Opinion
D071931
09-08-2017
In re NICKOLAS W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.W., Defendant and Appellant.
Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CJ1236) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura J. Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed. Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.W. (Mother) appeals an order terminating her parental rights in the juvenile dependency case of her minor son Nickolas W. She contends the court erred by determining that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We disagree and affirm.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. --------
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
"In accord with the usual rules on appeal, we state the facts in the manner most favorable to the dependency court's order." (In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1448, fn. 1.)
On June 2, 2015, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b) on behalf of eight-year-old Nickolas. The Agency alleged that Mother used alcoholic beverages to excess, locked Nickolas out of the house, hit him in the stomach, and grabbed his arms with force resulting in scratches. It further asserted that Mother was placed on a psychiatric hold due to threats of harm to herself. The Agency concluded Nickolas had suffered, or was at a substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness as a result of Mother's inability to care for him based on her mental illness and/or substance abuse.
The juvenile court found the Agency had made a prima facie showing that Nickolas was a person described by section 300, subdivision (b) and ordered that he be detained in out-of-home care. It later sustained the allegations of the petition and removed Nickolas from Mother's custody. The court ordered that she be provided with reunification services and frequent supervised visitation. Mother's case plan included a psychological evaluation, parenting education, on-demand drug testing, and a substance abuse treatment program. Mother agreed to stay sober and act appropriately toward Nickolas. Mother identified Jay P. as Nickolas's biological father, but the Agency was unable to locate him.
Nickolas was placed with his maternal grandmother U.W. (Grandmother). Three months later, however, the Agency filed a supplemental petition under section 387 alleging that placement with Grandmother was no longer appropriate because she allowed Mother to have unsupervised contact with Nickolas, including overnight visits, and she was not willing to abide by the Agency rules regarding visitation. The juvenile court again found the Agency had made a prima facie showing and ordered that Nickolas be detained in foster care.
The parties entered into a stipulation confirming Nickolas's placement in a foster home of Oliver L., but the Agency later removed Nickolas from Oliver's home based on allegations of inappropriate behavior and potential sexual abuse. It then placed Nickolas with his maternal uncle Michael W. and his wife Marissa W. In connection with the change in placement, the Agency asked the court to vacate its order requiring Nickolas to remain in his school of origin. The court granted the Agency's request and temporarily limited Mother's educational rights. Mother appealed, and this court affirmed in a nonpublished opinion. (In re N.W. (June 3, 2016, D069598).)
In advance of Nickolas's six-month review hearing, the Agency reported that Mother had not made substantial progress in her case plan. Although she had completed a parenting course and engaged in therapy, Mother had not meaningfully addressed her problem with alcohol abuse. She refused to acknowledge her substance abuse issues, failed to complete required drug testing, and severely relapsed resulting in her arrest on charges of resisting an officer and disorderly conduct while under the influence. She was unemployed and homeless.
Mother visited and called Nickolas frequently, but her visits were sometimes stressful for him. Despite admonitions from the Agency and the court, Mother discussed the dependency case with him and otherwise displayed a lack of insight regarding the effects of her statements and actions. For example, during one visit she allowed Nickolas to overhear her say that she had cancer. Nickolas's caregivers frequently had to end Mother's phone calls with him because she discussed inappropriate topics. In Mother's interactions with her relatives, including Nickolas's caregivers, she was frequently aggressive and abusive. Grandmother had obtained a restraining order against her. The Agency recommended that Mother's visits continue to be supervised.
Mother's comments to Nickolas about the dependency case violated court orders. She also violated court orders by sending confidential materials regarding the case to various politicians and the media. The Agency was additionally concerned that Mother apparently had continued contact with Oliver, the former foster caregiver, and Mother was making Nickolas feel guilty about disclosing Oliver's inappropriate behavior. After changing placement, Nickolas had reported additional incidents of such behavior.
Mother contested several Agency recommendations, including whether visitation would continue to be supervised. Before the contested hearing, however, she was again placed on a psychiatric hold after an altercation with police. Mother called police to Oliver's home, where she had apparently been living for several months. She was emotional, erratic, and speaking nonsensically. She told police that Oliver had molested Nickolas. Police questioned Oliver, who explained that he allowed Mother to live with him because she did not have any other place to go. Earlier that evening Oliver had been driving Mother, and she threatened to kill herself. Oliver drove them home, where she again threatened to kill herself. Mother became angry at Oliver, accused him of having sex with Nickolas, and hit him. Oliver locked himself in a bathroom. When police arrived, they attempted to place Mother in handcuffs, but she was uncooperative. They took her to a hospital, and she remained hospitalized two weeks later.
The Agency described the effect of Mother's actions on Nickolas as follows: "Although Nickolas reported he enjoys spending time with his mother, he recently indicated he would prefer that his supervised visits only occur twice a week, two hours per visit, in addition to continuing with the 15[-]minute phone call [per] court order. Nickolas stated he did not want 'to deal' with his mother's excessive talking. Nickolas has an enormous amount of pressure being placed on him by his mother, who has not been capable of putting his needs above her own, as she continues discussing inappropriate topics and describing his caregivers in negative terms, throughout phone calls, which [Nickolas] not only redirects but also ends."
At the contested six-month review hearing, the court found that Mother had made some progress in her case plan and ordered the Agency to continue providing services. It refused Mother's request for unsupervised visitation, however, and continued to limit her educational rights.
During the next few months, Mother became increasingly combative with Agency social workers and stopped going to her individual therapy. Although some of her interactions with Nickolas were positive, she continued to discuss the dependency case and other inappropriate topics with him. Mother entered an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. She appeared to maintain sobriety during that program, but was disrespectful to staff and prone to outbursts.
In its 12-month assessment, the Agency concluded Mother had made minimal progress in her case plan and had not mitigated or gained insight into the issues that led to Nickolas's dependency case. The Agency believed "[i]t is unlikely that [Mother] would make substantial progress within the remaining reunification time period; therefore, the prognosis of return by the 18[-]month hearing is poor." The Agency recommended terminating Mother's reunification services and setting a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26.
Mother disputed the Agency's recommendation, and the court held a contested hearing over parts of four days. It heard testimony from Mother and an Agency social worker, among others. In a comprehensive oral ruling, the court explained that Mother had not made substantial progress in her case plan and there was not a substantial probability that Nickolas would be returned to her care by the 18-month deadline. It terminated Mother's reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing.
The Agency recommended a permanent plan of adoption. Nickolas was a healthy child with no developmental delays. He had a mild learning disability and was receiving therapy for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and attachment disorder, primarily related to his feelings of guilt over his separation from Mother. He was doing well in his placement, and his relative caregivers wanted to adopt him.
Nickolas's interactions with Mother were emotional and complex. While Nickolas was attached to his mother, his contact with her was stressful and his therapist believed their daily phone calls were "detrimental" to him. Mother continued to engage in "constant harassment and confrontation" with Nickolas's caregivers, which further stressed him. Nonetheless, Nickolas said being back with Mother would make him "very happy." He said he got along well with his caregivers, but he would rather live with his mother. When an Agency social worker asked him what would happen if he could not live with his mother, Nickolas first said he would "freak out and kill myself," but then asked the social worker to cross that out because it was an exaggeration. Nickolas told the social worker to tell the court he would be "sad" if he could not live with Mother.
The Agency acknowledged it was "a very difficult assessment as there is a strong bond between Mother and son, even 18 months after removal. Mother is intensely connected to her son, they love one another, and Mother has consistently done whatever it took to visit or connect by phone. However, and this is the crux of the matter, it is also clear that connection serves to meet Mother's needs, often to the detriment of the well-being of [Nickolas]. Mother is not well and Nickolas serves as her confidant, therapist, nurturer, playmate, and partner, which is a crushing load for a nine-year-old." The Agency concluded that it would be better for Nickolas if Mother's parental rights were terminated: "[T]he pressure to [support Mother] has limited both his academic achievement and his social development. Mother has not formed a successful intervention team to work through her mental health diagnoses to be able to regulate her emotions, live free of addictions, and stabilize her life. Nickolas'[s] relationship with his mother is complex and often opposed to his well[-]being. . . . Although there is a strong bond between Mother and son, the benefits of permanency outweigh any detriment Nickolas would suffer if parental rights are terminated."
In an addendum report, the Agency stated that Mother had continued to act inappropriately during visits. For example, she told Nickolas not to trust his caregivers, which greatly upset him. Mother also continued to minimize Oliver's inappropriate behavior. The Agency believed Mother "does not demonstrate insight into actions that disrupt Nick's emotional stability nor emotional demands she places on him to choose sides, her side, and that those on the other side are not to be trusted. . . . Mother continues to foster an ambivalent attachment style with Nick, at once over the top and abundantly loving, countered by manipulations, allegations, and passively aggressive statements about the lack of love, care or trust of others."
At the hearing, Mother offered testimony from Nickolas's therapist, Laurie Dutart. Dutart had observed an increase in Nickolas's anxiety as a result of phone calls with Mother, and she was concerned that Mother discussed inappropriate topics with Nickolas. Dutart believed that Mother's visitation with Nickolas should be supervised, but cutting off contact entirely between them would "really devastate" Nickolas. Mother also offered testimony from another therapist, Claire Meyer-Lee, who conducted a bonding study on Mother and Nickolas. The study included interviews with both mother and son, as well as Meyer-Lee's observations of their interaction. Meyer-Lee concluded there was a "strong attachment" and "bond" between the two, such that the cessation of contact between them could possibly have a long-term negative effect. Meyer-Lee acknowledged, however, that Mother said things that indicated "a lack of attunement" to Nickolas, such as criticizing his caretakers and talking about living together in the future. She noted that Mother's comments likely caused Nickolas anxiety and demonstrated an inability to place his emotional needs above her own. Meyer-Lee also admitted that her bonding study did not take into account Mother's mental health, her parental functioning, or Nickolas's mental health. The study showed that, in her interview with Meyer-Lee, Mother minimized the circumstances that led to Nickolas's removal and did not accept responsibility for her actions.
An Agency social worker, Shari Crall, testified in response to Meyer-Lee's assessment. She agreed that Nickolas was attached to Mother, but it was not a "secure" attachment. Crall believed Nickolas had an ambivalent attachment to Mother, which is characterized by "a child who is anxious [when] separated from their mother, but doesn't receive reassurance when in their mother's presence . . . ." She believed the benefit of adoption outweighed whatever benefits Nickolas enjoyed based on his relationship with Mother. Nickolas's mental health had improved in the care of his relatives, and the permanency of adoption would foster further improvement.
Mother testified on her own behalf. She was Nickolas's primary caregiver for the first eight years of his life, before the Agency's involvement. She described her visits with Nickolas and his affection for her. She believed terminating her parental rights would be detrimental to Nickolas and requested a permanent plan of guardianship.
In another comprehensive oral ruling, the court found that Nickolas was adoptable. It described him as "a great kid," "smart, articulate, creative, endearing, expressive, and sensitive." The court noted, however, that "[h]e does suffer from anxiety and insecurity which is often fueled by circumstances where his mother challenges others regarding his care. And—and in this case, he has also suffered from circumstances where she has violated rules and court orders and overtly or covertly plac[ed] Nickolas in tough positions."
In assessing Mother's claim that the beneficial parent-child relationship should apply to prevent adoption, the court noted, "I probably have spent more time thinking about this relationship and the benefits and detriment to Nickolas than I have in any other case before me . . . ." Although the court found that Mother had consistently and regularly visited Nickolas, it recognized that she "has engaged in behavior . . . usually directed to others in Nickolas'[s] presence which has had a clear negative impact on him, and creates significant distress and anxiety for him."
The court credited the Agency's opinion of the relationship between Mother and Nickolas. It explained that "[s]ince the beginning of this case, Mother's visits have remained at supervised. And while she can exhibit love for Nickolas and he can to her, she also engages in behavior which makes anything short of carefully monitored visits exceedingly problematic. She will whisper to Nickolas [providing] him false information and attempts to interfere with his relationship with his caregivers and others. [¶] She has displayed no appreciation for the impact of these behaviors on Nickolas or the anxiety that it could and does create for him. These behaviors are not parental in nature and can be destructive."
The court found that Mother had not established that the benefits of maintaining the parent-child relationship outweighed the benefits of permanency through adoption: "While there is, as the social worker notes, a strong bond, it is fraught with detrimental as well as beneficial aspects for Nickolas. . . . [¶] The benefits of adoption and permanence for Nickolas are significant and many. He has done very well out of his mother's care, in a home that provides routine and structure and allows him to be a boy and not act in a parental role. [¶] As noted by the social worker and his therapist, his caregivers, and his educational advisors, he is making good progress, and he has developed very strong and close relationships with his . . . relatives and those in their household."
The court terminated parental rights and selected adoption as Nickolas's permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
I
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception inapplicable, terminating her parental rights, and selecting adoption as Nickolas's permanent plan. "Section 366.26 establishes a detailed procedure for terminating parental rights. Subdivision (c)(1) states that a prior order under section 361.5 terminating reunification services 'shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights.' If the court determines under a 'clear and convincing standard' that it is 'likely the child will be adopted,' the court 'shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The goal is to provide 'stable, permanent homes' for children who are dependents of the juvenile court, and the first choice to achieve that goal is adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); . . . .) [¶] This procedure recognizes that '[b]y the time of a section 366.26 hearing, the parent's interest in reunification is no longer an issue and the child's interest in a stable and permanent placement is paramount.' [Citation.] Thus, to terminate parental rights under section 366.26, the court 'need only make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated.' [Citation.] Under these circumstances, 'the court shall terminate parental rights' unless certain exceptions apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)" (In re Logan B. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1009-1010 (Logan B.).)
The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies where "[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent bears the burden in the juvenile court of showing the exception applies. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529 (J.C.).)
The juvenile court found that Mother had maintained regular visitation with Nickolas. Accordingly, the only issue in this appeal is whether the court erred in determining that Mother had not met her burden of showing sufficient benefit to Nickolas to invoke the exception. "The 'benefit' prong of the exception requires the parent to prove his or her relationship with the child 'promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.' " (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621.) In other words, "to establish the exception a parent must prove that the benefit of continuing a parental relationship outweighs the child's interest in the stability and permanence of adoption." (Logan B., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1012.) " 'If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.' " (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 594.)
The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies only in exceptional circumstances. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) "Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Jasmine D.).) " 'The factors to be considered when looking for whether a relationship is important and beneficial are: (1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child, and (4) the child's particular needs.' " (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315 (Bailey J.).)
II
Courts have articulated various standards of review when the juvenile court finds the exception does not apply and the parent appeals. Most courts have applied the substantial evidence standard. (See, e.g., In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).) Others have applied an abuse of discretion standard. (See, e.g., Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) Still others have adopted a hybrid standard, reviewing the court's underlying factual determinations (i.e., the regularity of visitation and the existence of a beneficial relationship) for substantial evidence, and reviewing the court's ultimate weighing of the benefits of that relationship against the benefits of adoption for abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531; Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315.) Finally, some courts have criticized the focus on substantial evidence where the parent—the party who bears the burden in the juvenile court—is the appellant. (See, e.g., In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 647; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528-1529.)
Mother urges this court to apply the substantial evidence standard, whereas the Agency favors the hybrid standard. This court recently applied the hybrid standard in In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 (Anthony B.), and we likewise adopt it here. Under the hybrid standard, "[w]e apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child." (Anthony B., at p. 395.)
The first determination is therefore a factual one, which we review for substantial evidence. "On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) "Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court's determination cannot succeed." (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)
"The second determination in the exception analysis is whether the existence of that relationship or other specified statutory circumstance constitutes ' "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." ' [Citation.] This ' " 'quintessentially' discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption[,]" is appropriately reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.' " (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531.) " 'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.' " (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; see Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)
III
In this appeal, whether we characterize Mother's arguments as challenging the juvenile court's factual determination that she had not shown the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship or the court's discretionary determination that the benefits of continuing that relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption, Mother has not shown error. We need not discuss the element of regular visitation, since the court found that element was satisfied.
The juvenile court was presented with conflicting evidence regarding the nature of Nickolas's relationship with Mother. On one hand, Nickolas had lived for eight years with Mother and loves her. He was an older child, able to articulate his own feelings, and wanted to live with her. He looked to Mother for support and affection to some extent, and all parties agreed he was bonded to her as described in Meyer-Lee's study.
On the other hand, Mother engaged in behavior that caused stress and anxiety in Nickolas's life. She placed her own need for love, support, and attention above Nickolas's well-being. She interfered with Nickolas's ability to form positive relationships with other adults in his life, such as his relative caregivers, which were necessary for his successful development. Finally, Mother could not adequately address the substance abuse and mental health issues that prevented her from parenting Nickolas in the first place and led to the Agency's involvement. Given this conflicting evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably find that Mother had not met her burden of showing the existence of a parent-child relationship that was beneficial, rather than detrimental, to Nickolas. As the court noted, Mother's behaviors toward Nickolas "are not parental in nature and can be destructive." Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding.
In her briefing, Mother focuses on the evidence favorable to her, including favorable visitation reports, portions of Dutart's testimony, and Meyer-Lee's bonding study. But contrary to Mother's implication, the question on appeal is not whether the juvenile court could reasonably have found that Nickolas had a beneficial parent-child relationship with Mother, but whether the opposite finding is unreasonable as a matter of law. Given the conflicting evidence in this case regarding their relationship, Mother has not met this standard.
More to the point, however, even if she had shown a beneficial relationship, the juvenile court could and did reasonably find that the benefits Nickolas derived from his relationship with Mother were outweighed by the benefits of adoption. Nickolas had already benefited from the stability and support provided by placement with his relative caregivers, as shown by the improvements in his mental health and social skills. Adoption would provide even more security and permanence, and it would therefore encourage further improvements. Nickolas would be freed from Mother's unhealthy demands for support and attention and could instead focus on his own development.
Without adoption, Mother could continue to be a disruptive force in Nickolas's life. As the juvenile court thoughtfully explained, "A scenario of legal guardianship, where it could be anticipated that [Mother] could continue her pattern of being verbally assaultive to [Nickolas's] caregivers, that she would be litigious, that she would be noncompliant with visitation rules, or acknowledging the primary role of his relative caregivers, and most importantly, failing to recognize the impact of this type of behavior on Nickolas would not be beneficial to him, even considering the suggestion that if possible contact should continue. [¶] Words fail me to describe how the impact of continuing this type of contact that has occurred for the life of the case would eat away at Nickolas." On this record, we cannot conclude the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of reason by finding that the benefits of adoption outweighed the benefits of his relationship with Mother.
Mother relies heavily on In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452 (Scott B.), but the unique circumstances of that case are not present here. The eleven-year-old minor, Scott, was diagnosed with autism, which was " 'substantially disabling.' " (Id. at p. 455.) After he was removed from his mother's custody based on her inability to care for him and the unsanitary conditions in their home, his behavior improved. (Id. at pp. 457-459.) In the initial stages of the dependency case, Scott would regress during visits with his mother, exhibiting tantrums and growling frequently, but that behavior improved as the case progressed as well. (Id. at pp. 459-461.)
Scott had a very close relationship with his mother and wanted to be with her. (Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 460.) When adoption was discussed with Scott, he had a profoundly negative reaction. (Id. at p. 462.) "Scott had made it clear that he did not want to be adopted and if the adoption were to occur he would run away. He was insisting that he wanted to live with Mother and nowhere else, and at one point he did make an attempt to leave." (Ibid.) After a few months, however, Scott's behavior stabilized and he no longer threatened to run away. (Id. at p. 465.) But just before the selection and implementation hearing he reiterated his threats: "Scott stated that he had changed his mind about adoption and if the foster mother did adopt him he would run away because he wanted to live with Mother." (Id. at p. 466.) The juvenile court recognized that Scott and his mother did have a beneficial relationship, but believed that the benefits of adoption outweighed the benefits of maintaining that relationship. (Id. at p. 468.)
The reviewing court concluded that the juvenile court erred, regardless whether the standard of review was substantial evidence, abuse of discretion, or compelled as a matter of law. (Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 470.) The court focused on Scott's uniquely vulnerable mental state: "It is also clear from the record that Scott's emotional makeup will not enable him to endure interruption of his long-standing frequent visits with Mother." (Id. at p. 471.) It explained, "Mother provides stability to Scott's life. That is what adoption is supposed to do, but it may not in this case. Given Scott's strong emotional attachment to Mother, his continued precarious emotional state, and his history of regressing and running away when he is stressed, there is a very good chance that he will have a meltdown if his usual frequent visitation with Mother does not continue." (Id. at p. 472.) The court concluded that termination of parental rights, with the chance that Scott's contact with the mother would cease, was "a danger not worth taking." (Id. at p. 472.)
Here, unlike in Scott B., the juvenile court could reasonably find that Nickolas's mental state was not fragile, that his relationship with Mother was on balance negative rather than positive, and that Nickolas could and would benefit from adoption in ways that would outweigh the loss of his relationship with Mother. Although Nickolas, like Scott, expressed opposition to adoption, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that adoption would ultimately be beneficial rather than detrimental to Nickolas's development based on, among other things, his positive relationship with his relative caregivers and the general improvement in his health and well-being while in their care.
IV
This is far from an easy case. Like the conscientious juvenile court judge, we would hope there is a way Mother can continue to have a place in Nickolas's life. Given his placement with his uncle and aunt, perhaps that can occur. Perhaps it cannot. It will certainly not happen without sustained effort on Mother's part. Ultimately, whether continued contact is in Nickolas's best interests will be a decision for his adoptive parents.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
DATO, J. WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting P. J. IRION, J.