Opinion
D072888
02-08-2018
In re A.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.W., Defendant and Appellant.
Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SJ13275) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael J. Popkins, Judge. Affirmed. Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Mother appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her reunification services at the 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)). Mother contends the court erred in terminating her reunification services because the court extended Father's reunification services to 18 months (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A), 366.21, subd. (g)(1)) and did not set a selection and implementation hearing (§ 366.26). We conclude the court had the authority to terminate Mother's reunification services notwithstanding the court's extension of Father's reunification services and Mother has not established the court abused its discretion in doing so.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
II
BACKGROUND
Minor became a court dependent because his younger half-sibling sustained inadequately explained burns, bruises, and scratches; Mother's home was unsafe for Minor; Mother had multiple unfavorable drug tests; and Mother failed to participate in voluntary services or comply with safety plans. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1) & (j).) The court found by clear and convincing evidence it would be detrimental to place Minor with Father. Instead, the court placed Minor in foster care and ordered reunification services for Mother and Father.
Minor's half-sibling is not part of this dependency proceeding. --------
Mother's reunification services included outpatient drug treatment, substance abuse testing, parenting classes, individual therapy, and psychotropic medication monitoring. Despite ongoing efforts to engage Mother in these services, by the 12-month review hearing, Mother had not made any progress toward completing her case plan objectives. Additionally, she admitted ongoing methamphetamine use and had been arrested for first degree burglary and possession of drug paraphernalia. Nonetheless, before her arrest, she had regularly participated in positive, supervised visits with Minor and, after her arrest, she participated in a handful of 12-step program meetings offered at the facility where she was detained.
Father's reunification services included drug treatment as recommended by a substance abuse specialist, substance abuse testing, and parenting classes. In contrast to Mother, by the 12-month review hearing, Father had completed an outpatient substance abuse recovery program, obtained employment, was regularly attending 12-step program meetings, and had favorable drug tests. He had also been participating in weekly supervised visits with Minor and was about to begin short, structured, unsupervised visits in public settings.
After considering the evidence and the parties' arguments, the court terminated Mother's reunification services at the 12-month review hearing, finding she had not made any progress in completing her case plan objectives and there was no substantial probability Minor would be returned to her care if her reunification services were extended to 18 months. Conversely, the court extended Father's reunification services to 18 months, finding Father was progressing well with his case plan and there was a substantial probability Minor would be returned to Father's care within the extended time period. The court set an 18-month review hearing, but did not set a selection and implementation hearing.
III
DISCUSSION
"When a dependent child is removed from parental custody, the court generally orders services for the family to facilitate its reunification." (In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 871, 876 (Katelynn Y.).) Reunification services for the parent of a child Minor's age are ordinarily limited to 12 months. (§ 361.5(a)(1)(A).) However, the court may extend the parent's reunification services to 18 months if the court finds there is a substantial probability the parent will regain physical custody within the extended time period. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A), 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) For the court to make this finding, the parent must have (1) had consistent, regular contacts and visits with the child; (2) made significant progress in resolving the problems prompting the child's removal; and (3) demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete his or her case plan and provide for the child's safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C).)
"In deciding whether to extend or terminate reunification services, the court does not consider the parents as one unit, but instead treats each of them on his or her own merits. 'Indeed, at each review hearing, the court must evaluate the efforts or progress toward reunification made by each parent individually by considering "the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services provided." [Citations.] Although the purpose of services is to facilitate a child's return to parental custody, reunification often involves one, but not both, parents. [¶] ... Because reunification services are a benefit, not a constitutional entitlement, the juvenile court has discretion to terminate those services at any time, depending on the circumstances presented. [Citation.] In deciding whether to terminate the services of one parent who has failed to participate or make progress toward reunification, the court is not constrained by a consideration of the other parent's participation in services.' " (Katelynn Y., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 877, italics omitted.)
"Where, as here, the court continues one parent's services and does not set a section 366.26 hearing, it retains discretion to terminate the other (nonreunifying) parent's services. [Citations.] The parent seeking additional services has the burden of showing such an order would serve the child's best interests. [Citations.] In exercising its discretion, the court has 'the ability to evaluate whether the parent will utilize additional services and whether those services would ultimately inure to the benefit of the minor.' [Citation.] We will not disturb the court's determination unless the court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination." (Katelynn Y., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 881.)
Here, the record shows Mother knew she had to make significant progress in completing her case plan by the 12-month review hearing if she wanted to reunify with Minor. However, at best, Mother made only minimal progress. She regularly visited Minor, but she never attempted to complete the other aspects of her case plan, except attending a handful of 12-step program meetings while incarcerated. Given Mother's lack of significant progress, the court had no factual basis upon which to find there was a substantial probability Mother would regain physical custody of Minor if her reunification services were extended to 18 months. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the court's termination of Mother's reunification services exceeded the limits of the court's discretion by being arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (Katelynn Y., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 881.)
IV
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: AARON, J. GUERRERO, J.