Opinion
D058586
12-20-2011
In re BRYAN G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRYAN G., a Minor Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. J223615)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, George W. Clarke and Carlos Armour, Judges. Affirmed.
Bryan G. was continued as a ward of the juvenile court after the court found he committed two felony car burglaries, misdemeanor vandalism, petty theft and misdemeanor possession of a burglary tool. On appeal, Bryan contends substantial evidence does not support the court's findings. We affirm.
Bryan was on probation on the date of the subject offenses and at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of July 11, 2010, Irma Herrera was awakened by the sound of a car alarm, glass breaking and the family dog barking. She ran outside and peered through a hole in the fence, where she saw three young men standing together near her brother's car which was parked in the driveway. The car had been locked the previous evening because it contained her brother's wallet and a global positioning device. The men were putting their hands in the car, trying to grab something. Irma went into the house, woke Luis, her son, and said "Son, they broke your uncle's car window."
Luis got up and ran outside. He saw his uncle's car door open and a window broken. Luis gave chase in the only direction the men could have gone. About a block later Luis saw two individuals wearing dark-colored hooded sweatshirts standing next to a silver Toyota, which was parked under a street light. One of the men was breaking into the car, although Luis could not identify which of the two men was doing so. Luis screamed, "You guys broke into my car," and the two men took off running.
Luis followed, also running. One of the young men looked back, and Luis was able to get a glimpse of Bryan's face. The fleeing men ran across a street to a bushy area. Bryan stood next to the bushes as "if he was the lookout," while his friend hid in the bushes. Then, Luis's dog Flex came running down the street and jumped into the bushes. Luis saw three men scatter, "and that's when it become chaos."
Flex chased Bryan. Luis chased his dog. When Bryan appeared to fatigue, the three came to stop in a dirt driveway. Luis grabbed Bryan, who said, "Let me go. Let me go" and "Stay away from me. You don't know what you are doing." Bryan appeared to touch his waistband. Luis confronted Bryan saying, "Don't do anything stupid. The cops are going to get here. If you didn't do anything, they are going to let you walk." Bryan then pulled a screwdriver from his waistband, but Flex bit him, causing Bryan to let go of the tool. Bryan tried twice to get away, but Flex grabbed him both times. Thereafter, Bryan stayed with Luis and Flex until the police arrived. Bryan was detained and arrested.
Irma had followed Luis. When she arrived at the dirt driveway, she saw Bryan, who at that point was being detained by police. Irma recognized Bryan as one of the three young men she earlier had seen breaking into her brother's car. Irma gave police a statement about the break-in.
Later that morning Irma's brother, Jose Herrera, went to his sister's house, where he noticed that the driver's side window of his car was broken, a cinder block lay on the front passenger seat, and his wallet and the global positioning device were no longer in the car. He later recovered his wallet from the bushes where Bryan and his companions hid.
Also on that morning, police contacted Jose Jimenez, the owner of the silver-colored Toyota, to inform him that his vehicle had been broken into. Jimenez followed a police officer to the car, where he noticed the driver's window was broken and glass was inside the car. The car doors were closed and locked, and nothing had been taken from inside the car.
The People filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 charging Bryan with two counts of felony burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), two counts of misdemeanor vandalism in an amount less than $400 (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A)), petty theft (§ 484), and misdemeanor possession of a burglary tool (§ 466). The juvenile court found the allegations of the petition true beyond a reasonable doubt.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.
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The court continued Bryan as a ward of the court, placed him under the care and supervision of the probation department, took custody of him pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, committed him to the Camp Barrett program for a period not to exceed 365 days and awarded victim restitution.
II
DISCUSSION
Bryan's sole appellate claim is that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's true finding as to each of the petition's six counts.
Our review of Bryan's substantial evidence claim is governed by the same standard applicable to adult criminal cases. (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138; In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value — from which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514; In re James B (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872.) Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Thomas, at p. 514) Whether a defendant is convicted as a direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor, the same standard of review applies. (People v. Mitchell (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 325, 329.)
Our role is limited. Under the substantial evidence rule, we must presume in support of the order the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the order. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) The test is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether any "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) A. The Burglaries
Bryan contends the People failed to prove he burglarized Herrera's or Jimenez's car because the record lacks sufficient evidence that he entered either car. We disagree.
Every person who enters a locked vehicle without the owner's consent is guilty of burglary. (§ 459; People v. Allen (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 909, 914.) An entry occurs for purposes of the burglary statute if any part of the intruder's body, or a tool or instrument wielded by the intruder, is inside the vehicle. (See People v. Garcia (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 271, 280.) It is well settled that entry into the burglarized car may be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. (People v. Savage (1936) 14 Cal.App.2d 142, 143-144.)
A true finding that the defendant committed burglary may be supported by evidence the defendant was either the direct perpetrator or aided and abetted another in committing the crime. One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime is guilty of the crime, even if the other commits some or all of the acts constituting the crime. (§ 31; People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) Liability as an aider and abettor attaches if the defendant knew the perpetrator intended to commit the crime and the defendant intended to, and did, encourage or facilitate the perpetrator in committing the crime. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561; People v. Keovilayphone (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 491, 497.) Whether a defendant aided and abetted the commission of a crime is a question of fact that may be proved by circumstantial evidence. (Beeman, at p. 559; People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 892-893.) "Among the factors which may be considered in determining aiding and abetting are: presence at the crime scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense." (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Other relevant factors include the defendant's failure to take steps to prevent the crime and flight from the crime scene. (People v. Jones (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 9, 15 (Jones).)
With respect to the burglary of Herrera's car, Bryan contends that Irma's testimony that she saw Bryan and two others reaching into the car is not credible because it was inconsistent with statements she gave to the police, and that what she saw was physically impossible. But, "[i]n deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a [true finding]." (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 (Young); see also People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403 (Maury).) Irma's eyewitness testimony that she saw Bryan and others reaching into Herrera's car was certainly not physically impossible or inherently improbable. Moreover, her testimony was bolstered by testimony from others that Herrera's wallet, which had been in the car, was found in the bushes where Bryan hid, and that Bryan had a burglary tool (a screwdriver) tucked into his waistband. This evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court reasonably to conclude that Bryan entered Herrera's car.
With respect to the burglary of Jimenez's car, Bryan argues that because Luis could not discern whether Bryan or his companion actually broke the window of Jimenez's car and nothing was missing from that car, the record lacks substantial evidence that Bryan entered the car. Although Luis was not able to tell whether it was Bryan or his companion who broke the window, he did see one of them break it. Luis also testified he shouted, "You guys broke into my car," as he approached, and Bryan and his companion ran across the street to a bushy area. When he was finally detained, Bryan had a burglary tool (a screwdriver) tucked in his waistband. The combination of this evidence is sufficient to support a finding that either Bryan or his companion entered Jimenez's car. (Cf. People v. Osegueda (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d Supp. 25, 31-32 [evidence of hole bored through wall and instruments used to cut hole was sufficient to sustain implied finding that airspace was penetrated, warranting finding that entry was made and supporting a conviction for burglary].) Further, Bryan's presence at the scene of the broken car window, his being with the companion both before and after the window was broken, and his flight upon detection by Luis support his liability as an aider and abetter. (See In re Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 5; Jones, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 15.) Thus, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude, based on the evidence presented, that Bryan was liable for the entry into Jimenez's car.
In short, Bryan's arguments on appeal amount to a request we reweigh the evidence on appeal and draw conclusions different from those drawn by the juvenile court. That is not the function of an appellate court. (E.g., Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.) Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's findings that Bryan burglarized both cars. B. The Vandalism
Bryan also contends that the record lacks substantial evidence he vandalized Herrera's or Jimenez's car. Every person who maliciously damages or destroys personal property of another is guilty of vandalism. (§ 594, subd. (a); In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, 743.) Evidence that the defendant was either the direct perpetrator or aided and abetted another in committing the crime may support a true finding that the defendant committed vandalism. (§ 31; see People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 219.)
At the jurisdictional hearing, Irma testified she was awakened by the sound of glass breaking. Irma looked through a gap in her fence to see Bryan and two companions reaching into Herrera's car. Herrera later returned to his car to find the driver's side window of his car broken and a cinder block on the front passenger seat. Further, Luis testified he saw Bryan and a companion "breaking into the window" of Jimenez's car. Upon returning to his car, Jimenez found the driver's side window broken and glass strewn about the car's interior. From the evidence that Bryan was present at the scene of both incidents of vandalism with his companions, his flight and his possession of a screwdriver, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Bryan maliciously damaged both Herrera's and Jimenez's cars by breaking the driver's side window of each. (See, e.g., In re Arthur V. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 61, 65, 69 [smashing windshield of car with skateboard constitutes vandalism]; People v. Wild (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 829, 832 [sufficient evidence of vandalism when testimony and physical evidence showed defendant broke windows of building by throwing cinder blocks through them]; In re Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 5 [presence at crime scene with companions supports aiding and abetting liability]; Jones, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 15 [flight from crime scene supports aiding and abetting liability].)
In support of Bryan's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, he makes the same challenges we rejected in part II.A., ante. Here too, none of the evidence supporting the vandalism charges was physically impossible or inherently improbable. Like the rest of Bryan's claims, his challenges to the weight and credibility of the evidence of vandalism were considered and rejected by the juvenile court, and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence that Bryan had broken windows on both Herrera's and Jimenez's cars is sufficient to support the juvenile court's true finding that Bryan vandalized both cars. C. The Petty Theft
Bryan contends that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that he took and carried away Herrera's property. Every person who feloniously steals, takes or carries away the personal property of another is guilty of theft. (§ 484.) "Direct proof of . . . theft is not necessary; [it] may be proved by circumstantial evidence." (People v. Kross (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 602, 610.)
At the adjudication hearing, Irma testified she saw Bryan reach into Herrera's car trying to grab something, and Luis testified that he and Flex flushed Bryan and his companion from bushes near Jimenez's car. Herrera testified he found the wallet that had been taken from his burglarized car in the same bushes where Bryan and his companion were hiding. From this testimony, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude Bryan had stolen the wallet out of Herrera's car and carried it with him to the bushes. Again, none of this evidence is physically impossible or inherently improbable, and our role is not to resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts. (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's true finding on the petty theft charge. D. The Possession of a Burglary Tool
Finally, Bryan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of possession of a burglary tool. Every person who possesses a screwdriver with intent to feloniously break or enter into any vehicle is guilty of a misdemeanor. (§ 466.) The offense is complete when tools or other implements are procured with intent to use them for a burglarious purpose. (People v. Southard (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1088.) To support a true finding, there must be evidence of the defendant's intent to use the tools for breaking or entering. (Ibid.)
Bryan admits to possessing a screwdriver, a burglary tool under section 466, but contends the People failed to prove he possessed the screwdriver with felonious intent. To find substantial evidence that Bryan possessed the screwdriver with the intent to use the tool for breaking or entering, we must look no further than the testimony of Irma and Luis, who saw Bryan or a companion reaching into Herrera's and Jimenez's cars. That Bryan actually burglarized these cars is sufficient evidence to satisfy the intent requirement of section 466. (See People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 508 [no better proof defendant entered home with intent to commit robbery than showing defendant committed robbery after entry].) Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court's true finding that Bryan was in possession of a burglary tool was supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
IRION, J. WE CONCUR:
MCDONALD, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.