Opinion
A159106
08-09-2021
In re R.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.R., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. JD19-3239
STREETER, J.
Appellant R.R. appeals the dismissal of a juvenile dependency petition filed on his behalf by the San Francisco Human Services Agency (the Agency) a few months before R.R. turned 18 years old. In a hearing held shortly before R.R.'s 18th birthday, the juvenile court declined to take jurisdiction over R.R., holding that there was insufficient current information about R.R.'s circumstances to make jurisdictional findings. In a hearing held after R.R.'s 18th birthday, the Agency requested withdrawal of the petition, which the juvenile court granted.
Like the parties, we construe the result of the final juvenile court hearing described in part I., post, as a dismissal of the petition.
R.R. contends there was sufficient evidence of his current circumstances to make jurisdictional findings and the court erred in holding otherwise. R.R. asks this court to reverse the juvenile court decision so he may be declared a dependent of the court and therefore be eligible for transitional support as a nonminor dependent until age 21.
Relying on this court's precedent in In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 638 (David B.), the Agency argues that this appeal is moot because R.R. is now over 18 and “[d]ependency jurisdiction may not be initiated in the first instance over someone who is over age 18.” (Ibid.)
We agree. Even if we found reversible error, based on our own precedent in David B. and the plain language of the juvenile dependency statutes, this court cannot provide effective relief. (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 638; e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, § 303, subds. (a), (c).) Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. BACKGROUND
The Agency filed a section 300 dependency petition on behalf of R.R. on September 17, 2019. The petition alleged that R.R. was a minor described by subdivisions (b), (c), (g), and (j) of section 300, and that R.R. was at serious risk of physical harm, illness, suffering, and emotional damage because of the inability of his mother (Mother) to supervise, protect, and provide regular care for him.
All future dates referenced are in the year 2019.
According to the petition, R.R. last received regular care from a relative through an arrangement organized by Mother. In February, the relative caregiver ordered R.R. out of the home due to allegations of sexual abuse of a female cousin. A detention report filed with the petition indicated that R.R. was missing with unknown whereabouts from February until August. In August, the Agency learned that R.R. was staying with his maternal great aunt, who also provided foster care for R.R.'s brother.
In the subsequent weeks leading to the filing of the petition, the Agency lost contact with R.R. and was unable to determine his whereabouts or if his basic needs were being met. Mother refused to provide the Agency with access to R.R. and did not share R.R.'s location. Consequently, the Agency recommended that R.R. be detained in foster care.
At the detention hearing on September 18, the juvenile court held that the Agency made a prima facie showing that R.R. came within section 300 and ordered R.R. detained and placed in foster care once he was located.
In a report filed on October 29 for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the Agency indicated that R.R. was still unaccounted for. The report recommended that the petition be sustained and that R.R. be declared a dependent of the juvenile court. The report indicated, however, that it was imperative R.R. be declared a dependent of the court before his 18th birthday in December so he could benefit from transitional support as a nonminor dependent until age 21.
On November 21, the Agency filed an addendum report, indicating R.R. was still missing. According to the report, Mother was in regular communication with R.R. but did not know his whereabouts. Mother reported “that [R.R.] does not want to come into care and is ready to be an adult when he turns 18 in... December.”
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing held on December 3, R.R. did not appear. R.R.'s counsel stated that she spoke with R.R. the day before the hearing. During the conversation, R.R. told his counsel that he wanted the case dismissed. R.R.'s counsel claims, however, that she could hear adults in the background of the call yelling instructions at R.R., pressuring him to request dismissal.
Because R.R.'s whereabouts were unknown, the court continued the hearing to December 6 and asked that R.R. be present so the court could make a ruling on the section 300 petition. The court also set a later hearing for a date shortly after R.R.'s 18th birthday, for the Agency to withdraw its petition should R.R. not appear at the hearing on December 6.
R.R. did not appear at the hearing on December 6. Relying on In re Baby Boy M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 588 and In re Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236, the juvenile court held that it lacked “current information with which to make the findings that the Court is required to make.” Consequently, the court continued the hearing to a later date in December for the Agency to withdraw its petition.
Prior to that continued hearing, R.R. turned 18 years old. At the continued hearing, the juvenile court granted the Agency's request to withdraw its petition. R.R. timely appealed.
“An order dismissing a dependency petition is appealable.” (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 644, fn. 4.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Inability of this Court To Provide Effective Relief Renders this Appeal Moot
“In general, it is a court's duty to decide ‘ “ ‘actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' ”' [Citation.] ‘[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.' ” (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.)
As noted above, R.R. is now over the age of 18. As we held in David B., “[d]ependency jurisdiction may not be initiated in the first instance over someone who is over age 18.” (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 638.) R.R.'s current status as an adult leaves this court with no avenue to provide effective relief. R.R.'s briefing is silent on how his appeal can overcome the mootness issue raised by the Agency. In the absence of distinguishing facts or a novel argument to the contrary, we will follow our own precedent in David B.
“A child becomes a dependent of the juvenile court only if (1) the court finds at the jurisdiction hearing that the child is a person described by section 300 (§§ 300, 355, subd. (a), 356), and (2) the court then adjudges the child a dependent at the disposition hearing (§§ 300, 358, subd. (a), 360, subd. (d); [Citations]).” (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 645―646.) Once initiated, dependency jurisdiction may only be “ ‘retain[ed],' ‘continu[ed]' or ‘resum[ed]' for nonminors in certain circumstances until age 21.” (Id. at p. 638.) “In essence, the Legislature created a form of dependency jurisdiction for nonminors until age 21, but made it derivative of dependency jurisdiction assumed prior to age 18.” (Ibid.)
We note that, under a recent amendment to section 358, a juvenile court may in some circumstances hold a disposition hearing for a youth who is 18 years old if the court found at a jurisdiction hearing held before the youth turned 18 that the youth was a minor described by section 300. (§ 358, subd. (d), added by Stats. 2019, ch. 682, § 1.) This statutory amendment does not affect the resolution of this case. Here, as noted, the juvenile court did not make jurisdictional findings before R.R. turned 18.
The juvenile court, therefore, cannot initiate dependency jurisdiction over R.R. because he is now over the age of 18. Even if we were to agree with R.R. on the merits of this appeal, “we cannot direct the juvenile court to take an action that is beyond the scope of its legislatively conferred power.” (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 650.)
This court lost the ability to provide effective relief the day R.R. turned 18. Because we are unable to provide effective relief, this appeal is moot.
B. The Discretionary Exceptions to Mootness Do Not Apply Here
“A court ordinarily will dismiss an appeal when it cannot grant effective relief, but may instead ‘exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue when there remain “material questions for the court's determination” [citation], where a “pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur” [citation], or where “there is a likelihood of recurrence of the controversy between the same parties or others.”' ” (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.)
Before addressing the discretionary exceptions to mootness, we note that neither party has asked this court to resolve this issue under any of the exceptions. Still, we wish to present the full basis of our decision to resolve this appeal without reaching the merits.
Because R.R. cannot be the subject of any future dependency proceedings, a ruling on the merits could not affect any future proceedings involving him. Additionally, this appeal presents no material questions for the court's determination beyond R.R.'s request that the dismissal of his section 300 petition be reversed.
This leaves the exception reserved for moot cases presenting “an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur.” (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23.) “[A]n appellate court may proceed to decide an otherwise moot appeal... only if a ruling on the merits... will have some precedential consequence in future litigation generally.” (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.) That standard is not met here.
While this court acknowledged in David B. that youth homelessness is an issue of broad public importance that might justify invoking an exception to mootness in the proper circumstances (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 654), this case, like David B., is not appropriate. R.R. argues the facts of his case are distinguishable from those in In re Baby Boy M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 588 and In re Claudia S., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 236, on which the trial court relied, because here substantial information about R.R.'s circumstances was available. To resolve this case on such a fact-bound basis would give our decision little precedential weight. Accordingly, we see no compelling question of precedential consequence requiring us to exercise our discretion and consider the merits of this appeal, despite its mootness.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: POLLAK, P. J., BROWN, J.