Opinion
D075865
11-06-2019
In re D.T. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUBEN N. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Ruben N. Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, F.T. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor, D.T.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CJ1340A, D-G) APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael J. Popkins, Judge. Affirmed. Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Ruben N. Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, F.T. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor, D.T.
Ruben N. (Father) and F.T. (Mother) appeal from orders under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating their parental rights to twins Isaac and Isaiah (age 9), Isabelle (age 7), and Veronica (age 5). Mother also appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to D.T. (age 17). D.T. joins in Mother's and Father's arguments only as to Isaiah and Veronica. Appellants contend the juvenile court erroneously refused to apply the sibling relationship exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). We affirm the orders.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Dependency
The case initiated in September 2016 when the child abuse hotline received a call that Mother's seven children were in a relative's care while Mother disappeared for days. This case involves five of the seven children.
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency's (Agency) investigation found a lice infestation in the family home. The children were dirty, had a "strong unpleasant odor," and there were "concerns about [Mother] using drugs." The two oldest daughters, one of whom is D.T., reported that Father had sexually abused them. The family had 23 prior Agency referrals, most of which involved the children being dirty, having lice, and engaging in severe behaviors. Isabelle, then four years old, is deaf and had not been exposed to sign language. Apart from facial expressions and gesturing, she could not communicate.
Mother denied that the children were dirty and also denied drug use. Her family reported she uses crack. Mother repeatedly failed to appear for scheduled drug tests.
B. Placement
The juvenile court ordered the children detained. The Agency made "every effort" to place all the siblings together; however, this was impossible because of the number of children and each child's unique needs.
D.T. was initially placed with her paternal aunt. Isaiah and Veronica were placed together with foster parents Claude and Yvonne. Isabelle was placed with Kerri, who is fluent in American Sign Language (ASL), because no family member knew sign language. Isaac, Isaiah's twin brother, remained at Polinsky Children's Center (Polinsky) because of "behavioral issues." The juvenile court ordered reunification services for Mother and Father.
Throughout dependency, Isaiah and Veronica were in Claude and Yvonne's care. In January 2017, Isabelle was placed with Crystal, who is deaf, fluent in ASL, and would be able to expose Isabelle to ASL "non-stop." Isaac remained at Polinsky because he was assaulting staff and engaging in other serious misbehavior. By February 2017, Isaac and D.T. were placed together with their maternal aunt, Suzanne. In sum, although the Agency was unable to place the siblings together, early in dependency they were placed in pairs, except for Isabelle, who had special needs.
C. Father Is Convicted of Sexual Abuse
In March 2017, the San Diego County District Attorney charged Father with nine counts of felony sex abuse perpetrated against D.T. and her half-sister, A.B, as well as a 10th felony count of child abuse perpetrated against their 13-year-old half-brother. A jury subsequently convicted Father on all counts.
D. July 2017 Through April 2018
By July 2017, Isabelle was learning ASL, and as her communication skills improved her behavioral issues subsided. Isaac was very close to his maternal aunt and was appropriately interacting with neighborhood children, although still misbehaving at school.
In early 2018, Isaac's behavior continued improving and Isabelle's ability to communicate in ASL was rapidly expanding. Although living in three separate homes, the five siblings visited each other at least once a month.
In April 2018, the Agency noted that Mother had only "sporadic contact" with the children. Mother had not participated in parenting education class since July 2017, nor in substance abuse treatment since December 2016. Mother was terminated from the dependency drug court program due to her excessive absences. Finding that Mother's and Father's "progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating the children's placement had been minimal," the court terminated reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing (the .26 hearing).
Father filed a petition for a writ of mandate, challenging the order setting the .26 hearing, which this court denied in R.N. v. Superior Court (June 22, 2018, D073841) [nonpub. opn.].
E. The .26 Hearing
1. Introduction
Adoption necessarily involves terminating the natural parents' legal rights to the child. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 574 (Autumn H.).) Once the court determines the child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the person challenging adoption to show that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions to adoption in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 553.)
Under the sibling relationship exception to adoption, terminating parental rights would be detrimental where it causes "substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, [1] whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) "The purpose of this exception is to preserve long-standing sibling relationships that serve as 'anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.' " (In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 437 (Isaiah S.).)
2. The Agency's Case
By the time of the .26 hearing, the children had continued doing well in their placements. D.T., now 16 years old, successfully completed her sophomore year in high school and aspired to attend college. Isaac had developed good relationships with adults. Although he continued struggling with impulsive behaviors, those were happening less frequently, and he was near grade level in most subjects. Isaiah received an award for outstanding academic achievement in second grade. Isabelle "flourished" since being placed with Crystal. Veronica's needs in communication, fine motor skills, and emotional behavior had now been addressed.
Sibling visits were occurring about twice each month. D.T. enjoyed the visits and looked forward to them. Isaac too enjoyed the visits, especially playing with Isaiah. Isaiah and Veronica were excited to see their siblings and upset when the visits ended.
In her October 2018 report, social worker Florence Keitel recommended a permanent plan of adoption for all five children. The children's caregivers all wanted to adopt, and the children wanted to be adopted. Isaiah pointed to a "super happy face" emoji to describe his desire to be adopted by Claude and Yvonne. Although Isaiah wished that Isaac could be adopted by them too, he was "consistent about his desire to be adopted by his foster parents, knowing that Isaac would not be adopted by [them]." Veronica used the happy face emoji to express her feelings about being adopted by Claude and Yvonne. When asked how she felt about being separated from her siblings, she again pointed to the happy face. Isabelle stated she wanted to live with Crystal "forever." D.T. was initially undecided about her adoption; however, at the .26 hearing, she wanted Suzanne to adopt her. Isaac was ambivalent about adoption. However, Isaac has never said that he does not want to be adopted, nor has he expressed unhappiness in his placement with Suzanne.
In her October 2018 report, Keitel opined that the benefits of adoption far outweighed any detriment to the sibling relationships:
"Even though these siblings are close and they enjoy each other's company, the sibling exception does not outweigh the benefits of adoption. For nearly the past two years, these siblings have lived with only one or none of their siblings. Despite being separated from their siblings, they have done relatively well as demonstrated by improved performance in school and being able to develop meaningful relationships with the caregivers' families. . . . [¶] All five of these children deserve safety and stability, after living through neglect, abuse, and instability. . . . Adoption with their respective caregivers allows the children to continue to have a sense of security, which is very important for the children's overall well-being."
Keitel noted that "[a]ll of the caregivers for the children reported that they would be open to having continued sibling contact, even after adoption finalizes." Elaborating on future sibling visits, Keitel stated:
"[A]ll the caregivers have stated they are willing to allow the siblings to have contact with each other post-adoption. In particular, this worker has emphasized the importance of sibling contact with Isaiah and Veronica's caregivers, given [D.T.'s] concerns.[] Isaiah and Veronica's caregivers have stated they want all the children to continue to have contact . . . ."
D.T. opposed adoption for Veronica and Isaiah because she feared that Claude and Yvonne would not allow sibling visits.
Claude and Yvonne agreed to "to put in writing what sibling contact would look like, post-adoption." Isabelle's caretaker, Crystal, as well as Suzanne, who was foster parenting D.T. and Isaac, similarly agreed. Further addressing the sibling bond exception, Keitel explained:
"In assessing the relationship between [D.T.] and Veronica, it does not appear that adoption would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. . . . [D.T.] would like for her and Veronica to live in the same home, but Veronica does not feel the same. Veronica stated . . . that she is not sad that she does not live with D.T. (or any of her other siblings who are separated from her). Furthermore, Veronica wants to be adopted by her current caregivers, whom she has lived with for a significant portion of her life.
"As for the relationship between [D.T.] and Isabelle, it appears that the two have a mutual affection for each other. . . . Nevertheless, D.T. is supportive of Isabelle being adopted by her current caregiver and it does not appear that adoption would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship.
"As for the relationship between [D.T.] and Isaiah, the two appear to have a good relationship with each other. . . . [D.T.] would like it if Isaiah was placed in the same home as her. However, Isaiah does not feel the same way. He stated that he is not sad that he does not live with all of his siblings. . . . More importantly, Isaiah very much wants to be adopted by his caregivers.
[¶] . . . [¶]
"As for the sibling relationship between Isaiah and Isaac, their relationship does not appear to be significant enough to outweigh the benefits of adoption. Isaac rated his closeness to Isaiah at a '5' (on a scale of 1-10), while Isaiah stated that Isaac is his 'next least favorite sibling.'
[¶] . . . [¶]
"As for the sibling relationship between Isaiah and Isabelle, they appear to have a good relationship but the relationship does not outweigh the benefits of adoption for the both of them. Since being
separated, both children have done well in their respective placements, even though they do not live together.
"In assessing the sibling relationship between Isabelle and Veronica, they appear to have a good relationship, but the relationship does not outweigh the benefits of adoption for the both of them. Isabelle loves her siblings equally (again, with the exception of [D.T], who she indicated is her 'favorite'). Veronica lists Isabelle as one of her favorite siblings. Isabelle and Veronica lived together prior to being removed at age 4 for Isabelle and age 3 for Veronica. In spite of being separated, the two children have done well living apart from each other.
"As for the relationship between Isabelle and Isaac, Isabelle loves Isaac and Isaac rated h[is] closeness to Isabelle at a '6' (on a scale of 1-10). Isaac will often show interest in learning ASL in order to communicate with Isabelle. The two have had the opportunity to spend more time together, as Isabelle's caregiver will take Isabelle to visit Isaac's home whenever Isaac's caregiver invites her over. Despite all this, adoption would not substantially interfere with the sibling relationship."
The court received the cited Agency reports in evidence without objection.
Isaiah, Veronica, and Isabelle testified by stipulated written submissions. Isaiah refers to his foster parents as "mom" and "dad," and he and Veronica want to live with them. Isabelle stated that she wanted to live with Crystal "until I am 18 because she loves me." Asked, "Do you wish you could see [Isaac, Isaiah and Veronica] more? Isabelle answered, "I see them with Crystal" during visits.
The siblings visit at least once, and often two or three times each month, and the foster parents promised to continue visits after adoption. Isaiah and Veronica are very close with D.T., "who basically raised them." Isaiah and Isaac have a "great time" playing together and are "inseparable" when playing at the park. The children were sad when visits ended; however, that was because play ended, not because they were returning to their respective placements.
By the time of the .26 hearing in May 2019, the twins had not lived together for over two years. Although Isaac still had behavioral issues, those existed even before dependency. Keitel concluded, therefore, that Isaac's struggles are not due to separation from his siblings.
In sum, although the children have "a fair amount of shared experiences," Keitel opined there would not be any significant interference with sibling relationships upon termination of parental rights.
3. Mother's Case
Mother testified that the twins lived together, sleeping in the same crib, going to school, and playing for the first six years of their lives. She believes that separating the twins is detrimental; they are "sad" when visits end. She doubted the foster parents would continue sibling visits after adoption.
4. The Ruling
After finding it likely that the children will be adopted, the court turned to what it described as the "crux" of the case—the sibling relationship exception. Tracking section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), the court stated:
"Let's not forget why this case came here in the first place. Original case was due to chronic neglect and sexual abuse of the children. They were dirty and foul smelling. Mom would leave them alone with relatives for days without anyone knowing where they were. She was using drugs, and the children were sexually molested by Dad, and that was the shared experience that these children had.
"In addition to that, the testimony here from [D.T.] was that she was changing diapers, she was feeding the twins, and taking care of them. This isn't [D.T.] today when she's 17 years old. This is [D.T.] when she was 8 years old doing this, which tells you that the shared experiences [are] not so rosy as it was presented."
Noting the benefits of adoption for each child, the court explained:
"Isaac and [D.T.] are doing [] great with maternal aunt. Isabelle, who has her issues that need to be dealt with, is doing great right now with her caregiver. And Veronica and Isaiah, I think their testimony shows that they're so happy being where they are."
The court rejected D.T.'s contention that Isaiah and Veronica should be placed with her in Suzanne's care, explaining:
"And I understand that [D.T.] wants the children to be with the maternal aunt, with her and Isaac, but they don't want to be there. They were specifically asked that. They didn't want to go there. They want to stay where they are."
Additionally, the court found Claude's promise to continue sibling visits after adoption was "extremely credible," stating:
"I think this all comes down to the fact that nobody trusts [Claude]. That's the bottom line. Nobody trusts that he's going to keep the visitation and I don't buy that. . . . And I found him to be extremely credible."
Finding that the children are "all happy in their current locations" and would "do great," the court determined the benefits of adoption "far outweigh" the sibling relationship, "but the sibling relationship is going to continue anyway notwithstanding that." Accordingly, the court ruled that (1) none of the circumstances described in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) exist; and (2) it is in the children's best interest to be adopted. The court terminated parental rights and referred the children to the Agency for adoption.
DISCUSSION
I. THE JUVENILE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE SIBLING RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY
A. The Sibling Relationship Exception
In analyzing the sibling relationship exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), the juvenile court first determines whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. If so, the court then balances the child's best interest in continuing that relationship against benefits the child would receive by the permanency of adoption. (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 173-174 (D.O.).)
" '[T]he sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a 'compelling reason' for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be 'detrimental' to the child due to 'substantial interference' with a sibling relationship." ' (In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 823 (Naomi P.).) This exception will be applied "rare[ly], particularly when the proceedings concern young children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount." (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.) If the court finds the sibling relationship exception applicable, it must select legal guardianship or long-term foster care rather than adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).)
B. The Standard of Review
"We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the court's factual findings regarding the applicability of the sibling relationship exception, 'and the abuse of discretion standard to the court's weighing of competing interests.' " (Isaiah S., supra, at p. 438.) We are bound by the juvenile court's credibility determinations. (In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1363.) The evidence must be considered "in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
C. Analysis
The court correctly determined that the sibling relationship exception is inapplicable. The statute's threshold requirement is a finding that adoption would cause "substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship . . . ." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. There is substantial evidence that such is the case here. Despite being separated from their siblings, the children were doing well—demonstrated by improved performance in school and meaningful relationships with their foster families. Moreover, the children's own statements belie any claim of detriment. Veronica stated she is not sad about living apart from her other siblings. Isaac rated his closeness to Isaiah as a "5" on a scale of 1 to 10, and the feeling was mutual: Isaac is one of Isaiah's least favorite siblings. Isaiah wants to be adopted by Claude and Yvonne, despite knowing they would not adopt Isaac. Isabelle is happy visiting her siblings and does not wish to see them more often.
Moreover, just as they had done during dependency, the foster parents promised to encourage and continue facilitating sibling visits. The juvenile court properly relied on this evidence in finding that terminating parental rights would not substantially interfere with the siblings' relationships. (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 175 [court may consider assurances of continued sibling visits in determining whether there will be substantial interference with sibling relationship].)
In any event, even if the evidence compelled a finding that adoption would cause substantial interference with sibling relationships, the juvenile court's orders would still have to be affirmed. The second prong of the exception requires the court to balance whether "ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) In applying this part of the statute, the court "must balance the beneficial interest of the child in maintaining the sibling relationship, which might leave the child in a tenuous guardianship or foster home placement, against the sense of security and belonging adoption and a new home would confer." (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951 (L.Y.L.).)
The juvenile court properly exercised its discretion by weighing these factors and determining the balance tilts decisively in favor of adoption. By the time of the .26 hearing, the children had spent more than two years in foster care with their future adoptive parents. The children thrived under their foster parents' care:
• D.T. aspired to attend college.
• Isabelle was communicating well with sign language.
• Isaac, who at the onset of dependency answered the social worker's questions with "fuck you"—had now developed good relationships with adults and his impulsive misbehaviors were diminishing.
• Veronica's emotional needs were now addressed.
• Isaiah was achieving in school.
The children's compelling need was for the stability and permanence provided by their foster families. Failing to terminate parental rights would have deprived the children of the permanent home their caregivers were prepared to provide. Although the siblings' interactions were mostly loving, playful, and nurturing, the court reasonably could determine that their long-term emotional and developmental interests were better served by the permanency of adoption rather than constant sibling contact. In rare cases, a close relationship between siblings is a sufficient reason to preclude terminating parental rights of an otherwise adoptable child. This is not the rare case.
D. Appellants' Contentions
Disagreeing with this analysis, Mother contends the court erred because "[t]he undisputed evidence demonstrated these five minors loved each other, wanted to remain in contact and have continued, regular visitation." Father makes the same argument, asserting that strong sibling bonds "abounded." D.T. joins in these arguments as to Isaiah and Veronica.
The Agency contends that D.T. lacks standing to assert these arguments. It is unnecessary to address D.T.'s standing because Mother has standing and D.T. merely joins in Mother's arguments. --------
These arguments fail because the existence of a strong loving sibling bond is not the test under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). The sibling relationship exception only applies where a "compelling reason" exists for concluding that terminating parental rights would be "detrimental" to the child due to "substantial interference" with a sibling relationship. (Naomi P., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination—as the juvenile court found here based on substantial evidence—there is no substantial interference with that relationship.
Mother also contends that terminating parental rights will cause substantial interference with the sibling relationships because the children would benefit from more visits. However, the juvenile court was not required as a matter of law to apply the sibling bond exception because the children enjoy seeing each other and would benefit from additional visits. (In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 292-293.)
In a related argument, Mother contends the sibling relationship exception applies as between D.T. and Isabelle because they share a close and loving relationship. However, the evidence Mother cites indicates a sibling relationship exists—but says nothing about the detriment, if any, that each child would suffer if that relationship were substantially interfered with, or whether that detriment would outweigh the benefits of the stability and permanence of adoption. (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 177.) Moreover, despite the close sibling relationship, D.T. testified that she was "okay with Crystal adopting Isabelle." D.T. concedes the same point in her appellate brief. Isabelle, despite her bond with D.T., states she wants to be adopted by Crystal.
Mother and Father also contend the court was required to apply the sibling exception because Isaiah felt "sad" being separated from his siblings and wanted his twin, Isaac, to be adopted with him. However, sadness from ending a sibling relationship is insufficient to show the requisite detriment. (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) Moreover, Isaiah stated he does not miss living with his siblings and wants to be adopted by his foster parents, even if that separates him from Isaac.
Mother also challenges the juvenile court's finding that the children's strongest shared experiences were the squalor, drug use, and sexual abuse they suffered while in parents' home. She states the children celebrated holidays and birthdays together, D.T.'s "happiest" memories were taking care of the twins as babies, and Isaac drew his "permanency house" to include his parents and siblings. Mother also states the children "had trouble" separating at the end of their visits. Father makes a similar argument, asserting the court erred in not recognizing the children's significant shared experiences.
These arguments are untenable. The question on appeal is not whether there was substantial evidence to support a different order. The relevant question is whether substantial evidence supports the order actually made. (Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 207.) Mother and Father's arguments ignore substantial evidence that the siblings' joint history was one of neglect, trauma, and sexual abuse by Father.
Father additionally contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in crediting Claude's testimony that he would ensure future sibling visits. Father asserts that Claude "did not get along" with other foster parents, some visits had not occurred as scheduled, and there was a "legitimate" concern whether sibling visitation would continue.
These are reasonable credibility arguments to make in the juvenile court, but are unavailing on appeal. The juvenile court is the trier of fact and the sole judge of a witness's credibility. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373.) The juvenile court credited Claude's testimony, stating:
"I heard the man on the stand. I had a chance to observe his testimony, listen to what he had to say under oath, and more importantly, just look at his demeanor. And I found him to be extremely credible. [¶] He specifically says he wants the children to continue to visit with each other, and I believe that he will follow through with that. I have no doubt that the children will not be in a situation where they are never going to see each other ever again."As a reviewing court, we do not second guess the trier of fact's credibility determinations. (In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733.)
Father further contends that the court abused its discretion in balancing ongoing sibling contact against the benefits of adoption. He cites evidence that the children did not want visits to end, Isabelle was very affectionate towards D.T., and the social worker described the twins as best friends who would run to each other and hug when the saw each other.
The children certainly had a sibling bond, and ongoing contact between them would be beneficial. However, the caregivers' credible promise to encourage and facilitate post-adoption sibling visits lessened the risk of detriment. (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 176.) Although the record shows the siblings' love for each other and desire to remain in contact, there is no evidence that separate placement is so harmful or so deprives them of benefit that the preference for adoption is overridden. Their various and considerable difficulties were related to the chaos and trauma associated with their home life before dependency. They made progress during the dependency and continued to do so when they were separated. Notwithstanding their separation, all five children were doing well in their respective adoptive placements. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in terminating parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. HUFFMAN, J.