Opinion
D083634
07-11-2024
In re K.K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. KRISTOPHER K., Defendant and Appellant. SAN DIEGO HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. EJ4317C, Marissa A. Bejarano, Judge. Affirmed.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RUBIN, J.
Kristopher K. (Father) appeals the juvenile court's dispositional order regarding his minor child, seven-year-old K.K. He contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering him to participate in an assessment for domestic violence treatment. We affirm, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when imposing the domestic violence treatment requirement.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because Father's only contention on appeal concerns the dispositional order's requirement for a domestic violence assessment, we limit our factual background accordingly.
A. Facts Leading to the Dependency Case
K.K.'s parents were in an abusive relationship until she was four years old. During this time, they had three dependency cases involving substance abuse and domestic violence. Once separated, they shared custody of K.K., although K.K. resided with the mother.
K.K.'s mother is not a party to this appeal and will only be referenced when necessary.
In September 2023, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) received a referral alleging both severe and general neglect of K.K. and her siblings. The Agency learned that on September 10, the mother contacted Father, and later law enforcement, to report that K.K. and a sibling were missing. Father arrived with his father and uncle, all of whom appeared intoxicated. According to the mother and her boyfriend, Father yelled at the mother, pushed and slapped her, and punched her boyfriend. Father denied any physical altercation. Ultimately, deputy sheriffs located the children at a neighbor's home where they went when their mother could not be located, rendering the children locked out of their own apartment.
All undesignated date references are to 2023.
B. The Agency's Petition and Detention Hearing
In October, based on the above incident, the Agency filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) alleging the mother used alcohol and Xanax to excess, passing out in her apartment while K.K. and her sibling played at the apartment complex pool. The children, locked out of the home, sheltered at a neighbor's apartment. The neighbor's attempts to contact the children's mother were unsuccessful. The mother woke up in the middle of the night and called law enforcement to report the children missing. Deputy sheriffs arrived, later noting that the mother was under the influence of alcohol. The Agency also alleged that mother later allowed her boyfriend to drive K.K.'s sibling while drinking alcohol, all of which created risk to K.K.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court made a prima facie finding on the petition, detaining K.K. with the parents and placing specific conditions on the mother.
C. The Agency's Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
The initial jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place in November 2023. The Agency recommended the juvenile court sustain the petition, place K.K. with both parents, and order family maintenance services for both parents. The court set the matter for trial.
Father told an Agency social worker he did not need services and was unable to participate in services due to his work schedule. Father said he completed a 52-week domestic violence and parenting course in the prior dependency case.
The Agency remained concerned about the history of domestic violence between the parents. The social worker noted that, although Father denied physically assaulting the mother, law enforcement arrested him for the September 10 incident at the mother's apartment and charges were pending. The Agency reported fears that the parents were unable to safely coparent because of their conflicts and disagreements. The Agency recommended Father participate in case plan services, including a domestic violence assessment, "to determine a need for any Domestic Violence treatment," and parenting education.
K.K. felt safe in her father's home and preferred to live with him. She denied witnessing domestic violence and said Father did not tell her things about the mother.
In November 2023, the mother reported communication with Father was difficult. She declined to testify against him in the criminal domestic violence case.
The Agency remained uneasy about the relationship between the parents. Father continued to deny domestic violence despite the mother's statements to the contrary. Further, father had not engaged in services aimed at high conflict parenting and domestic violence, both of which the Agency believed were necessary to ensure K.K. was not exposed to further conflict.
D. The Contested Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place in January 2024. On behalf of the Agency, the juvenile court received the Agency's reports into evidence.
Father denied he slapped or shoved the mother in September when he went to the mother's home after she reported K.K. missing. He also denied punching the mother's boyfriend. He did not agree to a domestic violence assessment because he lacked time to complete the service, though would if ordered by the court. He preferred a telephonic or online program. He also felt the assessment was unnecessary because the domestic violence charges were dropped. He stated that he completed a domestic violence program in 2022, remaining free of such actions since that time.
On cross-examination, Father testified he pled guilty to the 2022 felony domestic violence case and was required to complete a domestic violence class. He was arrested in 2023 for violating the restraining order protecting K.K.'s mother, and for domestic violence, but the charges were dropped. He said he spent six days in jail prior to being released with an ankle bracelet. He agreed his relationship with the mother was tumultuous.
Father's current wife testified that she arrived at the mother's home with Father when the children were missing in September. She testified that the mother was yelling at Father and that Father did not slap or shove the mother or punch the mother's boyfriend.
During closing arguments, county counsel argued the domestic violence assessment was appropriate for Father given the Agency's concern that domestic violence continued to occur between the parents. Father objected to the domestic violence assessment since he maintained he did not punch the mother's boyfriend or assault the mother in September. The mother asked the juvenile court to order the assessment for Father based upon the history of domestic violence and Father slapping and pushing her.
E. The Court's Ruling
The juvenile court found the petition true by a preponderance of the evidence and placed K.K. with both parents. The court also ordered family maintenance services. The court-ordered case plan included a domestic violence assessment for Father.
DISCUSSION
I.
Relevant Legal Principles
After finding a child is within the juvenile court's jurisdiction, that court must then proceed to the dispositional phase. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169.) At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court may" 'direct any reasonable orders to the parents' of a dependent child as the court deems necessary and proper to ensure appropriate care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child (§ 362, subd. (d))." (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 522.) The "juvenile court enjoys broad discretion in crafting a dispositional case plan to this end." (Ibid.) "The court's principal concern is a disposition consistent with the best interests of the minor." (In re Rodger H. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1183.)
In advance of the disposition hearing, the Agency must submit a case plan, and the juvenile court must consider the plan "at the initial hearing and each review hearing." (§ 16501.1, subd. (g)(14).) "The case plan has several components, including: identifying the reasons for dependency (§ 16501.1, subd. (g)(3)); setting forth specific goals and describing why planned services are appropriate to meet those goals (§ 16501.1, subd. (g)(2)); and describing the services to be provided to assist in reunification (§ 16501.1, subd. (g)(10))." (In re M.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 412, 423.) The case plan is intended to ensure "that services are provided to the child and parents or other caretakers . . . in order to improve conditions in the parent's home, to facilitate the safe return of the child to a safe home or the permanent placement of the child, and to address the needs of the child while in foster care." (§16501.1, subd. (a)(2).)
"We review the juvenile court's disposition case plan for an abuse of discretion." (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071.) "A court exceeds the limits of legal discretion if its determination is arbitrary, capricious[,] or patently absurd. The appropriate test is whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason." (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.) We note, however, there are some cases that have applied the substantial evidence standard of review to the juvenile court's dispositional orders, and others that have combined this standard with the abuse of discretion standard. (See In re T.M. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1219.) While in the instant matter we apply the abuse of discretion standard, we would reach the same result under either approach.
As part of its disposition case plan, the juvenile court may require a parent to participate in a counseling or education program. (§ 362, subd. (d).) The program in which the parent is required to participate "shall be designed to eliminate those conditions" that led to dependency. (Ibid.) However, "the juvenile court is not limited to the content of the sustained petition" when it determines the dispositional orders that would best serve the children's interests. (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311 (Briana V.).) "In fact, there need not be a jurisdictional finding as to the particular parent upon whom the court imposes a dispositional order." (Ibid.) Rather, the juvenile court should consider the "evidence as a whole" when crafting its dispositional orders. (Ibid.)
II.
The Court Acted Within Its Discretion
Father contends there was an insufficient basis for the juvenile court's order both requiring his participation in an assessment to determine whether he needs domestic violence treatment and then requiring him to follow the recommendations. He notes that the allegations in the Agency's petition involved the mother, not him, and that the court did not make any findings against him when it sustained the petition. He asserts that he "did not require domestic violence treatment to address [the mother's] substance abuse issues."
Contrary to Father's contention, however, "[t]he problem that the juvenile court seeks to address [in a dispositional order] need not be described in the sustained section 300 petition." (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311.) For instance, in Briana V., the juvenile court ordered the father to participate in sexual abuse counseling based on his criminal history of sexual assault, even though the court acknowledged there was no evidence the children were at risk of sexual abuse. (Id. at p. 307.) On appeal, the father argued that imposition of sexual abuse counseling was improper because it was not reasonably necessary to eliminate the conditions that led to the dependency proceedings. (Id. at p. 311.) The court of appeal rejected this argument, explaining, "At disposition, the juvenile court is not limited to the content of the sustained petition when it considers what dispositional orders would be in the best interests of the children. [Citations.] Instead, the court may consider the evidence as a whole." (Ibid.) The appellate court noted that the father's status as a registered sex offender was one of the conditions that led to the proceedings, and the evidence showed he had violated his probation by visiting schools, possessing children's clothing, having a computer, and caring for his children. (Id. at pp. 311-312.) Under those circumstances, the reviewing court was unable to say the court exceeded the bounds of reason by ordering him to attend sexual abuse counseling. (Id. at p. 312.)
Similarly, in Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001 (Christopher H.), although the juvenile court dismissed an allegation in the petition that the father's problems with alcohol negatively affected his ability to care for and supervise his child, the court ordered him to participate in random drug and alcohol testing. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, relying on evidence in the record indicating that the father struggled with drug and alcohol abuse, stating, "[T]he [juvenile] court would have been remiss if it failed to address appellant's substance abuse even though that problem had not yet affected his ability to care for [the child]." (Id. at p. 1008.)
These cases demonstrate that the juvenile court is within its discretion to consider the "evidence as a whole" when formulating its dispositional orders and is not limited to the allegations in the petition. (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 307.) Accordingly, the absence of allegations in the petition regarding Father's history of domestic violence is not a basis on which this court can, as a matter of law, overturn the component of the dispositional order requiring him to participate in an assessment for domestic violence treatment. The Agency's reports were admitted into evidence without objection, and they included allegations that the parents had prior dependency cases due to domestic violence, that Father struck the mother in September 2023 and continued to attack her and make threats towards her boyfriend, and that he was "not engaged in . . . domestic violence services." Due to these allegations, the Agency proffered that Father should utilize domestic violence services to "ensure [K.K.] is not exposed to unnecessary conflict."
A review of the record confirms that the parents had an extensive history of domestic violence, including incidents in September 2018, May 2020, August 2020, October 2021, and September 2023. The Agency substantiated a referral in September 2018, where K.K. and her siblings witnessed domestic violence between the parents, and a witness reported Father beat the mother "almost every week." In August 2020, the Agency substantiated another referral based upon domestic violence between the parents. Father "grabbed [the mother] by the throat, choked her for an estimated 15-20 seconds, threw her onto the bed, punched her leg and rib, and then put a knife to her throat and threatened to cut her throat." In October 2021, the mother obtained a restraining order against Father after "he held a knife to her neck, broke her ribs, and wouldn't let her leave." Father also had criminal charges and a conviction relating to domestic violence.
In September 2023, when Father arrived at the mother's home, in violation of the restraining order, the mother and her boyfriend said Father yelled at her, pushed, and slapped her. There was an audio recording of the mother and her boyfriend stating Father "smacked" the mother and shoved her to the ground during the September 2023 incident. The maternal grandmother believed Father would benefit from a domestic violence class because he was a "pretty violent man."
Although Father denies the mother's allegations, this Court cannot "reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or resolve evidentiary conflicts." (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328.) On the contrary, we are required to" 'consider all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.'" (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.) Here, we conclude that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to require Father to participate in a domestic violence assessment.
Father's reliance on cases in which the appellate court reversed a case plan's requirement does not compel a different conclusion. In contrast to the record before us, the cases cited by Father involved virtually no evidence supporting the requirement's imposition. (See In re Sergio C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 957, 960 [reversing drug testing requirement imposed based "solely on the unsworn and uncorroborated allegation of an admitted drug addict" and where the parent "flatly denied all involvement with drugs and has otherwise cooperated fully with all of the court's orders"]; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172-173, superseded by statute on another ground as noted in In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239-1242 [reversing drug testing requirement imposed based only on social worker's observation about mother's behavior being "somewhat out of the usual," including mother being "obsessed with discussing a fortune-making invention" for which mother made an offer of proof that the invention could potentially make money].)
Accordingly, considering the entirety of the evidence, we are unable to say the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of reason by ordering Father to participate in a domestic violence assessment-a requirement that is far less onerous than, for example, a treatment program for substance abuse. On this record, it was not unreasonable for the juvenile court to be concerned about Father's demonstrated domestic abuse and the risk it poses to K.K. (See Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008 ["court would have been remiss if it failed to address appellant's substance abuse even though that problem had not yet affected his ability to care for [the child]"]; Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 307 [where father was a registered sex offender, affirming juvenile court's order that father participate in sexual abuse counseling despite acknowledging the lack of evidence that the minors were at risk of sexual abuse by father].) We conclude the court acted within its proper discretion.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's findings and orders of January 22, 2024, are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. BUCHANAN, J.