Opinion
D060290 Super. Ct. No. J517099D
01-04-2012
In re I.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TONI G., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Peter Fagan, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Toni G. appeals the judgment terminating her parental rights to her daughter, I.G. Toni contends the juvenile court erred by declining to apply the beneficial relationship and sibling relationship exceptions to termination of parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), (v); all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In July 2008 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a dependency petition for one-week-old I.G. The petition alleged her brother, two and-one-half-year-old F.G., had parallel linear marks on his right flank. The lines were inconsistent with Toni's explanation and medically determined to have been caused by nonaccidentally inflicted trauma.
I.G. was detained in a foster home with F.G., their four-year-old brother Z.W. and their one and-one-half-year-old sister T.G. In July 2008 the court entered true findings on the petition and ordered I.G. placed in foster care. In mid-December I.G. was moved to a new foster home, and her siblings were moved to a separate foster home. At the 18-month review hearing in April 2010, the court set a section 366.26 hearing for August.
In March 2011 I.G.'s siblings were moved to a foster family agency home. I.G.'s foster parent wished to adopt her, but in June the Agency denied the foster parent's adoptive home study.
After many continuances, the section 366.26 hearing took place in July 2011. At the time of the hearing, I.G. remained in the same foster home. Her foster parent had filed a grievance regarding the denial of her home study, the grievance procedure was pending and the Agency was looking for an adoptive home.
THE BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
Toni does not contest the adoptability finding. If a dependent child is adoptable, the juvenile court must terminate parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing unless the parent proves the existence of a statutory exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80-81.) One such exception exists if "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A beneficial relationship is one that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) If terminating parental rights "would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome . . . ." (Ibid.) The existence of a beneficial relationship is determined by "[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs . . . ." (Id. at p. 576.) Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment (id. at p. 576), we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply.
Toni's visits were always supervised. At least toward the end of the case, she did not maintain regular visitation. She sometimes called the foster home, but it was unclear how frequently this occurred.
Three-year-old I.G. had been out of Toni's care since she was one week old. Although I.G. recognized Toni and called her "mom," I.G. also called other women "mom." I.G. enjoyed visits with Toni. Toni brought snacks and treats, changed I.G.'s diapers and combed her hair. They hugged and kissed each other at the beginning and end of each visit. During visits, I.G. often initiated play with the supervising social worker and sought her out for assistance. At the close of visits, I.G. separated from Toni easily. The social worker believed Toni's relationship with I.G. was that of a friendly visitor or distant relative, and noted the benefits of adoption included stability, permanency and a sense of belonging.
Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that terminating parental rights "would [not] deprive [I.G.] of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that [she] would be greatly harmed . . . ." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
THE SIBLING RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) provides an exception to termination of parental rights when termination would substantially interfere with the child's sibling relationship and the severance of the relationship would be so detrimental to the child as to outweigh the benefits of adoption. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-953; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) The juvenile court must "balance the beneficial interest of the child in maintaining the sibling relationship, which might leave the child in a tenuous guardianship or foster home placement, against the sense of security and belonging adoption and a new home would confer." (In re L.Y.L., supra, at p. 951, citing In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Factors to be considered in determining whether this exception applies include whether the siblings were raised in the same home; whether they shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds; and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interests, including his or her long-term emotional interests, as compared to the benefit of adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) "[T]he application of this exception will be rare, particularly when the proceedings concern young children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount." (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.) Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports the finding that Toni did not meet her burden of proving the exception. (In re L.Y.L., supra, at pp. 947, 952.)
I.G. lived with her siblings for the first five months of her life, virtually all of that time in a foster home. After that, I.G. and her siblings lived in separate homes. They saw each other during Toni's visits and during visits the foster families arranged with each other. I.G. enjoyed the visits and liked to play with her siblings. She recognized them as her siblings, knew their names and yelled with excitement when she saw them. While I.G. had a close relationship with her three siblings, it did not appear to be as strong as the relationship the three siblings had with one another.
At the time of the hearing, the Agency was looking for an adoptive home for all four children or, alternatively, caregivers who would maintain sibling visitation. The social worker believed that if the Agency did not find one permanent home for I.G. and her siblings, the benefits I.G. would derive from adoption—stability, permanency and a sense of belonging—outweighed the benefits of maintaining her relationship with her siblings.
There is substantial evidence that even if termination of parental rights were to substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, severance of the relationship would not be so detrimental to I.G. as to outweigh the benefits of adoption.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
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McCONNELL, P. J.
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McDONALD, J.