Opinion
D076518
03-04-2020
In re S.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.B., Defendant and Appellant.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Emily Harlan, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SJ12198C) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed. Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Emily Harlan, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant S.B. is a nonminor former dependent. While she was a minor, she lived in the home of a legal guardian, who received monetary aid (foster care payments) on her behalf. Before her 18th birthday in September 2017, S.B. enrolled in Job Corps, a residential work study program, and began living in a dormitory there. By her 18th birthday, S.B.'s legal guardian stopped receiving, and became ineligible to receive, further foster care payments.
A few months later, S.B. left Job Corps. In 2018, she filed a request to return to juvenile court jurisdiction and foster care under section 388.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Nonminors may not reenter the juvenile dependency and foster care system (and receive related public assistance and services) unless certain jurisdictional requirements are met. One requirement of relevance here is that S.B., or a guardian on her behalf, had to receive foster care payments after she turned 18 years old. (§ 388.1, subd. (a)(2) [eligible petitioners include "nonminor former dependent . . . who received . . . aid after attaining 18 years of age . . . ." (italics added)].) Based on mistaken information about S.B.'s circumstances, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) initially believed S.B. was eligible for reentry, and the juvenile court took jurisdiction over her. S.B. then received months of financial assistance and services as a nonminor dependent in extended foster care. When the Agency eventually became aware of its mistake, it notified S.B. and the juvenile court. After a contested hearing, the court found that S.B. had not been eligible to reenter the juvenile court system and dismissed her case.
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On appeal, S.B. contends the juvenile court erred in dismissing her case. For reasons we explain, we conclude the court did not err and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The material facts are undisputed. S.B. became a juvenile dependent when she was 10 years old. The juvenile court selected a permanent plan of legal guardianship and terminated its jurisdiction. S.B. lived in the home of a legal guardian, Rosa N. (guardian), for over five years. S.B.'s birthday is September 6.
The Agency provided financial aid (aid to families with dependent children-foster care, or AFDC-FC) to S.B.'s guardian while S.B. was living in her guardian's home. These payments were made via electronic funds transfer, generally posting around the end of the month for that month's care. For example, for the months of July and August 2017, a payment of $917 was transferred to the guardian's bank account in late July and August, respectively.
On September 5, 2017, the day before S.B.'s 18th birthday, she enrolled in Job Corps. According to Job Corps's records, S.B. arrived and became a "resident student" of Job Corps on September 5. The guardian received AFDC-FC funding for five days of September 2017, that is, for September 1 through 5, or $152. Beginning September 6, 2017, neither S.B. nor her guardian were eligible to receive further AFDC-FC payments.
The prorated amount of $152 is derived by dividing the full monthly amount of $917 by 30 days, and then multiplying by five days. This amount was direct deposited in the guardian's account in mid-September 2017.
S.B. and the guardian did not challenge the correctness of the AFDC-FC payments in an administrative proceeding or otherwise.
A few months later, in 2018, S.B. left Job Corps because she did not feel like it was the right program for her. By then, S.B.'s guardian was no longer able to house or foster S.B.
In July 2018, S.B. filed a form JV-466 request to return to juvenile court jurisdiction and foster care, i.e., to reenter as a nonminor dependent in the extended foster care program. S.B.'s request indicated that she planned to remove barriers to unemployment. An Agency social worker conducted an initial reentry assessment. Based on interviews with S.B. and the guardian, the social worker understood and reported to the court that S.B. had been living with the guardian until she was 18 and enrolled in Job Corps thereafter. The social worker assumed S.B. met the "funding eligibility" for reentry. S.B. agreed to certain productivity goals to achieve independent living, and the Agency recommended the juvenile court assume jurisdiction over her. In September 2018, the court accepted the Agency's recommendation and assumed jurisdiction over S.B. as a nonminor dependent.
At a review hearing in March 2019, the Agency reported on S.B.'s activities designed to reduce barriers to unemployment. Through the extended foster care program, S.B. was receiving numerous services, such as housing, transportation, and a case manager, to prepare S.B. for employment. The court continued jurisdiction over her as a nonminor dependent in the extended foster care program.
Further unspecified date references are to 2019.
In mid-April, the Agency learned that S.B. actually began Job Corps prior to turning 18 and that her AFDC-FC funding stopped before her 18th birthday, rendering her ineligible for extended foster care. The Agency worked with S.B. on a plan to transition out of the dependency system and requested a special hearing to terminate jurisdiction.
The special hearing was originally set in May, continued once per the request of S.B.'s counsel, set for trial, continued a second time per the request of S.B.'s counsel, and ultimately held over two dates in August. In the interim, both parties briefed the legal issue of eligibility to reenter the juvenile court and foster care system as a nonminor dependent.
At trial, the court received in evidence various Agency reports with attachments and several exhibits pertaining to the AFDC-FC funding issue. Further, the court heard testimony from (1) the Agency manager who was responsible for determining eligibility for foster care payments and (2) the social worker assigned to S.B.'s reentry case. The eligibility manager testified that S.B. was not eligible for reentry because "she did not receive any [AFDC-FC] payments after her eighteenth birthday." The manager explained how foster care payments were only made to S.B.'s guardian through September 5, 2017, and that S.B. could not retroactively become eligible to receive additional funds.
S.B.'s assigned social worker testified to the sequence of events that led to the Agency's realizing that S.B. was not eligible to reenter the juvenile court system as a nonminor dependent. The social worker described certain services that would still be available to S.B. even after her case closed.
S.B. was not present at trial, but the parties stipulated she would testify as follows: "I did not start staying at the Job Corps dorm until 9/6/19, the day I turned 18. I remember this because when I got to the dorm to meet everyone and get my room assignment, the counselor said, oh, it's your birthday today, and then asked all the girls in the dorm to sing me happy birthday." Even if S.B.'s testimony is credited, the Agency manager explained that it would not change the propriety of stopping the AFDC-FC funds to her guardian on September 5, 2017.
Following closing argument, the juvenile court found that S.B. was not in fact eligible to reenter foster care as a nonminor dependent because (1) she enrolled in and entered Job Corps on September 5, 2017, and (2) AFDC-FC funds to her guardian terminated that same day. The court stated that its initial assumption of jurisdiction was based on erroneous facts, and with the correct set of facts, it was clear the court could not assume jurisdiction over S.B. as a nonminor dependent in extended foster care. The court dismissed the case, and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Petitions for Reentry under Subdivision (a) of Section 388 .1
S.B. contends the juvenile court incorrectly found that it could not assume jurisdiction over her. She concedes the material facts are undisputed and accepts the trial court's factual findings. Her primary argument is that subdivision (a) of section 388.1, under which she petitioned for reentry, is not exclusionary, i.e., she could petition for reentry as a nonminor dependent under this section even if she did not fit the criteria set forth in subdivision (a).
" 'The interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review independently.' " (Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912, 919.) " ' "To determine legislative intent, a court begins with the words of the statute, because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent." [Citation.] If it is clear and unambiguous our inquiry ends. There is no need for judicial construction and a court may not indulge in it. [Citation.] "If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs." ' " (People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 905.)
Further, "[g]iven the complexity of the statutory scheme governing dependency, a single provision 'cannot properly be understood except in the context of the entire dependency process of which it is part.' " (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1235.)
Section 388.1, subdivision (a), states: "(a) A nonminor who has not attained 21 years of age may petition the court in which he or she was previously found to be a dependent or delinquent child of the juvenile court for a hearing to determine whether to assume dependency jurisdiction over the nonminor, if he or she meets any of the following descriptions[.]" The "descriptions" of eligible petitioners are, in relevant part:
"(1) He or she is a nonminor former dependent, as defined in subdivision (aa) of Section 11400, who received . . . aid after attaining 18 years of age under Kin-GAP pursuant to Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 11360) or Article 4.7 (commencing with Section 11385) of Chapter 2 of Part 3 of Division 9, or AFDC-FC pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 11405, and whose former guardian or guardians died after the nonminor attained 18 years of age, but before he or she attains 21 years of age.
"(2) He or she is a nonminor former dependent, as defined in subdivision (aa) of Section 11400, who received . . . aid after attaining 18 years of age under Kin-GAP pursuant to Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 11360) or Article 4.7 (commencing with Section 11385) of Chapter 2 of Part 3 of Division 9, or AFDC-FC pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 11405, and whose former guardian or guardians no longer provide ongoing support to, and no longer receive aid on behalf of, the nonminor after the nonminor attained 18 years of age, but before he or she attains 21 years of age.
"(3) He or she is a nonminor who received adoption assistance payments after attaining 18 years of age pursuant to Chapter 2.1 (commencing with Section 16115) of Part 4 of Division 9 and his or her adoptive parent or parents died after the nonminor attained 18 years of age, but before he or she attains 21 years of age.
"(4) He or she is a nonminor who received adoption assistance payments after attaining 18 years of age pursuant to Chapter 2.1 (commencing with Section 16115) of Part 4 of Division 9 and his or her adoptive parent or parents no longer provide ongoing support to, and no longer receive benefits on behalf of, the nonminor after the nonminor attained 18 years of age, but before he or she attains 21 years of age." (§ 388.1, subd. (a)(1)-(4), italics added.)
Subdivision (b) of section 388.1 sets forth where the petition for reentry may be filed, e.g., in the juvenile court that established the guardianship. Subdivision (c)(1) of section 388.1 requires the juvenile court to "order a hearing to be held within 15 judicial days of the date the petition was filed" if a prima facie showing is made that the nonminor satisfies specified criteria. Further provisions guide the juvenile court's proceedings, culminating with the factual findings the court must make to assume jurisdiction over the nonminor (§ 388.1, subd. (c)(2)-(5)).
Given the words and structure of section 388.1, we reject S.B.'s proposed reading of the statute. S.B. reads subdivision (a) of section 388.1 as a nonexclusive list of nonminors who may petition the court for reentry, maintaining that nonminors whose funding was terminated prior to attaining 18 years of age may also file a section 388.1 petition. S.B.'s reading of the statute is refuted by the statute's plain language. The Legislature specified four detailed categories of nonminors that "may" file a petition for reentry if they received a specified form of aid after attaining 18 years of age; it is implausible the Legislature intended to allow nonminors who do not fit any of these descriptions to also be able to file a section 388.1 petition. The juvenile court's duties to order a hearing, make factual findings, and assume jurisdiction under this section, flow from an eligible petitioner's properly filed petition. The clear import of the statute is that only nonminors described in subdivision (a) of section 388.1 are eligible to file a petition for reentry under this section.
In addition, subdivision (a)(2) of section 388.1, specifically at issue in S.B.'s case, unambiguously states that the nonminor former dependent must have "received . . . aid after attaining 18 years of age" (italics added)—not prior. It is undisputed here that S.B. did not receive AFDC-FC aid after attaining 18 years of age. The court did not err in finding S.B. was not eligible to file a petition for reentry.
As enacted, subdivision (a) of section 388.1 sets out categories of nonminors who received a form of financial aid after attaining the age of majority (18), but for some reason prior to attaining the age of 21, such as the death of a guardian or adoptive parent, stopped receiving aid. Only these specified nonminors are eligible to petition the juvenile court for reentry into the foster care system under section 388.1. (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2454, Stats. 2014, ch. 769 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) ["This bill would . . . authorize a nonminor who has not attained 21 years of age to petition the court . . . if the nonminor received public assistance after attaining 18 years of age, as specified, and his or her former guardian or guardians or adoptive parent or parents no longer provide ongoing support to, and no longer receive payment on behalf of, the nonminor"]; see also Recent Court Decisions and Legislation (2015) 19 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol'y 156, 170 ["The former foster youth must be under the age of 21 and must have, after turning the age of 18, received public assistance and had their legal guardianship or adoption fail."].)
S.B. contends the juvenile court in this case was required to assume jurisdiction over her under subdivision (c)(5) of section 388.1, which subdivision does not require the court to make a finding that the nonminor received aid after attaining 18 years of age. We disagree that subdivision (c)(5) of section 388.1 may be read in isolation. As we have indicated, the juvenile court's duties under subdivision (c) of section 388.1 are triggered by a properly filed petition; the findings to be made by the court under subdivision (c) clearly presuppose the receipt of financial aid after the nonminor's attaining 18 years of age. (E.g., § 388.1, subds. (a), (c)(1)(B)(ii) [requiring prima facie showing that nonminor's guardians or adoptive parents "no longer receive[d] payment on behalf of[] the nonminor after the nonminor attained 18 years of age"].)
Our interpretation of subdivision (a) of section 388.1 is buttressed by considering the internally referenced AFDC-FC benefits statute—subdivision (e) of section 11405—which provides that a nonminor former dependent who was in a nonrelated guardianship (like S.B.) shall "remain eligible for AFDC-FC benefits . . . until the youth attains 21 years of age, provided that the youth enters into a mutual agreement with the agency responsible for [his or her] guardianship . . . ." (§ 11405, subd. (e)(1), italics added; see also § 11403, subd. (c).) Subdivision (e)(1) of section 11405 contemplates a continuation of AFDC-FC benefits to the youth after the youth's 18th birthday based on entry in a mutual agreement. As we have noted, S.B. did not (1) receive AFDC-FC benefits after her 18th birthday, (2) enter in a mutual agreement, or (3) continue living with the guardian.
We decline to second guess the manner in which our state Legislature chose to alleviate the perceived problem that gave rise to section 388.1. (See In re Jesse S. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th, 611, 617 [enactment of section 388.1 may be traced back to 2008 federal legislation, which "arose out of the widespread perception that children who have grown up in foster care have disproportionate difficulty in transitioning to adulthood"].) States sought to alleviate foster youths' challenges in transitioning to adulthood with a variety of different reentry schemes. (See Boyer, Foster Care Reentry Laws: Mending the Safety Net for Emerging Adults in the Transition to Independence (2016) 88 Temp. L. Rev. 837, 860-863.) The language selected by the Legislature in section 388.1, subdivision (a), is clear and not subject to the interpretation urged by S.B. We must abide by the plain meaning of the statute.
Likewise, in the face of plain, unambiguous statutory language, we have no need to resort to extrinsic sources for interpretation.
S.B. claims her AFDC-FC benefits were incorrectly terminated and that the Agency improperly sent notice of the action to S.B.'s legal guardian rather than S.B. Based on our review of the record, we conclude notice was reasonably sent to the guardian because the guardian had been the one caring for S.B. and the payments terminated before S.B. reached 18. Even assuming some noticing defect, there is no merit to S.B.'s claim. As of her 18th birthday, S.B. was not living in the guardian's home and was living instead at Job Corps; the termination of AFDC-FC aid to the guardian was proper. (§ 11401 [conditions for aid]; id., subd. (d) [condition of child living in nonrelated legal guardian's home].)
S.B. also claims the juvenile court exercised continuing general jurisdiction over S.B.'s guardianship under section 303, subdivision (b), which gave the court authority to grant her petition for reentry. Subdivision (b) of section 303, which section deals generally with the court's ability to retain jurisdiction over nonminors, provides the "court shall have within its jurisdiction any nonminor dependent, as defined in subdivision (v) of Section 11400." Section 11400, subdivision (v), in turn, defines "nonminor dependent" as a foster child "who is a current dependent child or ward of the juvenile court, or who is a nonminor under the transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court, as described in Section 450 . . . ." (Italics added.) When S.B. petitioned for reentry into the juvenile court system, she was not a current dependent of the court nor was she under the court's transition jurisdiction; she was thus not a nonminor dependent as defined in subdivision (v) of section 11400. Section 303 is not applicable.
In summary, the court did not err in finding that S.B. was not eligible to petition to reenter the juvenile court and foster care system under section 388.1.
II. Equitable Estoppel
S.B. additionally argues the Agency is equitably estopped from changing its position regarding S.B.'s eligibility for reentry as a nonminor former dependent. We conclude the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply.
" 'The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on notions of equity and fair dealing and provides that a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts if that person has intentionally led others to believe a particular circumstance to be true and to rely upon such belief to their detriment. . . .' ' " 'Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.' " ' " (Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537, 564-565 (Krolikowski).)
The existence of an estoppel is generally a question of fact. We review the trial court's ruling in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. (Krolikowski, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 565.)
In this case, S.B. does not state, and we do not see, how she relied on the Agency's error to her detriment. Assuming the Agency intentionally led S.B. to believe she was eligible to petition for reentry (although she was not), for over 10 months S.B. received public assistance and support services that she was not otherwise entitled to receive. S.B. understandably wishes for these services to continue but has not shown any injury by the Agency's error.
Further, other elements of equitable estoppel are missing. S.B.'s social worker did not initially know the true state of facts concerning S.B.'s eligibility; the social worker explained how funding issues are handled by a different Agency department. In addition, S.B. and the guardian told the social worker that S.B. had lived with her guardian until she was 18 years old. The Agency did not receive confirmation from Job Corps of S.B.'s enrollment date until April 2019. When the Agency discovered that S.B. was not eligible to petition for reentry, it diligently notified the court and S.B. Thus, the juvenile court did not err in allowing the Agency to show, based on later discovered information, that S.B. was not eligible to petition for reentry.
III. Section 391
S.B. lastly argues the Agency failed to comply with the requirements of section 391, which provides for a hearing to take place prior to the court's decision to terminate jurisdiction over a nonminor. "Section 391 expresses the legislative preference for retaining jurisdiction and so the statute authorizes the termination of jurisdiction in only three specific circumstances . . . ." (In re Nadia G. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118.)
However, the restrictions on terminating jurisdiction contained in section 391 apply only to a nonminor "who meets the definition of a nonminor dependent as described in subdivision (v) of Section 11400[.]" (§ 391, subd. (c)(1); In re Shannon M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 298.) As discussed in section I, ante, at the time S.B. petitioned to reenter the juvenile court system, she was not a nonminor dependent as defined in subdivision (v) of section 11400, i.e., a current dependent of the court or under the court's transition jurisdiction. It was only through an inadvertent mistake that S.B. reentered the court's jurisdiction. We are not persuaded that the restrictions on terminating jurisdiction under section 391 applied in these circumstances, where the nonminor former dependent was not ever eligible to reenter the juvenile court system.
All references and citations to section 391 are to the version in effect in 2019.
Consistent with remaining provisions of section 391, we note the Agency worked with S.B. on a transition plan months before her case was dismissed, providing her with case information, documents, and services. (§ 391, subds. (e)-(f).) The Agency's efforts were documented in its written reports and confirmed at trial. We find no basis to reverse the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. IRION, J.