Opinion
D077632
02-26-2021
In re Sa.S., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.S., et al., Defendants and Appellants, M.S., Jr., a Minor, etc., Appellant.
Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.S. Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.S., Sr. Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor and Appellant M.S., Jr. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. EJ4235B-D) APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Browder A. Willis, Judge. Affirmed. Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.S. Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.S., Sr. Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor and Appellant M.S., Jr. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
J.S. (Mother), and M.S., Sr., (Father) appeal orders terminating their parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for their two daughters, Sa.S. and Sc.S. They are joined by M.S., Jr., (Brother), who likewise challenges the termination of parental rights to the extent it affects his sibling relationship with his sisters. Joining in each other's arguments, appellants contend the juvenile court erred by terminating parental rights after finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship and sibling relationship exceptions to adoption did not apply. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), (v).) They also challenge the denial of Mother's section 388 petition to return her daughters to her care and reinstate her reunification services based on a change in circumstances. We conclude that the juvenile court did not err in making these rulings and therefore affirm.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
"In accord with the usual rules on appeal, we state the facts in the manner most favorable to the dependency court's order." (In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1448, fn. 1.)
In January 2018, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b), on behalf of Mother's four children: 15-year-old A.G., 12-year-old M.S., Jr., 8-year-old Sa.S., and 6-year-old Sc.S. The Agency alleged that Mother was unable to provide a suitable home for the children due in part to a mental health condition.
The proceedings as to A.G. and M.S., Jr. are not a subject of this appeal other than in relation to Sa.S. and Sc.S. Accordingly, we do not discuss those proceedings beyond the issues relating to the girls.
As discussed in the detention report, the children were living with Mother and the biological father of A.G. Father, the biological father of M.S., Jr., Sa.S. and Sc.S., lived in Ohio. The Agency received a report in late 2017 that the children were attending school wearing clothes covered in animal feces and were alienated from the other students due to their strong odor. Efforts to provide clean clothes for the children and other items failed to resolve the cleanliness issues.
A social worker visited the home in January 2018 after receiving additional reports regarding the apparent neglect of the children. He observed the floor was covered in dog feces and clothing and the kitchen was full of gnats, dirty dishes, moldy food, and rotten meat. The children and A.G.'s father told the social worker that Mother had left to live at a friend's home while she recovered from a recent stroke. The social worker also learned that the children often had to ask neighbors for food and had a poor attendance record at school. On a later date, it was discovered that Mother was failing to take M.S., Jr., to scheduled appointments with a cardiologist to treat a heart condition. When questioned, Mother informed the Agency she had post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression arising from her prior relationship with Father that included "severe domestic violence."
Based on this information, the juvenile court found that the Agency had made an adequate showing that the children were persons described by section 300, subdivision (b), and ordered them detained in out-of-home care.
In its initial jurisdiction report filed in February 2018, the Agency noted that A.G. and M.S., Jr. were detained at Polinsky Children's Center and the girls were placed together in a foster home. Mother was unwilling to cooperate with the Agency and failed to attend meetings to discuss the proceedings. The Agency contacted Father, who informed the Agency that he had recently been released from incarceration in Ohio and was currently participating in a domestic violence rehabilitation program. None of the parents had visited the children since their detention.
In an addendum report, the Agency explained that Mother repeatedly failed to appear for scheduled drug tests. She was making only sporadic telephone calls to her daughters and had informed the children she was moving to Ohio. By April 2018, Mother had left the state and would not return phone calls or text messages from Agency personnel. The social worker also noted that at the first visit between the siblings, both older brothers quickly asked to end the visit because their sisters were "bugging them and they wanted to leave."
At the children's jurisdiction and disposition hearing in May 2018, the allegations of the petition under section 300, subdivision (b) were sustained. The court ordered reunification services for the parents; it placed A.G. and M.S., Jr. at the San Pasqual Academy and the girls in a foster home.
In advance of the six-month review hearing, the Agency reported that Mother was now living in Ohio, where she was homeless, had not participated in any services, and was only occasionally speaking with the children. Meanwhile, the girls were thriving in their foster home placement. They often expressed that they did not want to talk to Mother for their scheduled phone visits. Although sibling visits continued, on one such visit Sa.S. alleged that A.G. molested her and all contact between A.G. and the girls was suspended. At the six-month review hearing, the court continued the children's current placement and ordered reunification services to continue for another six months.
In its next review report, the Agency noted that Mother came back to San Diego to visit the children in January 2019. After the visit, Sa.S. had nightmares. Mother then cancelled subsequent visits in February and March. While living in Ohio, Mother did not have a stable home and was unemployed. The social worker reported that Mother was making little to no progress on the goals in her case plan. During this period, the girls continued to thrive in their foster placement and repeatedly expressed that they wanted to be adopted. The foster parents remained interested in adoption and reported to a social worker that they were open to continuing to support the sibling relationship between the girls and M.S., Jr.
Toward the end of spring, Mother had found housing and was beginning to make some progress on her case plan. She travelled to San Diego again in May 2019, but Sa.S. refused to meet with her. Although Mother had frequent phone visits with the girls, the girls often expressed they did not want to talk to her and told her they did not want to live with her. Mother later failed to take advantage of several offers by the Agency to arrange travel to San Diego to visit the children.
A contested 12-month review hearing, which was combined with an 18-month review hearing due to repeated continuances, concluded in October 2019. The juvenile court found that the Agency provided reasonable services, but that parents made only "minimal to some progress" that was "too little, too late." The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
Thereafter, the Agency recommended that the court terminate parental rights and find the girls to be adoptable. In an assessment report, the social worker acknowledged Mother's "sporadic" visits with the girls and that the girls generally enjoyed spending time with Mother, but they also frequently refused to visit with Mother and unequivocally stated their interest in being adopted. The girls told social workers that they did not feel safe while in Mother's care and did not trust Mother to protect them. Regarding the relationship between the girls and M.S., Jr., the social worker noted that M.S., Jr. often missed visits, but that the girls enjoyed the visits and expressed interest in continuing the relationship. The girls consistently told the social worker that they wanted to be adopted even if it ended their relationship with M.S., Jr. Similarly, they did not include their brothers when asked who they wanted to live with in the future. The social worker opined that the benefits of adoption outweighed any detriment that might be caused by termination of the girls' relationships with their family members.
In a final addendum report filed immediately before the hearing, the Agency noted that since the last report, Sc.S. refused to visit Mother on every occasion and Sa.S. refused on one occasion. The girls continued to reiterate their interest in adoption even if it interfered with their family relationships. The social worker noted that the girls' foster parents remained willing to maintain the relationship between the girls and M.S., Jr.
Less than a month before the section 366.26 hearing, Mother filed a petition pursuant to section 388 to either reinstate reunification services or return the girls to the care of Mother and Father. Mother stated she had reconciled with Father and was sharing an apartment with him. She asserted that she had continued to make progress and was stabilizing her mental health.
Father filed his own petition pursuant to section 388 presenting similar arguments. The juvenile court denied Father's petition, but because he does not challenge the trial court's ruling in regard to his own petition, we do not discuss it.
Before the selection and implementation hearing, the court first considered Mother's section 388 petition. The juvenile court found Mother's petition did not establish a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. The court noted the "22 months of efforts" coupled with the strong desire of the girls to move forward with adoption in finding that the alleged changed circumstances did not support a change in orders.
M.S., Jr., also filed a section 388 petition asking to participate in the section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court granted M.S., Jr.'s petition.
At the selection and implementation hearing, the parties submitted stipulated testimony from the social worker, both parents, M.S., Jr., Sc.S., and Sa.S. Mother's testimony, submitted in the form of a letter, discussed her participation in parenting classes. She stated that her bond with her children was "unbreakable" and that she believed both girls wanted to "come home." Mother asserted she was being separated from her children due to "false accusations" and suggested the children were being manipulated by their foster parents. Regarding the relationship between the children, she stated that they were all "close" and that it was not "fair" to her sons to be separated from her daughters.
The social worker stated that although the girls enjoyed visiting with M.S., Jr., they never asked for visits and showed no distress when he failed to attend scheduled visits. She reiterated that the prospective adoptive parents never objected to visits between the siblings and indicated they would allow visits to continue if they adopted the girls. The social worker denied that the girls were being manipulated or coached and confirmed that the girls had never expressed interest in returning to Mother's care. Both Sc.S. and Sa.S. suggested they would suffer no significant detriment if they could not live with M.S., Jr. or see him again. On his own behalf, M.S., Jr. stated that he would be "sad and mad" if he could not see his sisters, but "wouldn't really care" if he could not live with them.
After considering the stipulated testimony and hearing argument from counsel and additional statements from Sa.S. and the parents, the court found that the girls were adoptable and that none of the exceptions to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) applied. Regarding Mother's relationship with the girls, the court found that "[c]learly mother loves her daughters, her children." However, the court concluded that "when I look at the facts and I look at the reports that have been presented, it is that qualitative history that is lacking, and that hasn't risen to the level to create the parent-bond exception that would override the benefit of the safety and security that [Sa.S.] and [Sc.S.] have grown accustomed to over the last couple of years and that they have, quite simply, expressed time and time again that their level of happiness now rests with the caregivers." Regarding the relationship between M.S., Jr., and the girls, the court concluded while they "[c]ertainly . . . have shared experiences" as siblings, the relationship was a "standard" sibling relationship that did not rise to the level to establish a sibling-bond relationship that outweighs the benefits of adoption. Accordingly, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that adoption was the best permanent plan and terminated parental rights of both Mother and Father.
Mother, Father, and M.S., Jr. appealed.
Mother's notice of appeal references both the order denying her section 388 petition and the order terminating her parental rights. Mother's notice of appeal also referenced the termination of her parental rights as to M.S., Jr., but she raises no challenge to that order on appeal and therefore has abandoned any claims in regard to M.S., Jr.
DISCUSSION
1. Mother's Section 388 Modification Petition
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her petition filed pursuant to section 388 to modify the girls' placement by returning them to her care or, alternatively, to reinstate reunification services. Under section 388, a parent may petition the juvenile court to change, modify, or set aside a previous order on grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. The petitioning parent bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that there is new evidence or changed circumstances that make a change in placement in the best interests of the child. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) "After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability . . . .' [Citation] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child." (Ibid.)
Father joins in Mother's argument.
A juvenile court must construe a section 388 petition liberally and " 'if the petition presents any evidence that a hearing would promote the best interests of the child, the court will order the hearing.' " (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415; In re Heather P. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 886, 891.) "The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition." (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) The petitioning party must show changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the children. (Ibid.) If the petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing as to each of these elements, the court may deny the petition without a hearing. (Ibid.)
"In considering whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing, the juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. [Citation.] The court may consider factors such as the seriousness of the reason leading to the child's removal, the reason the problem was not resolved, the passage of time since the child's removal, the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made sooner. [Citation.] In assessing the best interests of the child, 'a primary consideration . . . is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.' " (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616.)
As Mother acknowledges, we review the juvenile court's decision under the abuse of discretion standard of review. (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 460 (Angel B.).) A proper exercise of discretion is " 'not a capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion, guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles . . . to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law, and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.' [Citations.]" (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1066.) Exercises of discretion must be " 'grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.' [Citations.]" (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) Thus, although the abuse of discretion standard is deferential, "it is not empty." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162.) The standard "asks in substance whether the ruling in question 'falls outside the bounds of reason' under the applicable law and the relevant facts. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
Mother contends that her recent progress, as evidenced by her participation in programs to address her mental health, substance abuse, and the domestic violence involving Father, combined with her newly-stable housing situation and positive visits with the girls, constituted a change in circumstances warranting reconsideration of the girls' placement or resumption of reunification services. She further contends it would be in her daughters' best interests to return the girls to her care because "they were bonded, the girls expressed their desire to return home, and they could be raised by their biological parents and remain a family with their siblings."
Accepting as true all of Mother's contentions regarding her progress in obtaining services, her other assertions are entirely contradicted by the evidence and do not support a change in the girls' placement. Mother made no effort to explain why her participation in services did not start sooner. Although she cited her relationship with Father as a positive benefit of returning the children to her care, Mother ignored that she was living with Father despite a no-contact order between them in Ohio based on the prior domestic violence that led to Father's incarceration. An evaluation by a case worker in Ohio determined Mother was "unable or unwilling to protect her children, and it was not in the children's best interest" to return them to her care. Additionally, throughout the proceeding, the girls expressed their fear in returning to Mother's care and their strong desire to be adopted by their foster parents. At the hearing on Mother's section 388 petition, 11-year-old Sa.S. stated that "I just really want my happiness, to stay with my foster parents."
The juvenile court considered the entire history of the case and concluded that even if Mother had demonstrated some changed circumstances based on her recent progress in services after failing to participate earlier, she failed to allege any facts that would establish it was in the girls' best interests to return to her care or to reinstate reunification services. Mother's section 388 petition—filed over two years after the children were removed from her care—requested a change in placement that would completely undermine the girls' need for stability and permanency. Accordingly, the court's denial of Mother's section 388 petition did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 2. The Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
Mother asserts the court erred in selecting adoption as the permanent plan for the girls following the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26. She does not contest the girls' adoptability, but rather contends the trial court erred in finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to a finding of adoptability does not apply here. We disagree.
In his own brief, Father joins in Mother's argument regarding the beneficial parent-child relationship as applied to Mother.
As we have already noted in discussing Mother's section 388 petition, the termination of reunification services changes the focus of the dependency process, shifting it to the children's need for permanency and stability. " 'A section 366.26 hearing . . . is a hearing specifically designed to select and implement a permanent plan for the child.' [Citation.] It is designed to protect children's 'compelling rights . . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child.' " (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52-53 (Celine R.).)
If the court determines the child is likely to be adopted, the court must terminate parental rights unless the court determines that termination would be detrimental due to the existence of one or more circumstances recognized by statute. (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) "The specified statutory circumstances—actually, exceptions to the general rule that the court must choose adoption where possible—'must be considered in view of the legislative preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed.' [Citation.] At this stage of the dependency proceedings, 'it becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home.' [Citation.] The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption." (Id. at p. 53.)
Mother contends the court should have recognized the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, declined to terminate her parental rights, and instead selected an alternative permanent plan. The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies where "[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent bears the burden of showing the exception applies. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529 (J.C.).) "We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child." (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 (Anthony B.).)
Mother asserts this court should apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (See, e.g., In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).) We believe the hybrid standard of review is correct for the reasons stated in J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pages 530-531, and we need not add our voice to the discussion surrounding the proper standard in this instance. This issue is currently pending in the California Supreme Court in In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, review granted July 24, 2019, S255839. Our conclusion in this case would be the same under either of these standards.
The first element that must be established under the beneficial relationship exception requires a showing that the parent maintained regular visitation and contact with the child. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The juvenile court did not make an express finding as to this element, and the parties disagree regarding whether the evidence supports a finding that Mother maintained regular visitation and contact with the girls in the months preceding the section 366.26 hearing. But we do not have to resolve this dispute because we conclude that even if Mother's visits were sufficiently consistent, we see no error by the juvenile court in finding she failed to show the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship.
"To overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of the natural parent's rights, the parent must show that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed. [Citations.] A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent. [Citation.] A child who has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree, but that does not meet the child's need for a parent." (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)
"A parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. [Citation.] 'Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child . . . . The relationship arises from the day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.' [Citation.] The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment between child and parent." (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) "A friendly relationship . . . 'is simply not enough to outweigh the sense of security and belonging an adoptive home would provide.' " (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 938.) "While the exact nature of the kind of parent/child relationship which must exist to trigger the application of the statutory exception to terminating parental rights is not defined in the statute, the relationship must be such that the child would suffer detriment from its termination." (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 467.)
The juvenile court found that Mother did not have a beneficial parent-child relationship with the girls. Mother contends otherwise, pointing to the evidence in the record suggesting that the visits were "warm and loving" and that she "engaged in age-appropriate activities and was always fully prepared for the visits with snacks and activities." Apparently in recognition that the girls did not express that they wanted to return to Mother's care, Mother correctly notes that children "[a]t their age . . . are not empowered to make [the choice to end their familial ties] for themselves."
Neither the Agency nor the juvenile court disputed that Mother and her daughters had a generally loving relationship and enjoyed each other's company. As the juvenile court noted, "[c]learly, Mother loves her daughters." This, however, is not enough to satisfy the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) While there was some measure of benefit to the girls arising from their relationship with Mother, the evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that it was not a sufficiently significant and beneficial relationship.
But even assuming Mother established the existence of a positive parent-child relationship, she has not shown that the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding that the termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the girls because the benefits of that relationship outweighed the benefits of adoption. Rather than suffering while separated from Mother, the girls were thriving in their placement with a foster family and repeatedly expressed their unequivocal preference for adoption. As expressed by the social worker, "[t]hroughout the case, [Sa.S.] and [Sc.S.] have continue[d] to verbalize their desire to be adopted and provided with permanency. [The girls] continue to thrive in a stable and permanent environment. They have stated that they feel safe, loved, and nurtured in the home of their caregivers. Additionally, the caregivers have stated that they love the girls and want to provide permanency through adoption." These statements, combined with the other evidence in the record, support the trial court's determination. Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the bond between Mother and Sa.S. and Sc.S. was not of such a quality that maintaining that relationship would outweigh the benefits of adoption. Mother has not shown that the court abused its discretion by finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply. 3. The Beneficial Sibling Relationship Exception
Father and M.S., Jr., also challenge the juvenile court's finding that the beneficial sibling relationship exception does not apply. This exception to adoption applies where the court concludes "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, [1] whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) The parent bears the burden in the juvenile court of showing the exception applies. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 949 (L.Y.L.).)
Mother joins in this argument.
Although any sibling relationship necessarily involves two or more siblings, a court considering the exception must focus its analysis on the child being considered for adoption, not the other siblings. (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54.) "The court is specifically directed to consider the best interests of the adoptive child, not the siblings, and must ultimately determine whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child, not the siblings." (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.) " 'The author of the legislation adding the sibling relationship exception anticipated that "use of the new exception 'will likely be rare,' " meaning "that the child's relationship with his or her siblings would rarely be sufficiently strong to outweigh the benefits of adoption." ' " (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 174 (D.O.).)
Application of the sibling relationship exception requires a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 173.) Second, if the court determines termination would substantially interfere with the relationship, it must then " 'weigh the child's best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption.' " (Id. at pp. 173-174.)
"To the extent appellants challenge the juvenile court's ultimate determination, we apply the substantial evidence standard to the juvenile court's underlying factual determinations, and the abuse of discretion standard to the court's weighing of competing interests." (D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 174; see also Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.)
M.S., Jr. asserts this court should apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (See, e.g., L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) As discussed ante, we believe the hybrid standard of review is correct for the reasons stated in J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 503. Regardless, our conclusion in this case would be the same under either of these standards. --------
The trial court found that the girls and M.S., Jr. did not have a beneficial sibling relationship that outweighed the benefits of adoption. Appellants argue otherwise, pointing to the evidence in the record establishing the loving relationship between M.S., Jr., and his sisters.
We conclude the court did not err in concluding that the sibling relationship exception did not apply. Most importantly, even if we accept the existence of a strong bond between the siblings, our focus must be on whether the evidence supports a finding that adoption would lead to a "substantial interference" with that relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) The evidence introduced in the juvenile court establishes that the termination of parental rights would not substantially interfere with the sibling relationship because the girls' current caregivers repeatedly expressed they were willing to maintain the relationship between the girls and M.S., Jr., even after adoption.
On appeal, M.S., Jr., and Father rely on the fact that M.S., Jr., expressed that he does not like the foster parents, and suggest his dislike would interfere with future visits. However, his expression of dislike was focused on whether he wanted to be adopted by the same caregivers. His dislike of the caregivers did not prevent past visits and he indicated he believed he would continue to visit his sisters so long as he did not have to "deal too much with the foster parents." Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that future visits would surpass M.S., Jr.'s threshold of "too much" involvement with those caregivers. Moreover, even if the girls were not adopted because the court found one of the exceptions to adoption applied, nothing in the record suggests that the girls would not continue to live with their current caregivers. Thus, M.S., Jr.'s feelings toward them was largely irrelevant to the court's decision regarding adoption.
Appellants also rely on a statement in an Agency report that the caregivers were "worried about how contact with brothers would be facilitated." Nothing in this record, however, suggests that this concern would lead to an unwillingness to maintain the sibling relationship. The foster parents can simultaneously be "worried" about visits while committing to continue the visits. The appellants bore the burden of showing the sibling relationship could not be maintained if parental rights were terminated. (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 949.) Other than mere speculation that M.S., Jr., may refuse to visit or that the caregivers will abandon their commitment to continue visits, the appellants do not point to any evidence to meet their burden to demonstrate a substantial interference with the sibling relationship.
Moreover, even if the juvenile court erred in determining there would be no substantial interference with the sibling relationship, we see no error in the court's finding that the benefits of adoption outweighed the benefits of maintaining the sibling relationship. As discussed ante, the girls achieved tremendous progress since being placed with their current caregivers and expressed a strong desire to be adopted. Although the girls enjoyed visiting with M.S., Jr., nothing in the record suggests the sibling relationship was so strong that it would outweigh the benefits of adoption for the girls.
When the benefits of adoption are weighed against the strength of the relationship between M.S., Jr. and his sisters, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the sibling relationship exception did not apply. Even when the interactions between siblings are "loving, affectionate, playful, and nurturing," a trial court can reasonably conclude that a child's best interests are better served by the permanency of adoption. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1013; see also In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 293 [termination of sibling relationship not sufficiently detrimental despite a "pleasant relationship" between siblings]; In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 215.) The court's conclusion here that the exception does not apply here is especially warranted in light of the evidence that the girls' permanent placement has not been shown to substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. Accordingly, having reviewed the record, we see no error by the juvenile court in finding the beneficial sibling relationship exception to the termination of parental rights does not apply.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
DATO, J. WE CONCUR: IRION, Acting P. J. GUERRERO, J.