Opinion
D073044
05-10-2018
In re X.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EVELYN G., Defendant and Appellant.
Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SJ13048) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael J. Popkins, Judge. Affirmed. Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Evelyn G. (Mother), mother of X.G. (Child), appeals from an order following a 12-month permanency hearing at which the juvenile court terminated Mother's reunification services and granted full legal and physical custody to Juan Carlos G., Child's presumed father (Father). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f).) Mother contends the court erred when it found that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) provided or offered her reasonable services. We disagree and affirm the order.
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We review a reasonable services finding to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence." (In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001 (A.G.); accord, In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako R.).) As the appellant, the burden is on Mother to show that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings. (A.G., at p. 1001.) Under the substantial evidence rule, we do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate witnesses' credibility, or indulge in inferences contrary to the findings of the juvenile court. (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1167; In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.)
The parties agree as to this standard of review.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the testimony of a single witness or evidence from a single document may be sufficient (Evid. Code, § 411), whereas even uncontradicted evidence in favor of a contrary finding does not establish the fact for which the evidence was submitted (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890). On appeal, "we must accept the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. (Estate of Teel (1944) 25 Cal.2d 520, 527.)" (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53; accord, In re Brittany H. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 533, 549.) Thus, "even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence," we do not consider—and, thus, do not discuss the facts associated with—such evidence in determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the court's finding. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
On appeal, Mother challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the Agency provided or offered reasonable services. More specifically, Mother challenges the Agency's provision of services related to: (1) Mother's possible mental health or comprehension issues; (2) a domestic violence program; and (3) visitation. Accordingly, we will limit our discussion to the facts and law associated with those services.
We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Agency, as the prevailing party, and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the juvenile court's ruling. (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) Accordingly, consistent with this standard of review and under the traditional rules on appeal, "we [will] state the facts in the manner most favorable to the dependency court's order." (In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1448, fn. 1.)
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL STATEMENT
A. The Case Plan
In July 2016, the Agency filed a petition on behalf of Child, who was then three years old. The Agency alleged that Child needed the protection of the juvenile court due to the ongoing domestic violence between Mother and Father. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) At the detention hearing, the juvenile court detained Child, ordered the Agency to arrange placement, and set a jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
Following a contested adjudication and disposition hearing in August 2016, the court made true findings on the allegations that Child had been exposed to violent confrontations, sustained the petition, found jurisdiction, declared Child to be a dependent of the juvenile court, and continued Child's placement in an approved home of Father's relative in Los Angeles.
The court ordered that Mother have two supervised visits a week with Child. Because Child was placed in Los Angeles, the court also ordered Agency to assist Mother with transportation for the visitation.
In addition, as particularly relevant to the present appeal, the court read and considered the Agency's jurisdiction and disposition report (which was admitted into evidence) with an attached proposed initial case plan for both Mother and Father. In part, the plan, which Mother was actively involved in developing, listed the following service objectives and client responsibilities: (1) attend and demonstrate progress in a certified domestic violence prevention plan; (2) individual therapy, including compliance with psychological treatment based on "the recommendations of the [psychological] evaluation"; and (3) participate in a parenting education program.
Mother has not provided a signed copy of either the initial plan or the updated plan ordered by the court. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [appellant has burden of providing adequate record and citations to record to support claims].) An unsigned copy of the initial plan is attached to the Agency's August 2016 jurisdiction and disposition report, and an unsigned copy of the updated plan is attached to the Agency's February 2017 status review report. Since both parties have relied on these unsigned copies of the plan, we will do the same.
The juvenile court ordered that the Agency provide these services to Mother and that Mother comply with the requirements of the services provided—including specifically a psychological evaluation if requested. The court set dates for the six-month review hearing and the 12-month permanency hearing. (§ 366.21, subds. (e), (f).) B. Six-Month Review Hearing (§ 366 .21, Subd. (e))
The court also ordered Father to comply with his plan, but we need not discuss Father's plan or the services offered, since in this appeal Mother challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the Agency provided reasonable services to her.
At the initially scheduled six-month review hearing, the Agency requested a continuance, recommending that services continue to be provided to both parents. The juvenile court allowed the prior case plan to remain in effect and continued the hearing— noting specifically the court's concern with some of Mother's behavior described in the February 2017 status review report provided by the Agency prior to the hearing.
At a May 2017 pretrial status conference for the continued contested six-month status review hearing, the parties and court agreed to proceed at that time with a documents trial. The juvenile court then presided over the status review hearing based on the Agency's above-described February 2017 status review report.
With regard to the domestic violence program, the evidence (from the February 2017 status review report) discloses: Mother began a program in early October 2016; by the end of 2016, Mother had attended between six and eight sessions, but had missed three sessions in a row without prior notice to the service provider; the provider accordingly dropped Mother from the services; Mother was scheduled to start classes with a different provider on February 7, 2017; less than 10 days later, Mother reported to the social worker that she (Mother) would no longer be attending classes from that provider; the provider told the social worker that, after two sessions, Mother voluntarily terminated the services. With no discussion, the February 2017 status review report attached an updated case plan.
Mother said that she "d[id] not feel comfortable" in the group setting. The service provider reported that Mother was "defensive," "not open to feedback," demonstrating "a negative attitude," and "not taking any responsibility."
With regard to individual therapy, the evidence (from the February 2017 status review report) discloses: Mother started therapy in early October 2016; by mid-January 2017, Mother had seven absences, only twice calling in advance to let the therapist know; at that time, Mother requested a new therapist, because the original therapist suggested a psychological evaluation; Mother told the social worker that she (Mother) "knows her rights" and asked the social worker to note that she (Mother) "refuses" to participate in a psychological evaluation; two weeks later, in early February 2017, Mother's therapist expressly requested a psychological evaluation; Mother confirmed to the social worker both that the therapist requested a psychological evaluation and that she (Mother) "refuses to be evaluated or to take any medication"; the social worker then advised Mother that the evaluation would assist in assessing her needs for purposes of referrals to appropriate services, and she agreed to an evaluation (which, as we discuss post, did not happen because Mother again changed her mind); Mother missed several therapy sessions; and, finally, the Agency expressly recommended a psychological evaluation.
With regard to the parenting program, the evidence (from the February 2017 status review report) discloses: Mother reported that she completed her classes by mid-December 2016; and in late January and early February 2017, Mother requested additional parenting classes.
With regard to visitation, the evidence (from the February 2017 status review report) discloses: the Agency, usually the social worker personally, had been providing Mother with twice monthly transportation to and from Los Angeles for visits with Child; the social worker provided the required supervision for the visits; on several occasions during the visits, the supervisor had to redirect Mother, in particular asking her to change topics of conversation (in which she had been asking Child about her placement and Father's activities); the Agency had been supervising Mother's telephone and video calls three times a week, but by November 2016, Mother voluntarily discontinued the calls with Child; and although Mother set a special hearing in October 2016 and received permission from the court to attend Child's dental appointment, due to Mother's behavior at the appointment, the dental office staff had to call the police.
At the May 2017 documents trial, Mother's counsel explained to the court that the Agency was having difficulty finding a Spanish-speaking provider for the domestic violence training. However, the evidence before the court—i.e., the Agency's February 2017 status review report—was that "[M]other stated that she can attend English domestic violence classes." The court did not make any rulings as to either the domestic violence component or the parenting program component of Mother's case plan.
The report indicated that Mother had requested a Spanish-speaking therapist, not a Spanish-speaking domestic violence counselor. At the May 2017 hearing, the Agency clarified that it was attempting to find a Spanish-speaking therapist who could address, in addition to other issues, domestic violence. At a pretrial conference for the 12-month permanency hearing in October 2017, Mother confirmed that she had declined translation services; Mother's attorney explained that Mother had assured her that she (Mother) "understands English very well"; and, at the hearing, even though an interpreter was present and the court at first insisted that Mother use the interpreter's services, Mother declined.
At trial, Mother's counsel argued that Mother visits Child only once a week for two hours. In response to the court's question, the social worker confirmed that she drove Mother to Los Angeles once a week and supervised the visit—a six-hour to eight-hour commitment. Although the court denied Mother's request for unsupervised visits, the court gave the social worker the discretion to allow such visits in the future if appropriate.
At the August 2016 contested adjudication and disposition hearing, the court ordered two supervised visits a week. In February 2017, the Agency reported that it had been providing transportation and supervision for two visits per month.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court reaffirmed its prior authorization for Mother's psychological evaluation, giving the social worker the discretion to require it. In addition, the court ruled both that the Agency had complied with the case plan and that Mother's progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes that necessitated Child's placement had been "minimal."
Having conducted the six-month review hearing at the pretrial status conference, the juvenile court vacated the previously ordered trial date and set a date for the 12-month permanency hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) C. 12-Month Permanency Hearing (§ 366 .21, Subd. (f))
The juvenile court presided over the 12-month permanency hearing on October 19, 2017. In addition to consideration of documentary evidence from four Agency reports and the social worker's curriculum vitae, the court heard testimony from the social worker and Mother.
The written updates after the February 2017 status review report included an August 2017 status review report and an October 2017 addendum report. The Agency's recommendations remained the same as in the August 2017 report—namely, that Father be granted legal and physical custody of Child, that Mother have reasonable supervised visitation, and that juvenile court jurisdiction over Child be terminated.
With regard to domestic violence services, the August 2017 status review report contains 41 separate entries that reflect the Agency's efforts to provide these services during the current reporting period—i.e., between February 2017 (i.e., the date of the prior status report) and August 2017. Indeed, the first entry indicates that the Agency began its efforts to locate another placement within a week after Mother notified the Agency that she had terminated the services of the second service provider, and the last entry indicates that the Agency discussed the matter with Mother 10 days prior to submission of the status review report.
With regard to individual therapy, based on Mother's agreement to have a psychological evaluation, the assessment was added to her case plan. However, despite her February 2017 agreement, during the current reporting period Mother repeated her position from January 2017, again saying both that she had the right to refuse a psychological evaluation and that she "refused" to participate in one.
With regard to visitation, the Agency had been providing transportation to and from Los Angeles for one supervised visit a week. During the visits, Mother continued to require redirection and instructions not to question Child about certain topics; yet Mother insisted not only that she had a right to question Child, but also that "no one could stop her."
The August 2017 status review report concluded with the following observations: Mother would initiate services, "but was not consistent with her attendance"; Mother voluntarily "discontinued" services due to conflicts on her part; the Agency provided Mother with assignments in support of her case plan, but she never turned in any of them; during visitation, Mother asked Child inappropriate questions, ignored redirection, and was not open to feedback; and, finally, Mother refused to participate in a psychological evaluation, even after previously agreeing to the assessment as part of her most recent case plan.
At trial, the testimony from the social worker consistently supported the written reports.
With regard to the initial case plan's objective and requirement that Mother attend and demonstrate progress in a domestic violence prevention program, the social worker confirmed, contrary to Mother's statements, that Mother was entirely responsible for the failures at both of the programs she began. The first provider discharged Mother due to several unexcused absences, and Mother voluntarily left the second provider
With regard to the updated case plan's objectives and requirements that Mother comply with psychological treatment, throughout the review period, Mother refused to participate in a psychological evaluation. This procedure had been requested independently by both the therapist and the Agency, and the juvenile court had ordered specifically that Mother participate in a psychological evaluation if requested.
With regard to visitation, the social worker confirmed the Agency's concerns that Mother required redirection, providing specific examples. A reasonable inference from the social worker's testimony is that Mother used information she learned from inappropriate questioning of Child to make false allegations against Father and his care of Child. Furthermore, even though Mother had successfully "participate[d]" in the parenting class required in her initial case plan, based on her behavior with Child at the visits, Mother had not "complete[d]" the parenting class component of her case plan. D. The October 19, 2017 Order
Regardless of the inference as to the source of Mother's information, the direct testimony was that Mother often made false allegations about Father and his care of Child.
In this regard, Mother's initial case plan expressly provides: "The parent is reminded that merely completing a program does not in and of itself indicates success. If the parent is unable and or unwilling to behaviorally demonstrate changes, consistently and over time, the parent could be asked to participate in additionally programming."
Following the 12-month permanency hearing, the juvenile court entered an order on October 19, 2017. As applicable to Mother's appeal, the court found that the Agency had provided or offered Mother reasonable services, granted full legal and physical custody of Child to Father, and terminated jurisdiction (which necessarily terminated reunification services to Mother).
The court ruled that Mother is to have reasonable supervised visitation and signed and forwarded appropriate orders to the family court.
Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction based on the October 19, 2017 order and Mother's notice of appeal. (§ 395, subd. (a)(1).)
III.
DISCUSSION
The only issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Agency offered or provided Mother reasonable services. In this context, "reasonable services" means those "services offered or provided by the county welfare agency . . . to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child, or to resolve the issues that led to the child's removal in order for the child to be returned home, or to finalize the permanent placement of the child." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502(33).) A. Law
Further unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
The general purpose of dependency law is to safeguard the welfare and best interests of children in the State of California. (§ 202, subds. (a), (b); In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 384 ["the paramount concern is the child's welfare"].) To this end, when a minor is removed from the home, " 'the court first attempts, for a specified period of time, to reunify the family.' " (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1008; see § 202, subd. (a) [after removal, reunification is "a primary objective"].) Family reunification services play a critical role in dependency proceedings under both federal and state law. (42 U.S.C. §§ 629, 629a(a)(7); § 361.5, subd. (a); A.G., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1000; In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563 (Alanna A.).) Reunification may be achieved by providing services that include "a full array of social and health services to help the child and family and to prevent reabuse of children." (§ 300.2; see § 16501, subd. (h); rule 5.502(8), (33); 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(7).)
Subject to exceptions inapplicable here, "whenever a child is removed from a parent's or guardian's custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child's mother . . . ." (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) As applicable here, at the adjudication and disposition hearing, "the juvenile court must provide services designed to reunify the family within a statutory time period." (Alanna A., supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 563, citing § 361.5 and 42 U.S.C. § 629a (a)(7).) At the six-month review hearing, if the child remains in foster care and the goal remains family reunification, the juvenile court must order that any reunification services previously ordered shall continue to be offered to the parent within the statutory time period, although the court has the discretion to modify the terms and conditions of those services. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(7); rule 5.710(a)(4).) At the 12-month permanency hearing, the court may not terminate reunification services unless it finds that "reasonable services have been provided or offered" to the parents. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(4).)
To support a finding that reasonable services were provided or offered to the parent, " 'the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.' " (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1426 (Tracy J.), italics omitted.) "The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547; In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 566 (J.E.).) B. Analysis
The starting point for an evaluation of a parent's reunification services is the parent's case plan. (See In re Adrianna P. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 44, 59 ["reunification services play a 'crucial role' in dependency proceedings and a case plan must be carefully tailored to meet the needs of the child and family"].) The case plan's service objectives and client responsibilities that are at issue in the present appeal required Mother to participate in: (1) a certified domestic violence prevention plan; (2) individual therapy, including compliance with psychological treatment based on "the recommendations of the [psychological] evaluation"; and (3) a parenting education program.
Within those parameters, Mother argues that the record on appeal lacks substantial evidence to support the finding that the Agency provided or offered reasonable services as follows: (1) the Agency failed to provide reasonable services based on its knowledge of Mother's possible mental health or comprehension issues; (2) the Agency failed to provide Mother with an appropriate domestic violence program; and (3) the Agency only provided weekly visitation services, despite a court order for twice weekly visitation.
1. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Finding That the Agency Provided or Offered Reasonable Mental Health Services
Mother's criticism is that, "despite having significant notice [M]other may suffer from some type of mental illness, the Agency never had mother undergo a psychological evaluation." More specifically, Mother argues that, although "the August 2016 [initial] case plan identified the need for [M]other to participate in a psychiatric/psychological evaluation," "[i]t was not until January 17, 2017[,] that [M]other's therapist suggested a psychological evaluation." Mother's position is not supported by the record.
Initially, we note that the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over Child and ordered the Agency to provide services consistent with Mother's case plan on August 29, 2016, and Mother began therapy on October 4, 2016. While a five-week delay in providing counseling services may not be "the best that might be provided in an ideal world" (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547; J.E., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 566), it is not unreasonable as a matter of law given that services were not terminated until October 19, 2017—more than 12 months later. The initial five-week delay did not adversely affect the subsequent 52 weeks of services that were provided.
We reject any implication from Mother's argument that the Agency should have compelled Mother to undergo a psychological evaluation. " 'It is . . . well established that "[r]eunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent." ' " (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233.) " 'The requirement that reunification services be made available to help a parent . . . is not a requirement that a social worker take the parent by the hand and escort him or her to and through classes or counseling sessions.' " (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 414 (Christina L.).) The Agency acknowledged the potential mental health issues, and at the August 2016 contested adjudication and disposition hearing, the court ordered Mother to attend individual counseling—with a psychological evaluation to be conducted "if ordered by Mother's therapist." (Capitalization omitted.) The fact that Mother's therapist did not order an evaluation until January 2017 is not the Agency's fault or responsibility. Nor can the therapist be faulted here, where Mother missed seven sessions between mid-October 2016 (when therapy began) and mid-January 2017 (when the therapist ordered the evaluation).
Moreover, the record contains more than substantial evidence that Mother would not participate in a psychological evaluation.
At the time the therapist first suggested to Mother that she undergo an evaluation in mid-January 2017, Mother stated that she knew her rights and that she refused to take a psychological evaluation. On appeal, Mother correctly notes that, a few days later, she returned to the therapist, apologized for having been rude, and "brought up having a psychological evaluation." However, less than two weeks later, Mother told the social worker that she (Mother) wanted a new therapist because the current provider had requested a psychological evaluation and Mother "refused to be evaluated." Although Mother eventually agreed to be evaluated after further counseling from the social worker—and, indeed, the psychological evaluation was added to Mother's case plan—Mother again changed her mind and reverted to her original position: She had a right to refuse a psychological evaluation, and she refused.
We are mindful that, "at each review hearing, the court must evaluate the efforts or progress toward reunification made by each parent individually by considering 'the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services provided.' (§ 366.21, subds. (e) & (f) . . . .)" (In re Jesse W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49, 60, italics omitted.) Most persuasively, at the 12-month permanency hearing here, the social worker testified without qualification that throughout the review period—i.e., from mid-May 2017 (six-month review hearing) through mid-October 2017 (12-month permanency hearing)—Mother had not been willing to participate in a psychological evaluation.
On this record, therefore, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Agency provided or offered Mother reasonable mental health services.
2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Finding That the Agency Provided or Offered Reasonable Domestic Violence Prevention Services
Mother attended and was terminated from two domestic violence prevention programs during the first four months of her case plan between October 2016 and February 2017. On appeal, Mother argues that, because the Agency failed to place her with a third domestic violence program before terminating services eight months later in October 2017, the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the Agency provided or offered reasonable domestic violence prevention services. We disagree.
First, Mother is entirely responsible for the termination of the services from the first two providers. The initial provider terminated services due to the number of Mother's unexcused absences. The second provider terminated services at Mother's specific request. The Agency provided two placements, each promptly when needed.
On appeal, Mother disingenuously suggests that Mother stopped classes with her initial domestic violence provider because the provider "left to teach elsewhere." The record is clear: The provider terminated services because of Mother's unexcused absences.
Second, between the time the Agency became aware that Mother needed a third domestic violence referral (mid-Feb. 2017) and time the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction (mid-Oct. 2017), the Agency's records reflect 41 separate entries of social workers' efforts to provide the services. This is certainly evidence of " 'reasonable efforts to assist [Mother] in [an] area[] where compliance proved difficult.' " (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426.)
For these reasons, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Agency provided or offered Mother reasonable domestic violence prevention services.
3. Mother Forfeited Appellate Review of Whether the Agency Provided or Offered Reasonable Visitation Services
Mother correctly points out that the Agency did not provide her with the visitation services that the court ordered. Following the contested adjudication and disposition hearing in August 2016, the juvenile court ordered two supervised visits a week, with assistance for transportation; yet the record does not show any time during which the Agency provided twice weekly visits. However, because Mother raises this issue for the first time on appeal—i.e., she did not mention this objection at the 12-month permanency hearing (or at any other time)—Mother forfeited appellate review of this argument.
In addition to the formal court setting, Mother spent six to eight hours with the social worker on each day that a supervised visit could be arranged.
"If [Mother] had brought this matter to the attention of the juvenile court, the court could have remedied any error. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Allowing [Mother] to raise these issues for the first time on appeal would contravene the dependency law's objective of expediently providing a permanent home for children whose parents have been unable to reunify with them. (Ibid.)" (In re Desiree M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 329, 334.) "If Mother felt during the reunification period that the services offered her were inadequate, she had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile court in formulating a better plan: ' "The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge's attention to any infringement of them.' ' " (Christina L., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.)
In any event, Mother lived in San Diego, Child was placed in Los Angeles, and Mother did not have contacts for either transportation or supervision (which left the responsibility for both with the Agency). In an ideal world, the Agency would have been able to provide transportation and supervision from Mother to visit Child twice weekly (or sought court approval for a modification to the case plan), but we are reminded again, "[t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547; J.E., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 566; italics added.) Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding that the Agency provided reasonable visitation services. D. Conclusion
In addition, prior to the contested six-month review hearing, Mother voluntarily discontinued her thrice weekly telephone and video visitations. --------
In short, we agree with the juvenile court's observations that "the Agency has more than bent over backwards to offer [Mother] services" and that, rather than taking advantage of the services offered, Mother "has chosen to make excuses . . . why these services cannot be completed."
In the present case, " 'the legislative purpose of providing safe and stable environments for children is not served by forcing the juvenile court to go "on hold" while the parent makes another stab at compliance.' " (Christina L., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 415.) As in Christina L., based on our review of the entire record, the Agency, faced with a difficult situation, "made a 'good faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan' (In re John B. [1984] 159 Cal.App.3d 268, 275) and thereby satisfied its statutory duty. (§ 361.5 . . . .)" (Christina L. at pp. 417-418.) In the context of the issue raised in this appeal, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Agency provided or offered reasonable services to Mother under the circumstances.
DISPOSITION
The October 19, 2017 order following the contested 12-month permanency hearing is affirmed.
IRION, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. HUFFMAN, J.