287 [" ' "there can be only one presumed father" ' "].) And former subdivision (c) of section 7612, in effect at the time of both decisions, stated, "The presumption under Section 7611 is rebutted by a judgment establishing paternity of the child by another man." (Legis. Counsel's Digest, Assem. Bill No. 1349 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) § 3.) Accordingly, former subdivision (c) required courts to find a voluntary declaration of paternity—having the "same force and effect as a judgment for paternity"—rebutted any section 7611 presumptions when evaluating two potential presumed parents. With the other presumptions rebutted, only the presumption arising from the voluntary declaration of paternity remained and there were no conflicting presumptions to weigh under section 7612(b). (Kevin Q., at p. 1139 ["Brent signed and filed a valid declaration of paternity that has the force of a judgment under section 7573 and trumps Kevin's presumption under section 7611, subdivision (d)."]; Levi H., at p. 1290 [holding because the voluntary declaration of paternity "extinguishes" the other presumption, "there are not two conflicting presumptions subject to the weighing process"].)
Since those cases were decided, the Legislature amended the relevant statutory provisions. As discussed in part II.A.1., ante, Senate Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) amended section 7612 to authorize courts to recognize more than two parents. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 29, 2013.) In doing so, former subdivision (c) was relettered as subdivision (d) and amended to provide, "Unless a court orders otherwise after making the determination specified in subdivision (c), a presumption under Section 7611 is rebutted by a judgment establishing parentage of the child by another person." (§ 7612, subd. (d), italics added; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill. No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 29, 2013, p. 6.) In other words, the voluntary declaration of paternity no longer automatically rebuts other presumptions of parentage under section 7611.
We recognize subdivision (d) of section 7612 could be interpreted as requiring a voluntary declaration of paternity to rebut other presumptions of parentage under section 7611 unless those presumptions and the voluntary declaration are determined to provide parental rights under section 7612(c). In other words, the voluntary declaration must rebut other presumptions unless the court is affording parental rights to both the person who executed the voluntary declaration and a person with another presumption of parentage under section 7611. (§ 7612, subd. (d).) However, we believe such an interpretation would impose greater restrictions on the juvenile court's authority than either required by the actual statutory language or intended by the Legislature when adding subdivision (c) and amending subdivision (d). (See, e.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) June 18, 2013, p. 7 ["This bill puts the interest of the child above all else."].)
Second, Michael asserts the court could not deny him parental rights under section 7612(c), because he has a conclusive presumption of parentage. Michael contends the court erred because section 7612(c) is designed to recognize additional parents rather than exclude an individual with a conclusive presumption of parentage. But section 7612(c) is not so limited.
Section 7612(c) provides "a court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child." The express language of this subdivision grants courts authority to determine whether "persons with a claim to parentage" should, in fact, be recognized as "parents." (§ 7612, subd. (c).) It further provides the court may decline to recognize multiple parents, despite legitimate claims to parentage, if doing so "would be detrimental to the child." (Ibid.)
The legislative history also supports a broad interpretation. For example, a committee report noted the bill would allow courts to determine the best interest of the child and "would authorize the court to order that not all parents share legal or physical custody of the child." (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 29, 2013, p. 8.) The report further explained the amended statutory language: "Courts therefore, under current law, apply a critical analysis to situations where more than two presumptions exist. This bill would add to the court's considerations that a court may find more than two parents only if finding otherwise would be detrimental to the child. . . . [¶] Thus, even in the event that more than two adults fit a presumption of parentage, a court would not be required to find that a child has more than two legal parents unless finding otherwise would be detrimental to the child. Accordingly, the number of families with more than two legal parents will be limited by judicial discretion." (Id. at p. 12, italics added; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) June 17, 2013, p. 7 ["it only provides that where there are more than two people who have an otherwise valid legal claim to parentage under existing California parentage law, the court can, but is not required to, recognize more than two people as legal parents of the child if it would otherwise be detrimental to the child"].) Thus, contrary to Michael's assertions, the legislative history expressly states section 7612(c) was intended to provide the court with discretion to withhold parental rights from those individuals who "fit a presumption of parentage" or "otherwise [have a] valid legal claim to parentage."
Moreover, the legislative history indicates the purpose of these statutory amendments was to focus on the best interests of the child, not the conduct of any potential presumed parent: "No other parentage determination considers the child's needs. The other determinations are all based on the presumed parent's actions. This bill puts the interest of the child above all else." (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) June 17, 2013, p. 10, italics added.) Accordingly, Michael's presumption of parentage does not automatically entitle him to become a parent without application of the detriment analysis set forth in section 7612(c) or the weighing process in section 7612(b).
b. Whether Recognizing Michael as a Parent Would Be Detrimental to the Minor
The juvenile court concluded Michael should not be deemed a parent because doing so would be detrimental to the minor. Michael contends insufficient evidence supported the court's holding because the social worker failed to conduct any investigation as to him.
Section 7612(c) requires the court to consider "all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child's physical needs and the child's psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time." We review the juvenile court's findings for substantial evidence, which requires us to "review[] the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and indulg[e] in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court's ruling." (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.) As long as there is substantial evidence to support the court's factual findings, an appellate court must affirm the resulting judgment, even if the court could have reached a contrary conclusion had it relied on other evidence and reasonable inferences. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874.)
As discussed in our prior opinion in this matter, " 'Detriment' was selected as a standard for permitting more than one presumed parent after the Governor vetoed a bill that would have made the decision dependent on the ' "best interest of the child." ' [Citation.] The standard was borrowed from section 3041, which governs the award of custody to a nonparent over the objection of a parent. Under that section, detriment is found if the nonparent has achieved a successful, established relationship with the child. [Citation.] Legislative reports prepared in connection with the amendment to section 7612 emphasized the provision for more than one presumed parent was intended to prevent the disruption of established emotional bonds between a child and his or her caretakers. [Citation.] . . . [T]he Donovan L. court concluded, ' "an appropriate action" for application of section 7612, subdivision (c) requires a court to find an existing, rather than potential, relationship between a putative third parent and the child, such that "recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child." ' " (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 497, quoting Donovan L., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092.) Barring such an existing relationship, there would be no substantial evidence to support a finding of detriment under section 7612(c). (Donovan L., at p. 1094.)
The same conclusion was reached in In re L.L. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1302, a case relied upon by Michael. There, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the biological father was a presumed parent. (Id. at p. 1313.) However, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court erred by finding the biological father qualified as a third parent under section 7612(c). (In re L.L., at p. 1316.) The court concluded the biological father "could not be recognized as a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c), because there is no evidence in the record showing he had an existing relationship with [the minor]. . . . Absent an existing relationship with [the minor], there is no ground on which [the biological father] could be recognized as a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c)." (Id. at pp. 1316-1317.)
In his reply brief, Michael contends presumed parents must make a showing under section 7612(c) but conclusively presumed parents do not. Michael offers no authority for such a distinction, and the statutory language does not support his claim. (See § 7612, subd. (c).)
In light of this authority, the juvenile court properly focused its inquiry on what, if any, current relationship existed between Michael and the minor. And its conclusion that the minor would not suffer detriment if Michael were denied legal or physical custody was supported by substantial evidence. Most notably, Michael testified he has not seen the minor since 2013. He did not identify any current relationship or contact with the minor. Nor did he testify to any efforts by him or his family to maintain such a relationship with the minor. Instead, Michael merely alleged a "connection" with the minor, without providing any explanation for how or why such a "connection" still existed. And, to the contrary, the social worker testified the minor only referred to Donald as "daddy." The court noted the minor was currently in a stable family consisting of Mother, Joel (his biological father), and Donald.
We recognize Michael's lack of contact with the minor stemmed, at least in part, from his ongoing family law case with Mother and a series of restraining orders against Michael dating back to 2013. But the restraining orders and the resulting separation of Michael from the minor were the direct result of Michael's acts of domestic violence against Mother and Michael's decision to violate the restraining order on at least one occasion. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's decision not to recognize Michael as a parent under section 7612(c). As aptly noted by the court, allowing Michael—who has no current relationship with the minor—to insert himself into the existing family "wouldn't be in the best interest of this child . . . . [¶] . . . [I]t is not a detriment to this child to not have [Michael] in his life, but it could be a detriment to this child if he was inserted back into this child's life and into the equation."
Any alleged error by the juvenile court in relying on Mother's declaration was harmless because Michael's testimony regarding his current relationship with the minor, along with the social worker's report and testimony, constitute substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's findings of detriment.
c. Weighing Process Under Section 7612(b)
"If [an additional] parent is not recognized under section 7612, subdivision (c), then a juvenile court generally must weigh the competing presumptions of two or more presumed fathers and determine which one should be recognized as the child's presumed father. [Citations.] Section 7612, subdivision (b), provides: 'If two or more presumptions arise under Section 7610 or 7611 that conflict with each other, or if a presumption under Section 7611 conflicts with a claim pursuant to Section 7610, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.' Accordingly, where there are conflicting claims of two or more presumed fathers, the juvenile court must make factual findings as to each claim and then determine which claim is entitled to greater weight under section 7612, subdivision (b)." (In re L.L., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1317-1318.)
In this case, however, the weighing process under section 7612(b) inherently overlaps with the detriment analysis under section 7612(c). In determining whether it would be detrimental to exclude Michael as a third father, the court acknowledged the stability of the minor's current family situation. Such stability arises from the biological and marital ties Joel and Donald have to the minor, the existing relationships between the minor, Joel, and Donald, and the minor's reference to Donald as "daddy." " 'In resolving such a conflict, the trial court must at all times be guided by the principle that the goal of our paternity statutes is "the protection of the child's well-being." ' [Citation.] '[T]he trial court must in the end make a determination which gives the greatest weight to [the child's] well-being.' " (V.S. v. M.L. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 730, 740.) Accordingly, the "weightier considerations of policy and logic" support giving deference to Joel's and Donald's presumptions over Michael's presumption.
Because we conclude the juvenile court properly applied section 7612 and substantial evidence supported its detriment finding under section 7612(c), we need not address whether the court also could deny Michael presumed parent status on equitable grounds.
d. Finding of Unfitness
Michael next argues revocation of presumed parent status and termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of abandonment or unfitness. He contends because he had a conclusive presumption of paternity, the court's decision to deny him parental status under section 7612(c), amounted to a revocation of presumed parent status and termination of his parental rights without the requisite finding. We disagree.
It is true "a court may not terminate a . . . presumed father's parental rights without finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that awarding custody to the parent would be detrimental." (In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, 20, fn. omitted.) However, we are unaware of any authority that concludes application of section 7612 to competing presumptions of parentage would amount to a termination of parental rights. If we adopted Michael's position, a juvenile court would be required to assess unfitness whenever individuals had competing presumptions of parentage and the court declined to recognize multiple parents under section 7612(c). However, the statute expressly sought to avoid imposing such a burden. (See § 7612, subd. (c) ["A finding of detriment to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any of the parents or persons with a claim to parentage."]; see also Martinez v. Vaziri, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 388 [evaluation of detriment under section 7612(c) "must include a realistic assessment of those parents' respective roles in providing care and support for the child. As the statute dictates, such consideration does not require a finding of unfitness of any of the parents."].) And this statutory language is not novel—prior to the adoption of section 7612(c), no court had concluded the weighing test under section 7612(b) to resolve competing presumptions of parentage required an assessment of parental fitness.
The California Supreme Court addressed a similar argument in In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 (Jesusa V.). There, two men were entitled to presumptions of parentage under section 7611. (Jesusa V., at p. 603.) The biological father argued the designation of another man as the child's presumed father amounted to a termination of his parental rights. (Id. at p. 610.) The court rejected this argument, finding "the identification of another man as [the child's] presumed father does not terminate [the biological father's] parental relationship with the child" or "render[] [the biological father] a legal stranger to the child. A declaration of presumed fatherhood entitles the presumed father to reunification services and custody of the child [citation] but does not itself terminate the biological father's parental relationship with the child. [Citation.] Termination of parental rights requires further proceedings. [Citations.] Hence, no showing of [the biological father's] unfitness was required before [the other man] could be declared [the child's] presumed father." (Ibid.; accord In re Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 448-449 [noting different parents may be afforded different degrees of rights].)
The current dispute, like the matter in Jesusa V., involves men who are all entitled to presumptions of parentage. While a presumption of parentage will often give rise to presumed parent status, section 7612(c) allows for a different outcome when there are multiple individuals with competing presumptions. Here, the juvenile court decided to recognize Joel and Donald as parents, while not recognizing Michael. This decision does not strip Michael of presumed parent status or parental rights—it declines to provide those to him in the first instance. This determination also does not render Michael "a legal stranger to the child." (See Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 610.) Rather, the court simply concluded, in this context, recognizing Michael as a third father would be detrimental to the child. However, Michael's voluntary declaration of paternity remains valid, and in other situations Michael may be able to assert various parental rights. But at this juncture we need not speculate what those may be.
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Margulies, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J. /s/_________
Dondero, J.